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Consciousness and the Paranormal

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What animals do this? Even in our fighting we are unique.........



What machine would do the above - what would have to be present to be 'human' in this way? Though we do anthropomorphize our teddy bears - even in this famous scene, the 'soul' shows up (the dove} - it's the only way we have of understanding consciousness/awareness........

 
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One of my absolute favorite lines, amongst so much rich dialog to choose, from the film Anna and the King -

Tuptim: [to Anna]: "If love was a choice, who would ever choose such exquisite pain?"
 
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I haven't completely finished reading the brief on the ITT. It should come as no surprise that I like the theory, very, very much. Here is how the theory lines up with my music analogy:

The individual instruments = Elements of the brain

Instrument sections = Complexes of elements

All the instruments and instrument sections taken together = The brain (the main complex)

The mechanical instrumentalists = The environment/stimuli

The notes = Bits of information

The song = Integrated information/experience/mind

I haven't read the entire paper nor had time to read other commentary on the theory, so I don't know how the ITT accounts for self-awareness. However, as I said earlier, the more primitive the orchestra (the fewer instruments and instrument sections, the more primitive the song. In the ITT this primitive song would be analogous to protoconsciousness, I believe, however I haven't made it that far yet.

@smcder Maybe that's why in the bat paper he spends so much time focusing on the "subjective" rather than using the word consciousness - that's why I was trying to say the "subjective" isn't a thing - but that's not like saying well, ideas and colors and experiences and lots of things aren't things - it's not like that b/c the subjective is an entire category itself, not just another concept, right? Or no?

The subjective (integrated information/experience/mind) may indeed be an ontologically new/unique category. I think it is. Thus the term "mental property" may be appropriate. This seems to be what Chalmers believes. However, this does not mean that mind does not arise via physical processes.

Read the opening to Tonini's paper and it is extremely difficult to deny that the mind is not causally tied to the brain (i.e., difficult to deny the mind has physical causation).

@smcder The word consciousness lends itself to a picture of this thing that floats around above your head and so ok it emerges from the mind properties of this primal substance - but if you say well what is the "subjective"? at least to me, it's hard to think of that as a substance - and that to me is a little rhetorical trick of the argument - Nagel says to physicalists (and if I understand your stance - I think of you as a physicalist - for you everything is made of some kind of stuff ... so maybe I want you to be less stuffy! ;-) Nagel says OK you can explain everything in terms of matter? Then explain the subjective -

Ok... this is the crucial point I am trying to make that I don't think anyone has groked. I'm not sure if Tonini goes out of his way to mention it, but the ITT does explain it.

Integrated information = Mind. It is a thing unto itself.

So we wouldn't say:

The brain experiences qualia/mind. No, it doesn't.

We would say:

The brain emits qualia/mind.

This qualia/mind is ontologically new - it may be a new property of matter like liquid, solid, gas. Do we know what it's like to be liquid, solid, gas? No, because we aren't liquid, solid, gas. Do we know what it's like to be qualia? Yes, yes we do, because we are qualia. That's us. We are a form of matter called qualia.

When our brains go to sleep or they stop working, they stop emitting mind, and guess what, we stop being. When the qualia stop, we stop. That's because we are qualia.

@scmder So the hard problem is not a problem to be solved in physical terms - rather, it is a problem, the problem for physical explanations. I think the only way to see the hard problem is to step outside the physical paradigm.

The track record for those arguing for non-physical explanations of what-is is not good. Is mind ultimately non-physical? Perhaps. I don't think so: 1) because we don't know enough about what-is to say so, and 2) there's lots of empirical evidence that the mind is intimately - even causally - tied to the physical.

I think we're going to have to agree on some terminology and concepts in order to minimize misunderstandings going forward:

· Mind/consciousness
· Mental causation
· Physicalism

Mind/consciousness:
The Chalmers' book review I linked above discusses his use of "mind" vs. "consciousness" (noting that “mind” is an ambiguous term among philosophers)

"For Chalmers, "mind" is any state of the brain that causes behavior. For example, I may drink because I am thirsty, I may move my hands because I want to grab an object, I may buy a plane ticket because I believe the fare will go up. These "mental" states may or may not be conscious. Chalmers therefore distinguishes between the conscious experience, that he calls the

"phenomenal properties of the mind"

and the mental states that cause behavior, that he calls the "psychological properties of the mind".

Phenomenal states deal with the first-person aspect of the mind, whereas psychological states deal with the third-person aspect of the mind.”

We don't have to commit to those exact definitions, but we can be aware of the distinctions - and I think phenomenal states is a good term for the first-person aspect of the mind.

Mental Causation
Book review of David Chalmers
“The paradox to be explained is not that body and mind communicate but that cognition and consciousness communicate.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_mental_causation

Exclusion problem – mental states are superfluous, causally irrelevant -> epiphenomenalism
note: there are other problems of mental causation!

"To the extent that we do not have to go outside human physiology in order to trace the causal antecedents of any bodily movement, intentional action can be fully causally explained by the existence of these physiological antecedents alone. No mention of mental states need enter into the explanation. This troubles philosophers because intuitively it seems that mental states are crucial in causing a person to act (for example, their beliefs and desires).

But, given that physiological facts are sufficient to account for action, mental states appear to be superfluous; they are at risk of being causally and explanatorily irrelevant with respect to human action (Yoo 2006, p. §3b.iii).

Many philosophers consider this apparent irrelevance to be a highly counter-intuitive and undesirable position to take. It ultimately leads to epiphenomenalism—the view that mental events or states are causally irrelevant, they are merely after effects that play no role in any causal chains whatsoever.

Thomas Huxley famously noted that epiphenomenalism treats mental states like the steam coming off a train: it plays no causal role in the train's moving forward, it is merely an "emergent property" of the actual causation occurring in the engine (Walter 2003, p. §2)."

Dualist solutions to mental causation:
" According to the current mainstream scientific world-view, the physical realm is causally closed, in that causal relationships only hold among physical events in the physical realm. Given these types of considerations, some argue that it is appropriate to say that the main assumptions in interactionist dualism generate the problem of mental causation rather than solve it (see (Yoo 2006, p. §1a)."

Physicalist solutions:
"The other major option is assert that mental events are either (at least contingently) identical to physical events, or supervene on physical events. Views that fall under this general heading are called physicalism or materialism.
But, such views require a particular theory to explain how mental events are physical in nature.

Behaviorists, in general, argue that mental events are merely dispositions to behave in certain ways.

identity theory, according to which mental events are (either type- or token-) identical to physical events.

functionalism, claims that mental events are individuated (or constituted by) the causal role they play. As such, mental events would fit directly into the causal realm, as they are simply certain causal (or functional) roles.

eliminative materialism, which simply denies that there are any such mental events; thus, there is really no problem of mental causation at all."
for more detail on mental causation see the SEP article on the same topic: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/
 
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I haven't completely finished reading the brief on the ITT. It should come as no surprise that I like the theory, very, very much. Here is how the theory lines up with my music analogy:

The individual instruments = Elements of the brain

Instrument sections = Complexes of elements

All the instruments and instrument sections taken together = The brain (the main complex)

The mechanical instrumentalists = The environment/stimuli

The notes = Bits of information

The song = Integrated information/experience/mind

I haven't read the entire paper nor had time to read other commentary on the theory, so I don't know how the ITT accounts for self-awareness. However, as I said earlier, the more primitive the orchestra (the fewer instruments and instrument sections, the more primitive the song. In the ITT this primitive song would be analogous to protoconsciousness, I believe, however I haven't made it that far yet.

@smcder Maybe that's why in the bat paper he spends so much time focusing on the "subjective" rather than using the word consciousness - that's why I was trying to say the "subjective" isn't a thing - but that's not like saying well, ideas and colors and experiences and lots of things aren't things - it's not like that b/c the subjective is an entire category itself, not just another concept, right? Or no?

The subjective (integrated information/experience/mind) may indeed be an ontologically new/unique category. I think it is. Thus the term "mental property" may be appropriate. This seems to be what Chalmers believes. However, this does not mean that mind does not arise via physical processes.

Read the opening to Tonini's paper and it is extremely difficult to deny that the mind is not causally tied to the brain (i.e., difficult to deny the mind has physical causation).

@smcder The word consciousness lends itself to a picture of this thing that floats around above your head and so ok it emerges from the mind properties of this primal substance - but if you say well what is the "subjective"? at least to me, it's hard to think of that as a substance - and that to me is a little rhetorical trick of the argument - Nagel says to physicalists (and if I understand your stance - I think of you as a physicalist - for you everything is made of some kind of stuff ... so maybe I want you to be less stuffy! ;-) Nagel says OK you can explain everything in terms of matter? Then explain the subjective -

Ok... this is the crucial point I am trying to make that I don't think anyone has groked. I'm not sure if Tonini goes out of his way to mention it, but the ITT does explain it.

Integrated information = Mind. It is a thing unto itself.

So we wouldn't say:

The brain experiences qualia/mind. No, it doesn't.

We would say:

The brain emits qualia/mind.

This qualia/mind is ontologically new - it may be a new property of matter like liquid, solid, gas. Do we know what it's like to be liquid, solid, gas? No, because we aren't liquid, solid, gas. Do we know what it's like to be qualia? Yes, yes we do, because we are qualia. That's us. We are a form of matter called qualia.

When our brains go to sleep or they stop working, they stop emitting mind, and guess what, we stop being. When the qualia stop, we stop. That's because we are qualia.

@scmder So the hard problem is not a problem to be solved in physical terms - rather, it is a problem, the problem for physical explanations. I think the only way to see the hard problem is to step outside the physical paradigm.

The track record for those arguing for non-physical explanations of what-is is not good. Is mind ultimately non-physical? Perhaps. I don't think so: 1) because we don't know enough about what-is to say so, and 2) there's lots of empirical evidence that the mind is intimately - even causally - tied to the physical.

This post was originally very long, so I broke it in two - recapping the first post:

terminology/concepts:

Mind/consciousness - phenomenal states for the first-person aspects of the mind (conscious experience)
Mental Causation
Problem of mental causation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Mental Causation (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
the problem: “The paradox to be explained is not that body and mind communicate but that cognition and consciousness communicate.”

Exclusion problem – mental states are causally irrelevant
highly counter-intuitive and undesirable
epiphenomenalism

Dualist solutions to mental causation - interactionist dualism appears to generate the problem of mental causation rather than solve it
Physicalist solutions:
Views that fall under this general heading are called physicalism or materialism - require a particular theory to explain how mental events are physical in nature:

Behaviorism
identity theory

functionalism
eliminative materialism
The other big concept we could deal with now is:

Physicalism -
. . . the simplest notion seems to be:
There is nothing over and above the physical.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

The article presents three ways of understanding the physical
  • theory-based
  • non theory-based
  • via negativa
theory-based understandings of the physical and Hempel's dilemma
Very roughly, Hempel's dilemma is that if we define the physical by reference to current physics, then physicalism is very likely to be false, as it is very likely (by pessimistic meta-induction[5]) that much of current physics is false. But if we instead define the physical in terms of a future (ideal) or completed physics, then physicalism is hopelessly vague or indeterminate

non-theory based conceptions and panpsychism
"Frank Jackson (1998) for example, has argued in favour of an "object-based"conception of the physical whereby (roughly speaking) an object or property is physical if and only if it is either a paradigmatic example of the physical, such as a rock or a tree, or it is required for a complete account of such entities or properties.[8]

An objection to this proposal, which Jackson himself noted in 1998, is that if it turns out that panpsychism or panprotopsychism is true, then the aforementioned understanding of the physical gives the incorrect (for some anyway) result that physicalism is, nevertheless, also true since such properties will figure in a complete account of paradigmatic examples of the physical"

... from there, you have the road not travelled:

"Finally, David Papineau[9] and Barbara Montero[10] have advanced and subsequently defended[11] a "via negativa" characterization of the physical. The gist of the via negativa strategy is to understand the physical in terms of what it is not: the mental.

In other words, the via negativa strategy understands the physical as "the non-mental". An objection to the via negativa conception of the physical is that (like the object-based conception) it doesn't have the resources to distinguish neutral monism (or panprotopsychism) from physicalism.[12]"

Three formulations of the physical
Metaphysical supervenience
- the article then looks at three waqys of formulating physicalism in terms of metaphysical supervenience, each iteration coming out of a problem of the previous formulation - this sections ends with the "necessary beings" problem.

A priori versus a posteriori physicalism

@Soupie says: I listened to the PEL podcast with Chalmers and his PQTI approach to… whatever. I noted that even the hosts seemed baffled by the project. When asked to share their thoughts, one said simply that it was “weird” and the other explained that they weren't sure how to apply the project. For a non-philosopher, that was concerning, haha.

Ok, this part may help:

"Physicalists hold that physicalism is true. A natural question for physicalists, then, is whether the truth of physicalism is knowable a priori (i.e., with justification independent of experience) or a posteriori (i.e., with justification dependent upon experience).

So-called "a priori physicalists" hold that from knowledge of the conjunction of all physical truths, a totality or that's-all truth, and some primitive indexical truths, the truth of physicalism is knowable a priori."

. . . sound familiar?

" Let "P" stand for the conjunction of all physical truths and laws, "T" for a that's-all truth, "I" for the indexical "centering" truths "I am A" and "now is B", and "N" for any non-physical truth at the actual world. We can then, using the material conditional "→", represent a priori physicalism as the thesis that PTI → N is knowable a priori.[30] An important wrinkle here is that the concepts in N must be possessed non-deferentially in order for PTI → N to be knowable a priori. The suggestion, then, is that possession of the concepts in the consequent, plus the empirical information in the antecedent is sufficient for the consequent to be knowable a priori."

A priori physicalism then sets us up for the “conceivability argument” or . . .

Zombie attack!

This is explained pretty clearly in the Wikipedia article - because we have talked of Zombie's and it comes up frequently in the literature - this seems a good place to get an understanding of the relationship between a priori physicalism and the zombie argument . . .

A posteriori physicalism - this section had the following very interesting idea:

Roughly speaking, the phenomenal concept strategy is a label for those a posteriori physicalists who attempt to show that it is only the concept of consciousness—not the property—that is in some way "special" or sui generis.[36]

The article ends with Strawsonian Physicalism (@Constance posted an article by Strawson in this thread):

Galen Strawson's realistic physicalism (or "realistic monism") entails panpsychism – or at least micropsychism.[39][40][41]
Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists [are mistakenly] committed to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, ‘a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity’, i.e. as experience or consciousness".[39]

Because experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to substance dualism, property dualism, eliminative materialism and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".[39]

. . . and with that cliff-hanger, I'll leave you to finish the article!

I plan to finish Tononi's article next - as for it's relationship to the hard problem Chalmers says:

“It’s the sort of proposal that I think people should be generating at this point: a simple and powerful hypothesis about the relationship between brain processing and conscious experience,” said David Chalmers, a philosopher at Australian National University. “As with most simple and powerful hypotheses, reality will probably turn out to be more complicated, but we’ll learn something from the attempt. I’d say that it doesn’t solve the problem of consciousness, but it’s a useful starting point.”
 
@smcder Chalmers says: “It’s the sort of proposal that I think people should be generating at this point: a simple and powerful hypothesis about the relationship between brain processing and conscious experience,” said David Chalmers, a philosopher at Australian National University. “As with most simple and powerful hypotheses, reality will probably turn out to be more complicated, but we’ll learn something from the attempt. I’d say that it doesn’t solve the problem of consciousness, but it’s a useful starting point.”

Holy shit, where to start, haha.

If qualia are material then it follows that they emerge from material processes and if they emerge from material process then follows panpsychism.

Why does liquid emerge from the accumulation of X number of H2O molecules?

Why does qualia emerge from the accumulation of X number of integrated information?

Qualia is something ontologically new/unique to reality; liquid is something ontologically new/unique to reality.

Both liquid and qualia have equally unique, ontologically novel properties. As Chalmers suggests, we need a new language to discuss the properties of qualia. Chalmers makes it clear that his approach is a naturalistic approach.

I am a panpsychist; I believe that all information processing systems of X level of complexity emit qualia.

How do qualia supervene on the IPS from which they emerge? I'm not sure, but I believe they do. Like Chalmers suggests, this is in need of exploring.

How does a flock supervene on the individual birds of which it is composed? How does liquid supervene on the molecules of which it is composed? How does a forest supervene on the trees of which it is composed? In all these cases, it's clear that the emergent property supervenes, albeit indirectly, on the units of which it is composed. I think qualia and IPSs are no different.

I agree with Chalmers that the ITT is a great start and that reality is going to be vastly more complex. I don't think Tonini would disagree. For starters, I'm still not sure how the ITT accounts for self-awareness. Much reading left to do; a lifetime of reading and learning.
 
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Large Red Man Reading

There were ghosts that returned to earth to hear his phrases,
As he sat there reading, aloud, the great blue tabulae.
They were those from the wilderness of stars that had expected more.

There were those that returned to hear him read from the poem of life,
Of the pans above the stove, the pots on the table, the tulips among them.
They were those that would have wept to step barefoot into reality,

That would have wept and been happy, have shivered in the frost
And cried out to feel it again, have run fingers over leaves
And against the most coiled thorn, have seized on what was ugly

And laughed, as he sat there reading, from out of the purple tabulae,
The outlines of being and its expressings, the syllables of its law:
Poesis, poesis, the literal characters, the vatic lines,

Which in those ears and in those thin, those spended hearts,
Took on color, took on shape and the size of things as they are
And spoke the feeling for them, which was what they had lacked.

Wallace Stevens
 
Esthétique du Mal / Wallace Stevens (XV)


XV

The greatest poverty is not to live
In a physical world, to feel that one's desire
Is too difficult to tell from despair. Perhaps,
After death, the non-physical people, in paradise,
Itself non-physical, may, by chance, observe
The green corn gleaming and experience
The minor of what we feel. The adventurer
In humanity has not conceived of a race
Completely physical in a physical world.
The green corn gleams and the metaphysicals
Lie sprawling in majors of the August heat,
The rotund emotions, paradise unknown.

This is the thesis scrivened in delight,
The reverberating psalm, the right chorale.

One might have thought of sight, but who could think
Of what it sees, for all the ill it sees?
Speech found the ear, for all the evil sound,
But the dark italics it could not propound,
And out of what one sees and hears and out
Of what one feels, who could have thought to make
So many selves, so many sensuous worlds,
As if the air, the mid-day air, was swarming
With the metaphysical changes that occur
Merely in living as and where we live.

Wallace Stevens
1944
 
See the article on "Supervenience" at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Some extracts:

Because we expect supervenience theses to be explainable, it is hard for us to rest content with a supervenience thesis if we do not see what would explain why it is true. If it is claimed, for instance, that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, we expect there to be an explanation of why this is so. Appeals to unexplainable supervenience theses can thus seem to be mystery mongering.

3.8 Tallying Up
Supervenience gives us less than some philosophers have thought. Even logically or metaphysically necessary supervenience is compatible with there being no B-properties that entail any A-properties. Supervenience is not itself explanatory, and does not guarantee that the A-properties either reduce to or ontologically depend upon the B-properties. It might provide a way to capture the thought that A-properties or facts are not a further ontological commitment over and above the B-properties or facts, but this is controversial. At heart, all a supervenience claim says is that A-properties covary with B-properties. Nevertheless, as we shall see in Section 5, supervenience has a variety of philosophical uses.

5. Applications

5.1 An Argumentative Strategy
Another argument by appeal to a FIST ["McLaughlin (1984, 1995) calls this style of argumentation ‘argument by appeal to a false implied supervenience thesis’"] is Chalmers' appeal to the (putative) metaphysical possibility of zombies (see Section 3.1 and Section 5.4). This is intended to show that phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on, and thus do not reduce to, physical properties. This line of argument is available even though physicalists have not yet proposed any such reduction. If it succeeds, then the project of reducing phenomenal properties to physical properties is doomed to failure.

Supervenience (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
 
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If horses had Gods, they would look like horses. Xenophanes

Modern man prides himself on his rationality without realizing it is won at the expense of his vitality. Carl Jung

It is the duty of the natural scientist to attempt a natural explanation before he contents himself with drawing upon factors extraneous to nature. Konrad Lorenz

The chief intellectual characteristic of this history has been man's ability to increasingly remove himself from the concrete experience of the phenomenological 'here and now' and place himself in an abstracted world of concepts and logic. Thomas & Chess
 
See the article on "Supervenience" at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Some extracts: Supervenience (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
From wiki:

Supervenience has traditionally been used to describe relationships between sets of properties in a manner which does not imply a strong reductive relationship.[2] For example, many hold that economic properties supervene on physical properties, in that if two worlds were exactly the same physically, they would also be the same economically. However, this does not entail that economics can be reduced in any straightforward way to physics. Thus, supervenience allows one to hold that "high-level phenomena" (like those of economics, psychology, or aesthetics) depend, ultimately, on physical substance, without assuming that one can study those high-level phenomena using means appropriate to physics.
 
If horses had Gods, they would look like horses. Xenophanes

Modern man prides himself on his rationality without realizing it is won at the expense of his vitality. Carl Jung

It is the duty of the natural scientist to attempt a natural explanation before he contents himself with drawing upon factors extraneous to nature. Konrad Lorenz
The chief intellectual characteristic of this history has been man's ability to increasingly remove himself from the concrete experience of the phenomenological 'here and now' and place himself in an abstracted world of concepts and logic. Thomas & Chess

What's the game here . . . ? Dueling quotes? ;-)

I agree with the second and fourth - Weber talks about this in terms of rationalization. The third depends a lot on how "natural" is defined - and if I remember Lorentz was an animal behaviorist who talked about "imprinting" ... I looked at Wikipedia and found some interesting information, like Heidegger he was involved with the Nazi Party:

Politics[edit]
Lorenz joined the Nazi Party in 1938 and accepted a university chair under the Nazi regime. In his application for membership to the Nazi-party NSDAP he wrote in 1938: "I'm able to say that my whole scientific work is devoted to the ideas of the National Socialists." His publications during that time led in later years to allegations that his scientific work had been contaminated by Nazi sympathies: his published writing during the Nazi period included support for Nazi ideas of "racial hygiene" couched in pseudoscientific metaphors.[6][7][8] After the war Lorenz long denied having been a party member until his membership request turned up, and he also denied having known about the extent of the genocide in spite of having held a post as a psychologist in the Office of Racial Policy.[9] He also denied having ever held anti-semitic views, but was later shown to have used frequent antisemitic language in a series of letters to his mentor Heinroth.[10]
In his biography he wrote:
"I was frightened—as I still am—by the thought that analogous genetical processes of deterioration may be at work with civilized humanity. Moved by this fear, I did a very ill-advised thing soon after the Germans had invaded Austria: I wrote about the dangers of domestication and, in order to be understood, I couched my writing in the worst of nazi terminology. I do not want to extenuate this action. I did, indeed, believe that some good might come of the new rulers. The precedent narrow-minded catholic regime in Austria induced better and more intelligent men than I was to cherish this naive hope. Practically all my friends and teachers did so, including my own father who certainly was a kindly and humane man. None of us as much as suspected that the word "selection", when used by these rulers, meant murder. I regret those writings not so much for the undeniable discredit they reflect on my person as for their effect of hampering the future recognition of the dangers of domestication."[11]

During the final years of his life Lorenz supported the fledgling Austrian Green Party and in 1984 became the figurehead of the Konrad Lorenz Volksbegehren, a grass-roots movement that was formed to prevent the building of a power plant at the Danube near Hainburg an der Donau and thus the destruction of the surrounding woodland.

-----------------
of particular interest:
"All the advantages that man has gained from his ever-deepening understanding of the natural world that surrounds him, his technological, chemical and medical progress, all of which should seem to alleviate human suffering... tends instead to favor humanity's destruction"[17

Lorenz's vision of the challenges facing humanity[edit]
Lorenz also predicted the relationship between market economics and the threat of ecological catastrophe. In his 1973 book, Civilized Man's Eight Deadly Sins, Konrad Lorenz addresses the following paradox:
"All the advantages that man has gained from his ever-deepening understanding of the natural world that surrounds him, his technological, chemical and medical progress, all of which should seem to alleviate human suffering... tends instead to favor humanity's destruction"[17]
Lorenz adopts an ecological model to attempt to grasp the mechanisms behind this contradiction. Thus "all species... are adapted to their environment... including not only inorganic components... but all the other living beings that inhabit the locality." p31.
Fundamental to Lorenz's theory of ecology is the function of feedback mechanisms, especially negative ones which, in hierarchical fashion, dampen impulses that occur beneath a certain threshold. The thresholds themselves are the product of the interaction of contrasting mechanisms. Thus pain and pleasure act as checks on each other:
"To gain a desired prey, a dog or wolf will do things that, in other contexts, they would shy away from: run through thorn bushes, jump into cold water and expose themselves to risks which would normally frighten them. All these inhibitory mechanisms... act as a counterweight to the effects of learning mechanisms... The organism cannot allow itself to pay a price which is not worth paying". p53.
In nature, these mechanisms tend towards a 'stable state' among the living beings of an ecology:
"A closer examination shows that these beings... not only do not damage each other, but often constitute a community of interests. It is obvious that the predator is strongly interested in the survival of that species, animal or vegetable, which constitutes its prey. ... It is not uncommon that the prey species derives specific benefits from its interaction with the predator species..." pp31–33.
Lorenz states that humanity is the one species not bound by these mechanisms, being the only one that has defined its own environment:
"[The pace of human ecology] is determined by the progress of man's technology (p35)... human ecology (economy) is governed by mechanisms of POSITIVE feedback, defined as a mechanism which tends to encourage behavior rather than to attenuate it (p43). Positive feedback always involves the danger of an 'avalanche' effect... One particular kind of positive feedback occurs when individuals OF THE SAME SPECIES enter into competition among themselves... For many animal species, environmental factors keep... intraspecies selection from [leading to] disaster... But there is no force which exercises this type of healthy regulatory effect on humanity's cultural development; unfortunately for itself, humanity has learned to overcome all those environmental forces which are external to itself" p44.
Lorenz does not see human independence from natural ecological processes as necessarily bad. Indeed, he states that:
"A completely new [ecology] which corresponds in every way to [humanity's] desires... could, theoretically, prove as durable as that which would have existed without his intervention (36).
However, the principle of competition, typical of Western societies, destroys any chance of this:
"The competition between human beings destroys with cold and diabolic brutality... Under the pressure of this competitive fury we have not only forgotten what is useful to humanity as a whole, but even that which is good and advantageous to the individual. [...] One asks, which is more damaging to modern humanity: the thirst for money or consuming haste... in either case, fear plays a very important role: the fear of being overtaken by one's competitors, the fear of becoming poor, the fear of making wrong decisions or the fear of not being up to snuff..." pp45–47.
In this book, Lorenz proposes that the best hope for mankind lies in our looking for mates based on the kindness of their hearts rather than good looks or wealth. He illustrates this with a Jewish story, explicitly described as such.
Lorenz was one of the early scientists who recognised the significance of overpopulation. The number one deadly sin of civilized man in his book is overpopulation, which is what leads to aggression.

@Soupie says

If horses had Gods, they would look like horses. Xenophanes


Well, I'm not so sure ... horses strike me as particularly unimaginative creatures :-) - and I suspect that gods for any animal on the planet these days would look awfully human. The Sandkings from the new series of The Outer Limits is a good ficitional presentation of this idea.

sandkings.jpg

But if the point is that the gods are just an anthropomorphization of forces beyond human control - which is the context I've generally seen this quote, then I would refer you to the idea of the "godhead" as found in the orthodox theology (and mystical literature) of any of the major religions - apophatic language is frequently used.

Godhead in Judaism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The leading Jewish Neoplatonic writer was Solomon ibn Gabirol. In his Fons Vitae, Gabirol's position is that everything that exists may be reduced to three categories: the first substance (God), matter and form (the world), with the will as intermediary. Gabirol derives matter and form from absolute being. In the Godhead he seems to differentiate essentia (being) from proprietas (attribute), designating by proprietas the will, wisdom, creative word ("voluntas, sapientia, verbum agens"). He thinks of the Godhead as being and as will or wisdom, regarding the will as identical with the divine nature. This position is implicit in the doctrine of Gabirol, who teaches that God's existence is knowable, but not His being or constitution, no attribute being predicable of God save that of existence.

God in Hinduism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The later Vedic religion produced a series of profound philosophical reflections in which Brahman is now considered to be the one Absolute Reality behind changing appearances; the universal substrate from which material things originate and to which they return after their dissolution. The sages of the Upanishads made their pronouncements on the basis of personal experience (revelation or sruti) as an essential component of their philosophical reflection.

Sounds much like modern day metaphysical speculation!

End of digression, back to Tononi . . .
 
From wiki:

Supervenience has traditionally been used to describe relationships between sets of properties in a manner which does not imply a strong reductive relationship.[2] For example, many hold that economic properties supervene on physical properties, in that if two worlds were exactly the same physically, they would also be the same economically. However, this does not entail that economics can be reduced in any straightforward way to physics. Thus, supervenience allows one to hold that "high-level phenomena" (like those of economics, psychology, or aesthetics) depend, ultimately, on physical substance, without assuming that one can study those high-level phenomena using means appropriate to physics.

Pain and suicide are both interesting problems within mental causation - even the very existence of pain.
 
@scmder Thomas Huxley famously noted that epiphenomenalism treats mental states like the steam coming off a train: it plays no causal role in the train's moving forward, it is merely an "emergent property" of the actual causation occurring in the engine (Walter 2003, p. §2)." ... Many philosophers consider this apparent irrelevance to be a highly counter-intuitive and undesirable position to take. ...

A priori physicalism then sets us up for the “conceivability argument” or . . .

Zombie attack!

Haha, it may be highly counter-intuitive and/or undesirable, but that doesn't mean it's untrue. Show me a living human with no qualia, and I'll show you a working steam engine with no steam!
 
@scmder Thomas Huxley famously noted that epiphenomenalism treats mental states like the steam coming off a train: it plays no causal role in the train's moving forward, it is merely an "emergent property" of the actual causation occurring in the engine (Walter 2003, p. §2)." ... Many philosophers consider this apparent irrelevance to be a highly counter-intuitive and undesirable position to take. ...

A priori physicalism then sets us up for the “conceivability argument” or . . .

Zombie attack!

Haha, it may be highly counter-intuitive and/or undesirable, but that doesn't mean it's untrue. Show me a living human with no qualia, and I'll show you a working steam engine with no steam!

You have a double negative in the first sentence and I'm not sure what it's referring to - when you say it doesn't mean it's untrue - what point are you saying is true? Epiphenomenalism?

The whole point of the argument is that I would be unable to show a living human with no qualia - that a Zombie would be indistinguishable from anyone else.

As for value of intution in philosophy, it's commonly used - if our intuition is unreliable (and it often is - but in specific ways that might at least be visible in hindsight) . . . well then we get into the rationality argument against Naturalism, namely that is our brains evolved to survive - then there is no reason to rely on them in terms of discerning philosophical truth - which would include Naturalism, so if Naturalism is true, it's false and if it's false . . . well you get the point.

http://consc.net/papers/intuition.pdf
 
@scmder You have a double negative in the first sentence and I'm not sure what it's referring to - when you say it doesn't mean it's untrue - what point are you saying is true? Epiphenomenalism?

Epiphenomenalism being undesirable <> Epiphenomenalism being true or untrue

@scmder The whole point of the argument is that I would be unable to show a living human with no qualia - that a Zombie would be indistinguishable from anyone else.

Haha okay. Show me a zombie indistinguishable from anyone else and I'll show you a working steam engine with no steam.
 
@scmder You have a double negative in the first sentence and I'm not sure what it's referring to - when you say it doesn't mean it's untrue - what point are you saying is true? Epiphenomenalism?

Epiphenomenalism being undesirable <> Epiphenomenalism being true or untrue

@scmder The whole point of the argument is that I would be unable to show a living human with no qualia - that a Zombie would be indistinguishable from anyone else.

Haha okay. Show me a zombie indistinguishable from anyone else and I'll show you a working steam engine with no steam.

I understand all of that - my question is are you arguing for or against epiphenomenalism?
 
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