Consciousness and the Paranormal

[Soupie]

... do you not see a problem with using economics as an example? ...

Yes, but the point remains: Trying to completely explain the macro with the micro is a mistake.

 

[smcder]

nobody complains about the physics/economics disjunct b/c consciousness is in the middle ...

physics -> conscious entities -> economics

but I think many still expect this sort of explanation:

particle physics -> Newtonian mechanics (we're ok with this jump) -> chemistry -> biology - > consciousness -> pretty much everything else ...





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[Soupie]

nobody complains about the physics/economics disjunct b/c consciousness is in the middle ...

physics -> conscious entities -> economics

but I think many still expect this sort of explanation:

particle physics -> Newtonian mechanics (we're ok with this jump) -> chemistry -> biology - > consciousness -> pretty much everything else ...

At some level yes, but not completely... (unless one believes in a completely deterministic universe. Which I do not.)

Emergent Properties (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Epistemological Emergence

Irreducible-Pattern: Emergent properties and laws are systemic features of complex systems governed by true, lawlike generalizations within a special science that is irreducible to fundamental physical theory for conceptual reasons. The macroscopic patterns in question cannot be captured in terms of the concepts and dynamics of physics. Although he does not use the language of emergence, Jerry Fodor (1974) expresses this view nicely in speaking of the ‘immortal economist’ who vainly tries to derive economic principles from a knowledge of physics and the distribution of physical qualities in space-time. ...

Ontological Emergence

Ontological emergentists see the physical world as entirely constituted by physical structures, simple or composite. But composites are not (always) mere aggregates of the simples. There are layered strata, or levels, of objects, based on increasing complexity. Each new layer is a consequence of the appearance of an interacting range of ‘novel qualities.’ Their novelty is not merely temporal (such as the first instance of a particular geometric configuration), nor the first instance of a particular determinate of a familiar determinable (such as the first instance of mass 157.6819 kg in a contiguous hunk of matter). Instead, it is a novel, fundamental type of property altogether. We might say that it is ‘nonstructural,’ in that the occurrence of the property is not in any sense constituted by the occurrence of more fundamental properties and relations of the object's parts. Further, newness of property, in this sense, entails new primitive causal powers, reflected in laws which connect complex physical structures to the emergent features. (Broad's trans-ordinal laws are laws of this sort.)

 

[smcder]

see also eo Wilson's Comsillience on all things "then a miracle occurs" - I mean emergent!

;-)


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[smcder]

At some level yes, but not completely... (unless one believes in a completely deterministic universe. Which I do not.)

I don't think anyone is saying something comes between any of these steps are they? we can see that physics to chemistry makes sense, also chemistry to biology (this is where the vitalists were) - but I do think there is a which one of these things is not like the other? argument to be made for consciousness ...



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[Soupie]

I don't think anyone is saying something comes between any of these steps are they? we can see that physics to chemistry makes sense, also chemistry to biology (this is where the vitalists were) - but I do think there is a which one of these things is not like the other? argument to be made for consciousness ..

Any sufficiently unexplained natural phenomena is indistinguishable from magic.

 

[smcder]

Any sufficiently unexplained natural phenomena is indistinguishable from magic.

I've posted this before:

The Archdruid Report: Clarke's Fallacy



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[smcder]

@Soupie - I don't know if you are listening through the Peterson series on personality (YouTube) but 10 Carl Rogers is very good on listening and 11 he discusses how little, how few of our ideas are our own (as educated people), that attention may be more important than intelligence and how to discern which ideas are yours - (and how he says you do that is very interesting, it has to do with the body) ... these ideas impacted me and I think what a gift he is giving to his students.

 

[smcder]

Any sufficiently unexplained natural phenomena is indistinguishable from magic.

What does that mean for you in this discussion?

 

[smcder]

It's the reverse: Beliefs about what our bodies and minds are made of follow from how we feel about our bodies and minds. (Or at least that's the concept I was conveying.)

Well, because it's a subjective feeling/experience, it's difficult to describe. I'm extremely introverted (resist reading that as "socially anxious" because I'm not socially anxious). I tend to view most physical needs/processes as a nuisance: eating, sleeping, defecating, talking, etc. I'm sure that sounds bizarre and creepy, haha. When I was in college, my apartment room looked like the inside of a shoe box. This was partly due to having no money, but also because I could generally give a damn about having pretty things around me. My typical outfit is jeans and a black t shirt.

In the one Peterson lecture, he asked the students to consider why they have Christmas trees. He said "You don't know why you do!" I had to chuckle: If I had my druthers, I wouldn't do anything for any "holiday." I don't want a Christmas tree.

I live in the world of ideas and concepts, not the world of objects and the sensations we have from interacting with them.

(Now, I'm trying to convey how I feel here. This is not to say that I don't enjoy certain physical experiences, but I clearly do not enjoy/seek them to the extent that most other people do. I am not a sensual person, I'm the polar opposite.)

I am totally caught up on substance and properties! See, for me, that is the fun of it all. Trying to make sense of it and figure it out.

I have no formal training in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, or neurology. I haven't read any books on consciousness either. It has been a blast for me the past several weeks to read formal theories and terms which mirror my own ideas and intuitions about reality and consciousness.

I agree that humans don't have much of a clue - they have a clue, but not much of one - but for me, the joy is in discussing and developing my own views and the views of others, while fully realizing that I may be wrong. (I haven't gotten the point where Peterson talks about consciousness... but I have gotten through most of that lecture. It must be at the very end.)

I'm pretty much uninterested in what people think are the consequences of their beliefs, haha.

I would say little to no practical difference must necessarily follow from being either a property or substance dualist. It would likely impact (not negate) religious beliefs though, such as beliefs about souls and heaven. For example, I'd imagine that a substance dualist would believe that the soul and heaven were made of a different substance than their body and the universe. A property dualist - while they could still believe in souls and heaven - would not believe these things were made of a different substance then their body and the universe, they would simply believe these entities/structures were made of a different form of the substance.

I'm sure that sounds bizarre and creepy,

Why do you think it would sound bizarre and creepy?

I know someone who fits this description of your relationship to the body and physical needs very closely and I know quite a lot about their history - and it's a combination of temperament (tending to the ascetic) and upbringing. However, this person has intentionally reconnected with their body and in doing so found a rich new set of experiences.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie -

There are inherent limitations with this way of knowing. It's the subjective attempting to use the objective to describe the subjective. (This is the opposite of science - the objective - attempting to use the objective to describe the subjective.)

Just skimming back on the thread - I have missed a lot the past several days - I may take this out of context (your sentence above)

(This is the opposite of science - the objective - attempting to use the objective to describe the subjective.)

but it seems to me science has to use the subjective, all the time ... ? That scientists are in no different a position than phenomenologists, they don't use an objective consciousness (what would that mean anyway? something like omniscience I think ... omni + science ...) they only have the first person experience of doing science ... its just that phenomenologists explicitly recognize that all we have is the first person subjective ... suppose I write an equation down - then I hand it to you, or I look at it again in a few seconds ... all of that is subjective ... I can't do a thing with any objective reality sitting "out there" ...

in terms of phenomenology and loading it with qualifiers, the problem is, we only have our subjectivity - this was in the Buddhist talk I linked to - the recognition of what we don't know (of course the Buddha asked us to take some things as working hypotheses, but remember, his claim was he had confirmed those hypotheses, so he said we would find it very difficult to engage in the practice if we did not take these as working hypotheses) ... so how can we really qualify it as "human" experience . . . when it's the only experience we have?

 

[Soupie]

I've posted this before:

The Archdruid Report: Clarke's Fallacy

That is definitely an interesting read, but I find his assertion that Clarke has posited a falsehood to be disingenuous. The Archdruid's conceptualization of "magic" is different from the commonly accepted meaning, the meaning that Clarke clearly intended in his axiom:

Magic - The power of apparently influencing the course of events by using mysterious or supernatural forces.

@Soupie Any sufficiently unexplained natural phenomena is indistinguishable from magic.

@smcder What does that mean for you in this discussion?

For me, it means that simply because consciousness cannot currently be explained via natural processes does not mean consciousness cannot be explained via natural processes. Here natural means non-magical.

...to move beyond what the Buddha calls papañca (conceptual proliferation - conceptualization of the world through the use of ever-expanding language and concepts) we are asked to take some positions about consciousness as being beyond the product of physical processes and that awareness may lie outside of space and time

Do you see the problem with this statement?

@smcder

I do think there is a which one of these things is not like the other? argument to be made for consciousness ...

There is no doubt in my mind ( ) that life and self-aware experience are like nothing else in our universe.

What are the limits of self-aware experience? Who knows? What is the potential of self-aware experience? Who knows?

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie That scientists are in no different a position than phenomenologists...

What objective science does that subjective experience/logic does not is suggest that reality may not be only as it appears to us.

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie - I don't know if you are listening through the Peterson series on personality (YouTube) but 10 Carl Rogers is very good on listening and 11 he discusses how little, how few of our ideas are our own (as educated people), that attention may be more important than intelligence and how to discern which ideas are yours - (and how he says you do that is very interesting, it has to do with the body) ... these ideas impacted me and I think what a gift he is giving to his students.

I haven't listened to those lectures yet, but what I have learned from Peterson (and you) has already changed me. Many thanks for that.

 

[Soupie]

@smcder

but it seems to me science has to use the subjective, all the time ... ? That scientists are in no different a position than phenomenologists...

I think at least three things follow from this:

1) There is an objective reality which cogito can completely define.

2) There is an objective reality which cogito can't completely define.

3) There is no objective reality, just cogito.

All three of these are possibilities. My narrative is that (2) is the correct one, but (3) is just as likely, and (1) seems the least likely.

 

[Constance]

And what is the relationship between information and qualia? Is Tonini on the right path or way off?

I think Tononi does not understand, and thus does not attempt to respond to, the qualitative nature of consciousness that arose at least 50,000 years ago according to some anthropologists (and I would guess far earlier than that). We have only to observe the interactions of members of still-extant species from which we evolved, the protohuman species that eventuated in homo sapiens, to recognize the qualitative nature of their consciousnesses in their behaviors toward one another. See de Waals.

I strongly disagree. Indeed, Tonini is attempting to explain this very thing!

Yes, I know that's what he is 'attempting to explain', but the question is whether he succeeds (or can succeed) in doing so based on his IIT approach as he has described it so far. The following linked page provides commentary and further links to critiques of IIT by both John Searle and Colin McGinn that can help us to understand the explanatory gap between what Tononi and Koch currently believe about the IIT as potentially explanatory of consciousness and the reasons why it cannot do that work. See especially the links (at the bottom of the page) to Searle's NYT review of Koch's most recent book [the direct link there allows you to download that review without charge] and to McGinn's article [not behind a paywall as the Searle review normally is].

EDIT TO ADD the link referred to above:

Consciousness Wars: Tononi-Koch versus Searle | Corona Radiata

Scroll down for these embedded links on that page:

**Can Information Theory Explain Consciousness? Most of the review is behind a paywall. Contact me ([email protected]). Zenio permits me to send out the text of the paper, one email at a time. March 2014; or download here.

*** Colin McGinn makes this argument eloquently in a more recent article in the NYRB, Homunculism which is a review of Kurzweil’s current book. This is not behind a paywall.

Also, I think the qualitative nature of consciousness arose long, long before 50,000 years ago!

I think so too; as I indicated, this is obvious in de Waal's observations of primate behavior.

In other words, Tonini is suggesting that qualitative experience arises via the organism's ability to discriminate and integrate staggeringly vast amounts of stimuli. This integrated information is qualitative experience. Living organisms interact with the environment (and vice versa) and integrated information (living experience) arises.

What you say here ^ corresponds with the phenomenogical viewpoint of 'lived reality'. But Tononi has not yet taken his theory to the phenomenological/experiential level and it is doubtful, given his current definition of 'information', that he can ultimately do so. Searle clarifies this in his NYT review.

This really dovetails with William James' "filter" theory of consciousness.

Steve had asked earlier for a paper that describes the filter theory of the brain vis a vis consciousness in James and other researchers pursuing an understanding of psychical and paranormal experience. I haven't seen in this thread that a paper on the filter theory has been linked. Have you posted one? If not, what source or sources are you using re James?

This paper by Ned Block might be helpful at this point:

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Kimfestschrift.pdf

 

[Constance]

The above-linked article by Colin McGinn in the New York Review of Books is in fact behind a paywall. Here's a link to another response by McGinn to IIT as supported by Koch.

Conscious Entities » IIT

 

[Constance]

Here is an interesting exchange between a neuroscientist responding to McGinn's review of the Kurzweil and McGinn himself:

‘How to Create a Mind’ by Joe Herbert | The New York Review of Books

 

[smcder]

That is definitely an interesting read, but I find his assertion that Clarke has posited a falsehood to be disingenuous. The Archdruid's conceptualization of "magic" is different from the commonly accepted meaning, the meaning that Clarke clearly intended in his axiom:

For me, it means that simply because consciousness cannot currently be explained via natural processes does not mean consciousness cannot be explained via natural processes. Here natural means non-magical.

Do you see the problem with this statement?

There is no doubt in my mind ( ) that life and self-aware experience are like nothing else in our universe.

What are the limits of self-aware experience? Who knows? What is the potential of self-aware experience? Who knows?

"That is definitely an interesting read, but I find his assertion that Clarke has posited a falsehood to be disingenuous. The Archdruid's conceptualization of "magic" is different from the commonly accepted meaning, the meaning that Clarke clearly intended in his axiom:"

I don't read it that Greer asserts Clarke as positing a falsehood - I haven't re-read the article, so he may at some point, but the relevant portion to me is quoted below. Greer also acknowledges that the misunderstanding is a common one in our culture. I think the definition of magic that he uses is the correct one historically. See also the lectures I posted on science, religion and magic. All three are still around and are vital.

(note: With the advent of chaos magic, the spelling is often seen as "magick" to distinguish it from this popular usage.)

The apotheosis of this sort of thinking is Arthur C. Clarke’s famous Third Law: "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." I mean no disrespect whatsoever to Clarke, who was among the best of SF authors; it’s hardly blameworthy that he shared misunderstandings of magic that were all but universal in his culture. The point remains that since magic does not do what technology does, and vice versa, the Third Law should properly be renamed Clarke’s Fallacy; no matter how advanced a technology may be, it does the kind of thing technologies do—that is to say, it manipulates matter and energy directly, which again is what magic does not do. I’d like to propose, in fact, an alternative rule, which I’ve modestly titled Greer’s Law: "Anyone who is unable to distinguish between magic and any technology, however advanced, doesn’t know much about magic."

@Soupie Any sufficiently unexplained natural phenomena is indistinguishable from magic.
@smcder What does that mean for you in this discussion?

For me, it means that simply because consciousness cannot currently be explained via natural processes does not mean consciousness cannot be explained via natural processes. Here natural means non-magical.

Are we using different definitions again? ;-) "Causing change in consciousness in accordance with will." to me could be considered a natural process. And I agree - it doesn't mean it cannot . . . but it doesn't mean it can. We don't know. "We don't know" - is becoming an important statement to me, "we don't know" in this instance doesn't mean:

"we don't know now, but in principle, we could know"
"we don't know now, but we will know in the future"
"we don't know now, but we will go ahead and make reasonable assumptions"

it means "we don't know now and we don't know if we will now in the future or if we can know in the future" - that would have been a more accurate statement for me to make.

...to move beyond what the Buddha calls papañca (conceptual proliferation - conceptualization of the world through the use of ever-expanding language and concepts) we are asked to take some positions about consciousness as being beyond the product of physical processes and that awareness may lie outside of space and time​

Do you see the problem with this statement?

I don't, but I may have a sense of how you do - but I think it will involve some papañca on your part to explain it . . . ;-)

 

[smcder]

What objective science does that subjective experience/logic does not is suggest that reality may not be only as it appears to us.

The suggestion that reality may not be only as it appears to us can only appear in subjective experience.