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Consciousness and the Paranormal

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Buddhist phenomenology and conceptions of consciousness are intriguing to me - but I've only started with these.., very much "beginners mind"

"Zen and the Brain" by Austin - linked above is an amazing book. It links various mind states as recognized in Zen to their neural substrates - a materialist, Austin does believe Enlightenment is real - a real state of the mind (for him, the brain).

he is also a long term meditator and grounds the book in his own experience


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Buddhist phenomenology and conceptions of consciousness are intriguing to me - but I've only started with these.., very much "beginners mind"

"Zen and the Brain" by Austin - linked above is an amazing book. It links various mind states as recognized in Zen to their neural substrates - a materialist, Austin does believe Enlightenment is real - a real state of the mind (for him, the brain).

he is also a long term meditator and grounds the book in his own experience

I'll look into Austin's book. You might also be interested in the book linked below, Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism. The second link below goes to a sample of it at Scribd that includes a significant portion of the very insightful first chapter, Hyong-hyo Kim, "Merleau-Pontean “Flesh” and Its Buddhist Interpretation."


Description:
"Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism explores a new mode of philosophizing through a comparative study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and philosophies of major Buddhist thinkers such as Nagarjuna, Chinul, Dogen, Shinran, and Nishida Kitaro. Challenging the dualistic paradigm of existing philosophical traditions, Merleau-Ponty proposes a philosophy in which the traditional opposites are encountered through mutual penetration. Likewise, a Buddhist worldview is articulated in the theory of dependent co-arising, or the middle path, which comprehends the world and beings in the third space, where the subject and the object, or eternalism and annihilation, exist independent of one another. The thirteen essays in this volume explore this third space in their discussions of Merleau-Ponty's concepts of the intentional arc, the flesh of the world, and the chiasm of visibility in connection with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self and the five aggregates, the Tiantai Buddhist concept of threefold truth, Zen Buddhist huatou meditation, the invocation of the Amida Buddha in True Pure Land Buddhism, and Nishida's concept of basho."

A few review comments:

"The French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty independently rediscovered something that has long been articulated in many of the various strains of Mahayana Buddhist practice, namely the ambiguous interpenetration and dependent becoming of the self and its world. These two sites of thinking have much to say to each other and in this important and provocative volume they are brought into dialogue. In these strong and diverse essays, we do not merely learn what is the same and what is different in these two interlocutors. The intermediary nature of both becomes a model for comparative thinking itself." (Jason Wirth, Seattle University)

"Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism is comparative philosophy at its best. The chapter authors clearly and insightfully draw out the resonances (as well as the often equally illuminating contrasts) between this key 20th century phenomenologist and a rich variety of Buddhist figures and schools of thought. Going beyond a simple demarcation of similarities and differences, however, the authors take advantage of the dialogical space opened up as an opportunity to engage in the practice of philosophizing itself, which in this case includes questioning the very nature (and limits) of philosophy as such. Jin Y. Park and Gereon Kopf have done scholars of phenomenology as well as those of Buddhist thought a great service in assembling and co-authoring this volume, which is bound to leave a positive and lasting impact on both fields." (Bret W. Davis, Loyola University Maryland)


Sample at Scribd:
Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism
 
I've spent the last several hours reading parts of the Austin book (recommended by Steve) at amazon and Google Books and I've got to have it. Fortunately, a number of used copies are available at amazon for around $5.00, though even new copies are not that expensive ($26.59 for an 800-pp. book). Austin writes extremely well and, while I'm not interested much in whether his neurological explanations for states of enlightenment will hold up, I am fascinated by his descriptions of his own experiences in meditation. I'm going to have to apply myself to this practice because I want to experience that state of seeing what-is beyond the scenery, and in one case described in the amazon review below [highlighted in blue], what appears in one instance to be 'there' without a viewer. Here's an amazon review that provides a sense of what happens in this book:

Evelyn Uyemura:
James H. Austin M. D.is an experimental neurologist who spent several sabbaticals in Japan doing things to cat brains and practicing Zen rather earnestly at the same time, and altogether probably spent 30 or so years sitting Zazen (not only in Japan but wherever he went), experiencing at least one odd physical event, one interesting internal absorption (trance-hallucination, maybe) and one lightning-strike of kensho or wisdom-insight. He does not seem to consider himself to have gotten as far as a state of on-going enlightenment, but he believes that such a state is the result of an accumulation of a series of such kensho experiences.
He says that he is not a dualist. But the interesting point is that his monism is purely materialistic. Perhaps not precisely "Matter alone is, nothing that is not matter is," but something more like "Physical states governed by physical laws alone are, nothing that is not subject to physical laws is." He is the classic man of science. And although he experienced and is describing what most would consider a spiritual insight, he seeks to explain it and value it in biological, physiological, neurological terms, as a rsult of predictable and understandable processes in the brain and nothing else. But his moment of kensho left him so awed that he was tempted to refer it to God. This temptation he overcomes.
The odd physical experience he had is recounted in chapter 94 (after a very long prelude!) He heads the chapter with famous lines by p'ang Chi-Shih:
How wonderous this, how mysterious!
I carry wood, I draw water.
And he has spent a lot of time explaining the Zen emphasis on the here and now. Then: One day after 25 minutes of Zazen, he goes in to shave. "Suddenly, for the first time ever, I really feel both hands. My tactile sensations are enormously enhanced. Perception increases dramatically on the right hand to the elbow; on the left hand not as strongly and only to the wrist. ONly the sense of touch is enhanced, as it is elicited by the towel in my hands....I still retain all the usual distinctions between myself as subject and towel as object...Astonishing, delicious perception! How much richer than ordinary feeling." After a few seconds, the change fades away. There follows pages of theorizing about what could have happened in the brain to cause such a sensation.
Later, an experience during a prolonged sitting in which "conscious drops out" although he remains erect and awake, and then conscious returns with a hallucinated red maple leaf as the only object in a place entirely black and silent, glistening black and infinitely silent. Then the leaf evaporates, and bliss overwhelms what he calls "the experient,' and all sense of space and bodily consciousness is erased temporarily.
Finally, 10 years later, a chapter called "A Taste of Kensho" :
"It strikes unexpectedly at 9 am on the surface platform of the London subway system. (Due to a mistake)...I wind up at a station where I have never been before....The view is the dingy interior of the station, some grimy buildings, a bit of open sky. Instantly the entire view aquires three qualities: Absolute Reality, Intrinsic Rightness, Ultimate Reflection. With no transition, it is all complete....Yes, there is the paradox of this extraordinary viewing. But there is no viewer. The scene is utterly empty, stripped of every last extension of an I-Me-Mine (his name for ego-self). Vanished in one split second is the familiar sensation that this person is viewing a city scene. The new viewing proceeds impersonally, not pausing to register the paradox that there is no human subject "doing" it. Three insights penetrate the experient, each conveying Total Understanding at depths far beyond simple knowledge: This is the eternal state of affairs. There is nothing more to do. There is nothing whatever to fear."
The result of this kensho is a rather deep re-ordering of the personality, and even some changes in the physical body (the absorption also made physiological changes, but did not re-order the personality much.)

His analysis of these events is that they are physiological, measurable states in the brain, and that they "etch" (his metaphor) the brain, destroying some brain cells and activating other ones, so that an enlightened person is actually a person whose brain has been changed by the physiological process of meditation (and sometimes by other processes, such as drug-induced or naturally occuring lesions of some sort), but meditative processes, though slower, are also more controlled and more likely to be beneficial.
His explanation is at odds both with Advaistic mysticism and with theistic dualistic mysticism. But it is also clear that he is describing the same experience that all mystics describe. Although his neurological explanations are novel, his process and product fit quite well in the Zen setting, which is non-theistic and also not particularly "spiritual."
HIs description of the ongoing state of enlightenment is that after emptying the brain of lots of clutter and junk, including the personal ego, one is able to "return to the marketplace with bliss-bestowing hands." This fits with my understanding of Jesus and mystics as well--that having been set free, they now can act compassionately and freely.
And the place where enlightenment shows up is in ordinary daily life, which is now lived directly, "mindlessly" (meaning non-analytically).
Although Dr. Austin seem to be saying exact opposite things from most other mystics, they are somehow looking at the same exact elephant from two different sides and describing it differently while still talking about the same thing. My other thought is that what we think about "enlightenment" doesn't matter at all. It is a thing in itself, and it really doesn't matter what we say about it or what we think it means.
I enjoyed this book, though my brain kind of blurred over the technical neurology stuff.

As the reviewer wrote, Austin's "monism is purely materialistic. Perhaps not precisely 'Matter alone is, nothing that is not matter is,' but something more like 'Physical states governed by physical laws alone are; nothing that is not subject to physical laws is.' He is the classic man of science. And although he experienced and is describing what most would consider a spiritual insight, he seeks to explain it and value it in biological, physiological, neurological terms, as a result of predictable and understandable processes in the brain and nothing else." As it happens, in reading sections of the book at Google Books (also linked below) I came across these paragraphs on p. 294:

. . . At the personal level, dualism implies that separate entities exist: I am the subject; it is the object. Zen steers away from such dualisms and from all other imaginings. In science, the word dualism is used in yet another sense. A very few neuroscientists remain outspoken dualists. They content that a separate ‘self-conscious mind’ exists, and that it operates at some level removed from the other activities of our own basic modular, personal ‘liaison brain.’ 4 In contrast, most neuroscientists, including myself, are monists. To us, the brain is the organ of our mind. In fact many monists stand so far inside the biological and humanist frame that they regard this dualistic ‘mind-brain problem’ – which others find so vexing – as something artificial and not worth arguing about.

In the annals of Zen, a precedent for their seemingly casual approach can be dated back to the year 676. A temple banner was flapping in the breeze. Monks were arguing about it. One said, “The banner is moving.” “No,” the other argued, “the wind is moving.” The dispute went on and on. Finally, the Sixth Patriarch said, “Neither the wind nor the banner is moving. What is moving is your own mind.”5

If monists were forced to consider the issue seriously, perhaps we would lean toward some viewpoint which might be called the “partial promissory materialism theory.”4 Here, the word ‘partial’ acknowledges that we will never completely understand the brain: each research question answered merely spawns others to take its place. The next two words imply that as we gradually discover more about the brain we hope to use rigorous terms to describe how it all works. Words that will have clear structural, numerical, and materialistic counterparts, not soft ‘mental’ terms.

As is obvious in my posts in this thread, I come to consciousness studies opposed to scientific reductionism, but maybe there is something to Austin's thesis after all. Could we humans encounter a space beyond 'ego-consciousness' -- and, more significantly access a place in our familiar environment where we discover a scene (like the one highlighted in blue) as it is without the presence of consciousness -- without a preparation of some kind in the material brain that enables this seeing? We know from recent experiments with skilled meditators that their extended periods of meditation lead to physical changes in the brain. (I don't have a link to that experiment, but will try to find it.)

For me, still, what goes on in consciousness and mind is basically oriented, structured, by our temporal interactions with and in the physical world in which we live, and with the others in it, but what work the mind does is surely enabled over time by the increasingly immense interconnectivity of the brain (the brain thought of as perhaps like any muscle or set of muscles that we develop by using it). It seems to me that there must always be interaction between our awareness and consciousness and thinking on one side and the brain's enabling connections. We build these connections in our experience as embodied consciousnesses in the world and use them as we grow in knowledge and understanding, indeed in empathy and compassion as well as in the ability for abstract thinking. But if there is an immense Invisible behind the visibility we encounter in our physical environment, the way toward reaching it, even briefly, would indeed require a radical shift in our own ordinary perspective such as that reached through meditation, in which we must (like the skilled medium and remote viewer) step outside the precincts of our ordinary localized ego consciousness to access the wider, deeper background out of which consciousness and mind arise. Or so it seems to me currently.

Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness - James H. Austin - Google Books

Amazon.com: Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness (9780262511094): James H. Austin: Books
 
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I keep coming back to a great physicist's (Bohr?) statement to the effect that a human being is just an atom's way of looking at itself. The boundary between 'self' and the universe as vast intelligence is a construct of the mind, evolved or emergent for purposes of biological survival. This is a very old thought. But recent work in neuroscience seems to support it nicely.

Niels Bohr Quotes
 
I keep coming back to a great physicist's (Bohr?) statement to the effect that a human being is just an atom's way of looking at itself. The boundary between 'self' and the universe as vast intelligence is a construct of the mind, evolved or emergent for purposes of biological survival. This is a very old thought. But recent work in neuroscience seems to support it nicely.

Interesting thought. Can you expand your last sentence into some details to illustrate what you mean?
 
If amazon's book description of Damasio's Self Comes to Mind, which I quoted two posts back, is accurate, Damasio is still missing the way in which the "lived world" experienced by embodied consciousness contributes directly to the development of consciousness. ... It sounds as if Damasio, like most neuroscientists, still sees consciousness as produced solely by the brain rather than recognizing that the long process of the development of consciousness took place in and through interaction with the world present to and encompassing incipient consciousness in its prereflective state -- a tactile, tangible, sensually communicating world in which evolving consciousness recognized its own 'situation', i.e., its situatedness in a milieu occupied by things that could constitute obstacles as well as efficacious means of survival, and occupied by others like oneself who could navigate and survive better in this world by working together.
Hm, I felt the opposite was the case - that Damasio captures the idea that consciousness is embodied. Indeed, he gave the example of the cyst in his retina producing an anomaly in his visual experience of the world: a bump in his retina creates a bump in his experience (qualia) of reality. Wow. If that's not an example of embodied consciousness, I don't know what is.

Also, I haven't read the book, but in the description it says Damasio spends considerable time addressing how/why consciousness may have arisen as an adaptive quality/ability of organisms. That is to say, how the organisms' historical experience in the "lived world" gave rise to the ability to subjectively experience the world.
 
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The boundary between 'self' and the universe ... is a construct of the mind, evolved or emergent for purposes of biological survival.
This sentence is absolutely loaded with deep concepts.

I've suggested that the (conscious) mind is the boundary between the body-self and the universe. When the conscious mind (aka the ego or mental-self) melts away, the boundary does as well, as they are one and the same.

At the same time, there are many accounts by mystics, those who meditate, those who use "visionary" plants, and episodic experiences by normal individuals who experience the dissolution of this boundary, but seem to retain the sense of self/conscious awareness.

It seems this oneness with the cosmos, if you will, can be experienced with and without maintaining awareness of self.

In the first case, perhaps, the mental-self quiets and our body-self "merges back" with reality (from whence it never really left). In the second case, perhaps, the mental-self expands out from the body-self to encompass the infinity of the cosmos.
 
This sentence is absolutely loaded with deep concepts.

I've suggested that the (conscious) mind is the boundary between the body-self and the universe. When the conscious mind (aka the ego or mental-self) melts away, the boundary does as well, as they are one and the same.

At the same time, there are many accounts by mystics, those who meditate, those who use "visionary" plants, and episodic experiences by normal individuals who experience the dissolution of this boundary, but seem to retain the sense of self/conscious awareness.

It seems this oneness with the cosmos, if you will, can be experienced with and without maintaining awareness of self.

In the first case, perhaps, the mental-self quiets and our body-self "merges back" with reality (from whence it never really left). In the second case, perhaps, the mental-self expands out from the body-self to encompass the infinity of the cosmos.

"At the same time, there are many accounts by mystics, those who meditate, those who use "visionary" plants, and episodic experiences by normal individuals who experience the dissolution of this boundary, but seem to retain the sense of self/conscious awareness."

try it ... and see?




Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Hm, I felt the opposite was the case - that Damasio captures the idea that consciousness is embodied. Indeed, he gave the example of the cyst in his retina producing an anomaly in his visual experience of the world: a bump in his retina creates a bump in his experience (qualia) of reality. Wow. If that's not an example of embodied consciousness, I don't know what is.

It's not an example of 'embodied consciousness' as demonstrated in Maturana, Varela, Thompson, {MVT} et al. What Damasio described in the TED talk was a distortion in his vision in one eye, brought about by the cyst beneath the retina.

Also, I haven't read the book, but in the description it says Damasio spends considerable time addressing how/why consciousness may have arisen as an adaptive quality/ability of organisms. That is to say, how the organisms' historical experience in the "lived world" gave rise to the ability to subjectively experience the world.

He's certainly not alone in that train of thought. In fact, I can't think of a single consciousness researcher or biologist interested in consciousness that doesn't recognize the gradual evolution of awareness and consciousness in the evolution of species within the physical environment of earth. The critical difference in the MVT et al approach is that the investigation of evolving awareness/consciousness/mind is not turned over at the human level to essentially objectivist presuppositions in neuroscientific research.
 
@Soupie

Hm, I felt the opposite was the case - that Damasio captures the idea that consciousness is embodied. Indeed, he gave the example of the cyst in his retina producing an anomaly in his visual experience of the world: a bump in his retina creates a bump in his experience (qualia) of reality. Wow. If that's not an example of embodied consciousness, I don't know what is.
@Constance

It's not an example of 'embodied consciousness' as demonstrated in Maturana, Varela, Thompson, {MVT} et al. What Damasio described in the TED talk was a distortion in his vision in one eye, brought about by the cyst beneath the retina.
Perhaps, but it would seem that Damasio is clearly considered a proponent of embodied cognition:

Embodied Cognition at Wiki: Neuroscientists Gerald Edelman, António Damásio and others have outlined the connection between the body, individual structures in the brain and aspects of the mind such as consciousness, emotion, self-awareness and will.[7]Biology has also inspired Gregory Bateson, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, Eleanor Rosch and Evan Thompson to develop a closely related version of the idea, which they call enactivism.[8]
 
@smcder

I finally found that long-lost article on consciousness I was looking for - the one where the author makes light of philosophy. (Perhaps he needs to read DD's essay published by the same journal, no?) Even so, it is a good read.

definitely can see the influence on your thinking -
 
I've spent the last several hours reading parts of the Austin book (recommended by Steve) at amazon and Google Books and I've got to have it. Fortunately, a number of used copies are available at amazon for around $5.00, though even new copies are not that expensive ($26.59 for an 800-pp. book). Austin writes extremely well and, while I'm not interested much in whether his neurological explanations for states of enlightenment will hold up, I am fascinated by his descriptions of his own experiences in meditation. I'm going to have to apply myself to this practice because I want to experience that state of seeing what-is beyond the scenery, and in one case described in the amazon review below [highlighted in blue], what appears in one instance to be 'there' without a viewer. Here's an amazon review that provides a sense of what happens in this book:



As the reviewer wrote, Austin's "monism is purely materialistic. Perhaps not precisely 'Matter alone is, nothing that is not matter is,' but something more like 'Physical states governed by physical laws alone are; nothing that is not subject to physical laws is.' He is the classic man of science. And although he experienced and is describing what most would consider a spiritual insight, he seeks to explain it and value it in biological, physiological, neurological terms, as a result of predictable and understandable processes in the brain and nothing else." As it happens, in reading sections of the book at Google Books (also linked below) I came across these paragraphs on p. 294:



As is obvious in my posts in this thread, I come to consciousness studies opposed to scientific reductionism, but maybe there is something to Austin's thesis after all. Could we humans encounter a space beyond 'ego-consciousness' -- and, more significantly access a place in our familiar environment where we discover a scene (like the one highlighted in blue) as it is without the presence of consciousness -- without a preparation of some kind in the material brain that enables this seeing? We know from recent experiments with skilled meditators that their extended periods of meditation lead to physical changes in the brain. (I don't have a link to that experiment, but will try to find it.)

For me, still, what goes on in consciousness and mind is basically oriented, structured, by our temporal interactions with and in the physical world in which we live, and with the others in it, but what work the mind does is surely enabled over time by the increasingly immense interconnectivity of the brain (the brain thought of as perhaps like any muscle or set of muscles that we develop by using it). It seems to me that there must always be interaction between our awareness and consciousness and thinking on one side and the brain's enabling connections. We build these connections in our experience as embodied consciousnesses in the world and use them as we grow in knowledge and understanding, indeed in empathy and compassion as well as in the ability for abstract thinking. But if there is an immense Invisible behind the visibility we encounter in our physical environment, the way toward reaching it, even briefly, would indeed require a radical shift in our own ordinary perspective such as that reached through meditation, in which we must (like the skilled medium and remote viewer) step outside the precincts of our ordinary localized ego consciousness to access the wider, deeper background out of which consciousness and mind arise. Or so it seems to me currently.

Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness - James H. Austin - Google Books

Amazon.com: Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness (9780262511094): James H. Austin: Books

the author's website with essays and book chapters, interviews, podcasts, videos etc ...
Videos -   Zen and The Brain             James H. Austin M.D.
 
Perhaps, but it would seem that Damasio is clearly considered a proponent of embodied cognition:

Yes, by some unidentified and uninformed 'editors' at wikipedia. The article is a muddle and the Talk page about it (linked below) just scratches the surface of the misunderstandings in it. Some wiki articles on complex subject matter are excellent because at some point a scholar steps in and writes one to replace this kind of thing.

Talk:Embodied cognition - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

One needs to have read Varela, Thompson, and Rosch's The Embodied Mind to see the difference between what they (with Merleau-Ponty, who originated the concept of "embodied consciousness") mean by the term 'embodied' and what cognitive neuroscientists such as Edelman, Tononi, Damasio, and others mean by it. The latter should have found another term (or invented one) to distinguish their meaning from that established by the former. The result is the confusion you see in the wikipedia article, which only consciousness researchers from various disciplines will not be prey to. Here's a link to, and an extract from the conclusion of, a Scholarpedia article on the Mind-Body Problem which provides a much-needed context for an appreciation of what is at stake in the current 'consciousness wars' among academic scientists and philosophers.

Mind-body problem: New approaches - Scholarpedia
"We have seen that there are serious problems in the idealist or dualist answers to the mind-body problem. In the first case no idealist approach of any persuasion has even begun to explain the detail of the material world at the present level science has reached. The characteristics of the protons, neutrons and electrons which compose our bodies, and more especially of the quarks and gluons that compose them, is infinitely remote from an idealist world view. Nor does dualism seem to provide much help, although it does take the load from the idealist’s shoulders as to the intimate details of the construction of matter. Yet it throws little light on how the two different worlds – of mind and matter – interact. In spite of the increasing understanding of matter at ever shorter distances there is no hint of a corresponding enlightenment about how mind is constructed and more particularly interacts with that miniscule matter. Numerous questions arise such as does mind act on each sub-atomic particle independently or is there some sort of global mind-to-matter interaction? What about action in the reverse direction – of matter on mind? These and many similar questions have no answers. However there are likewise serious problems for the physicalist approach: the Mind-Body problem still faces brain science and philosophy like a nemesis. The global principles being painfully gleaned for the brain do not seem to involve any solution to this problem. That is because neuroscience has not explicitly led to any idea as to how and where consciousness arises in the higher-order brain processing achieved by attention and guided by emotion and long-term memory. More particularly there is no handle at all provided by brain science on the neural components that could support the I at the core of one's self-attribution (for the Western phenomenologists owner/content division). This has led to a further set of problems – especially the ‘hard problem’ of Chalmers (1996), the ‘explanatory gap’ of Levine and the question of ‘what is it like to be a bat?’ of Nagel (Chalmers, 1996, Levine, 1981, Nagel, 1974) in the physicalist program. The first of these problems emphasises the intrinsic difficulty of understanding consciousness, the second that of how to get mind out of a stone and the third as to how can we appreciate the mental experience of other animals. None of these, as subparts of the mind-body problem, has had any accepted solution. If the mind-body problem cannot be explained satisfactorily through a brain-based approach as above, possibly expanding on the principles governing the brain, but always being able to be checked by scientific methods, then science will have failed in its attempt to explain all of the world. It would not have been able to answer in particular how mental experience is created from the activities of the apparently mindless nerve cells in interaction in the brain. Such a dramatic situation has not yet been met. Brain science is in its infancy, and even the principles adumbrated about how the brain processes information are still not agreed upon. The possibility of the creation of consciousness by brain activity is even more so. Thus we are still not in a position where the scientific approach to solving the mind-body problem has been seen to have failed. In any case it is fair to say that the mind-body problem is still unsolved."
 
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Maybe analogies will substitute for examples. If someone's BS detector goes off while reading, please don't hesitate to say so.

I start with the assumption that there can be no self-awareness that is not
continually grounded in ongoing processes of the universe at large. This means
consciousness is a fundamental property of all reality, with individuated
awareness of the self as an individuated entity, separate from the larger
conscious universe, an artificial but necessary construct of our brains. Indeed,
there has long been the argument of whether matter precedes (a very inadequate
term because it assumes time as a one directional dimension and this is in itself
a flawed concept) mind/information, or vice-versa.


So consider the "iceberg" model, with the iceberg of the human psyche divided
into immediate self awareness at the top and the personal unconscious underneath,
and the sea in which it is floating a kind of unfathomable intelligence with a
language of its own: i.e. the conscious universe. I'm not sure this is exactly
what Jung had in mind. But it's my personal takeaway.


This analogy is flawed in at least one crucial way: the iceberg is static,
whereas its hard to imagine this model of consciousness in which all is not
continually dynamic, with information flowing both up and down.

What I think may be valid is the impossibility of any kind of detached or
independent consciousness in the individuated sense. At least within our four dimensional frame of reference. Science has long relegated
the brain's lower centers to mere regulatory roles, dealing only with the body. Or
pumping often inappropriate emotions into the higher centers of the cortex. But
if I understand correctly (a big 'if') the higher and lower centers of the
brain, from brain stem to neo-cortex, seem to enable self-awareness by virtue of
a kind of ongoing feedback loop. If I am wrong here, someone will please correct
me.

So then: where is the line between individual consciousness and
the universe at large? Is it between self awareness and the personal
unconscious? Between the brain plus body and the "outside" world ? All are
necessary in "real time" for self-awareness as we know it. The implication is that the only
demarcation defining 'self' as a unique experience is a process hard wired into the biological brain.

All that is new here, as far as I know, are relatively recent functional
imaging studies that indicate very active and necessary roles on the part
of lower brain centers and even the physical body in the production of personal
self-awareness. The body and the ground on which it sits is not merely regarded at
a distance by higher level thinking. They are inherent in it. Something mystics
have been telling us for centuries.
 
Theoretical physics has met the unbearable lightness of being:

. . . uncertainty disturbs many physicists who are adjusting to the idea of the multiverse. Not only must we accept that basic properties of our universe are accidental and uncalculable. In addition, we must believe in the existence of many other universes. But we have no conceivable way of observing these other universes and cannot prove their existence. Thus, to explain what we see in the world and in our mental deductions, we must believe in what we cannot prove.

Not so bad really; it leaves us with lots to think about.

The Accidental Universe | Harper's Magazine
 
Maybe analogies will substitute for examples. If someone's BS detector goes off while reading, please don't hesitate to say so.

I start with the assumption that there can be no self-awareness that is not
continually grounded in ongoing processes of the universe at large. This means
consciousness is a fundamental property of all reality, with individuated
awareness of the self as an individuated entity, separate from the larger
conscious universe, an artificial but necessary construct of our brains.

Why 'artificial'?


Indeed, there has long been the argument of whether matter precedes (a very inadequate term because it assumes time as a one directional dimension and this is in itself a flawed concept) mind/information, or vice-versa.

So consider the "iceberg" model, with the iceberg of the human psyche divided
into immediate self awareness at the top and the personal unconscious underneath, and the sea in which it is floating a kind of unfathomable intelligence with a language of its own: i.e. the conscious universe. I'm not sure this is exactly
what Jung had in mind. But it's my personal takeaway.

This analogy is flawed in at least one crucial way: the iceberg is static,
whereas its hard to imagine this model of consciousness in which all is not
continually dynamic, with information flowing both up and down.

What I think may be valid is the impossibility of any kind of detached or
independent consciousness in the individuated sense. At least within our four dimensional frame of reference. Science has long relegated the brain's lower centers to mere regulatory roles, dealing only with the body. Or pumping often inappropriate emotions into the higher centers of the cortex. But if I understand correctly (a big 'if') the higher and lower centers of the brain, from brain stem to neo-cortex, seem to enable self-awareness by virtue of a kind of ongoing feedback loop. If I am wrong here, someone will please correct me.

I don't know that this is 'wrong'. It is, I believe, a theory at this point rather than something proved.


So then: where is the line between individual consciousness and
the universe at large? Is it between self awareness and the personal
unconscious? Between the brain plus body and the "outside" world ? All are
necessary in "real time" for self-awareness as we know it. The implication is that the only demarcation defining 'self' as a unique experience is a process hard wired into the biological brain.

I don't think there are such lines of distinction as you postulate above. But, if there are such lines of distinction to be drawn, why would their necessary implication be that 'self' is hard-wired in the brain?


All that is new here, as far as I know, are relatively recent functional
imaging studies that indicate very active and necessary roles on the part
of lower brain centers and even the physical body in the production of personal
self-awareness. The body and the ground on which it sits is not merely regarded at
a distance by higher level thinking. They are inherent in it. Something mystics
have been telling us for centuries.

I agree. :)
 
Yes, by some unidentified and uninformed 'editors' at wikipedia. The article is a muddle and the Talk page about it (linked below) just scratches the surface of the misunderstandings in it. Some wiki articles on complex subject matter are excellent because at some point a scholar steps in and writes one to replace this kind of thing.
The wiki article may be a "muddle" because terms such as "embodied cognition" and phenomenology itself have widely varying definitions and perspectives within themselves.

I don't care to argue semantics, but SEP has this to say about Embodied Cognition:

Embodied Cognition @ SEP:

Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent's body beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing.
The example Damasio shared of the shape of his retina (non-brain) directly effecting his phenomenal consciousness is an example of embodied cognition as defined above.

You mentioned Damasio needing a new definition, but it seems the version of embodied cognition you refer to needs the new term, and indeed, it does have a new term. There are several: Enactivism, situated cognition, embedded cognition, and extended cognition.

I'm not claiming that Damasio is a phenomenologist, just that he views cognition as embodied.

As far as what phenomenology has to say about the so-called mind-body problem, SEP has this to say:

Phenomenology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In the early 1970s Thomas Nagel argued in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974) that consciousness itself — especially the subjective character of what it is like to have a certain type of experience — escapes physical theory. Many philosophers pressed the case that sensory qualia — what it is like to feel pain, to see red, etc. — are not addressed or explained by a physical account of either brain structure or brain function. Consciousness has properties of its own. And yet, we know, it is closely tied to the brain. And, at some level of description, neural activities implement computation.

In the 1980s John Searle argued in Intentionality (1983) (and further in The Rediscovery of the Mind (1991)) that intentionality and consciousness are essential properties of mental states. For Searle, our brains produce mental states with properties of consciousness and intentionality, and this is all part of our biology, yet consciousness and intentionality require a “first-person” ontology. Searle also argued that computers simulate but do not have mental states characterized by intentionality. As Searle argued, a computer system has a syntax (processing symbols of certain shapes) but has no semantics (the symbols lack meaning: we interpret the symbols). In this way Searle rejected both materialism and functionalism, while insisting that mind is a biological property of organisms like us: our brains “secrete” consciousness.

The analysis of consciousness and intentionality is central to phenomenology as appraised above, and Searle's theory of intentionality reads like a modernized version of Husserl's. (Contemporary logical theory takes the form of stating truth conditions for propositions, and Searle characterizes a mental state's intentionality by specifying its “satisfaction conditions”). However, there is an important difference in background theory. For Searle explicitly assumes the basic worldview of natural science, holding that consciousness is part of nature. But Husserl explicitly brackets that assumption, and later phenomenologists — including Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty — seem to seek a certain sanctuary for phenomenology beyond the natural sciences. And yet phenomenology itself should be largely neutral about further theories of how experience arises, notably from brain activity. ...

Phenomenology offers descriptive analyses of mental phenomena, while neuroscience (and wider biology and ultimately physics) offers models of explanation of what causes or gives rise to mental phenomena.
 
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