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Consciousness and the Paranormal

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@smcder



@smcder I think the experiments I referred to are covered here: Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I'll check them out. The experiment I linked to was from 12/13, so it's very recent. The jury is obviously still out on this, but I think the tide is shifting. Research into the Executive Functions has shed incredible light on the function of self-awareness:

My own intuitive belief is along these lines as well: It has been suggested that consciousness mostly serves to cancel certain actions initiated by the unconscious.

Experimental evidence that decisions to act precede execution has been around for some time. Perhaps someone here knows how long. So in a sense, we all live in the past, even if measured in fractions of a second.

How the brain chooses what information to repress and what to express, or at least experience, is likely a critical key to better understanding of how the it functions. Consider the Acquired Savant Syndrome, in which brain damage seems to enhance the acuity of certain mental functions in rare individuals. (Why won't my beloved computer cut and paste the needed link at the moment???)

The brain paradoxically does not 'know what it knows'. The upshot of free will experiments and Acquired Savant Syndrome would seem to argue for consciousness as an emergent phenomenon along for the larger ride. But this tells us nothing about the subjective nature of qualia (I think). Is there a distinction between the terms "qualia" and "self-awareness" ? At any rate, both may be carried along on the same current as memory and executive function.
 
Experimental evidence that decisions to act precede execution has been around for some time. Perhaps someone here knows how long. So in a sense, we all live in the past, even if measured in fractions of a second.

How the brain chooses what information to repress and what to express, or at least experience, is likely a critical key to better understanding of how the it functions. Consider the Acquired Savant Syndrome, in which brain damage seems to enhance the acuity of certain mental functions in rare individuals. (Why won't my beloved computer cut and paste the needed link at the moment???)

The brain paradoxically does not 'know what it knows'. The upshot of free will experiments and Acquired Savant Syndrome would seem to argue for consciousness as an emergent phenomenon along for the larger ride. But this tells us nothing about the subjective nature of qualia (I think). Is there a distinction between the terms "qualia" and "self-awareness" ? At any rate, both may be carried along on the same current as memory and executive function.
You mean decisions to act precede awareness of said decisions (from which the conclusion is drawn that free will is an illusion). I'm aware that consensus science believes all events are determined, including human thoughts and behaviors. However, there are some experiments (like the one I linked above) and logic which suggest otherwise.

Do you believe all events are determined, including events such as behaviors and thoughts of self-aware humans?

Agent-Causality

But following Aristotle, Epicurus thought human agents have the autonomous ability to transcend necessity and chance (both of which destroy responsibility), so that praise and blame are appropriate. This is a form of agent-causality. It answers the flawed standard argument against free will..

...some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. ...necessity destroys responsibility and chance is uncertain; whereas our own actions are autonomous, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.
(Letter to Menoeceus, §133)​
I believe the same; that events have three causes: 1:1 cause/effect determinism, (quantum) randomness, and self-aware agents.

Re: the distinction between qualia and self-awareness.

Metacognition.PNG
 
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Subversive Thinking: Causal efficacy of consciousness: empirical evidence for dualism

Causal efficacy of consciousness: empirical evidence for dualism

If mind-body dualism is true, then we'd expect that ... consciousness would cause effects on the brain and the body (the latter would cause effects on consciousness too, since that they interact with each other; but in this post we'll address only causation from consciousness to the brain and body). That is, if dualism is true, then consciousness is efficacious (therefore, evidence of the efficacy of consciousness is evidence for dualism).

Empirical evidence support this idea:

PLACEBO EFFECT:

1)It's a medical phenomenon (i.e., it's recognized as a medical observable fact)

2)The person's BELIEFS (=a subjective phenomenon) produce effects and consequences on bodily health. Or, as said in the definition, "the treatment having the expectedconsequences of those beliefs upon health" (which entails that beliefs produces, as consequences and effects, physical and biological changes according to the subjective expectation of the patient)

This point is essential, since the cause of the treatment's effectivity (in the cases of placebo effects) are the BELIEFS. And beliefs are subjetive phenomena (of consciousness), not objective ones. Hence, subjective consciousness is causally efficacious.

For example, you can't see my beliefs in this moment, you can only see my writing here (by the way, my writing is a consequence of my beliefs too!); you can infer what my beliefs are; but you can't "see" them directly, because they're subjective. But such subjective beliefs, as part of my consciousness, can have effects on my health in cases of placebo effect. Hence, consciousness has causal efficacy on the body (and on the brain, since that physiological changes on the body are mediated by the brain and the nervous system)

3)The placebo effect has a physiological action. Since that physiology includes neurological functions, it follows that placebo effect (i.e. beliefs acting on health) produces neurological changes too.
I did some modifying of this quote, and there are more examples and links at the source.
 
You mean decisions to act precede awareness of said decisions (from which the conclusion is drawn that free will is an illusion). I'm aware that consensus science believes all events are determined, including human thoughts and behaviors. However, there are some experiments (like the one I linked above) and logic which suggest otherwise.

Do you believe all events are determined, including events such as behaviors and thoughts of self-aware humans?

I believe the same; that events have three causes: 1:1 cause/effect determinism, (quantum) randomness, and self-aware agents.

Re: the distinction between qualia and self-awareness.

Metacognition.PNG

Yes. The graphic helps. And somewhat dovetails with the notion of consciousness modeling a larger reality in relation to the senses in a kind of infinitely recursive feedback loop. Perhaps.


I believe all the neurological data indicates is a cause and effect relationship between subconscious and conscious mind. It tells us nothing about causality in relationship to the subconscious, or likewise about apparent causality in the larger macro world of conscious awareness. I'm guessing the effect of the conscious upon the unconscious might be much more difficult, if not impossible to disentangle.
 
Constance wrote
]I'll be away until tonight but I want to insert a thought before I lose it. It seems to me that bringing the subconscious and unconscious into Tonini's IIT theory forces us to entertain the phenomenological insights into consciousness, including that of Kierkegaard above. Human consciousness does integrate information and feeling from those sub-liminal levels or layers of consciousness, but I think it is/will be a problem of much deeper complexity for Tononi to represent that information in his system.

how do we examine this with phenomenology Constance?

Do you mean how do we ask questions based in phenomenology concerning how Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness would cope with subconscious and unconscious information, or how does/could phenomenology account for the existence and effects of subconscious and unconscious information in human beings?


I have been trying to look at how "I" "will" and what kind of freedom I seem to have - and there is no uncomplicated act of willing - no unconstrained will that I can see ... so it's very interesting - I do feel some agency of course - and if I pay attention to how thoughts arise I find I have more choice more freedom.

The underscored is very interesting. Would you give an example or two of what you're describing?
 
Experimental evidence that decisions to act precede execution has been around for some time. Perhaps someone here knows how long. So in a sense, we all live in the past, even if measured in fractions of a second.

Among experiments you might be referring to, Libet's widely noticed one has been variously interpreted. Libet himself was not in accord with the general interpretation from neuroscientists carried in the popular science magazines. The significance of the lag-time involved in that experiment is still being explored and should be. I think it will be a long time before we have an adequate understanding of the working of the brain and of consciousness to reach an informed judgment about that lag-time.

How the brain chooses what information to repress and what to express, or at least experience, is likely a critical key to better understanding of how it functions. Consider the Acquired Savant Syndrome, in which brain damage seems to enhance the acuity of certain mental functions in rare individuals.

Acquired Savant Syndrome is another fascinating subject needing considerable research. Re your prior sentence, I don't know how we can conclude that "the brain chooses what information to repress and what to express, or at least experience." My impression has been that the brain does not experience anything but rather sorts and integrates information. Also, while I see that the executive functions (combined with an individual's will) can enable greater focus on tasks chosen, I doubt that they can completely repress impulses and information rising from the subconscious and unconscious mind.

The brain paradoxically does not 'know what it knows'. The upshot of free will experiments and Acquired Savant Syndrome would seem to argue for consciousness as an emergent phenomenon along for the larger ride. But this tells us nothing about the subjective nature of qualia (I think). Is there a distinction between the terms "qualia" and "self-awareness" ? At any rate, both may be carried along on the same current as memory and executive function.

Your first statement in that paragraph does indeed seem to state the case. But I don't think we know enough to claim that free will/will to make choices has been disproven in humans. I don't know what to make of Acquired Savant Syndrome. Qualia are qualitative and felt or sensed aspects of conscious experience that no doubt make a considerable contribution to the development of self-awareness in my opinion.
 
I'll be away until tonight but I want to insert a thought before I lose it. It seems to me that bringing the subconscious and unconscious into Tonini's IIT theory...
I still haven't had a moment to read the first ITT brief let alone the second. However I think ITT would handle the unconscious without a problem. I'm certainly not a neurologist, but my understanding is that organisms bring in gobs of information that never makes it to their awareness.

For example, a fly may land on your arm; while your central nervous system and brain will process this, the sensation/qualia never comes to your awareness. That's because the information never becomes fully integrated since it doesn't receive the attention of the whole complex.

This would work the same for both self-aware and non-self-aware organisms.
 
I've been re-reading your post . . . but can't understand most of it - I feel like what I understand of it, I agree with (generally) . . . the example of breathing is similar to something I remember reading by Alan Watts - I think he used the skin as an example (maybe in The Book On The Taboo Against KNowing Who You Are - I'll have to look it up)

In general, is there some context you can provide or expand on these ideas?

Other divisive terms like "conscious" and "unconscious" accomplish the same feat of confusion. We seem to think that we know what we're talking about when we talk about "mind," "consciousness" or "awareness," when the reality is that regardless of the label, all of these formations of reality are seemingly dependent on something we can never be mentally connected to.

Vocabulary is definitely a big piece of the discussion . . . what do we mean by such and such - some of this comes out of the context of the discussion, sometimes we refer to other sources ...

There's an interesting inverse relationship between two polarized states of existence:

(1) Complete theoretical omniscience destroying consciousness
(2) Complete omniscience and awareness in a limited finite domain requires a domain of not knowing.


What is "complete theoretical omniscience"?

I've probably stated this in other ways in earlier posts and discussion. The very fact that we can live in a world and be comfortable with "knowing" and "doing" things and yet stand outside this framework as if it were utterly incomprehensible and alien means that some how, in some manner, our existence somehow thrives on mystery. Weird that it may be, mystery, incomprehensibility, and confusion may lie as the fundamental bedrock for all sensual experience. The wavering line between breathing as voluntary and as involuntary is a division forced on us.

It does seem strange that we can "stand outside" and alienation has been a perennial theme of Western thought ... otherwise I'm not following this part very well.

Conscious experience wouldn't exist without the curious human ability to think we know what we are talking about without actually knowing anything at all.

If you can expand on this last part particularly . . . ? Maintaining a keen awareness of our ignorance can definitely be helpful. Piaget talked of meaning in terms of embodiment, constructing our way through the world . . ..
Apologies on the delay ... somehow I missed the notification that would have indicated your posted reply to my own. I will have to think on it...

Sent from my SCH-I545 using Tapa....

Edit: And there lies technology blurting out the reason why i cannot just rattle out my reply atm :)
 
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@Constance I'd like to ask about the partially underscored statement above in Soupie's post: "The interesting thing to me was how brain integrates disparate streams of information to create qualia.

Koch makes a similar statement here: “Since the early days of computers, scholars have argued that the subjective, phenomenal states that make up the life of the mind are intimately linked to the information expressed at that time by the brain.” A "Complex" Theory of Consciousness - Scientific American

It seems to me that a major question about both brain activity and the phenomena of mind/consciousness is side-stepped by the use of these bolded transitive verbs to characterize actions by the brain as creating qualia and expressing information.

What is the major question that you feel is sidestepped?

I answered part of it in the statement you quoted next.

@Constance From the standpoint of phenomenological description and analysis of human perception and consciousness, we receive rather than produce impressions from phenomena present to us in the world that produce the qualia we experience.

The point is that qualia accompany our phenomenal experiences, whether of what we see and otherwise sense in our environment or what we think, remember, desire, etc. Qualia are given to us in our conscious experiences (and I think also in our subconscious experiences. Qualia likely also accompany unconscious information that seeps into our minds (such as archetypes that become problematic for some individuals, as Jung demonstrated).

I've been puzzled by your apparent claims about qualia as 'created' by the brain from integrated micro-information received directly by the brain rather than being experienced through embodied conscious presence to and involvement in the local physical world we inhabit. But after reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on Qualia I now perhaps understand somewhat better where you're coming from and why we've been speaking without mutual understanding on this subject. The article distinguishes four different uses/definitions of the term 'qualia' being employed by philosophers and neuroscientists concerned with understanding consciousness (or with eliminating it). I'll quote the section on different uses of the term here and let you read the rest yourself. It should answer the questions you put to me, or clarify why they are unanswerable from my point of view given the way you use the term qualia.

Qualia
First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Mon Apr 22, 2013

Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.

The entry that follows is divided into ten sections. The first distinguishes various uses of the term ‘qualia’. The second addresses the question of which mental states have qualia. The third section brings out some of the main arguments for the view that qualia are irreducible and non-physical. The remaining sections focus on functionalism and qualia, the explanatory gap, qualia and introspection, representational theories of qualia, qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties, relational theories of qualia and finally the issue of qualia and simple minds.

1. Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’
(1) Qualia as phenomenal character. Consider your visual experience as you stare at a bright turquoise color patch in a paint store. There is something it is like for you subjectively to undergo that experience. What it is like to undergo the experience is very different from what it is like for you to experience a dull brown color patch. This difference is a difference in what is often called ‘phenomenal character’. The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. If you are told to focus your attention upon the phenomenal character of your experience, you will find that in doing so you are aware of certain qualities. These qualities — ones that are accessible to you when you introspect and that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience are sometimes called ‘qualia’.

There are more restricted uses of the term ‘qualia’, however.

(2) Qualia as properties of sense data. Consider a painting of a dalmatian. Viewers of the painting can apprehend not only its content (i.e., its representing a dalmatian) but also the colors, shapes, and spatial relations obtaining among the blobs of paint on the canvas. It has sometimes been supposed that being aware or conscious of a visual experience is like viewing an inner, non-physical picture or sense-datum. So, for example, on this conception, if I see a dalmatian, I am subject to a mental picture-like representation of a dalmatian (a sense-datum), introspection of which reveals to me both its content and its intrinsic, non-representational features (counterparts to the visual features of the blobs of paint on the canvas). These intrinsic, non-representational features have been taken by advocates of the sense-datum theory to be the sole determinants of what it is like for me to have the experience. In a second, more restricted sense of the term ‘qualia’, then, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, non-representational features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that are responsible for their phenomenal character. Historically, this is how the term ‘qualia’ was first used in philosophy. It was introduced in 1929 by C.I. Lewis in a discussion of the sense-datum theory. As Lewis used the term, qualia were properties of sense-data themselves.

(3) Qualia as intrinsic non-representational properties. There is another established sense of the term ‘qualia’, which is similar to the one just given but which does not demand of qualia advocates that they endorse the sense-datum theory. However sensory experiences are ultimately analyzed — whether, for example, they are taken to involve relations to sensory objects or they are identified with neural events or they are held to be physically irreducible events — many philosophers suppose that they have intrinsic, consciously accessible features that are non-representational and that are solely responsible for their phenomenal character. These features, whatever their ultimate nature, physical or non-physical, are often dubbed ‘qualia’.

In the case of visual experiences, for example, it is frequently supposed that there is a range of visual qualia, where these are taken to be intrinsic features of visual experiences that (a) are accessible to introspection, (b) can vary without any variation in the representational contents of the experiences, (c) are mental counterparts to some directly visible properties of objects (e.g., color), and (d) are the sole determinants of the phenomenal character of the experiences. This usage of ‘qualia’ has become perhaps the most common one in recent years. Philosophers who hold or have held that there are qualia, in this sense of the term, include, for example, Nagel (1974), Peacocke (1983) and Block (1990).

(4) Qualia as intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties. Some philosophers (e.g, Dennett 1987, 1991) use the term ‘qualia’ in a still more restricted way so that qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences that are also ineffable, nonphysical, and ‘given’ to their subjects incorrigibly (without the possibility of error). Philosophers who deny that there are qualia sometimes have in mind qualia as the term is used in this more restricted sense (or a similar one). It is also worth mentioning that sometimes the term ‘qualia’ is restricted to sensory experiences by definition, while on other occasions it is allowed that if thoughts and other such cognitive states have phenomenal character, then they also have qualia. Thus, announcements by philosophers who declare themselves opposed to qualia need to be treated with some caution. One can agree that there are no qualia in the last three senses I have explained, while still endorsing qualia in the standard first sense.

In the rest of this entry, we use the term ‘qualia’ in the very broad way I did at the beginning of the entry. So, we take it for granted that there are qualia. Later on, in section 8, we discuss specifically the view of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. . . .
 
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I still haven't had a moment to read the first ITT brief let alone the second. However I think ITT would handle the unconscious without a problem. I'm certainly not a neurologist, but my understanding is that organisms bring in gobs of information that never makes it to their awareness.

For example, a fly may land on your arm; while your central nervous system and brain will process this, the sensation/qualia never comes to your awareness. That's because the information never becomes fully integrated since it doesn't receive the attention of the whole complex.

I agree with most of what you say here. I was thinking at the time I wrote that post of information of various kinds existing in the human subconscious and unconscious and affecting human thought and behavior in often complex ways -- sometimes dis-integrating ways. At the same time, Jungian therapists can bring that information forward with insights that re-integrate individual minds, while Jungian scholars as well as practitioners expand our understanding of the ways our minds work and add to our ability to interpret our species' history. I'm not sure, however, that questions and projects of this nature would have a bearing on what Tononi hopes to achieve with his theory.
 
See Tiller among quantum mind physicists and Radin among parapsychologists for a start. I'll try to find a comprehensive paper on this subject after I return from an errand.

I'm thinking of Radin's pre-cognition experiments:

Entangled Minds: "Predicting the unpredictable" in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

" I conducted my first presentiment experiment in 1996. As of today this type of experiment has been repeated something like 40 times by a dozen labs."

"A recent meta-analysis of experiments from seven independent laboratories (n=26) published since 1978 indicates that the human body can apparently detect randomly delivered stimuli occurring 1-10 seconds in the future. The key observation in these studies is that human physiology appears to be able to distinguish between unpredictable dichotomous future stimuli, such as emotional vs. neutral images or sound vs. silence. This phenomenon has been called presentiment (as in "feeling the future"). In this paper we call it predictive anticipatory activity or PAA. The phenomenon is "predictive" because it can distinguish between upcoming stimuli; it is "anticipatory" because the physiological changes occur before a future event; and it is an "activity" because it involves changes in the cardiopulmonary, skin, and/or nervous systems.

PAA is an unconscious phenomenon that seems to be a time-reversed reflection of the usual physiological response to a stimulus. It appears to resemble precognition (consciously knowing something is going to happen before it does), but PAA specifically refers to unconscious physiological reactions as opposed to conscious premonitions. Though it is possible that PAA underlies the conscious experience of precognition, experiments testing this idea have not produced clear results."
 
http://www.skeptiko.com/240-david-lane-patricia-churchland-part-2/

around 37 minutes in David Lane on what's the matter with matter, pointing out that there is plenty of room for the mystical in the material b/c we don't know what material is - at the deepest level it's evanescent and we are made of congealed light ... and Alex's response at around 44 min. Alex discusses the sequelae of Scientific Materialism - the over-arching paradigm to reduce things to material structures. He argues that thinking our enemies are "biological robots" or that we're made of meat - in the end just really complicated machines - allows us (and he means US) to use weapons with depleted uranium or to take water and other resources away from people ... and would we really do that if we truly thought we were all connected or had some deeper value than just an ultimately material basis?



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Do you mean how do we ask questions based in phenomenology concerning how Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness would cope with subconscious and unconscious information, or how does/could phenomenology account for the existence and effects of subconscious and unconscious information in human beings?




The underscored is very interesting. Would you give an example or two of what you're describing?

mindfulness of thinking - when a thought arises you label it "thought" and go back to the breath. also known as "noting" you become aware that a thought is arising and what type it is before it is fully formed - worry, planning etc - would performing these experiments on persons trained in awareness of thought formation have a different outcome? or could u use biofeedback to train subjects to "catch" thoughts in early formation and defeat the predicted outcome?


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Yes. The graphic helps. And somewhat dovetails with the notion of consciousness modeling a larger reality in relation to the senses in a kind of infinitely recursive feedback loop. Perhaps.


I believe all the neurological data indicates is a cause and effect relationship between subconscious and conscious mind. It tells us nothing about causality in relationship to the subconscious, or likewise about apparent causality in the larger macro world of conscious awareness. I'm guessing the effect of the conscious upon the unconscious might be much more difficult, if not impossible to disentangle.

What if in fact there is no subconscious mind at all, and all that is being observed is the totality or expanse of our natural cognitive relationship to consciousness? How do we know that it's not merely the physical portion of ourselves, the organic temporal machine upstairs, the rest of us included, *is* that which* is*, the very nature of that which regulates a very limited relationship to consciousness producing reality specific experience?

Is not the subconscious mind merely a "view"? How can such a view be truthfully substantiated? Even if we (humanity) produce a model explaining cognizant awareness based on Freud's views, do we really have anything substantial apart from the language of mathematics that supports the hypothetical?

This is not meant as an attention getting wrench in the works here in the least. I REALLY don't get this aspect of consciousness research.
 
@Soupie - where do you get the little cartoon images of qualia-enhanced cats?
I made it using Word.

Regarding unconscious and conscious awareness, ITT has this to say:

Finally, consciousness not only requires a neural substrate with appropriate anatomical structure and appropriate physiological parameters, it also needs time (Bachmann, 2000). The theory predicts that the time requirement for the generation of conscious experience in the brain emerges directly from the time requirements for the build-up of an integrated repertoire among the elements of the corticothalamic main complex so that discriminations can be highly informative (Tononi, 2004; Balduzzi and Tononi, unpubl.). To give an obvious example, if one were to perturb half of the elements of the main complex for less than a millisecond, no perturbations would produce any effect on the other half within this time window, and would be zero. After, say, 100 ms, however, there is enough time for differential effects to be manifested, and should grow.
In other words, if a person witnesses, say, a car crash, all the stimuli will physically reach the body at different times (light travels faster than sound, sound travels fast than smell, etc.). Then, the different "elements" of the organisms will begin to process the stimuli - eyes, ears, nose, etc. At this point in time, this information is still in the "unconscious." However, within milliseconds, all this information will be integrated into coherent qualia, that is to say, a stream of consciousness.

Thus, we would expect to see various neurological activity in the brain - and even physiological responses - before an organism is consciously aware. Back to the music analogy: we would expect to see the instruments being played before the music was produced.

This is related to, but not the same as, mental causation. While the mind may be emitted/produced by the brain, once the mind is emitted, it can still influence/affect the brain - just as the music (sound waves) produced by an instrument can affect the instruments. The sound waves emitted from a base drum can cause it and other instruments to rattle, etc.

@smcder Entangled Minds: "Predicting the unpredictable" in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

PAA is an unconscious phenomenon that seems to be a time-reversed reflection of the usual physiological response to a stimulus. It appears to resemble precognition (consciously knowing something is going to happen before it does), but PAA specifically refers to unconscious physiological reactions as opposed to conscious premonitions. Though it is possible that PAA underlies the conscious experience of precognition, experiments testing this idea have not produced clear results."


Try as I might, I can't seem to grasp what is being said here.

Are these studies suggesting that organisms react physiologically to events before they have conscious awareness of events?
 
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I made it using Word.

Regarding unconscious and conscious awareness, ITT has this to say:

In other words, if a person witnesses, say, a car crash, all the stimuli will physically reach the body at different times (light travels faster than sound, sound travels fast than smell, etc.). Then, the different "elements" of the organisms will begin to process the stimuli - eyes, ears, nose, etc. At this point in time, this information is still in the "unconscious." However, within milliseconds, all this information will be integrated into coherent qualia, that is to say, a stream of consciousness.

Thus, we would expect to see various neurological activity in the brain - and even physiological responses - before an organism is consciously aware. Back to the music analogy: we would expect to see the instruments being played before the music was produced.

This is related to, but not the same as, mental causation. While the mind may be emitted/produced by the brain, once the mind is emitted, it can still influence/affect the brain - just as the music (sound waves) produced by an instrument can affect the instruments. The sound waves emitted from a base drum can cause it and other instruments to rattle, etc.

@smcder Entangled Minds: "Predicting the unpredictable" in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

PAA is an unconscious phenomenon that seems to be a time-reversed reflection of the usual physiological response to a stimulus. It appears to resemble precognition (consciously knowing something is going to happen before it does), but PAA specifically refers to unconscious physiological reactions as opposed to conscious premonitions. Though it is possible that PAA underlies the conscious experience of precognition, experiments testing this idea have not produced clear results."


Try as I might, I can't seem to grasp what is being said here.

Are these studies suggesting that organisms react physiologically to events before they have conscious awareness of events?

that is my understanding that there is a physiological response prior to exposure to the stimuli - I recommend spending te on Radin's blog and his book Conscious Universe




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