Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[smcder]

Marcel Proust once wrote, “The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.”

Proust is on my list . . . I hear it's phenomenal . . . ;-)

 

[Randall]

so when you put forward your video as an answer to the hard problem, I say 1) its not a purely physical description (in the sense Nagel means it - which is a strictly physical description of the underlying structure of consciousness - for physicalism that would be the neurophysiology of the animal) and 2) in any event it doesn't show me what it is like to be a dog or cat or bat (which is what is necessary to solve the "hard problem") -

And, I responded with a post that demonstrates, that based on a purely physical description of the underlying structure of consciousness, what the visual perceptual experience of various animals is "like" ( like being similar ) and made the claim that it is valid because perceptual experience is a substantial part of "what it's like" ( you agreed ) and therefore because we can show "what it's like" we have a "proof of concept" for a physical solution to the so-called hard problem. I also went on to describe why any objection to that claim logically results in the hard problem being incoherent or unresolvable and therefore pointless.

but
the hard problem is a challenge to physicalism in the first place (as Nagel presents it) so, saying the hard problem can't be solved by a physical explanation or doesn't make sense from a physicalist perspective, isn't the same as saying the hard problem is nonsense or meaningless -

Sure, but to be specific, I'm not claiming it's meaningless. It has meaning because it forces us into a mode involving abstract analysis, the result of which leads to a conclusion that allows us to move on past that issue.

now, if you're not trying to solve it with physicalism (perhaps your field theory is not physicalist?) then it may not be relevant to that explanation . . . and that may be where all the confusion comes in . . . ?

I think the confusion revolves around my claim that the hard problem is not solvable, not because it's "hard" but because it's logically incoherent. Also, it isn't necessarily easy to see why it's not coherent because that determination depends on very specific interpretations of the language used in the formulation. I've done what I can to explain that in my previous posts, but grammatical transitivity is a tricky business. Combine that with the nuances of Physicalism, and we have plenty of room for chaos.

Perhaps Nagel is challenging a different view of Physicalism than the way I see it, I'm not sure. But as I mentioned earlier, even if we take these variations into account, there are only so many possibilities, and thay all seem to shake out so many ways, ( 1. The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent. or 2. The hard problem appears to be solvable as shown in the video. or 3. The hard problem is not solvable because it's formulated in such a way that no solution is possible ).

 

[Tyger]

Ah, fields......I know how much some here enjoy schematics.....here's one.....albeit such a 'picture' does not in fact adequately convey what is being attempted to be represented.

As when I teach astronomy to middle schoolers I initially stay well clear of representations of the solar system, for example, precisely because such pictures are static and astronomical systems are dynamic, in constant movement, in ever-changing relationships - which is best handled in the imagination.

So, too, schematics of realities perceived with the finer senses - while helpful as suggestions - can be misleading. Even so, I offer here [one representation or interpretation of] the 'fields' of the human being's 'signature'.

Based on observation a Seer states: "The layer of energy that is closest to your physical body closely follows the shape of your body. It usually is uniform in size, being about 4 to 8 inches (10 to 21 centimeters) deep. When a person begins to see auras, the physical auric body is the layer that they are most likely to observe. Irregularities in the color or shape of this layer of energy are thought to be indications of injuries or issues with the physical body in that area."

Please note that the Seer is in a state of exploration and investigation regarding what s/he sees - note the words "are thought to be" - it is an on-going corpus of information that continually is being sifted and refined, as in any 'physical' scientific inquiry.

“Magic … is the ancient and absolute science of nature and her laws.” ~ A.L. Constant The History of Magic, London, 1922

A bit of an aside: the loss of a healthy and diverse nature is a tragedy to humankind on a scale that is not fully comprehended by most - though ardent conservationists may intuit the enormity of the loss beyond the physical. The winking out of the 'signatures' of other living beings on this planet will have consequences to the human being in ways incalculable - beyond our current meager understanding - though with even some knowledge of the role of the subtler realms of nature in the human life span, those who work with these refined perceptions know we are losing a great resource and support. (This loss has been going forward for centuries btw).

 

[Constance]

ufology: "there are only so many possibilities, and thay all seem to shake out so many ways:

1. The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent. or

2. The hard problem appears to be solvable as shown in the video. or

3. The hard problem is not solvable because it's formulated in such a way that no solution is possible )."


or 4.

The hard problem is a real problem that is currently unsolvable on the basis of current neuroscience (and might never be solvable by neuroscience).

 

[Randall]

Ah, fields......I know how much some here enjoy schematics.....here's one.....albeit such a 'picture' does not in fact adequately convey what is being attempted to be represented.
As when I teach astronomy to middle schoolers I initially stay well clear of representations of the solar system, for example, precisely because such pictures are static and astronomical systems are dynamic, in constant movement, in ever-changing relationships - which is best handled in the imagination.

Did you check out the post I put in A science Minute Thread? You might find it relevant: https://www.theparacast.com/forum/threads/a-science-minute.12104/page-3#post-170259

 

[Tyger]

I think we have to talk about lucid dreaming, and fortuitously Tyger -- hi Tyger -- just posted something about it.

Hi, Constance! Am enjoying the conversation -

what I have read of it.

 

[Randall]

ufology: "there are only so many possibilities, and thay all seem to shake out so many ways:

1. The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent. or

2. The hard problem appears to be solvable as shown in the video. or

3. The hard problem is not solvable because it's formulated in such a way that no solution is possible )."


or 4.

The hard problem is a real problem that is currently unsolvable on the basis of current neuroscience (and might never be solvable by neuroscience).

Your number 4. actually works out to being the same as my number 3.

 

[Constance]

And fortunately it doesn't take long to read that particular poem. Let's have a closer look at how, contrary to the claims in Steve's poem, metaphor can and does exceed sense ( perception ), and how the "rhetorician" can and does reach farther than what mere sensory perception alone can convey. For example, let's take the first 3 lines and translate them into the metaphor represented by the colors of the flowers according to the standard symbolism for floral colors. First we have Steve's lines, then those same lines again, but expressed in metaphor:

Bouquet of Roses in Sunlight

Say that it is a crude effect, black reds,
Pink yellows, orange whites, too much as they are
To be anything else in the sunlight of the room,

-------- The same lines above in metaphor --------

Say that it is a raw, bewitching passionate desire,
Feminine compassion, joyful innocence, too much as they are
To be anything else in the divine light of the room

-------------------------------------------------------

So what's the point? No matter how pure Steve's perceptual experience is compared to inferior rhetorical descriptions, the symbolic aspect of flowers cannot be detected by perceptual experience alone, and therefore metaphor can and actually does "exceed sense".

So what's the point?

Do you mean what's the point of metaphor, art, human expression, philosophy's perennial fascination with the mind-body problem and with the unanswered question about the nature of 'reality'? All of the above (and more) are involved in our attempt to understand the meaning of perception and consciousness in a world to which these capacities of living beings open up -- a world never known as an object, or an object containing objects, from the perspectives revealed in conscious presence to it. From our open-ended, radically temporal, changing perspectives on the world in which we find ourselves, our sense of the world and of our being in it is, as Stevens expresses it, "sense in the changing sense of things." Thus "sense exceeds all metaphor," for metaphors, like images, similes, symbols, and all closed interpretations of the nature of reality freeze our continuous activity of perception {the 'worlding of the world' in MP's philosophy} -- in reifications of 'what-is' that falsify what-is. Thus, as Stevens also wrote, “Conceptions are artificial. Perceptions are essential.” Why? because perceptions are never finished as long as consciousness persists in its presence -- its temporal presence -- to the world/environment in which it lives in time. What consciousnesses all produce is a funding of meaning drawn from their perceptual and sentient experience of the world, the latter never known fully in its objectivity. MP calls our attention to the dual meanings of the word 'sense' ['sens' in French] as referring both to perception and meaning.* He also writes that in humans 'the first perception' involves imagination.

*The same is true in English and doubtless other modern languages.

 

[Constance]

Hi, Constance! Am enjoying the conversation -

what I have read of it.

Hi Tyger. Good to see you and to read you. You bring a whole other side to this discussion -- i.e., those 'things' that we perceive when they are suddenly introduced into our consciousnesses from elsewhere. Last time we talked you were interested in a book I mentioned (Irreducible Mind); have you had time yet to read it in part or whole? I've still only read sections of it since it's such a tome and 'there's ... so ... little ...time', as Steve {smcder} noted. Such an important book for this thread's discussion too. I wish we could all have it downloaded into our consciousnesses overnight.

 

[Constance]

Your number 4. actually works out to being the same as my number 3.

I'm not sure about that. Maybe you can clarify what you mean by "formulated in such a way that no solution is possible." I've had the impression from your recent posts that you think the hard problem is only hard because of the way it's been formulated in language by Chalmers and Nagel, and that if it's formulated in other terms (yours) it's no longer a real problem. I think it's a real problem that cannot be resolved by objective neuroscientific attempts to resolve it to date. On what does one base one's faith (if one holds to that faith) that such attempts will at some point resolve the hard problem (account for consciousness in objective material or physical terms)?

 

[Constance]

For anyone interested in the book I mentioned in my post to Tyger, here's the necessary bibliographical information and a short summary from amazon:

Edward Kelly and Emily Williams Kelly et al, Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century.

"Current mainstream opinion in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind holds that all aspects of human mind and consciousness are generated by physical processes occurring in brains. Views of this sort have dominated recent scholarly publication. The present volume, however, demonstrates empirically that this reductive materialism is not only incomplete but false. The authors systematically marshal evidence for a variety of psychological phenomena that are extremely difficult, and in some cases clearly impossible, to account for in conventional physicalist terms. Topics addressed include phenomena of extreme psychophysical influence, memory, psychological automatisms and secondary personality, near-death experiences and allied phenomena, genius-level creativity, and 'mystical' states of consciousness both spontaneous and drug-induced. The authors further show that these rogue phenomena are more readily accommodated by an alternative 'transmission' or 'filter' theory of mind/brain relations advanced over a century ago by a largely forgotten genius, F. W. H. Myers, and developed further by his friend and colleague William James. This theory, moreover, ratifies the commonsense conception of human beings as causally effective conscious agents, and is fully compatible with leading-edge physics and neuroscience. The book should command the attention of all open-minded persons concerned with the still-unsolved mysteries of the mind."

 

[Constance]

More from Stevens . . .

“The Idea of Order at Key West

She sang beyond the genius of the sea.
The water never formed to mind or voice,
Like a body wholly body, fluttering
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry,
That was not ours although we understood,
Inhuman, of the veritable ocean.

The sea was not a mask. No more was she.
The song and water were not medleyed sound
Even if what she sang was what she heard,
Since what she sang was uttered word by word.
It may be that in all her phrases stirred
The grinding water and the gasping wind;
But it was she and not the sea we heard.

For she was the maker of the song she sang.
The ever-hooded, tragic-gestured sea
Was merely a place by which she walked to sing.
Whose spirit is this? we said, because we knew
It was the spirit that we sought and knew
That we should ask this often as she sang.
If it was only the dark voice of the sea
That rose, or even colored by many waves;
If it was only the outer voice of sky
And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled,
However clear, it would have been deep air,
The heaving speech of air, a summer sound
Repeated in a summer without end
And sound alone. But it was more than that,
More even than her voice, and ours, among
The meaningless plungings of water and the wind,
Theatrical distances, bronze shadows heaped
On high horizons, mountainous atmospheres
Of sky and sea.

It was her voice that made
The sky acutest at its vanishing.
She measured to the hour its solitude.
She was the single artificer of the world
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea,
Whatever self it had, became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we,
As we beheld her striding there alone,
Knew that there never was a world for her
Except the one she sang and, singing, made.

Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know,
Why, when the singing ended and we turned
Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights,
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there,
As the night descended, tilting in the air,
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea,
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles,
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.

Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
The maker's rage to order words of the sea,
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
And of ourselves and of our origins,
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds”
― Wallace Stevens


“THE POEMS OF OUR CLIMATE

I
Clear water in a brilliant bowl,
Pink and white carnations. The light
In the room more like a snowy air,
Reflecting snow. A newly-fallen snow
At the end of winter when afternoons return.
Pink and white carnations - one desires
So much more than that. The day itself
Is simplified: a bowl of white,
Cold, a cold porcelain, low and round,
With nothing more than the carnations there.

II
Say even that this complete simplicity
Stripped one of all one's torments, concealed
The evilly compounded, vital I
And made it fresh in a world of white,
A world of clear water, brilliant-edged,
Still one would want more, one would need more,
More than a world of white and snowy scents.

III
There would still remain the never-resting mind,
So that one would want to escape, come back
To what had been so long composed.
The imperfect is our paradise.
Note that, in this bitterness, delight,
Since the imperfect is so hot in us,
Lies in flawed words and stubborn sounds.”
― Wallace Stevens


Reality is an Activity of the Most August Imagination

Last Friday, in the big light of last Friday night,
We drove home from Cornwall to Hartford, late.
It was not a night blown at a glassworks in Vienna
Or Venice, motionless, gathering time and dust.
There was a crush of strength in a grinding going round,
Under the front of the westward evening star,
The vigor of glory, a glittering in the veins,
As things emerged and moved and were dissolved,
Either in distance, change or nothingness,
The visible transformations of summer night,
An argentine abstraction approaching form
And suddenly denying itself away.
There was an insolid billowing of the solid.
Night’s moonlight lake was neither water nor air.


from "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird"
— Wallace Stevens
V
I do not know which to prefer,
[URL='http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/42920.Wallace_Stevens']The beauty of inflections
Or the beauty of innuendoes,
The blackbird whistling
Or just after.


The Snowman

“One must have a mind of winter
To regard the frost and the boughs
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow;

And have been cold a long time
To behold the junipers shagged with ice,
The spruces rough in the distant glitter

Of the January sun; and not to think
Of any misery in the sound of the wind,
In the sound of a few leaves,

Which is the sound of the land
Full of the same wind
That is blowing in the same bare place

For the listener, who listens in the snow,
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.”

― [URL='http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/42920.Wallace_Stevens']Wallace Stevens [/URL][/URL]

"“From this the poem springs: that we live in a place
That is not our own and, much more, not ourselves
And hard it is in spite of blazoned days.”
― Wallace Stevens

“It is not in the premise that reality
Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses
A dust, a force that traverses a shade.”
― Wallace Stevens

“The partaker partakes of that which changes him. The child that touches takes character from the thing, the body, it touches.”
― Wallace Stevens



“The essential fault of surrealism is that it invents without discovering. To make a clam play an accordion is to invent not to discover. The observation of the unconscious, so far as it can be observed, should reveal things of which we have previously been unconscious, not the familiar things of which we have been conscious plus imagination. p. 919”
― Wallace Stevens

“Everything is complicated; if that were not so, life and poetry and everything else would be a bore.”
― Wallace Stevens

http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/42920.Wallace_Stevens
from "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven"

“... Suppose these hours are composed of ourselves,
So that they become an impalpable town, full of Impalpable bells, transparencies of sound.

Sounding in transparent dwellings of the self,
Impalpable habitations that seem to move
In the movement of the colors of the mind.

Confused illuminations and sonorities,
So much ourselves, we cannot tell apart
the idea and the bearer-being of
the idea....”
― Wallace Stevens

 

[smcder]

And, I responded with a post that demonstrates, that based on a purely physical description of the underlying structure of consciousness, what the visual perceptual experience of various animals is "like" ( like being similar ) and made the claim that it is valid because perceptual experience is a substantial part of "what it's like" ( you agreed ) and therefore because we can show "what it's like" we have a "proof of concept" for a physical solution to the so-called hard problem. I also went on to describe why any objection to that claim logically results in the hard problem being incoherent or unresolvable and therefore pointless.

Sure, but to be specific, I'm not claiming it's meaningless. It has meaning because it forces us into a mode involving abstract analysis, the result of which leads to a conclusion that allows us to move on past that issue.

I think the confusion revolves around my claim that the hard problem is not solvable, not because it's "hard" but because it's logically incoherent. Also, it isn't necessarily easy to see why it's not coherent because that determination depends on very specific interpretations of the language used in the formulation. I've done what I can to explain that in my previous posts, but grammatical transitivity is a tricky business. Combine that with the nuances of Physicalism, and we have plenty of room for chaos.

Perhaps Nagel is challenging a different view of Physicalism than the way I see it, I'm not sure. But as I mentioned earlier, even if we take these variations into account, there are only so many possibilities, and thay all seem to shake out so many ways, ( 1. The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent. or 2. The hard problem appears to be solvable as shown in the video. or 3. The hard problem is not solvable because it's formulated in such a way that no solution is possible ).

And, I responded with a post that demonstrates, that based on a purely physical description of the underlying structure of consciousness, what the visual perceptual experience of various animals is "like" ( like being similar ) and made the claim that it is valid because perceptual experience is a substantial part of "what it's like" ( you agreed ) and therefore because we can show "what it's like" we have a "proof of concept" for a physical solution to the so-called hard problem. I also went on to describe why any objection to that claim logically results in the hard problem being incoherent or unresolvable and therefore pointless.

the only objection I have to the claim is that it's not applicable - the video is not a purely physical description of the underlying structures (neuro-physiology) of consciousness (again, this is all an argument against physicalism -so thats all we can work with) - so the video only "works" if it's being watched by another conscious entity who can feel empathy, so consciousness is assumed to make the point, otherwise you break it down into bits that code for actions by a computer to create sound and visual stimuli - which don't amount to a description of the nuerophysiology of the animals portrayed - whereas a formula could be written for a chemical reaction (or any other physical process) and it would describe the reaction/process completely, how much energy released as heat, light, by-products, etc - thus a purely physical description of the underlying neurological anatomy, would include all the possible chemical and physical reactions and would be complete (as a physical description of events in the neuroanatomy) and would still not account for or even imply that there is any subjective experience on hand - you could look all day at the equations and not "see" that it implies consciousness . . .that's all it's saying -

 

[smcder]

Perhaps Nagel is challenging a different view of Physicalism than the way I see it, I'm not sure. But as I mentioned earlier, even if we take these variations into account, there are only so many possibilities, and thay all seem to shake out so many ways, ( 1. The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent. or 2. The hard problem appears to be solvable as shown in the video. or 3. The hard problem is not solvable because it's formulated in such a way that no solution is possible ).

Think of it as "the hard challenge" instead of the hard problem - when you hear problem you seem to think it can only fall into one of 3 categories: solvable, incoherent or unfair but here the problem means obstacle to as in "it's going to be a problem for you to hold physicalism as true when you hear what I have to say" -so, physicalism means you just have matter and energy and forces/fields available to work with - and Nagel, when he wrote the paper didn't think it necessarily meant physicalism was false, just that we maybe didn't know enough physics yet - then 40 years later he thinks it can't be solved (but not because it was formulated in such a way that no solution was possible) but because he doesn't think a physical account of the world is enough - because the world isn't strictly physical - it can't be reduced just to physical elements - in addition to the irreducible elements of materialism (particles, fields, forces - whatever) he thinks there is another irreducible element - which he calls "mind" - now, it still requires a complex arrangement to form human consciousness (Chalmers' "structural invariance") - but nonetheless, tear that brain apart and you will have irreducible physical and mental elements . . . but that is his conclusion 40 years later and not inherent in what he wrote in What It's Like to Be a Bat

 

[Randall]

I'm not sure about that. Maybe you can clarify what you mean by "formulated in such a way that no solution is possible." I've had the impression from your recent posts that you think the hard problem is only hard because of the way it's been formulated in language by Chalmers and Nagel, and that it if it's formulated in other terms (yours) it's no longer a real problem. I think it's a real problem that cannot be resolved by objective neuroscientific attempts to resolve it to date. On what does one base one's faith (if one holds to that faith) that such attempts will at some point resolve the hard problem (account for consciousness in objective material or physical terms)?

It's explained over the course of several posts in this thread and elsewhere, so the best way to follow it is to go back and sift through them and ask questions that don't seem to get answered in the exchanges. Probably the best place to start is here: Philosophy, Science, and the Unexplained | Page 5 | The Paracast Community Forums

 

[smcder]

I'm not sure about that. Maybe you can clarify what you mean by "formulated in such a way that no solution is possible." I've had the impression from your recent posts that you think the hard problem is only hard because of the way it's been formulated in language by Chalmers and Nagel, and that if it's formulated in other terms (yours) it's no longer a real problem. I think it's a real problem that cannot be resolved by objective neuroscientific attempts to resolve it to date. On what does one base one's faith (if one holds to that faith) that such attempts will at some point resolve the hard problem (account for consciousness in objective material or physical terms)?

Hi Constance - Thomas Nagel is a mainstream academic philosopher who introduced the subjective as argument against physicalism (or, at the time as a "problem" for physicalism) that I guess basically defined "the hard problem".

So, it is significant that his newest book "Mind and Cosmos" comes to the conclusion that "mind" is as irreducible as "matter" (and this has far reaching conclusions, one of which is to re-introduce teleology into the natural sciences) . . . it's significant because it comes from someone who I think is pretty mainstream, pretty conservative in academic circles - at the end of his career, I don't get the impression anyone is going to label him a wild-eyed radical, but not one might pay him much attention either -

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory.

. . .

To me, the "hard problem" has always been a real problem for reductive materialism - and some of the responses, such as "eliminative materialism" seem to torture logic and common sense in order to evade or invalidate the hard problem - but I don't completely rule them out either, on the other hand, my gut and intuition and everyday (and more than everyday experiences) seem to inform me that there is just so much more than is "dreamt of in your philosophy" . . .

 

[Randall]

Think of it as "the hard challenge" instead of the hard problem - when you hear problem you seem to think it can only fall into one of 3 categories: solvable, incoherent or unfair but here the problem means obstacle to as in "it's going to be a problem for you to hold physicalism as true when you hear what I have to say" -so, physicalism means you just have matter and energy and forces/fields available to work with - and Nagel, when he wrote the paper didn't think it necessarily meant physicalism was false, just that we maybe didn't know enough physics yet - then 40 years later he thinks it can't be solved (but not because it was formulated in such a way that no solution was possible) but because he doesn't think a physical account of the world is enough - because the world isn't strictly physical - it can't be reduced just to physical elements - in addition to the irreducible elements of materialism (particles, fields, forces - whatever) he thinks there is another irreducible element - which he calls "mind" - now, it still requires a complex arrangement to form human consciousness (Chalmers' "structural invariance") - but nonetheless, tear that brain apart and you will have irreducible physical and mental elements . . . but that is his conclusion 40 years later and not inherent in what he wrote in What It's Like to Be a Bat

Yes, I get all that, and it still doesn't change how it all breaks down into:

1. The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent. or
2. The hard problem appears to be solvable as shown in the video. or
3. The hard problem is not solvable because it's formulated in such a way that no solution is possible.

How the possibilities above wash out is dependent on particular interpretations of what Physicalism is, what is meant by the word "physical", what is meant by "account for", and what is meant when we say this is "what it's like" to be something and other language in the formulation and various texts that engage the topic. To review I've reposted the relevant information again below. This may be tedious. But I've yet to identify the specific spots where we're not on the same page and why.

Point 1 - The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent.

The analysis for this begins with the description of the hard problem in the Wikipedia article, so let's stick with that for the moment, to quote:

"Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set ( the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena ), and he argues that the problem of experience will persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained."​

The circular argument is that if all the relevant functions of subjective experience ( consciousness ) are explained then there is no reason to think that it ( consciousness ) hasn't been explained. However Chalmers simply denies this by invoking this so-called "hard problem" that he maintains will persist regardless of whether modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena explains consciousness. This problem isn't as obvious in Nagel's paper because he starts off assuming that the hard problem is relevant in the first place. Specifically he assumes that explaining how subjective experience ( consciousness ) arises ( how a bat works ) cannot adequately explain what subjective experience ( consciousness ) itself is like ( what it's like to be a bat ) and the inference is that therefore, we have not explained what consciousness is ( our original question ).

The counterpoint to this is that Chalmer's position as explained by Nagel isn't relevant to the question because it's based on a logical incoherency brought about by the language in the formulation. Specifically, explaining what something "is" doesn't require that we explain what it's "like". It only requires that we explain what it "is". What something "is" and what something is "like" are two separate questions. A full explanation gets into the details of gramatical transitivity. In simpler terms:

• Question Q : Asks, What is X?
• Answer A: Explains what X is.
• Answer B: Explains that answer A does not explain what it's like to be X.
• Because Answer B addresses Answer A instead of answering Question Q, Answer B is not a relevant to Question Q. It's relevant only to another question that has not been asked ( What is it like to be X? ).

The above logical incoherency of the so-called hard problem as formulated by Chalmers and illustrated in Nagel's paper is only one facet of the larger problem, which is the general concept of duality. For that problem we've also provided a theoretical resolution to the issue of material versus non-material as it relates to the idea of physical versus non-physical.

-----------------------------------

If possible, what's needed here is to identify specific spots where there is a point of contention so that we can identify what specifically that contention is and resolve it. Or we can give in to frustration as the Trickster stands by in the shadows, the smile on his face growing ever wider like that of the Cheshire Cat. Or ... I dunno ... If you were in Calgary I'd say we should go for a beer or something .

 

[smcder]

Yes, I get all that, and it still doesn't change how it all breaks down into:

1. The hard problem is not solvable because it's incoherent. or
2. The hard problem appears to be solvable as shown in the video. or
3. The hard problem is not solvable because it's formulated in such a way that no solution is possible.

Or ... I dunno ... If you were in Calgary I'd say we should go for a beer or something .

I say: beer!

we'll get through it - I'll sit down here and work through this and see what we can come up with . . . we'll not let the Trickster get the best of us . . .

 

[Constance]

Hi Constance - Thomas Nagel is a mainstream academic philosopher who introduced the subjective as argument against physicalism (or, at the time as a "problem" for physicalism) that I guess basically defined "the hard problem".

So, it is significant that his newest book "Mind and Cosmos" comes to the conclusion that "mind" is as irreducible as "matter" (and this has far reaching conclusions, one of which is to re-introduce teleology into the natural sciences) . . . it's significant because it comes from someone who I think is pretty mainstream, pretty conservative in academic circles - at the end of his career, I don't get the impression anyone is going to label him a wild-eyed radical, but not one might pay him much attention either -

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory.

. . .

To me, the "hard problem" has always been a real problem for reductive materialism - and some of the responses, such as "eliminative materialism" seem to torture logic and common sense in order to evade or invalidate the hard problem - but I don't completely rule them out either, on the other hand, my gut and intuition and everyday (and more than everyday experiences) seem to inform me that there is just so much more than is "dreamt of in your philosophy" . . .

I read Nagel's important article "What is it Like to be a Bat?" about ten years ago and maybe one or two other articles by him, but have not yet read his book Mind and Cosmos, so I'm grateful for your bringing it into this thread. I especially like this from your quoted extract: "it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory." Fortunately quantum mechanics, systems theory, and information theory have enabled scientists to rethink their reductive materialist premises concerning nature and have been part of the recent 'consciousness revolution' in science. Still early times in that revolution, though, so we will have to struggle still against the dominant materialism for some time.

The great irony is that qm brought about the recognition of the role of the observer in exerimentation, and yet physicists in general have shrunk from confronting it. I think that's why so many incommensureable interpretations of qm have continued to coexist for many decades.

Objectivist thinking seems to become a habit of life for those who apply it continually in their work, and so it seems to be the case that such thinkers miss a large percentage of what goes on in their own consciousness, their own experience (their actual lived reality). It's a great effort to engage subjectivity not as an abstraction but as one's native experience reflected on with one's sentient mind. That requires paying attention to all (or even much) of what passes through the mind in any given space of time, something that task-oriented individuals who operate on reductive- objectivist premises are apparently reluctant to do. Why it's so hard to persuade them to even consider that consciousness may be an ontological primitive.

 

[smcder]

Objectivist thinking seems to become a habit of life for those who apply it continually in their work, and so it seems to be the case that such thinkers miss a large percentage of what goes on in their own consciousness experience (lived reality). It's a great effort to engage subjectivity not as an abstraction but as one's native experience reflected on with one's sentient mind. That requires paying attention to all (or even much) of what passes through the mind in any given space of time, something that task-oriented individuals who operate on reductive- objectivist premises are apparently reluctant to do. Why it's so hard to persuade them to even consider that consciousness may be an ontological primitive.

"ontological primitive" - that is worth the price of admission . . . ! ;-)