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Consciousness and the Paranormal

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  1. I'll be away until tonight but I want to insert a thought before I lose it. It seems to me that bringing the subconscious and unconscious into Tonini's IIT theory forces us to entertain the phenomenological insights into consciousness, including that of Kierkegaard above. Human consciousness does integrate information and feeling from those sub-liminal levels or layers of consciousness, but I think it is/will be a problem of much deeper complexity for Tononi to represent that information in his system.

how do we examine this with phenomenology Constance? I have been trying to look at how "I" "will" and what kind of freedom I seem to have - and there is no uncomplicated act of willing - no unconstrained will that I can see ... so it's very interesting - I do feel some agency of course - and if I pay attention to how thoughts arise I find I have more choice more freedom



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Re: the illusion. Of course the brain can be fooled and subjective experience <> reality. The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia. Yes, you will experience "bah" despite there being no "bah."

Re Frankl: I was trained in the Adlerian "school."
 
Re: the illusion. Of course the brain can be fooled and subjective experience <> reality. The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia. Yes, you will experience "bah" despite there being no "bah."

Re Frankl: I was trained in the Adlerian "school."

ah ha! ("bah" "fah")



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Re: the illusion. Of course the brain can be fooled and subjective experience <> reality. The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia. Yes, you will experience "bah" despite there being no "bah."

Re Frankl: I was trained in the Adlerian "school."

lots of humor clusters around the bah/ fah nexus ...




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Re: the illusion. Of course the brain can be fooled and subjective experience <> reality. The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia. Yes, you will experience "bah" despite there being no "bah."

Re Frankl: I was trained in the Adlerian "school."

the trend now is "brief therapy" per dictates of insurance? lots of CBT ? in terms of how providers are trained now ... or?my mom got her LPC in the 80s and headed state NAMI then -mental health (industry ) has changed a lot since. I read a lot of her books from school then majored in psych/math in college .., read too much Nietzsche though for my own (and everyone else's good )





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@smcder It is sometimes objected that distinct physical and mental states could not interact, since there is no causal nexus between them. But one lesson from Hume and from modern science is that the same goes for any fundamental causal interactions, including those found in physics. Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works, for example; rather, the relevant laws are simply fundamental. The same goes for basic laws in other physical theories. And the same, presumably, applies to fundamental psychophysical laws: there is no need for a causal nexus distinct from the physical and mental properties themselves.

By far the most influential objection to interactionism is that it is incompatible with physics. ...

Where did you get this text from? Is there a link to the full article/book? Re: the bolded line: I would add the phrase "our current understanding of" physics.

@smcder I think the experiments I referred to are covered here: Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I'll check them out. The experiment I linked to was from 12/13, so it's very recent. The jury is obviously still out on this, but I think the tide is shifting. Research into the Executive Functions has shed incredible light on the function of self-awareness:

My own intuitive belief is along these lines as well: It has been suggested that consciousness mostly serves to cancel certain actions initiated by the unconscious.

While cancelling actions (what I would call impulse control or inhibiting) is one important (social) function of self-awareness, there are several others. The executive functions have been called the "I." The "I" is whatever we are self-aware of at any given moment. Recall that until Helen Keller attained self-awareness, she had no sense of "I" and she was wild and out-of-control. She was guided only by the unconscious; she was essentially operating via stimulus (experience) and unconscious (non-self-aware) response.

From the evolutionary perspective, I believe the unconscious (non-self-aware) mind developed first and effectively guided (and guides) organisms through life. I believe all organisms that process information (and according to ITT create integrated information) have minds.

The unconscious is vast and deep. Organisms - especially complex ones - are receiving, processing, and storing staggering amounts of information. Staggering. The processing power of organisms and the efficiency (size and power consumption) with which they do it is without precedent.

I believe the conscious (self-aware) mind developed second. I don't believe all organisms are self-aware. I believe the self-aware "layer" of mind serves the functions outlined by Barkley: emotion regulation, self-motivation, planning, and working memory enable people to pursue both personal and collective goals that are critical to survival.

I believe this extra, self-aware layer of mind does have causal influence over the organism. I'm not sure what the mechanism is. This may not jive with deterministic physics, as it is currently understood, but science currently only looks at the objective level of reality, but mind is something ontologically distinct - the subjective; and self-aware mind is something perhaps ontologically distinct from that. "The paradox to be explained is not that body and mind communicate but that cognition and consciousness communicate." Chalmers

The above is all incredibly naive and simplistic, I know. (That's because, as you know, it's my self-aware mind trying to make sense of reality.) Another approach to the unconscious/conscious layers/aspects of minds is perhaps the two hemispheres of the brain. @smcder linked to this book some time ago: The Master and His Emissary.

I'm not sure that the two hemispheres are analogous with the conscious and unconscious aspects of mind, but they play a role.

Again, the PEL episode about Jung really touches on the unconscious/conscious aspects of mind.

Another way of thinking about the unconscious and conscious - by way of EF - is to think of it like a large corporation, like a construction company. The unconscious mind would be all the workers, equipment, and the knowledge and data they gather. The conscious mind would be the foreman "in charge" of steering the operation in a certain direction.

While the foreman does have "control" over the company, it is extremely limited, and he is only aware - at any given moment - of a small fraction of the huge amount of data being processed and exchanged, not to mention the thousands of decisions his employees are making beneath him.

"The above is all incredibly naive and simplistic, I know. (That's because, as you know, it's my self-aware mind trying to make sense of reality.) "

right - we all just got here ... in 45 years I've noticed some regularities and maybe they are part of some long term trends ... who knows - but other parts of us are really, really old and they do know and will carry us if we get out of the way - right?

But I think you have the starts to a manifesto, some real poetry here ... my Dad wrote a book called Modern Job and it's in a succession of writings that summarize his philosophy - he's working on another now at almost 80 years of age - it seems to help consolidate his thinking


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@comstance. @Soupie

Hegel vs. Eliminative Materialism in Neuroscience | The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast | A Philosophy Podcast and Blog

discusses some things you have both been talking about

and see links at bottom for even more relevance

Two of the comments at that page seem to me to focus some of our differences re: consciousness in humans:

Thomas Shea says:
April 15, 2011 at 7:26 pm
Folk notions are scientifically uninformed, common-sense views toward a certain domain. So, folk psychology gives us a rule of thumb on how to understand and predict the behavior of ourselves and others. When used by the folk, it assumes a dualism between physical acts and mental states which have causal relationships with one another (e.g., “If Mark desires milk, and he knows there’s milk in the refrigerator, then Mark will go to the refrigerator to get the milk.”).

Churchland, then, sees folk psychology as a THEORY of human behavior and psychology, which posits the existence of the abstract entities of propositional attitudes (belief, desire, et cetera). He dislikes folk psychological theory as well as the notions that come along with it, so he wants to show that it’s first, an inadequate theory (because it lacks the scope that we’d want a scientifically rigorous, all-encompassing theory of human behavior and psychology to have, has been fruitless for at least 2,500 years, and isn’t conservative toward the well-established theories of neuroscience, et cetera), and second, that it’s been proven wrong empirically (in folk psychology our concept of memory is that it’s some unified thing, but we’ve found there’s not a single process or function of the brain that corresponds to memory, and it seems as though there’s nothing that corresponds to what we mean when we talk about “the will,” and so on). For these reasons, he wants to eliminate folk psychological theory as well as strip its postulates (the propositional attitudes) of their ontological status, i.e., he wants us to stop talking about belief and desire as if they’re something that actually exists and refers to something in our brain.

So it seems as though his argument is something like this:

Propositional attitudes are postulated by the theory of folk psychology.

Folk psychological theory is inadequate and wrong.

Therefore, strip its postulates of their ontological status.

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Tom McDonald says:
April 17, 2011 at 6:06 pm
@ TS: Seeking a “scientifically rigorous, all-encompassing theory of human behavior and psychology”, as you say Churchland does, strikes me as itself disturbing. Natural science assumes a concept of ‘nature’ as the subsumption of particular individual entities under mechanical laws. So the theorist is going to posit the mechanical laws that are supposedly behind his own positing of the laws? Hegel has been accused of totalizing overreach in his theoretical ambition, but at least he paves the way to his mountaintop accounting for historical contingency, freedom, and subjectivity which speak to the concrete individual reader, not mere mechanical laws that would erase the content and relevance of the actual individual thought.
 
Re: the illusion. Of course the brain can be fooled and subjective experience <> reality. The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia. Yes, you will experience "bah" despite there being no "bah."

The fah/bah example seems to me to mean only that our senses are fallible, that we are not always in a position to receive sufficient information from the environment to identify a particular thing or in this case a particular distinction between two sounds since we are relying in part on a visual cue concerning the almost indistinguishable appearance of the lips when articulating 'f' and 'b'. Perhaps I'm missing something here?

Phenomenology recognizes that we don't have total access to all the information available in our immediate surroundings (thus as MP advises we have to multiply our perspectives, our own and also the perspectives of others on a thing or event if we are to gather adequate information to understand what we are are seeing or hearing.

I'd like to ask about the partially underscored statement above in Soupie's post:

"The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia.

Koch makes a similar statement here:

“Since the early days of computers, scholars have argued that the subjective, phenomenal states that make up the life of the mind are intimately linked to the information expressed at that time by the brain.” A "Complex" Theory of Consciousness - Scientific American

It seems to me that a major question about both brain activity and the phenomena of mind/consciousness is side-stepped by the use of these bolded transitive verbs to characterize actions by the brain as creating qualia and expressing information. From the standpoint of phenomenological description and analysis of human perception and consciousness, we receive rather than produce impressions from phenomena present to us in the world that produce the qualia we experience. And likewise we receive information of various kinds in our phenomenal experience in the world, much, perhaps most, of it constituted in our encounter with macro phenomena of both natural and cultural origins -- objects, other persons/consciousnesses, relationships, interactions, etc) which we experience directly as well. I believe we also receive information from the entangled quantum substrate of the physical world at levels of reality we cannot directly sense. Maybe this is a subject the two of you would like to dispute or discuss?
 
I completely reject the views of the first commentor. I believe the mind is ontologically distinct from the brain/body, and I think the mind has causal influence on the brain/body.

I have interesting resources I found re the problem of mental causation. Will post soon.
 
I completely reject the views of the first commentor. I believe the mind is ontologically distinct from the brain/body, and I think the mind has causal influence on the brain/body.

I have interesting resources I found re the problem of mental causation. Will post soon.

Good - I look forward to it. I didn't identify either of you with EM by the way - but with other points in the post.
 
The fah/bah example seems to me to mean only that our senses are fallible, that we are not always in a position to receive sufficient information from the environment to identify a particular thing or in this case a particular distinction between two sounds since we are relying in part on a visual cue concerning the almost indistinguishable appearance of the lips when articulating 'f' and 'b'. Perhaps I'm missing something here?

Phenomenology recognizes that we don't have total access to all the information available in our immediate surroundings (thus as MP advises we have to multiply our perspectives, our own and also the perspectives of others on a thing or event if we are to gather adequate information to understand what we are are seeing or hearing.

I'd like to ask about the partially underscored statement above in Soupie's post:

"The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia.

Koch makes a similar statement here:

“Since the early days of computers, scholars have argued that the subjective, phenomenal states that make up the life of the mind are intimately linked to the information expressed at that time by the brain.” A "Complex" Theory of Consciousness - Scientific American

It seems to me that a major question about both brain activity and the phenomena of mind/consciousness is side-stepped by the use of these bolded transitive verbs to characterize actions by the brain as creating qualia and expressing information. From the standpoint of phenomenological description and analysis of human perception and consciousness, we receive rather than produce impressions from phenomena present to us in the world that produce the qualia we experience. And likewise we receive information of various kinds in our phenomenal experience in the world, much, perhaps most, of it constituted in our encounter with macro phenomena of both natural and cultural origins -- objects, other persons/consciousnesses, relationships, interactions, etc) which we experience directly as well. I believe we also receive information from the entangled quantum substrate of the physical world at levels of reality we cannot directly sense. Maybe this is a subject the two of you would like to dispute or discuss?

I believe we also receive information from the entangled quantum substrate of the physical world at levels of reality we cannot directly sense. Maybe this is a subject the two of you would like to dispute or discuss?

I think that's a fascinating idea - Constance. I know you have brought specific articles and thinkers to the thread on this position - is there a specific link to look at now? This also ties in with paranormal phenomena around non-localized consciousness.
 
how do we examine this with phenomenology Constance? I have been trying to look at how "I" "will" and what kind of freedom I seem to have - and there is no uncomplicated act of willing - no unconstrained will that I can see ... so it's very interesting - I do feel some agency of course - and if I pay attention to how thoughts arise I find I have more choice more freedom

I think Sartre is the best philosopher among the phenomenological-existentialists to consult re the question of human freedom. He describes our freedom as 'situated freedom'. As existential beings occurring at some point in the planet's history, we are always in a situation that affects the degree of our freedom, sometimes drastically, but we remain free to some degree even then in the mental attitude if not behavior we are able to exercise in response to extreme constraint or injustice.

Re 'will', we can indeed will many things, and change our minds about what we will (for ourselves, for the world) based on our own developing capacities of imagining and thinking about the nature of the results if we were to attempt to actualize what we will, and if everyone were to do so.
 
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I believe we also receive information from the entangled quantum substrate of the physical world at levels of reality we cannot directly sense. Maybe this is a subject the two of you would like to dispute or discuss?

I think that's a fascinating idea - Constance. I know you have brought specific articles and thinkers to the thread on this position - is there a specific link to look at now? This also ties in with paranormal phenomena around non-localized consciousness.

See Tiller among quantum mind physicists and Radin among parapsychologists for a start. I'll try to find a comprehensive paper on this subject after I return from an errand.
 
I think Sartre is the best philosopher among the phenomenological-existentialists to consult re the question of human freedom. He describes our freedom as 'situated freedom'. As existential beings occurring at some point in the planet's history, we are always in a situation that affects the degree of our freedom, sometimes drastically, but we remain free to some degree even then in the mental attitude if not behavior we are able to exercise in response to extreme constraint or injustice.

Re 'will', we can indeed will many things, and change our minds about what we will (for ourselves, for the world) based on our own developing imaging and thinking about the nature of the results if we were to attempt to actualize what we will, and if everyone where to do so.

In thinking about "I will" - I can't imagine an unconstrained will - it would seem to require something like omnipotence, omniscience and atemporality ... things which could get someone in a lot of trouble philosophically, logically and theologically.

Meanwhile, back here on earth - I like Frankel's logotherapy too - I don't know as much about Sartre. Nietzsche's idea of Eternal Recurrence is a grandfather to existentialism and notions of free will, I had a long post I deleted b/c I couldn't get it right - but I will try to post the Gay Science, I think 341 or 347 where he discusses it.
 
See Tiller among quantum mind physicists and Radin among parapsychologists for a start. I'll try to find a comprehensive paper on this subject after I return from an errand.

Radin's good - I've read one of his books, Conscious Minds - have it at the house, easy to brush up on. His blog is also excellent.

Entangled Minds

the current topic on Wikipedia bias is interesting.

As I've previously mentioned, Wikipedia has a problem with topics that fall outside a tightly constrained, naive view of reality. That there are different opinions about such topics as homeopathy, parapsychology, or energy medicine, is not surprising. But it is disappointing (and on the verge of abetting libel when it comes to biographies of living persons) when an otherwise useful encyclopedia maintains a policy of presenting such topics with a systematic negative bias.

Attempts to edit these articles to provide more balance are summarily ignored, and even neutral, well-intentioned editors have been banned. Articles with citations only from unreliable, uninformed, or cynical sources might be useful for promoting favored ideologies, but only in an Orwellian world could such an encyclopedia be considered anything but a work of fiction. Indeed, this very blog was labeled an "unreliable source" when I've simply pointed out an easily demonstrable
mathematical fact.

...

see also http://www.skeptiko.com/236-rome-viharo-wikipedia-we-have-a-problem/
 
re unreliability of folk psych and self deception of brain through evolutionary means for evolutionary ends should apply to the Churchlands abilities? or do they have methods to avoid self deception? what are the personal implications if EM for them and why would they want it to be true - secondary gain? any effect on their lifestyle or creature/emotional comforts?


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re unreliability of folk psych and self deception of brain through evolutionary means for evolutionary ends should apply to the Churchlands abilities? or do they have methods to avoid self deception? what are the personal implications if EM for them and why would they want it to be true - secondary gain? any effect on their lifestyle or creature/emotional comforts?

In my view they're deceiving themselves about the nature of their own experiential consciousness. A great many materialist scientists and philosophers do that too. I think they want eliminative materialism to be true because it's something they've been persuaded to believe, they work in a field in which most others think the same way, and representing themselves as spokespersons for this approach furthers their influence and their careers.
 
@Constance I'd like to ask about the partially underscored statement above in Soupie's post: "The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia.

Koch makes a similar statement here: “Since the early days of computers, scholars have argued that the subjective, phenomenal states that make up the life of the mind are intimately linked to the information expressed at that time by the brain.” A "Complex" Theory of Consciousness - Scientific American

It seems to me that a major question about both brain activity and the phenomena of mind/consciousness is side-stepped by the use of these bolded transitive verbs to characterize actions by the brain as creating qualia and expressing information.

What is the major question that you feel is sidestepped?

@Constance From the standpoint of phenomenological description and analysis of human perception and consciousness, we receive rather than produce impressions from phenomena present to us in the world that produce the qualia we experience.

A couple very sincere questions. (Perhaps there is an article/essay that would answer these questions that you could link me to.)

1) What would be an example of a phenomena that would produce qualia?

2) How does this phenomena produce qualia?

3) What are the produced qualia made of?

4) How do these qualia move through the environment?

5) How many different (kinds of) qualia are there?

6) How do we receive qualia?

7) What happens to a qualia once it is received by a human?

8) How do qualia relate to the unconscious/conscious mind?

8a) If qualia are not the mind, then what is the mind?
9) Are thoughts qualia?

9a) If thoughts are not qualia, what are thoughts?​

@Constance I believe we also receive information from the entangled quantum substrate of the physical world at levels of reality we cannot directly sense. Maybe this is a subject the two of you would like to dispute or discuss?

I assume you mean this information would be received by a means other than the 7 known senses. I think this is a fascinating idea, but I'm not sure how an organism would "receive" such information. I think macro organisms are affected by such information, but again, I'm not sure how we would "receive" it. I'm open to ideas though!

However, as I do believe the mind (integrated information) is ontologically distinct from other matter states and likely adheres to ontologically distinct laws of nature, I think it's possible that 1) minds can interact with other minds in ways currently unknown to man, and 2) it's possible - though I couldn't guess how - that "disembodied" minds may exist which can interact with "embodied" minds, that is, minds which are currently emitted from organisms.

@smcder had mentioned vortices which can exist in water for a short period of time. It's conceivable (at least to me, haha) that integrated information - minds - could exist for a period of time independent of the organisms which produced them. To go back to my music analogy, it might be like a song (sound waves) reverberating through the air for a short period of time after the band has stopped playing.

If this integrated information was some how able to self-sustain, perhaps it could last for a much longer period of time. But as I've questioned before, how would this disembodied mind receive new information from the environment?
 
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