Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[smcder]

But Mary obviously hasn't discovered all the "physical information" as has been claimed. She's overlooked what the cones in the retina are for. So her incompleteness of experience matches her incompleteness of the physical information, therefore the argument isn't coherent. Still it's my view that Physicalism fails because of the way it's generally defined. There also seems to be contradicting points of view about it. Personally I don't see Physicalism as Monism because the two types of realities ( subjective versus objective ) obviously exist.

The contention seems to be with what the word "physical" means. For some it seems to be synonymous with "material" while with others it seems synonymous with "physical processes or phenomena" which may include such things as magnetism, which is non-material, yet physical ( within one context of the word ). So which version is correct? Is this just a matter of consensus? I think what's missing is the third option that treats dualism in a general fashion based on the idea of mind as virtual versus brain as material, yet both working within the bounds of the physical ( as per the second definition that includes non-material phenomena and processes ).

Obviously! Only now her world is just a little bluer . . .

The appropriate evaluation of the knowledge argument remains controversial. The acceptability of its second premise P2 (Mary lacks factual knowledge before release) and of the inferences from P1 (Mary has complete physical knowledge before release) to C1 (Mary knows all the physical facts) and from P2 to C2 (Mary does not know some facts before release) depend on quite technical and controversial issues about (a) the appropriate theory of property concepts and their relation to the properties they express and (b) the appropriate theory of belief content. It is therefore safe to predict that the discussion about the knowledge argument will not come to an end in the near future.

I'm glad you two have it all worked out though . . . ;-)

Here's a few more papers on the subject if you want to go a little deeper:

Online papers on consciousness

and you can contact Chalmers at the e-mail on the bottom of this page:

David Chalmers

 

[smcder]

I wish I had the time to engage this material with the depth it deserves - maybe organize a study group for those interested. I think there's enough here to challenge all of us in those places in our thinking where we've made ourselves comfortable - and this is all within mainstream academic thinking, there are lots of other approaches out there - Buddhism has a very sophisticated view of the mind that has been developed from introspection/meditation. I was listening to a Buddhist talk on awareness:

Zencast.org

and another on dependent origination - both remarkably pertinent to topics dealt with in this thread.

"Therefore, surely, O monks, whatever form, past, future or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, low or lofty, far or near, all that form must be regarded with proper wisdom, according to reality, thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.'

"Therefore, surely, O monks, whatever feeling, past, future or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, low or lofty, far or near, all that feeling must be regarded with proper wisdom, according to reality, thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.'

"Therefore, surely, O monks, whatever perception, past, future or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, low or lofty, far or near, all that perception must be regarded with proper wisdom, according to reality, thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.'

"Therefore, surely, O monks, whatever mental formations, past, future or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, low or lofty, far or near, all those mental formations must be regarded with proper wisdom, according to reality, thus: 'These are not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.'

"Therefore, surely, O monks, whatever consciousness, past, future or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, low or lofty, far or near, all that consciousness must be regarded with proper wisdom, according to reality, thus: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.'

"O monks, the well-instructed noble disciple, seeing thus, gets wearied of form, gets wearied of feeling, gets wearied of perception, gets wearied of mental formations, gets wearied of consciousness. Being wearied he becomes passion-free. In his freedom from passion, he is emancipated. Being emancipated, there is the knowledge that he is emancipated. He knows: 'birth is exhausted, lived is the holy life, what had to be done is done, there is nothing more of this becoming.'"

This the Blessed One said. Pleased, the group of five monks were delighted with the exposition of the Blessed One; moreover, as this exposition was being spoken, the minds of the group of five monks were freed of defilements, without attachment.

Amen! ;-)

 

[smcder]

Last one for the night, this was too fascinating not to share:

http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP

What Do Philosophers Believe?

It's a survey of professional philosphers about their beliefs on 30 questions - includes various demographic date . . .

Zombies . . . ? Survey says!

Zombies: conceivable but not metaphysically possible 35.6%; metaphysically possible 23.3%; incontheivable 16.0%; other 25.1%

Other?? 25.1% really??? good night all, ponder and sleep deeply my friends

 

[Randall]

I think the mind can be considered to be composed of the same matter as the brain itself.

I guess the truth of that assumption depends on how we define minds and consciousness. Returning once again to our imaginary red Ferrari, it is plain that in our imagination we see can see it, yet it is also plain that no amount of investigation into the material that makes up the brain is going to reveal a little red Ferrari inside one's skull.

The mind is a process occurring in the various parts of the brain in a nonsynchronous fashion that only appears to happening synchronously and in real time. Yet, this process is entirely chemical and linked directly to the physical configuration and make-up of the brain. It is a physical thing in as much as the brain itself is physical.

What do you mean by the word "physical"? Do you mean the same as "material" or do you mean belonging to the set of objects and phenomena considered to be "physical" according to "physical science" e.g. magnetism?

We're hamstrung by the fact that we are viewing all of this through the simulation itself. That's why the distinction between what is physical and what isn't is so difficult to make. We've never experienced actual physical reality, we have only experienced the virtual reality of our own consciousnesses.

We might imagine that "the mind" is a real thing hanging out somewhere, however the way I understand things to be, it only exists from moment to moment within the chemical processes within brain as dictated by its physical configuration. This is why you can loose consciousness and regain it and still be the same "you". The physical and chemical configuration is the same.

I honestly think the pursuit of consciousness as some sort of separate energetic entity is as fruitless and doomed as the search for an ethereal human spirit or soul.

That all depends on how you answer the other question on what you mean by "physical"?

 

[trainedobserver]

The car only exists within the chemical reactions in the brain. There is no red ferrari as such.

When I say physical, I mean the real world material outside of the mind. We understand it through how it is modeled by our brains and central nervous system. Its true nature may be beyond our design spec.

 

[Randall]

The car only exists within the chemical reactions in the brain. There is no red ferrari as such.
When I say physical, I mean the real world material outside of the mind. We understand it through how it is modeled by our brains and central nervous system. Its true nature may be beyond our design spec.

Clarification is still needed. You are describing two things:

1. The material world outside the mind.
2. The mind as separate from the material world.

Yet you say the car only exists within the chemical reactions of the brain. Do you consider "chemical reactions in the brain" as part of the material world outside the mind?

 

[trainedobserver]

Yes, it's all a jargon problem. The mind is made of the same matter as everything else. The mind's representation of matter is what makes the word "physical" so elusory. Given that what you experience as "light" in your consciousness is not "light" and what you experience as "sound" is not mechanical vibrations in a medium, then the problem of what constitutes "physical" reality becomes just a matter of what is more convenient.

You are experiencing a ongoing process composed of events inside a neural network that simulate a 3 Dimensional world and you in it. If you use the computer model, you experience your own personal version of reality constructed by your central nervous system as it is being processed but before it actually gets rendered by some transducer like device like a graphic display or a speaker. I hope that made sense.

 

[Randall]

Yes, it's all a jargon problem. The mind is made of the same matter as everything else. The mind's representation of matter is what makes the word "physical" so elusory.

It seems to me that what you are calling, "The mind's representation of matter ...", is an essential part of the mind itself, and this is what we're focused on here. What exactly is that "representation" made of. It's certainly not made of the same material as what the brain material is made of. So what is it?

 

[smcder]

It seems to me that what you are calling, "The mind's representation of matter ...", is an essential part of the mind itself, and this is what we're focused on here. What exactly is that "representation" made of. It's certainly not made of the same material as what the brain material is made of. So what is it?

The hard problem!

Yes there is a difference. The evidence is that consciousness is located in close proximity to the brain that is producing it. Therefore maintaining proximity and function during replacement seems necessary in order to justify a continuity of personhood. Nanoscale neuron replacement fits these criteria, whereas the slice and digitize method doesn't.

Continuity of personhood in a legal sense? Or subjectively/for the person themselves? Also, could you generally point me to the evidence for this? Will bookmark for later ref.

. . . you and TO's (?) field theory differentiates between the neuronal replacement/Kurzweil methods - (because it "locates" consciousness near brain . . .) whereas the Eliminative Materialist position does not . . . would that be a good intro to the animation for your theory? "You're suffering from Parkinson's and one of two methods is available to you . . . which do you choose and why?"

 

[Randall]

The hard problem!

Yes there is a difference. The evidence is that consciousness is located in close proximity to the brain that is producing it. Therefore maintaining proximity and function during replacement seems necessary in order to justify a continuity of personhood. Nanoscale neuron replacement fits these criteria, whereas the slice and digitize method doesn't.

Continuity of personhood in a legal sense? Or subjectively/for the person themselves? Also, could you generally point me to the evidence for this? Will bookmark for later ref.
[/quote]

I mean continuity of personhood, as in what constitutes you as a person, not to be confused with personal identity ( as in one's legal name ). Simply changing labels doesn't change the fact that we're still persons. The evidence for locality of consciousness is a topic that is often discussed in debates about non-locality of consciousness, so there are lots of places it can be found, specifically in debates about OOBEs and life after death, neither of which have been verified as accurate by any objective scientific means. On the other hand all verifiable evidence indicates that consciousness ends with the death of the brain. I'll leave you to find your own bookmarks for those. The other evidence is in the studies that involve experiments and measurements with EM fields associated with the brain. Such fields are measureable via an EEG and can be distorted with EM field generators. Persinger has done experiments of that type and has been able to induce perceptual phenomena ranging from mild to full blown hallucinations. I assume you've also heard of Persinger, so no need for bookmarks there either.

. . . you and TO's (?) field theory differentiates between the neuronal replacement/Kurzweil methods - (because it "locates" consciousness near brain . . .) whereas the Eliminative Materialist position does not . . . would that be a good intro to the animation for your theory? "You're suffering from Parkinson's and one of two methods is available to you . . . which do you choose and why?"

Not exactly, the "because" has more to do with maintaining a continuity of personhood than where consciousness is located. In the live neuro-replacement model there is no deconstructing the brain and then building it again over there someplace else, which would result in the same types of problems we have with teleportation ( the Star Trek transporter problem you alluded to earlier ). Live neuro-replacement could in theory simply replace neurons in such a way that there would be no remarkable disruption in the totality of the fields within the brain that appear to be associated with consciousness, thus facilitating continuity of consciousness ( and sub-consciousness ) in a design that operates in the same configuration as the existing brain.

In contrast, the slice and digitize method would require the complete destruction of a functioning brain and the birth of a new digital one. It would be more akin to reincarnation into a digital machine than continuity of life as person. Reflect on just the difference that live neuro-replacement wouldn't be a digitization, so the resulting brain wouldn't be a digital device. Sure there may be some differences, but ultimately, provided that continuity of consciousness is preserved, perhaps those differences might be advantageous.

 

[smcder]

Yes there is a difference. The evidence is that consciousness is located in close proximity to the brain that is producing it. Therefore maintaining proximity and function during replacement seems necessary in order to justify a continuity of personhood. Nanoscale neuron replacement fits these criteria, whereas the slice and digitize method doesn't.

Continuity of personhood in a legal sense? Or subjectively/for the person themselves? Also, could you generally point me to the evidence for this? Will bookmark for later ref.

I mean continuity of personhood, as in what constitutes you as a person, not to be confused with personal identity ( as in one's legal name ). Simply changing labels doesn't change the fact that we're still persons. The evidence for locality of consciousness is a topic that is often discussed in debates about non-locality of consciousness, so there are lots of places it can be found, specifically in debates about OOBEs and life after death, neither of which have been verified as accurate by any objective scientific means. On the other hand all verifiable evidence indicates that consciousness ends with the death of the brain. I'll leave you to find your own bookmarks for those. The other evidence is in the studies that involve experiments and measurements with EM fields associated with the brain. Such fields are measureable via an EEG and can be distorted with EM field generators. Persinger has done experiments of that type and has been able to induce perceptual phenomena ranging from mild to full blown hallucinations. I assume you've also heard of Persinger, so no need for bookmarks there either.


Not exactly, the "because" has more to do with maintaining a continuity of personhood than where consciousness is located. In the live neuro-replacement model there is no deconstructing the brain and then building it again over there someplace else, which would result in the same types of problems we have with teleportation ( the Star Trek transporter problem you alluded to earlier ). Live neuro-replacement could in theory simply replace neurons in such a way that there would be no remarkable disruption in the totality of the fields within the brain that appear to be associated with consciousness, thus facilitating continuity of consciousness ( and sub-consciousness ) in a design that operates in the same configuration as the existing brain.

In contrast, the slice and digitize method would require the complete destruction of a functioning brain and the birth of a new digital one. It would be more akin to reincarnation into a digital machine than continuity of life as person. Reflect on just the difference that live neuro-replacement wouldn't be a digitization, so the resulting brain wouldn't be a digital device. Sure there may be some differences, but ultimately, provided that continuity of consciousness is preserved, perhaps those differences might be advantageous.[/quote]

yep yep Persinger . . . the Skeptiko forums just re-opened:

Skeptiko

I re-credentialed but haven't had time to have a look, this whole topic would be front and center over there - Persinger has been on at least once, here:

89. “God Helmet” Inventor, Dr. Michael Persinger Discovers Telepathy Link in Lab Experiments | Skeptiko - Science at the Tipping Point

GH Hardy reference was specifically to number theory which he didn't imagine would have any practical applications . . . (continuing debate about whether math is created or discovered, but see also Lakoff on embodied mathematics which is more to your view - ) my thought was whether good, coherent philosophical reasoning may similarly always have rough analogical relationship to the "real" world -

 

[smcder]

The evidence for locality of consciousness is a topic that is often discussed in debates about non-locality of consciousness, so there are lots of places it can be found, specifically in debates about OOBEs and life after death, neither of which have been verified as accurate by any objective scientific means. On the other hand all verifiable evidence indicates that consciousness ends with the death of the brain. I'll leave you to find your own bookmarks for those.

Skeptiko forum/podcast is a good source for other opinions on this -

 

[smcder]

It seems to me that what you are calling, "The mind's representation of matter ...", is an essential part of the mind itself, and this is what we're focused on here. What exactly is that "representation" made of. It's certainly not made of the same material as what the brain material is made of. So what is it?

this is promising . . . skimmed it and I'm giving it a thorough read now:

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

The moral of all this is that you can't explain conscious experience on the cheap. It is a remarkable fact that reductive methods - methods that explain a high-level phenomenon wholly in terms of more basic physical processes - work well in so many domains. In a sense, one can explain most biological and cognitive phenomena on the cheap, in that these phenomena are seen as automatic consequences of more fundamental processes. It would be wonderful if reductive methods could explain experience, too; I hoped for a long time that they might. Unfortunately, there are systematic reasons why these methods must fail. Reductive methods are successful in most domains because what needs explaining in those domains are structures and functions, and these are the kind of thing that a physical account can entail. When it comes to a problem over and above the explanation of structures and functions, these methods are impotent.
With experience, on the other hand, physical explanation of the functions is not in question. The key is instead the conceptual point that the explanation of functions does not suffice for the explanation of experience. This basic conceptual point is not something that further neuroscientific investigation will affect. In a similar way, experience is disanalogous to the élan vital. The vital spirit was put forward as an explanatory posit, in order to explain the relevant functions, and could therefore be discarded when those functions were explained without it. Experience is not an explanatory posit but an explanandum in its own right, and so is not a candidate for this sort of elimination.

and the kicker (if this raises eyebrows, it's in section 6, fifth paragraph, skim the paragraphs following and see if they convince you to have a go:

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of somethingfundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.

 

[Randall]

this is promising . . . skimmed it and I'm giving it a thorough read now:
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

Unfortunately I get an error saying that the connection is refused. So the link doesn't work for me.

The moral of all this is that you can't explain conscious experience on the cheap. It is a remarkable fact that reductive methods - methods that explain a high-level phenomenon wholly in terms of more basic physical processes - work well in so many domains. In a sense, one can explain most biological and cognitive phenomena on the cheap, in that these phenomena are seen as automatic consequences of more fundamental processes. It would be wonderful if reductive methods could explain experience, too; I hoped for a long time that they might. Unfortunately, there are systematic reasons why these methods must fail. Reductive methods are successful in most domains because what needs explaining in those domains are structures and functions, and these are the kind of thing that a physical account can entail. When it comes to a problem over and above the explanation of structures and functions, these methods are impotent.

With experience, on the other hand, physical explanation of the functions is not in question. The key is instead the conceptual point that the explanation of functions does not suffice for the explanation of experience. This basic conceptual point is not something that further neuroscientific investigation will affect. In a similar way, experience is disanalogous to the élan vital. The vital spirit was put forward as an explanatory posit, in order to explain the relevant functions, and could therefore be discarded when those functions were explained without it. Experience is not an explanatory posit but an explanandum in its own right, and so is not a candidate for this sort of elimination.

and the kicker (if this raises eyebrows, it's in section 6, fifth paragraph, skim the paragraphs following and see if they convince you to have a go:

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of somethingfundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.

The sense I'm getting from all this is that explaining "conscious experience" on the level of the so-called "hard problem" is akin to explaining anything on that level, that level being the ultimate nature of existence for anything, including the material. When it comes right down to it, science only knows what properties materials exhibit under certain conditions and how they are formed from other materials. Yet on the scale of the subatomic the idea of particles as "material" gets fuzzier and fuzzier until really all they're talking about are tiny regions of space with certain properties, the origin of which is still unknown.

So what are we to make of this situation then? I would submit that we know how to make a display panel that projects light in patterns that we recognize as representing material objects, yet we really don't know where the "fundamental forces" come from in nature that allows that to happen. We only know how to organize existing materials in such a way that the picture emerges, and my theory is that consciousness is no different. Therefore we may never know the ultimate answer to its existence, yet still be able to reproduce it. Our own biological reproductive processes seem to be ample proof of this. Biology is just a collection nanoscale parts with specific functions that all work together within a single larger organism.

 

[smcder]

But Mary obviously hasn't discovered all the "physical information" as has been claimed. She's overlooked what the cones in the retina are for. So her incompleteness of experience matches her incompleteness of the physical information, therefore the argument isn't coherent. Still it's my view that Physicalism fails because of the way it's generally defined. There also seems to be contradicting points of view about it. Personally I don't see Physicalism as Monism because the two types of realities ( subjective versus objective ) obviously exist.

The contention seems to be with what the word "physical" means. For some it seems to be synonymous with "material" while with others it seems synonymous with "physical processes or phenomena" which may include such things as magnetism, which is non-material, yet physical ( within one context of the word ). So which version is correct? Is this just a matter of consensus? I think what's missing is the third option that treats dualism in a general fashion based on the idea of mind as virtual versus brain as material, yet both working within the bounds of the physical ( as per the second definition that includes non-material phenomena and processes ).

I think you will like the Chalmers paper I posted:

This leads to a natural hypothesis: that information (or at least some information) has two basic aspects, a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect. This has the status of a basic principle that might underlie and explain the emergence of experience from the physical. Experience arises by virtue of its status as one aspect of information, when the other aspect is found embodied in physical processing.

As an interesting addition to the knowledge argument: - apparently it's been recently discovered that some people like Fred (below) do exist - tetrachromats
Some women may see 100 million colors, thanks to their genes - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case of Mary, but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article: the case of a person, Fred, who sees a color unknown to normal human perceivers. We might want to know what color Fred experiences when looking at things that appear to him in that particular way. It seems clear that no amount of knowledge about what happens in his brain and about how color information is processed in his visual system will help us to find an answer to that question. In both cases cited by Jackson, an epistemic subject A appears to have no access to particular items of knowledge about a subject B: A cannot know that B has an experience of a particular quality Q on certain occasions. This particular item of knowledge about B is inaccessible to AbecauseA never had experiences of Q herself.

 

[smcder]

Ufology is a brilliant man. I wish I had the kind of free time that both you ,and he, seem to endure the liberty of enjoying on this forum. Being so insanely busy at work this past week, all I have been able to do is to spy tantalizing tidbits of postings from those I enjoy reading here.

Here's a little relevant commentary from my ego's very own armchair peanut gallery.

virtual protons and field consciousness = a little inspiration from Jeff Davis, mixed with some Ufology brilliance, thank you very much.

Try searching Jeff Davis and "consciousness" via this forum, or the origin of the term "consciousness field". I think you'd be surprised. What did you wanna know precisely?

The truth is, I'm a moron. The deeper I get, the less I know, but the more intuitively right it instinctively feels. This is the nature of progressive sentience.

Not doing, is FAR more important than doing. Thinking is what got us to take that wrong turn at Albuquerque in the first place.

The truth is, we know EVERYTHING, now. More precisely, a relatively short while, prior to now, actually.

Do you want to see treasure with respect to consciousness exploration?

Glimpse this my friend, and please express what this article reveals to you concerning consciousness exploration.

The Strange and Mysterious History of the Ouija Board | History & Archaeology | Smithsonian Magazine

"The real glory of men is in their successful combining." Jeff Davis, who the hell cares when.

"In the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too) those who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed" Charles Darwin, does it matter when?

The more you think you know, the less chance you have of adapting to change. Therefore, the greater the chance of your demis of a sincere community based consciousness exploration discussion. Let us evolve together as nature intende. This is NOT the mental aptitude to adopt if we ever hope to really get on with the processed.

HI Jeff!

An interesting article on the Ouija Board- I think I first heard it discussed on Mysterious Universe podcast.


Here's a little relevant commentary from my ego's very own armchair peanut gallery.

virtual protons and field consciousness = a little inspiration from Jeff Davis, mixed with some Ufology brilliance, thank you very much.

Try searching Jeff Davis and "consciousness" via this forum, or the origin of the term "consciousness field". I think you'd be surprised. What did you wanna know precisely?

I was looking for a write-up/abstract of the theory. Ufology said it was sort of spread throughout the threads - he wanted to make a video with animation to illustrate the theory. I've pieced it together a bit through this discussion but I haven't braved the threads to try and get the whole thing.

I did a Google search: virtual photons elementary carriers consciousness and that turned up: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000001/1249

I'm not sure if that's exactly along the lines or not - but Ufology I believe indicated it looked similar to him. I thought the idea might well be worth shopping around outside the forum to see what response it gets but also thought of the idea of some kind of archive or repository of member theories - to aid discussion (to be able to say - just go to the archive and download my position/theory on whatever topic . . . )

This is NOT the mental aptitude to adopt if we ever hope to really get on with the processed.

What is the mental attitude not to adopt?

 

[smcder]

Unfortunately I get an error saying that the connection is refused. So the link doesn't work for me.

The sense I'm getting from all this is that explaining "conscious experience" on the level of the so-called "hard problem" is akin to explaining anything on that level, that level being the ultimate nature of existence for anything, including the material. When it comes right down to it, science only knows what properties materials exhibit under certain conditions and how they are formed from other materials. Yet on the scale of the subatomic the idea of particles as "material" gets fuzzier and fuzzier until really all they're talking about are tiny regions of space with certain properties, the origin of which is still unknown.

So what are we to make of this situation then? I would submit that we know how to make a display panel that projects light in patterns that we recognize as representing material objects, yet we really don't know where the "fundamental forces" come from in nature that allows that to happen. We only know how to organize existing materials in such a way that the picture emerges, and my theory is that consciousness is no different. Therefore we may never know the ultimate answer to its existence, yet still be able to reproduce it. Our own biological reproductive processes seem to be ample proof of this. Biology is just a collection nanoscale parts with specific functions that all work together within a single larger organism.

Sorry - just seeing this . . . I double-checked the link:

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

and it worked - I can copy into Word or maybe some other format and e-mail you if you still don't get to it.

I think there is some common ground with your statements above and Chalmers' position in this paper - at least he doesn't give up on the hard problem! - (this was vintage 1996 so when I get time I'm going to see if he has updated his position or filled in any gaps)

happy hunting! (or fishing)

Most existing theories of consciousness either deny the phenomenon, explain something else, or elevate the problem to an eternal mystery. I hope to have shown that it is possible to make progress on the problem even while taking it seriously. To make further progress, we will need further investigation, more refined theories, and more careful analysis. The hard problem is a hard problem, but there is no reason to believe that it will remain permanently unsolved.[*]

*[[The arguments in this paper are presented in greater depth in my book The Conscious Mind (Oxford University Press, 1996). Thanks to Francis Crick, Peggy DesAutels, Matthew Elton, Liane Gabora, Christof Koch, Paul Rhodes, Gregg Rosenberg, and Sharon Wahl for their comments.]]

In what follows, I present my own candidates for the psychophysical principles that might go into a theory of consciousness. The first two of these are nonbasic principles - systematic connections between processing and experience at a relatively high level. These principles can play a significant role in developing and constraining a theory of consciousness, but they are not cast at a sufficiently fundamental level to qualify as truly basic laws. The final principle is my candidate for a basic principle that might form the cornerstone of a fundamental theory of consciousness. This final principle is particularly speculative, but it is the kind of speculation that is required if we are ever to have a satisfying theory of consciousness. I can present these principles only briefly here; I argue for them at much greater length in Chalmers (1996).


1. The principle of structural coherence. This is a principle of coherence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness. Recall that "awareness" was used earlier to refer to the various functional phenomena that are associated with consciousness. I am now using it to refer to a somewhat more specific process in the cognitive underpinnings of experience. In particular, the contents of awareness are to be understood as those information contents that are accessible to central systems, and brought to bear in a widespread way in the control of behavior. Briefly put, we can think of awareness as direct availability for global control. To a first approximation, the contents of awareness are the contents that are directly accessible and potentially reportable, at least in a language-using system.


2. The principle of organizational invariance. This principle states that any two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. If the causal patterns of neural organization were duplicated in silicon, for example, with a silicon chip for every neuron and the same patterns of interaction, then the same experiences would arise. According to this principle, what matters for the emergence of experience is not the specific physical makeup of a system, but the abstract pattern of causal interaction between its components. This principle is controversial, of course. Some (e.g. Searle 1980) have thought that consciousness is tied to a specific biology, so that a silicon isomorph of a human need not be conscious. I believe that the principle can be given significant support by the analysis of thought-experiments, however.

3. The double-aspect principle stems from the observation that there is a direct isomorphism between certain physically embodied information spaces and certain phenomenal (or experiential) information spaces. From the same sort of observations that went into the principle of structural coherence, we can note that the differences between phenomenal states have a structure that corresponds directly to the differences embedded in physical processes; in particular, to those differences that make a difference down certain causal pathways implicated in global availability and control. That is, we can find the same abstract information space embedded in physical processing and in conscious experience.

This leads to a natural hypothesis: that information (or at least some information) has two basic aspects, a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect. This has the status of a basic principle that might underlie and explain the emergence of experience from the physical. Experience arises by virtue of its status as one aspect of information, when the other aspect is found embodied in physical processing.

 

[Jeff Davis]

Interestingly enough, there was a recent article written about this whole Ben Rich thing by Peter W. Merlin and published in Tim Printy's SUNlite. Now, I'm going to state right off the bat that I don't know enough about this whole thing to make any kind of judgement here, I need to do a lot more research on both sides of this story before I form an opinion, I'm simply presenting this as a more skeptical take on the Ben Rich story.

I'd be interested in hearing what other members who've looked deeper into this situation have to say about this, especially Don Ecker since he knew people who met Ben and might be able to inform us as to their thoughts on this article. I found this article thanks to a post on this forum made by Sentry. You can read the article in PDF form here:

http://home.comcast.net/~tprinty/UFO/SUNlite5_6.pdf

I literally read this over the weekend about two hours after we exchanged posts! Ben Rich and the Jan Harzan ET story | The Paracast Community Forums

Darn! @Sentry. LOL!! I have to admit Muadib, right now, the ESP part of that whole Ben Rich thing, that I have been hanging onto for years now, is on MIGHTY shaky ground.

You know something though, I like that! I can now dig in, listen, regroup, reassess, and possibly get just a little bit, if only in the tiniest manner possible, closer to the truth.

I'm thinking that the SUNlite article has made sense out of something I have personally wondered about for a LONG time now. I see that Issac Koi has come on board in this thread which is honestly where I learned of this whole thing over the weekend.

Both Curtis and Issac are serious researchers. Time for me to reverently sit back and watch this thread intently to possibly find out what's up.

 

[Jeff Davis]

HI Jeff!

An interesting article on the Ouija Board- I think I first heard it discussed on Mysterious Universe podcast.


Here's a little relevant commentary from my ego's very own armchair peanut gallery.

virtual protons and field consciousness = a little inspiration from Jeff Davis, mixed with some Ufology brilliance, thank you very much.

Try searching Jeff Davis and "consciousness" via this forum, or the origin of the term "consciousness field". I think you'd be surprised. What did you wanna know precisely?

I was looking for a write-up/abstract of the theory. Ufology said it was sort of spread throughout the threads - he wanted to make a video with animation to illustrate the theory. I've pieced it together a bit through this discussion but I haven't braved the threads to try and get the whole thing.

I did a Google search: virtual photons elementary carriers consciousness and that turned up: ingentaconnect Are virtual photons the elementary carriers of consciousness?

I'm not sure if that's exactly along the lines or not - but Ufology I believe indicated it looked similar to him. I thought the idea might well be worth shopping around outside the forum to see what response it gets but also thought of the idea of some kind of archive or repository of member theories - to aid discussion (to be able to say - just go to the archive and download my position/theory on whatever topic . . . )

This is NOT the mental aptitude to adopt if we ever hope to really get on with the processed.

What is the mental attitude not to adopt?

Oh my goodness, please don't take that too seriously. That was a joke via the green smiley. Just a little self fabricated horn tootn'. It's just that Ufology and I have been hammering on this consciousness nail almost since the very beginning of my coming here. You know, it's the typical ETH vs. EDH. Nuts n Bolts vs. Mysticism, or Fringe Sciences. I am certain it came up LONG prior to that, but he and I, and a few others that haven't touched it for a while now, have had some really interesting discussion and debate on the subject of alternate consciousness model proposals and just thought you might be surprised at how far back the discussions went. That's all.

As far as my own theory goes, I do not have a formal theory typed up or anything like that. It's all a work in progress IMO. Just way too much uncertainty at this time in the realm of empirical science itself for me to think I have the answer.

The "attitude" part is just a simple way to state, this is a thread that it is impossible to "know it all" about. I have appreciated every word in this thread so far, just keep those hypothetical ideas a flying without the slightest inhibition or fear of being dismissed out of hand quickly. The more far out, the better!

 

[smcder]

Oh my goodness, please don't take that too seriously. That was a joke via the green smiley. Just a little self fabricated horn tootn'. It's just that Ufology and I have been hammering on this consciousness nail almost since the very beginning of my coming here. You know, it's the typical ETH vs. EDH. Nuts n Bolts vs. Mysticism, or Fringe Sciences. I am certain it came up LONG prior to that, but he and I, and a few others that haven't touched it for a while now, have had some really interesting discussion and debate on the subject of alternate consciousness model proposals and just thought you might be surprised at how far back the discussions went. That's all.

As far as my own theory goes, I do not have a formal theory typed up or anything like that. It's all a work in progress IMO. Just way too much uncertainty at this time in the realm of empirical science itself for me to think I have the answer.

The "attitude" part is just a simple way to state, this is a thread that it is impossible to "know it all" about. I have appreciated every word in this thread so far, just keep those hypothetical ideas a flying without the slightest inhibition or fear of being dismissed out of hand quickly. The more far out, the better!

No, no I didn't take it seriously or any particular way at all - was just trying to make sure I knew what you meant! I'm just getting my feet wet, threads get unwieldy quick and change topics and other kinds of stuff gets mixed in - so I haven't even really tried to go back through old threads - it would just be a lot of time and effort and overall probably impractical but it would be really interesting to have an archive/library with files/videos/links that kind of stake out positions on various topics (survey results too, maybe) I was thinking back just on this thread, thought about trying to do a summary of where we've been for my own use in case I'm away for a bit - and it's interesting to see where we started and where we are now -the "hard problem" has always interested me and the knowledge problem and the processes of philosophy generally - I have a lot of sympathy for McGinn's New Mysterianism and it actually opens doors for me instead of closing them down - but I've really not even approached my own beliefs yet - I've been trying to get a hold of the field theory through a black-box/Socratic method - if I ask this question, what answer do I get? - indirect but I think it worked for me for a bit (and hopefully Ufology) as we seemed to agree that we sharpened our understanding of the hard problem and that was satisfying.

Communication styles (across the forum, not just on this thread) are fascinating and so varied. In the South, deep South (Arkansas) we have a very discursive way of speaking and it takes work sometimes in everyday communication to know just what the heck someone is saying - I lived in Germany for a bit and when I came back everyone said how rude I was! But I just thought I was saying what I meant - so I do strive to try and understand how people say things as much as what they are saying . . . thank you for the good feedback!

P.S. I'm a big fan of far-out too.