Consciousness and the Paranormal

[smcder]

Yes, I think so. I do plan to read that book.


Yes, it's at the very end.

And, yes, I interpreted it as him separating the body and mind, but I also vaguely understand that Phens don't believe that. (Which I find interesting about you @Constance because I get the sense that you believe in the immortality of the soul, that is, that the mind/soul exists before and after the body. But how can that be so if the physical body and mental mind are indivisible?)

Thompson was the most coherent of all the Phens that I've read so far, so I look forward to reading him.

Which I find interesting about you @Constance because I get the sense that you believe in the immortality of the soul, that is, that the mind/soul exists before and after the body. But how can that be so if the physical body and mental mind are indivisible?)

Re: survival of consciousness, I'd like to see more discussion of this, in light of Myers work - mentioned in these posts:

Constance, post: 177814, member: 6124
Constance, post: 190948, member: 6124

part or all of this work is online free - or was, I'll try to find and post the links later

 

[Constance]

I'm certainly not a computer scientist, but Searle's contention seems valid to me.

I think mind arises from physical brains interacting with the physical environment. I think mind can be conceived as a property of these physical systems (brains) a la Chalmers and Max Texmark.

I can't see it that way. The brain doesn't get out there in the environment to interact with anything. Everything we can think about comes to us first through the body and consciousness. Consciousness and mind are embodied. Where do you read Chalmers conceiving of mind as identical with the brain, btw?

 

[Constance]

yes, I interpreted it as him separating the body and mind, but I also vaguely understand that Phens don't believe that. (Which I find interesting about you @Constance because I get the sense that you believe in the immortality of the soul, that is, that the mind/soul exists before and after the body.

Not exactly. I believe that consciousness survives the death of the body.

But how can that be so if the physical body and mental mind are indivisible?)

Perhaps they're not 'indivisible' in any sense we presently understand. I had a spontaneous OBE when I was 21 that demonstrated to me that my consciousness had relocated at a distance away from my body, about 30 feet across the room from where I had just been sitting in my body, at a desk reading a book. During this experience my consciousness moved along the ceiling on the far wall transfixed by discovering itself outside my body, observing it from behind, and then overheard another consciousness within my own (evidently long familiar with me) commenting to herself that I was 'in a mess' but conveying that it was no big deal. Then I snapped back into my body and sought help at the university counselling office.

 

[Constance]

Re: survival of consciousness, I'd like to see more discussion of this, in light of Myers work - mentioned in these posts:

Constance, post: 177814, member: 6124
Constance, post: 190948, member: 6124

part or all of this work is online free - or was, I'll try to find and post the links later

Here's an article I came across recently by Bruce Greyson that you might find interesting. It concerns what he calls 'Peak in Darien' cases (both NDEs and visionary experiences just prior to death) which include veridical evidence of access to paranormal knowledge concerning the deaths and survival of consciousness of others.

http://www.newdualism.org/nde-papers/Greyson/Greyson-Anthropology and Humanism_2010-35-159-171.pdf

 

[smcder]

@Constance - just got the bit about speech and though being thedic thetic ? pre-conscious ... very interesting


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[smcder]

Jordan Peterson: 11. Rollo May & Viktor Frankl (Existentialism) - Personality & Its Transformations - YouTube

... a knockout ending on this one; showing secondary gain to nihilism ... which actually is the tougher choice - life is meaningless, so nothing you do matters or everything you do matters? questions the old saw of religion as a "comfort" ...


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[smcder]

Here's an article I came across recently by Bruce Greyson that you might find interesting. It concerns what he calls 'Peak in Darien' cases (both NDEs and visionary experiences just prior to death) which include veridical evidence of access to paranormal knowledge concerning the deaths and survival of consciousness of others.

http://www.newdualism.org/nde-papers/Greyson/Greyson-Anthropology and Humanism_2010-35-159-171.pdf

some thoughts and a link to Myers book:

1 . fascinating - the part about modern biotech blurring the lines of life/death - there was a podcast on technology to communicate with the dead - will have to find the guest ... interesting future in which the living and dead communicate ... lots of short story potential!

2. Buddhist idea of the aggregates or skandas

3. Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death by F. W. H. Myers - Free Ebook




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[Soupie]

I can't see it that way. The brain doesn't get out there in the environment to interact with anything. Everything we can think about comes to us first through the body and consciousness. Consciousness and mind are embodied.

In this case, consider my use of "brain" as shorthand, in a way. I've tried to generally use the term "body/brain" and/or "organism." I view the body/nervous system as an extension of the brain. More specifically, I think consciousness arises from the entire organism, not just the brain.

I still don't understand what is meant by the term "embodied."

Where do you read Chalmers conceiving of mind as identical with the brain, btw?

I didn't mean to imply that was Chalmers' view. However, Chalmers does apparently describe himself as a property dualist, not a substance dualist.

Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance - the physical kind - there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical substances (namely brains) (Wiki).

Whether this view can be said to be viewing the brain and mind as identical, I don't know. I don't think so.

I hold similar views my self, but I'm still searching for the right language to express them. (I've already created enough confusion by describing my views with the wrong terms.)

For example, I think the body and mind are distinct (I believe we are living bodies and living mind) - thus I suppose I'm a "dualist" but I'm not a substance dualist! I think Reflexive Monism describes my beliefs best.

 

[smcder]

In this case, consider my use of "brain" as shorthand, in a way. I've tried to generally use the term "body/brain" and/or "organism." I view the body/nervous system as an extension of the brain. More specifically, I think consciousness arises from the entire organism, not just the brain.

I still don't understand what is meant by the term "embodied."
I didn't mean to imply that was Chalmers' view. However, Chalmers does apparently describe himself as a property dualist, not a substance dualist.
Whether this view can be said to be viewing the brain and mind as identical, I don't know. I don't think so.

I hold similar views my self, but I'm still searching for the right language to express them. (I've already created enough confusion by describing my views with the wrong terms.)

For example, I think the body and mind are distinct (I believe we are living bodies and living mind) - thus I suppose I'm a "dualist" but I'm not a substance dualist! I think Reflexive Monism describes my beliefs best.

@Constance ...

is this a good starting point? see 2.6

We shall not explore the convergence between the early phenomenological tradition and embodied cognitive science, although we recognize that phenomenological insights can be an indispensable resource for the ongoing investigation of consciousness, self-consciousness, action and intersubjectivity (see Gallagher 2009; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Thompson 2007; Gallagher 2005; Wheeler 2005

Embodied Cognition (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

and then 3

I've got lakoffs book on mathematics going now - (see 2.1 metaphor for more on Lakoffs work) and I posted a couple of articles on mathematics in this thread ...

I'm more interested just now in survival of consciousness - but think we could keep mathematics and it's "unreasonable effectiveness" on the back burner:

smcder, post: 191129, member: 5134

url=Ants are laying siege to the world's chocolate supply – Ed Yong – Aeon is mathematics about? – James Franklin – Aeon

"People care about the philosophy of mathematics in a way they do not care about, say, the philosophy of accountancy. Perhaps the reason is that the certainty and objectivity of mathematics, its once-and-for-all establishment of rock-solid truths, stands as a challenge to many common philosophical positions. It is not just extreme sceptical views such as postmodernism that have a problem with it. So do all empiricist and naturalist views that hope for a fully ‘scientific’ explanation of reality and our knowledge of it. The problem is not so much that mathematics is true, but that its truths are absolutely necessary, and that the human mind can establish those necessities and understand why they must be so. It is very difficult to explain how a physical brain could do that.

...

Aristotelian realism stands in a difficult relationship with naturalism, the project of showing that all of the world and human knowledge can be explained in terms of physics, biology and neuroscience. If mathematical properties are realised in the physical world and capable of being perceived, then mathematics can seem no more inexplicable than colour perception, which surely can be explained in naturalist terms. On the other hand, Aristotelians agree with Platonists that the mathematical grasp of necessities is mysterious. What is necessary is true in all possible worlds, but how can perception see into other possible worlds? The scholastics, the Aristotelian Catholic philosophers of the Middle Ages, were so impressed with the mind’s grasp of necessary truths as to conclude that the intellect was immaterial and immortal. If today’s naturalists do not wish to agree with that, there is a challenge for them. ‘Don’t tell me, show me’: build an artificial intelligence system that imitates genuine mathematical insight. There seem to be no promising plans on the drawing board."





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[Soupie]

I gather that I am the only one pondering/interested in the problem of what I have called "subjective experience" and "self-aware subjective experience" but I recently found a great, long, technical paper addressing this issue. I haven't gotten completely through it yet, but I will post it here for posterity.

If nothing else, this paper validates my own thoughts and gives me the appropriate terminology to share my views with others!

What Phenomenal Consciousness is Like (MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

This paper has the following three goals, in ascending order of ambition. First, to show that there is a genuine dispute in the vicinity. Second, to rebut arguments against first-order theories based on a distinction (to be explained shortly) between “experiences” and “conscious experiences”. Third, to show that higher-order theories are mistaken. Even if none of these goals is met, at least the paper can serve as a terminological guide for the perplexed. ...

According to [First Order] theories, an event may be phenomenally conscious even though it is not represented by one of the subject’s mental states/events. In other words, higher-order representations are not necessary for phenomenal consciousness. In particular, we may take the first-order theorist to hold that a certain first-order condition—to be explained in a moment—is sufficient for having phenomenal character G. Take a phenomenally conscious perceptual experience e of a cucumber in daylight. If e is in fact represented by one of the subject’s mental states/events, then consider e*, an event as similar to e as possible, except that e* is not represented by one of the subject’s mental states/events. (Hence, if e is not in fact the target of a higher-order representation, then e*=e.) Repeat this process for other phenomenally conscious experiences of cucumbers, limes, green peppers,..., resulting in other (possible) experiences e**, e***,... Then the first-order theorist’s sufficient condition for G is this: being mentally exactly like e* (or like e**, or like e***,...).

According to [Higher Order] theories, on the other hand, higher-order representations are necessary for phenomenal consciousness. On this view, e* is not phenomenally conscious (and hence does not have G). That is, the higher-order theorist claims that there can be events that are mentally exactly like phenomenally conscious experiences, except that they are not targeted by higher-order representations, and thus are not phenomenally conscious. ...

According to the FOR theorist, necessarily any experience of green is (phenomenally) conscious; according to the HOR theorist, there could be experiences of green that are not conscious. Of course, the FOR theorist will add other sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness (in our abbreviated formulation: being an experience of blue, being an experience of triangularity, and so on); again, the HOR theorist will claim that there could be such experiences that are not conscious. ...

3. Experiences vs. conscious experiences: three accounts of this distinction

3.1 Carruthers: worldly vs. experiential subjectivity

Carruthers’ distinction between worldly subjectivity (what the world is like for the subject) and experiential subjectivity (what the subject’s experience is like for the subject) is one between properties:

...what the world (or state of the organism’s own body) is like for an organism...is a property of the world (or of a world-perceiver pair, perhaps). And:​

...what the organism’s experience of the world (or of its own body) is like for the organism...is a property of the organism’s experience of the world (or of an experience-experience pair) (2000: 127-8)​

My intuition is that the First Order theories are correct, and that Higher Order theories are not required for "conscious experience." However, intellectually, I can't conceive this yet. As this article argues for FO theories and against HO theories, I'm anxious to learn a new way to conceive of this "problem."

I think "conscious experience" may simply emerge from - perhaps not brains per se, but - the Integrated Information that brains/bodies produce. This is why the hard problem exists! It's analogous to explaining why the property of liquidity emerges from certain groups of molecules.

 

[smcder]

you really like the liquidity metaphor! we never got to the discussion on emergence from the SEP ... needs to stay on the to do list I think, I want a better understanding. I still recommend EO Wilson's Consillence on the subject generally.


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[smcder]

no cucumbers in sight ... but a phenomenally gorgeous day here of a. higher order!


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[smcder]

did u read this:

4. Possible Applications
Epistemological conceptions of emergence have clear and straightforward applications in current scientific contexts. Indeed, such notions have been carefully defined to capture macroscopic phenomena of current interest within the special sciences.

Whether there are any instances of ontological emergence is highly controversial. Some metaphysicians and philosophers of mind contend that there are strong first-person, introspective grounds for supposing that consciousness, intentionality, and/or human agency are ontologically emergent. The intrinsic qualitative and intentional properties of our experience, they suggest, appear to be of a fundamentally distinct character from the properties described by the physical and biological sciences.[12] And our experience of our own deliberate agency suggests a form of ‘direct’, macroscopic control over the general parameters of our behavior that cannot be reduced to the summation of individual causal interchanges of relevant
portions of the cerebral and motor cortex.[13]

? and contrast with the vitalism debate?


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[smcder]

also for posterity;

Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness:Amazon:Books

Aldous Huxley called humankind's basic trend toward spiritual growth the "perennial philosophy." In the view of James Austin, the trend implies a "perennial psychophysiology" -- because awakening, or enlightenment, occurs only when the human brain undergoes substantial changes. What are the peak experiences of enlightenment? How could these states profoundly enhance, and yet simplify, the workings of the brain? Zen and the Brain presents the latest evidence. In this book Zen Buddhism becomes the opening wedge for an extraordinarily wide-ranging exploration of consciousness. In order to understand which brain mechanisms produce Zen states, one needs some understanding of the anatomy, physiology, and chemistry of the brain. Austin, both a neurologist and a Zen practitioner, interweaves the most recent brain research with the personal narrative of his Zen experiences. The science is both inclusive and rigorous; the Zen sections are clear and evocative. Along the way, Austin examines such topics as similar states in other disciplines and religions, sleep and dreams, mental illness, consciousness-altering drugs, and the social consequences of the advanced stage of ongoing enlightenment."

...

as a Perennialist (among other things) this book had enormous appeal to me a few years ago. The last section is fascinating and inspired a short story about Satori I and II - supercomputer/neural networks placed on the moon and designed to - using magnetic fields - keep humanity humming along entrained in a state of enlightenment. A couple of novice monks are assigned the low status task of maintaining the system and hilarious consequences ensue.



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[smcder]

"Because intention plays such a critical role in the unfolding of our lives paying attention to it becomes a compelling interest. we begin this practice by noticing those obvious intentions that precede major movements of the body. before you shift position can you notice the intention in the mind to move? you may experience this as a particular thought as some urge or impulse, or even as the simple knowing that you're about to move. I often refer to intention as the "about to" moment. we know we are about to do something before we do it. in times of moving more slowly and deliberately, awareness of intention becomes clear. as we become more practiced in this observation, intentions before other kinds of actions also become apparent."

Joseph Goldstein "One Dharma"

the above is from a section on. how to practice ( meditation) - and puts me in mind of the experiments on free will we discussed earlier ... would the results be different for a trained mind (generally trained to attention on intention and trained to that task)? it seems that would be a first thing to look at ... so maybe the experimenters have done so


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[Soupie]

Whether there are any instances of ontological emergence is highly controversial. Some metaphysicians and philosophers of mind contend that there are strong first-person, introspective grounds for supposing that consciousness, intentionality, and/or human agency are ontologically emergent. The intrinsic qualitative and intentional properties of our experience, they suggest, appear to be of a fundamentally distinct character from the properties described by the physical and biological sciences.[12] And our experience of our own deliberate agency suggests a form of ‘direct’, macroscopic control over the general parameters of our behavior that cannot be reduced to the summation of individual causal interchanges of relevant portions of the cerebral and motor cortex.[13]

? and contrast with the vitalism debate?

I have said that I believe the mind is something ontologically unique/new in reality. By that I mean only that "conscious experience" is unlike anything else in reality. If that's not ontologically unique, then so be it.

I also conceive of emergence this way:

Emergent Properties (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Alexander, by contrast, is committed only to the appearance of novel qualities and associated, high-level causal patterns which cannot be directly expressed in terms of the more fundamental entities and principles. But these patterns do not supplement, much less supersede, the fundamental interactions. Rather, they are macroscopic patterns running through those very microscopic interactions. Emergent qualities are something truly new under the sun, but the world's fundamental dynamics remain unchanged.

This view also has appeal to me:

Epistemological Predictive: Emergent properties are systemic features of complex systems which could not be predicted (practically speaking; or for any finite knower; or for even an ideal knower) from the standpoint of a pre-emergent stage, despite a thorough knowledge of the features of, and laws governing, their parts.

I use the metaphor (analogy?) of liquidity only to illustrate what I mean about something (liquidity) arising from organised units (molecules). Vitalism to me is much like liquidity. Life and liquidity are properties that emerge from organised units.

Now, when it comes to mind, there is much nuance (and my conception is still a work in progress). But it goes something like this:

Organisms produce/emit Integrated Information, and Conscious Experience is an emergent property (a la liquidity) of Integrated Information.

Brains > Integrated Information > Conscious Experience

The "problem" for me, is can Conscious Experience follow/emerge from Integrated Information without an "observer." Thus my extreme interest in the FO/HO discussion of Experience vs. Conscious Experience.

Chalmers is a Property Dualist, so I wonder if he means the following:

Brains > a. Integrated Information, b. Conscious Experience

Finally, this view also has appeal to me!

William Hasker (1999) goes one step further in arguing for the existence of the mind conceived as a non-composite substance which ‘emerges’ from the brain at a certain point in its development. He dubs his position ‘emergent dualism,’ and claims for it all the philosophical advantages of traditional, Cartesian substance dualism while being able to overcome a central difficulty, viz., explaining how individual brains and mental substances come to be linked in a persistent, ‘monogamous’ relationship. Here, Hasker, is using the term to express a view structurally like one (vitalism) that the British emergentists were anxious to disavow, thus proving that the term is capable of evoking all manner of ideas for metaphysicians.

However, I don't follow how Hasker's view is like Vitalism... Was Vitalism conceived of as a "substance" that emerged from organisms? Not in my understanding of the concept...

 

[smcder]

I have said that I believe the mind is something ontologically unique/new in reality. By that I mean only that "conscious experience" is unlike anything else in reality. If that's not ontologically unique, then so be it.

I also conceive of emergence this way:

This view also has appeal to me:
I use the metaphor (analogy?) of liquidity only to illustrate what I mean about something (liquidity) arising from organised units (molecules). Vitalism to me is much like liquidity. Life and liquidity are properties that emerge from organised units.

Now, when it comes to mind, there is much nuance (and my conception is still a work in progress). But it goes something like this:

Organisms produce/emit Integrated Information, and Conscious Experience is an emergent property (a la liquidity) of Integrated Information.

Brains > Integrated Information > Conscious Experience

The "problem" for me, is can Conscious Experience follow/emerge from Integrated Information without an "observer." Thus my extreme interest in the FO/HO discussion of Experience vs. Conscious Experience.

Chalmers is a Property Dualist, so I wonder if he means the following:

Brains > a. Integrated Information, b. Conscious Experience

Finally, this view also has appeal to me!
However, I don't follow how Hasker's view is like Vitalism... Was Vitalism conceived of as a "substance" that emerged from organisms? Not in my understanding of the concept...

I had just wondered if you had read the part distinguishing it from the debate over vitalism - came after the part I quoted.




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[smcder]

18] Note that, if one grants the phenomenological claims of the mind-emergentist while denying their veridicality, one is doing something very different from twentieth-century scientists who debunked vitalist and strong emergentist views about life by uncovering life's physico-chemical basis. In the latter case, one accepts a challenge to provide a reductionist story of a seemingly unique sort of phenomenon, and meets it by developing better experimental and analytical tools. In the former case, on the other hand, one accepts the claims about how experience and agency seem to us but simply dismisses such seemings as illusory. Here, one is not simply overcoming an argument from ignorance with new, powerful theories; instead, one is doing something rather more like denying the data. (Further, classic empiricist accounts of the justification of our empirical beliefs assume that beliefs about the character of experience are veridical. Rejecting this assumption, it seems, entails a radical overhaul of one's epistemology, and it may be that this can be accomplished only by giving an implausible, deflationary conception of epistemic justification.)



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[smcder]

sorry this phone frustrates me - pasting more than I want


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[smcder]

conscious experience without an observer - is this something you could pursue phenomenologically? I mean as an. experience? through meditation

"... one helpful way to cut through the identification as observer or witness is to language our experience in the passive voice:

... consider hearing as "sounds being known" or thinking as "thoughts being known" ... experience of the body as "sensations being known"

this way of expressing what is happening takes the "I" out of the picture. What remains is luminous awareness spontaneously knowing. No "I," no self there at all.

Joseph Goldstein


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