Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[smcder]

OK. We're still on track. Perhaps the problems I've been describing will become self evident as we run through the next set of questions. At this point we have the meaning of "a full, physical accounting", which is akin to an inventory of all materials and their associated properties involved in the construction of something ( in this case a conscious being ).

So the next task is to define what we mean by "account for something that it is like to be" something? This latter type of accounting doesn't appear to be of the same nature as the former. We're no longer dealing with a technical manual. So what are we dealing with? Does the question even make sense in the first place? I don't think so.

My perspective on this problem is that producing the "what it's like" part ( the second part ) is the result of applying the knowledge gained in the first part ( the technical manual ). All we need to do is use the technical manual to build another working conscious something and it will be sufficiently "like" the first one to justify the assumption that both "somethings" possess a "like" consciousness. So it's not logical to assume that because the technical manual itself doesn't account for the presence of the actual "something" that the technical manual doesn't account for ( in a conceptual sense ) that something.

Regarding the concept of duality, I'm not making a reference to any specific philosophical model. I use it only to differentiate between our subjective personal perceptual experiences and external material reality. So specific issues like substance dualism as a combination of physical/non-physical and all the baggage that goes along with that aren't relevant.

My perspective on this problem is that producing the "what it's like" part ( the second part ) is the result of applying the knowledge gained in the first part ( the technical manual ). All we need to do is use the technical manual to build another working conscious something and it will be sufficiently "like" the first one to justify the assumption that both "somethings" possess a "like" consciousness. So it's not logical to assume that because the technical manual itself doesn't account for the presence of the actual "something" that the technical manual doesn't account for ( in a conceptual sense ) that something.

Nagel is picking a bone with the claims of the physicalists themselves - namely that they can give a full accounting of everything by its physical properties alone - without an accounting of consciousness, a physical explanation of it and the accompanying measurements, assurances, tests that it is present, proof that it is present - we have only the faith that the second something is "conscious" and not a zombie simply because it is built like the first (and that is a logical assumption only if physicalism is true - but that's circular logic - this is why Nagel says the problem of consciousness is unique and I think what ultimately leads him to the idea that mind is irreducible.

This is also where he delves more into the subjective and the point of view issues . . . something I didn't get the importance of first time around.

And it makes me question what the basis of materialism is? Why the a priori commitment that there can only be whirling particles and forces? Because it's what is testable by the methods developed following the church/science agreement in Enlightenment?

 

[smcder]

listening to Mac Tonnies on a Coast to Coast broadcast . . . is it just me or is his voice paranormally hypnotic?

 

[smcder]

that should be:

". . . and it makes me question what the basis of the commitment to materialism is? Why the a priori commitment that there can only be whirling particles and forces? Because it's what is testable by the methods developed following the church/science agreement in Enlightenment?"

 

[smcder]

OK. We're still on track. Perhaps the problems I've been describing will become self evident as we run through this next part. At this point we have the meaning of "a full, physical accounting", which is akin to an inventory of all materials and their associated properties involved in the construction of something ( in this case a conscious being ).

So the next task is to define what we mean by "account for something that it is like to be" something? This latter type of accounting doesn't appear to be of the same nature as the former. We're no longer dealing with a technical manual. So what are we dealing with? Does the question even make sense in the first place? I don't think so.

So the next task is to define what we mean by "account for something that it is like to be" something? This latter type of accounting doesn't appear to be of the same nature as the former. We're no longer dealing with a technical manual. So what are we dealing with? Does the question even make sense in the first place? I don't think so.

This latter type of accounting doesn't appear to be of the same nature as the former.

Right! and I think that's exactly the point Nagel is making - and again, why he says the mind-body problem is unlike other problems such as he lists in the very beginning of his paper (like water-h20) - so, the approach you take is one he criticized his contemporaries for taking - namely, ignoring the real problem or claiming it is incoherent, but that's kind of admitting that we just don't seem to be able to account for this consciousness in physical terms . . . (but why just through our hands up in the air and claim it doesn't make sense?) but again, the claim Nagel is picking on is the claim of the physicalists themselves: that everything can be accounted for in physical terms - he;s just holding their feet to the fire (this is where subjective/objective comes in and we haven't even dealt with that yet . . . but basically the argument is that in a physical accounting of say the water-h20 problem you move away from subjective descriptions to objective ones, ones that can be understood from any viewpoint (say an intelligent bat) and that seems to solve the problem or at least to approach a limit of understanding, but you can't do that with consciousness because it is the subjective . . . )

 

[smcder]

Steve, what is the source of that Chalmer's quote in your first post of today?

jump in here with us Constance! The water is fine!

 

[smcder]

My perspective on this problem is that producing the "what it's like" part ( the second part ) is the result of applying the knowledge gained in the first part ( the technical manual ). All we need to do is use the technical manual to build another working conscious something and it will be sufficiently "like" the first one to justify the assumption that both "somethings" possess a "like" consciousness. So it's not logical to assume that because the technical manual doesn't account for in a material sense, the presence of the actual completed "something" that the technical manual doesn't account for ( in a conceptual sense ) that actual something it represents ( that it's "like" ).

All we need to do is use the technical manual to build another working conscious something and it will be sufficiently "like" the first one to justify the assumption that both "somethings" possess a "like" consciousness.

But there are two possibilities: either we are just making a copy of something, we've "growing" a neural net in a computer or in a vat according to some rules or trial and error or evolutionary algorithms - or we truly understand how to put something together. The first isn't really a valid response because we don't know everything that goes into it - the second is much more interesting but since we don't have such a manual, we can't yet say that in order to do this we don't have to solve the hard problem. But it may also involve the recognition that mind is irreducible and so that then would have to be taken into account when constructing this conscious something.

 

[smcder]

Thanks. I read that before, a few years ago, and want to read it again. I just noticed that there are twenty-some responses to it and then a response by Chalmers to the points raised by these various commentators. It might be a very good resource for us to explore in identifying the critical junctures in this inquiry into the origin of consciousness. Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness

i think that's an excellent suggestion! - and Dennett did the same sort of thing on the other side with his Consciousness Explained and its responses and then his responses to those responses . . .

 

[Tyger]

"I awoke, only to see that the rest of the world is still asleep." ~ Leonardo da Vinci

Arguing with only half the brain is no argument at all. Just sayin' - to no one and nothing in particular.

 

[smcder]

"I awoke, only to see that the rest of the world is still asleep." ~ Leonardo da Vinci

Arguing with only half the brain is no argument at all. Just sayin' - to no one and nothing in particular.

but arguments between the two halves of the brain are the worst . . . ;-) I enjoy the engagement of ideas - in trying to see what is in the logic of an argument, there is a beauty in a good idea, in a good "argument" for an idea . . . just as in an equation, there's a balance there, an aesthetic like a good piece of music, but it's also ephemeral and dependent on so much context - that I always try not to confuse any argument, statement or logic with what is - the map is not the territory . . . that freedom makes discussion of ideas deeply pleasurable because you're not attached to them -

 

[smcder]

http://www.ece.lsu.edu/kak/sutra.pdf

 

[Tyger]

but arguments between the two halves of the brain are the worst . . . ;-) I enjoy the engagement of ideas - in trying to see what is in the logic of an argument, there is a beauty in a good idea, in a good "argument" for an idea . . . just as in an equation, there's a balance there, an aesthetic like a good piece of music, but it's also ephemeral and dependent on so much context - that I always try not to confuse any argument, statement or logic with what is - the map is not the territory . . . that freedom makes discussion of ideas deeply pleasurable because you're not attached to them -

Understood - and exactly so. Love your sentiment and your language to express it. I feel the same. I'd engage except there are too many obligations and a serious response just is not possible. So I babble on the side-lines - happily and contendedly so - like so.

 

[Constance]

I don't know - people are afraid of being duped maybe, it seems so many biographies of famous people or heroes like Jefferson have revealed their human side - fathering children with slaves or other things that might not be as outrageous as you would first think but that firmly confirm those people as human, all too human (to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche) and my age group grew up with pretty heroic and unrealistic views of these men in early school day encounters (really this was the mythology of early America, I think) so maybe people are kind of disenchanted with the old "great man idea"? or afraid to hope for people to be better than they can be? . . . but I think it's also an appeal to people's baser senses - provocation and outrage are strong sensations and I guess people will consume that . . . but we seem to be such passive consumers, not objecting to so many things (and funny what we do object to) that a kind of cynicism does seem to be fed to us through the media . . . again, with this example - Penn and Teller are entertainers first and so if any of this is right, it would fit in for them to target someone like the Dalai Lama for the payoff (and that could still be true regardless of the truth of their claims - after all, they could focus on positive themes, but probably wouldn't make the money they do (or did) and that says a lot about people in general)

A good range of possible motivations for the reaction. I think there's something else there too, a resistance to an implied challenge to follow those kinds of examples in one's own life. And I think that's too bad, a sign of a loss of something that I think humans need: a sense of the seriousness and value of life on this planet and the need to improve it for all living beings.

 

[Constance]

jump in here with us Constance! The water is fine!

I've been reading Chalmers' responses to his commentators.

 

[Constance]

that should be:

". . . and it makes me question what the basis of the commitment to materialism is? Why the a priori commitment that there can only be whirling particles and forces? Because it's what is testable by the methods developed following the church/science agreement in Enlightenment?"

Probably, but it's become a deadening habit of mind in the last 150+ years, and the advance of technologically dominated culture has made it worse in my opinion. Capitalism and corporatism have played a enormous role in all this too.

 

[Tyger]

This sums up my pov pretty much.......

It's all about timing - and when the questions come.....

 

[Constance]

ufology, could you unpack this sentence for me? I can't follow what you're saying:

So it's not logical to assume that because the technical manual doesn't account for in a material sense, the presence of the actual completed "something" that the technical manual doesn't account for ( in a conceptual sense ) that actual something it represents ( that it's "like" ).

Never mind, I got the general outline of the statement reading it again, but let's get back to what you mean by 'the technical manual'. Some examples would help.

 

[Randall]

But there are two possibilities: either we are just making a copy of something, we've "growing" a neural net in a computer or in a vat according to some rules or trial and error or evolutionary algorithms - or we truly understand how to put something together. The first isn't really a valid response because we don't know everything that goes into it - the second is much more interesting but since we don't have such a manual, we can't yet say that in order to do this we don't have to solve the hard problem. But it may also involve the recognition that mind is irreducible and so that then would have to be taken into account when constructing this conscious something.

Let's slow down because we're getting ahead of ourselves just a little. We almost had it back there where I commented that two separate types of "accounting for" are in play when it comes to the formulation of the so-called hard problem.

1. On one hand we're talking about the design, materials, properties, and operating principles of a conscious being.
2. On the other hand, we're talking about conveying the subjective experience of the fully assembled and functioning conscious being.

Solving the hard problem seems to require that the type of "accounting for" in 1. ( above ) also perform the same type of "accounting for" as 2. ( above ).

1. Is it sufficient to convey a subjective experience by analogy or illustration ( what it's like )
2. Or must it go beyond that to impart a "one in the same" type of subjective experience?

If the answer is 1. ( above ), then we have done that to some extent with the video example, and hypothetically could do something similar for the other perceptual information that make up a substantial part of what we call consciousness. However if the answer is 2. ( above ), then what is being asked is impossible and the question becomes pointless. It's like saying that just because we have a cookbook doesn't mean we have food. So what? That's not relevant to the initial question because the cookbook still explains food sufficiently. Get all the ingredients, follow the instructions, and out pops food. A fresh baked loaf of bread might take the better part of an hour. In the case of humans, it takes about 9 months, and the evidence for this is rather overwhelming.

 

[smcder]

Probably, but it's become a deadening habit of mind in the last 150+ years, and the advance of technologically dominated culture has made it worse in my opinion. Capitalism and corporatism have played a enormous role in all this too.

I think you might like John Michael Greer's The Archdruid Report - and his book: "The Long Descent" . . . there's quote I'm trying to remember about our technology using us . . . oh, another podcast you might like is Entitled Opinions - Entitled Opinions (about Life and Literature) from your interest in literature and ideas generally, he covers a wide range of topics and has fascinating guests, I think his monologue shows are some of the best though -

 

[Constance]

I have no idea how all these strike-throughs have appeared in the text of this post. Any suggestions on how to remove them? I drafted the post within the screen and word-processing system provided here, so the strike-throughs must have arisen here.

Let's slow down because we're getting ahead of ourselves just a little. We almost had it back there where I commented that two separate types of "accounting for" are in play when it comes to the formulation of the so-called hard problem.

1. On one hand we're talking about the design, materials, properties, and operating principles of a conscious being.
2. On the other hand, we're talking about conveying the subjective experience of the fully assembled and functioning conscious being.

Solving the hard problem seems to require that the type of "accounting for" in 1. ( above ) also perform the same type of "accounting for" as 2. ( above ).

1. Is it sufficient to convey a subjective experience by analogy or illustration ( what it's like )
2. Or must it go beyond that to impart a "one in the same" type of subjective experience?

If the answer is 1. ( above ), then we have done that to some extent with the video example, and hypothetically could do something similar for the other perceptual information that make up a substantial part of what we call consciousness. However if the answer is 2. ( above ), then what is being asked is impossible and the question becomes pointless. It's like saying that just because we have a cookbook doesn't mean we have food. So what? That's not relevant to the initial question because the cookbook still explains food sufficiently. Get all the ingredients, follow the instructions, and out pops food. A fresh baked loaf of bread might take the better part of an hour. In the case of humans, it takes about 9 months, and the evidence for this is rather overwhelming.

The question seems to be: do we know all of the ingredients that constitute perceptual processing in the brain? You refer to "the other perceptual information that make up a substantial part of what we call consciousness." Would you clarify or specify what you mean by 'the other perceptual information that makes up a substantial part of what we call consciousness'?

It seems that neuroscientists now understand a good deal about visual perception in terms of how the brain and its connected visual sensoria present that which is seen in the world through our visual apparatus. The problem in understanding consciousness and mind seems to be how to account for what happens to, and through, information initially conveyed through perception and further processed in thought.

Alva Noe is a philosopher of mind knowledgeable about both phenomenological and neurological approaches to the problem of consciousness. His sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience has challenged both externalist and internalist thinkers in consciousness studies and has found support from specialists on both sides. Noe's theory is summarized in the short version, linked below, of a much longer paper presenting this theory, which I read several years ago. It is further elaborated and contextualized in several books by Noe published in recent years and is likely presented at its fullest in the final chapter of Alva Noe and Evan Thompson, eds., Vision and Mind, briefly described here:

Vision and Mind presents a case-study in constructive, empirically informed philosophical debate. This volume collects 23 major contributions covering a wide spectrum of approaches, from orthodox constructivism to ecological psychology, enactionism and beyond. It's essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of perception, the function of vision and the way the human mind makes contact with the world. -- Andy Clark, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh)

I think Noe's sensorimotor theory might help us move closer to the core of the problem we are discussing in this thread.

What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual
experience

 

[Randall]

I have no idea how all these strike-throughs have appeared in the text of this post. Any suggestions on how to remove them?

Highlight the text in the editor and click the strikethrough icon in the menu bar.