• NEW! LOWEST RATES EVER -- SUPPORT THE SHOW AND ENJOY THE VERY BEST PREMIUM PARACAST EXPERIENCE! Welcome to The Paracast+, eight years young! For a low subscription fee, you can download the ad-free version of The Paracast and the exclusive, member-only, After The Paracast bonus podcast, featuring color commentary, exclusive interviews, the continuation of interviews that began on the main episode of The Paracast. We also offer lifetime memberships! Flash! Take advantage of our lowest rates ever! Act now! It's easier than ever to susbcribe! You can sign up right here!

    Subscribe to The Paracast Newsletter!

Consciousness and the Paranormal

Forums New posts

Free episodes:

Status
Not open for further replies.
@smcder Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states are caused by physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.

That is my view. That is why I specify that experience/integrated information is something unto itself.
 
Soupie said:
@scmder As far as I know - no theory solves the hard problem of consciousness or mental causation . . .

I don't disagree.

One idea to explore - as I've already said - is what are the properties of qualia? How might these properties supervene on IPS and integrated information?

For instance, just as the properties of liquid supervene on the molecules of which the liquid is composed, so might the properties of qualia supervene on the integrated information of which they are composed.

For instance, an H2O molecule on its own cannot swirl around in a glass cup. However, if that H2O molecule is engaged with X number of other molecules, it can swirl around in a glass, as this is a property of liquid.

Such might be the relationship of qualia on the information of which it is composed. We don't know. That it why I agree with Chalmers that qualia likely have ontologically new properties which we need to explore.

Finally, keep in mind that Chalmers is a property dualist, not a substance dualist. Meaning: my perspective and his perspective are closer than you seem to believe, scmder.

@Constance I don't think your response to Steve/smcder (quoting some earlier claims of yours) actually answered his question.

Did I solve the mind/body paradox? The hard problem? No. Did I answer scmder's question? Yes. (From here forward, Constance, if I don't reply to a direct question of yours, it won't be out of spite, but because I feel that you have allowed your own biases to color my words. This has happened too many times already. i can't waste any more time on it.)

@Constance I don't think you do since you ignore his recognition of the role of subjective phenomenal experience in human consciousness and cognition.

No, I don't.

Taken directly from Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto:

"[T]he quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships generated within that complex. Integrated information (Φ) is defined as the amount of information generated by a complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated by its parts. Qualia space (Q) is a space where each axis represents a possible state of the complex, each point is a probability distribution of its states, and arrows between points represent the informational relationships among its elements generated by causal mechanisms (connections). Together, the set of informational relationships within a complex constitute a shape in Q that completely and univocally specifies a particular experience."

> the role of subjective phenomenal experience in human consciousness

What you still don't seem to understand is that subjective phenomenal experience is consciousness.

@Constance In human consciousness, information is integrated by and through more than the brain (which for you seems to be identical to a computer). Information is first felt and integrated through the body, which experiences a palpable world via all of its primary senses (and perhaps subtler ones that we are not yet aware of).

The underlined may be your view, but that is certainly not what Tonini and ITT suggest. Information is not "felt" until and only if it is integrated.

@Constance My cat is undoubtedly aware of the qualia she experiences, just as humans are.

Unless your cat is self-aware, it will not be aware that it is experiencing qualia. Note that this is not the same as saying your cat does not experience qualia.

Metacognition.PNG


@scmder . . . what does even a human level of Phi mean in a robot? I'm not sure of that either - the subjective experience I guess would be very different - what's it like to be a robot could be very, very different than what it's like to be a human.

According to ITT, two different complexes can theoretically generate the same experience. But since ITT says this:

(i) the quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements; (ii) the quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships generated within that complex. Integrated information (Φ) is defined as the amount of information generated by a complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated by its parts. Qualia space (Q) is a space where each axis represents a possible state of the complex, each point is a probability distribution of its states, and arrows between points represent the informational relationships among its elements generated by causal mechanisms (connections).

It's likely that a "robot" would have much richer qualia than humans, just as humans have much richer qualia than an earthworm.

As ITT suggests that qualia = integrated information, any robot brain that functioned by generating integrated information would thus have qualia. (Note that Chalmers agrees that AI may have qualia.) However, it's possible that some AI might not generate integrated information and thus they would not have qualia.
Click to expand...

Right - an open question then, if you can have intelligence without qualia - and whether, as long as the material would support the structure, intelligence and consciousness is substrate independent?

I don't disagree.

One idea to explore - as I've already said - is what are the properties of qualia? How might these properties supervene on IPS and integrated information?

For instance, just as the properties of liquid supervene on the molecules of which the liquid is composed, so might the properties of qualia supervene on the integrated information of which they are composed.

For instance, an H2O molecule on its own cannot swirl around in a glass cup. However, if that H2O molecule is engaged with X number of other molecules, it can swirl around in a glass, as this is a property of liquid.

Such might be the relationship of qualia on the information of which it is composed. We don't know. That it why I agree with Chalmers that qualia likely have ontologically new properties which we need to explore.

Finally, keep in mind that Chalmers is a property dualist, not a substance dualist. Meaning: my perspective and his perspective are closer than you seem to believe, scmder.

no, no I don't believe anything about your perspective or advocate Chalmers' - that's why I ask questions and I'm still working on Chalmers - so don't think I have necessarily mis-characterized your position, it's a questioning process.

The question for me about causation is how a phenomenal experience of intention " I am going to ...." relates to physical action . . . and how/why "I" or even "want" arises? If neurological states can be detected that predict action before one is consciously aware then why construct awareness after the event - especially if it comes at a biological cost?

It is sometimes objected that distinct physical and mental states could not interact, since there is no causal nexus between them. But one lesson from Hume and from modern science is that the same goes for any fundamental causal interactions, including those found in physics. Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works, for example; rather, the relevant laws are simply fundamental. The same goes for basic laws in other physical theories. And the same, presumably, applies to fundamental psychophysical laws: there is no need for a causal nexus distinct from the physical and mental properties themselves.

By far the most influential objection to interactionism is that it is incompatible with physics. It is widely held that science tells us that the microphysical realm is causally closed, so that there is no room for mental states to have any effects. An interactionist might respond in various ways. For example, it could be suggested that although no experimental studies have revealed these effects, none have ruled them out. It might further be suggested that physical theory allows any number of basic forces (four as things stand, but there is always room for more), and that an extra force associated with a mental field would be a reasonable extension of existing physical theory. These suggestions would invoke significant revisions to physical theory, so are not to be made lightly; but one could argue that nothing rules them out.

By far the strongest response to this objection, however, is to suggest that far from ruling out interactionism, contemporary physics is positively encouraging to the possibility. On the stan- dard formulation of quantum mechanics, the state of the world is described by a wave function, according to which physical entities are often in a superposed state (e.g., in a superposition of two different positions), even though superpositions are never directly observed. On the standard dynamics, the wave function can evolve in two ways: linear evolution by the Schrodinger equa- tion (which tends to produce superposed states), and nonlinear collapses from superposed states into nonsuperposed states. Schrodinger evolution is deterministic, but collapse is nondeterminis- tic. Schrodinger evolution is constantly ongoing, but on the standard formulation, collapses occur only occasionally, on measurement.

The collapse dynamics leaves a door wide open for an interactionist interpretation. Any phys- ical nondeterminism might be held to leave room for nonphysical effects, but the principles of collapse do much more than that. Collapse is supposed to occur on measurement. There is no widely agreed definition of what a measurement is, but there is one sort of event that everyone agrees is a measurement: observation by a conscious observer. Further, it seems that no purely physical criterion for a measurement can work, since purely physical systems are governed by the linear Schro ̈dinger dynamics. As such, it is natural to suggest that a measurement is precisely a conscious observation, and that this conscious observation causes a collapse.

 
@smcder Fascinating. Just last night on the show Cosmos, they mentioned that no one knows why the electrons down jump. Is that the same thing, I wonder? I had never heard that before.

Re observer affect. I'm wondering about self-awareness and "observing" ones own thoughts/qualia.
 
Soupie said:
@smcder Fascinating. Just last night on the show Cosmos, they mentioned that no one knows why the electrons down jump. Is that the same thing, I wonder? I had never heard that before.

Re observer affect. I'm wondering about self-awareness and "observing" ones own thoughts/qualia.
Click to expand...

I was thinking again about the Buddhist ideas of Dependent Orogination and Five Aggregates (skandas?) - also trying to watch myself in terms of "I will" and how it connects to when I make a physical action
 
Soupie said:
@smcder Fascinating. Just last night on the show Cosmos, they mentioned that no one knows why the electrons down jump. Is that the same thing, I wonder? I had never heard that before.

Re observer affect. I'm wondering about self-awareness and "observing" ones own thoughts/qualia.
Click to expand...

Anything applicable here?


BUDDHIST PHENOMENOLOGY

This method of splitting consciousness into various parts is characteristic for meditation as taught in theravada buddhism, the so called vipassana meditation. As a result one is able to understand better the functioning of consciousness. The word `vipassana' means `insight'.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Yes - many interesting questions re: mental causation, intention, free will - meditation. In the experiments where awareness came AFTER - could someone alter that with biofeedback - you know of CBT for OCD right? Brain physically altered by cognitive therapy - will post ref


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Here are two brief articles I came across recently related to consciousness.

The Mental Life of Plants and Worms, Among Others by Oliver Sacks | The New York Review of Books

Charles Darwin’s last book, published in 1881, was a study of the humble earthworm. His main theme—expressed in the title, The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms—was the immense power of worms, in vast numbers and over millions of years, to till the soil and change the face of the earth. But his opening chapters are devoted more simply to the “habits” of worms. ...

“When a worm is suddenly illuminated,” Darwin wrote, it “dashes like a rabbit into its burrow.” He noted that he was “at first led to look at the action as a reflex one,” but then observed that this behavior could be modified—for instance, when a worm was otherwise engaged, it showed no withdrawal with sudden exposure to light.

For Darwin, the ability to modulate responses indicated “the presence of a mind of some kind.” He also wrote of the “mental qualities” of worms in relation to their plugging up their burrows, noting that “if worms are able to judge…having drawn an object close to the mouths of their burrows, how best to drag it in, they must acquire some notion of its general shape.” This moved him to argue that worms “deserve to be called intelligent, for they then act in nearly the same manner as a man under similar circumstances.”
Click to expand...

Toward a Theory of Self-Organized Criticality in the Brain | Simons Foundation

In 1999, the Danish physicist Per Bak proclaimed to a group of neuroscientists that it had taken him only 10 minutes to determine where the field had gone wrong. Perhaps the brain was less complicated than they thought, he said. Perhaps, he said, the brain worked on the same fundamental principles as a simple sand pile, in which avalanches of various sizes help keep the entire system stable overall — a process he dubbed “self-organized criticality.” ...

In the 1980s, Bak first wondered how the exquisite order seen in nature arises out of the disordered mix of particles that constitute the building blocks of matter. He found an answer in phase transition, the process by which a material transforms from one phase of matter to another. The change can be sudden, like water evaporating into steam, or gradual, like a material becoming superconductive. The precise moment of transition — when the system is halfway between one phase and the other — is called the critical point, or, more colloquially, the “tipping point.”
Click to expand...

This episode of the PEL podcast discusses Jung's ideas about the unconscious. It touches on many of the themes we have recently: abstract rationality versus phenomenological intuition, etc.

Partially Examined Life Ep. 81: Jung on the Psyche & Dreams | The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast | A Philosophy Podcast and Blog
 
I can also personally vouch for Schwartz's method.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Soupie said:
Here are two brief articles I came across recently related to consciousness.





This episode of the PEL podcast discusses Jung's ideas about the unconscious. It touches on many of the themes we have recently: abstract rationality versus phenomenological intuition, etc.

Partially Examined Life Ep. 81: Jung on the Psyche & Dreams | The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast | A Philosophy Podcast and Blog
Click to expand...

PEL episode looks good ... Don't have a way to download this week - Ill have a look at the site though.



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
The Power of Conscious Intention Proven At Last? - Neuroskeptic | DiscoverMagazine.com

"These results indicate that conscious intentions govern motor function… until today, it was unclear whether conscious motor intention exists prior to movement, or whether the brain constructs such an intention after movement initiation."​

The authors, Zschorlich and Köhling of the University of Rostock, Germany, are weighing into a long-standing debate in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, concerning the role of consciousness in controlling our actions.

To simplify, one school of thought holds that (at least some of the time), our intentions or plans control our actions. Many people would say that this is what common sense teaches us as well.

But there’s an alternative view, in which our consciously-experienced intentions are not causes of our actions but are actually products of them, being generated after the action has already begun. This view is certainly counterintuitive, and many find it disturbing as it seems to undermine ‘free will’.

That’s the background. Zschorlich and Köhling say that they’ve demonstrated that conscious intentions do exist, prior to motor actions, and that these intentions are accompanied by particular changes in brain activity. ...

Full paper: How thoughts give rise to action - conscious motor ... [PLoS One. 2013] - PubMed - NCBI
Click to expand...
@smcder
 
How will Tononi's theory handle unconscious and subconscious information and mind? This paper provides good background for approaching that question.

The Unconscious Mind
John A. Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella
Yale University

ABSTRACT—
The unconscious mind is still viewed by many psychological scientists as the shadow of a ‘‘real’’ conscious mind, though there now exists substantial evidence
that the unconscious is not identifiably less flexible, complex, controlling, deliberative, or action-oriented than is its counterpart. This ‘‘conscious-centric’’ bias is due in part to the operational definition within cognitive psychology that equates unconscious with subliminal. We review the evidence challenging this restricted view of the unconscious emerging from contemporary social cognition research, which has traditionally defined the unconscious in terms of its unintentional nature; this research has demonstrated the existence of several independent unconscious behavioral guidance systems: perceptual, evaluative, and motivational. From this perspective, it is concluded that in both phylogeny and ontogeny, actions of an unconscious mind precede the arrival of a conscious mind—that action precedes reflection.


http://www.yale.edu/acmelab/articles/Bargh_Morsella_Unconscious_Mind.pdf
 
Last edited:
Last edited by a moderator:
Constance said:
How will Tononi's theory handle unconscious and subconscious information and mind? This paper provides good background for approaching that question.

The Unconscious Mind
John A. Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella
Yale University

ABSTRACT—
The unconscious mind is still viewed by many psychological scientists as the shadow of a ‘‘real’’ conscious mind, though there now exists substantial evidence
that the unconscious is not identifiably less flexible, complex, controlling, deliberative, or action-oriented than is its counterpart. This ‘‘conscious-centric’’ bias is due in part to the operational definition within cognitive psychology that equates unconscious with subliminal. We review the evidence challenging this restricted view of the unconscious emerging from contemporary social cognition research, which has traditionally defined the unconscious in terms of its unintentional nature; this research has demonstrated the existence of several independent unconscious behavioral guidance systems: perceptual, evaluative, and motivational. From this perspective, it is concluded that in both phylogeny and ontogeny, actions of an unconscious mind precede the arrival of a conscious mind—that action precedes reflection.


http://www.yale.edu/acmelab/articles/Bargh_Morsella_Unconscious_Mind.pdf
Click to expand...

I've been curious too about the evidence for non-local consciousness: NDE & OOBEs with veridical evidence, reincarnation studies (University of Virginia) and other anamolous cognition? Dr. Radin's work too. We had some discussion on these topics earlier in the thread - they are relevant to any claims about the ultimate nature of consciousness.




Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top