S
smcder
Guest
Maybe so . . . maybe so.
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Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread
- Thread starter Randall
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Maybe so . . . maybe so.
S
smcder
Guest
Maybe this is real reason they call it "the hard problem". The semantics problem isn't in Wikipedia. It's something I explain ( or at least try to explain ) myself in the post ( here ) using an analogy to the concept of flight. The other reason is based on Chalmers comment in his formulation of the hard problem, to quote: "It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises." However, contrary to this, our theory of a consciousness field is a "good explanation" of why and how it ( consciousness ) arises. The why and how are because of causal factors associated with the biology of the stimulus response, yet arising from the stimulus response doesn't make it something material, so dualism ( in a general sense ) remains intact. There may be an argument that it ( the consciousness field ) is still physical ( within the realm of physics ), but that makes no difference to our pursuit anyway.
I do see all of that but I think the hard problem is still there - I wish I could convey my sense of why to you, but I can't seem to get it into words - so I don't think we're going to come to any productive conclusions at this point - maybe a third party perspective can come in, otherwise I'm afraid we're just going to go back and forth repeating ourselves.
The classic paper seems to be Nagel's
What is it like to be a bat?
that and Dennet's Book Consciousness Explained - its critique and his answer to criticism of it:
Consciousness Explained or Explained Away?
would seem to pretty well cover the field - and it's been years since I've read all of this, but it doesn't look like anyone has made an end of it and it's still an open (if peculiarly intractable) question, so I'm happy to leave this where it is. I do like McGinn's position, wish I could find his classic paper on it and cognitive closure.
That said - I'm happy to stick around and hash it out, it's just that right now I can't shake the sense of the hard problem that I have, can't get it resolved in my own head - but also can't get it into words to convey it - so I'd just be repeating myself. :-(
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smcder
Guest
Reading Nagel - and I think I am going to have some specific things to point you to in his essay, so maybe I can make some progress . . . I'd forgotten why the bat was so important!
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smcder
Guest
It's not a long read - I've got so many quotes here, but I think you need the whole essay. If you get time and read it - I'd like to know what you think. I'm making mental notes of where it applies directly to our conversation, but I don't want to just stick in a quote or two.
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smcder
Guest
Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences' having an objective character at all. Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experiences are really like, as opposed to how they appear to me? We cannot genuinely understand the hypothesis that their nature is captured in a physical description unless we understand the more fundamental idea that they have an objective nature (or that objective processes can have a subjective nature).
sorry . . . couldn't resist that one!
sorry . . . couldn't resist that one!
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smcder
Guest
This is..actually good advice, thanks.
What'd I say??
S
smcder
Guest
You want me to...
well . . . anyone! I think you ALL would benefit from it!!
Especially anyone who ever did wonder what it was like to be a bat!
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smcder
Guest
what, indeed, do any of us know in the grand scheme of things . . . being German, you'll know what the word "nagel" means, though!
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
If you see what I'm saying then you understand that it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved. Perhaps the reason that you're having trouble with it is because the basic idea of the hard problem ( what is it that does the perceiving as opposed to what creates the perceptions ) is still a valid issue. This part is a bit more tricky because it involves the feedback loop we talked about earlier and fuses Cartesian Materialism with a non-standard type of dualism.
As I mentioned before, I'm not well versed in philosophese, so perhaps there is some "official" term for this non-standard type of dualism, but since I don't know what that term is ( or if it even exists ) let's call it Physical Dualism. This type of dualism isn't identical to Substance Dualism because although it uses the idea of a non-material substance ( virtual photons ), it's still physical because it lies within the realm of physical laws ( like magnetism ). On the other hand, substance dualism is often deemed to be some type of "non-physical substance", and that creates problems ( see this video for some details ).
Returning to the problem of consciousness and what is doing the perceiving and what is creating the perceptions we find that the typical Cartesian Materialist model places our center of consciousness in the audience at a cinema where the outside world is projected onto a screen inside our heads ( see Cartesian Theatre ). There are obvious problems with this model, the main one being that no matter how closely we look at the material of the brain, we'll never find a little screen or image or other identifiable analog to the image we see. It exists separate from the material of the brain in non-material form ( hence dualism ), yet it's not a substance. So what is it then?
The situation we're proposing is that it's a field interacting with the brain material in a feedback loop where what does the perceiving and what creates the perceptions are one in the same, and every moment of consciousness is represented by a single frame ( momentary state ) in the loop. This eliminates the need to create some third party who is doing the perceiving and unifies the perception and the perceiver into one that exists with each momentary state of the consciousness field ( some interesting Zen overtones there ).
I'll have to check that out and get back to you, but I already suspect where it's going
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smcder
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[/quote][/quote]If you see what I'm saying then you understand that it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved. Perhaps the reason that you're having trouble with it is because the basic idea of the hard problem ( what is it that does the perceiving as opposed to what creates the perceptions ) is still a valid issue. This part is a bit more tricky because it involves the feedback loop we talked about earlier and fuses Cartesian Materialism with a non-standard type of dualism.
As I mentioned before, I'm not well versed in philosophese, so perhaps there is some "official" term for this non-standard type of dualism, but since I don't know what that term is ( or if it even exists ) let's call it Physical Dualism. This type of dualism isn't identical to Substance Dualism because although it uses the idea of a non-material substance ( virtual photons ), it's still physical because it lies within the realm of physical laws ( like magnetism ). On the other hand, substance dualism is often deemed to be some type of "non-physical substance", and that creates problems ( see this video for some details ).
Returning to the problem of consciousness and what is doing the perceiving and what is creating the perceptions we find that the typical Cartesian Materialist model places our center of consciousness in the audience at a cinema where the outside world is projected onto a screen inside our heads. There are obvious problems with this model, the main one being that no matter how closely we look at the material of the brain, we'll never find a little screen or image or other identifiable analog to the image we see. It exists separate from the material of the brain in non-material form ( hence dualism ), yet it's not a substance. Instead it's a field, and the situation we're proposing here is more like a feedback loop where what does the perceiving and what creates the perceptions are one in the same, and every moment of consciousness is represented by a single frame ( momentary state ) in the loop. This eliminates the need to create some third party who is doing the perceiving and unifies the perception and the perceiver into one that exists with each momentary state of the consciousness field ( some interesting Zen overtones there ).
I'll have to check that out and get back to you, but I already suspect where it's going
Yes, I suspect you do . . .
S
smcder
Guest
If you see what I'm saying then you understand that it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved. Perhaps the reason that you're having trouble with it is because the basic idea of the hard problem ( what is it that does the perceiving as opposed to what creates the perceptions ) is still a valid issue. This part is a bit more tricky because it involves the feedback loop we talked about earlier and fuses Cartesian Materialism with a non-standard type of dualism.
As I mentioned before, I'm not well versed in philosophese, so perhaps there is some "official" term for this non-standard type of dualism, but since I don't know what that term is ( or if it even exists ) let's call it Physical Dualism. This type of dualism isn't identical to Substance Dualism because although it uses the idea of a non-material substance ( virtual photons ), it's still physical because it lies within the realm of physical laws ( like magnetism ). On the other hand, substance dualism is often deemed to be some type of "non-physical substance", and that creates problems ( see this video for some details ).
Returning to the problem of consciousness and what is doing the perceiving and what is creating the perceptions we find that the typical Cartesian Materialist model places our center of consciousness in the audience at a cinema where the outside world is projected onto a screen inside our heads ( see Cartesian Theatre ). There are obvious problems with this model, the main one being that no matter how closely we look at the material of the brain, we'll never find a little screen or image or other identifiable analog to the image we see. It exists separate from the material of the brain in non-material form ( hence dualism ), yet it's not a substance. So what is it then?
The situation we're proposing is that it's a field interacting with the brain material in a feedback loop where what does the perceiving and what creates the perceptions are one in the same, and every moment of consciousness is represented by a single frame ( momentary state ) in the loop. This eliminates the need to create some third party who is doing the perceiving and unifies the perception and the perceiver into one that exists with each momentary state of the consciousness field ( some interesting Zen overtones there ).
I'll have to check that out and get back to you, but I already suspect where it's going
If you see what I'm saying then you understand that it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved.
Presumptuous . . . especially as you haven't read Nagel's paper at the time of this post.
As I mentioned before, I'm not well versed in philosophese . . .
You're doing really well, nonetheless! ;-)
Returning to the problem of consciousness and what is doing the perceiving and what is creating the perceptions we find that the typical Cartesian Materialist model places our center of consciousness in the audience at a cinema where the outside world is projected onto a screen inside our heads ( see Cartesian Theatre ). There are obvious problems with this model, the main one being that no matter how closely we look at the material of the brain, we'll never find a little screen or image or other identifiable analog to the image we see. It exists separate from the material of the brain in non-material form ( hence dualism ), yet it's not a substance. So what is it then?
I know about the Cartesian Theatre/theater . . . as I said, you are doing remarkable well without all that pesky philosophese . . .
The situation we're proposing is that it's a field interacting with the brain material in a feedback loop where what does the perceiving and what creates the perceptions are one in the same, and every moment of consciousness is represented by a single frame ( momentary state ) in the loop. This eliminates the need to create some third party who is doing the perceiving and unifies the perception and the perceiver into one that exists with each momentary state of the consciousness field ( some interesting Zen overtones there ).
I know - Nagel addresses this and finds it wanting, early and often throughout his essay.
The hard problem is intact.
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
OK I've done a once over, it's pretty much as anticipated, and is relevant to what we've been discussing here, particularly the idea that consciousness is a problem with a reductionist solution. The article starts out by saying:
Thomas Nagel said:
I submit that our "distant intellectual future" may be taking shape right here in this discussion. We're looking at the right questions and posing a formula with a "new theoretical form" that addresses the issues. We're also not alone in that others like the author of the paper you posted also proposes virtual photons may play a role in "carrying consciousness". This is really quite exciting for me because so little progress has been made on this problem in so long, and if it turns out that we really have hooked problem and are working on reeling it in, our thinking is right up there with the best of them. Or maybe it's still a gumboot full of mud. Either way it's best to be prepared
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smcder
Guest
I love it!! ;-)
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Not presumptuous based on what Chalmers allegedly says as described in the Wikipedia article. It may be true that there are other descriptions or claims about the nature of the hard problem that don't apply to this analysis, however because I've identified one source that seems to fit, your counterpoint needs to address that issue in a more specific manner.
Nagel's paper also appears consistent with the Wikipedia description. However, I admit that it's possible that I'm missing something, so I suggest we break this down into smaller chunks. Can you provide a specific quote to a key paragraph and explain it in a way that provides relevant counterpoint?
A search of Nagel's article doesn't return the word "field" once in the context of consciousness, as in a "consciousness field". So perhaps you could quote a specific relevant paragraph and we'll have a closer look at how it applies. This is where it's going to get rather tricky, but I'm up to another round if you are
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smcder
Guest
Not presumptuous based on what Chalmers allegedly says as described in the Wikipedia article. It may be true that there are other descriptions or claims about the nature of the hard problem that don't apply to this analysis, however because I've identified one source that seems to fit, your counterpoint needs to address that issue in a more specific manner.
Nagel's paper also appears consistent with the Wikipedia description. However, I admit that it's possible that I'm missing something, so I suggest we break this down into smaller chunks. Can you provide a specific quote to a key paragraph and explain it in a way that provides relevant counterpoint?
A search of Nagel's article doesn't return the word "field" once in the context of consciousness, as in a "consciousness field". So perhaps you could quote a specific relevant paragraph and we'll have a closer look at how it applies. This is where it's going to get rather tricky, but I'm up to another round if you are
If you see what I'm saying then you understand that it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved.
I just don't see that circular reasoning at all in Nagel's paper - I think that would be made pretty short work of in academic circles - Nagel seems very clearly to lay out the hard problem and discusses the gap between the objective and the subjective and why reductionist approaches haven't worked. I don't see where the idea of a consciousness field bridges that gap specifically accounts for what it is like to be something. Your theory would need to be able to successfully predict what it is like to be a bat.
I do think your interpretation of the Koan in the discussion above and specifically your belief that you have "shredded" it (which, from your point of view, you surely have) ties in with what appears to me to be your inability to understand the hard problem. Yes, I do think I could quote Nagel in specific objection but I think you would just respond with reiteration.
As I truly think I could be missing the point of all this - I think you should contact Nagel directly with an abstract, there's an e-mail at the link below:
Thomas Nagel, Faculty of Philosophy | NYU
or a relevant department or association of philosophy for a review. If you do, I would like to know the response.
Or again, if someone is reading this thread and can help us out - that would be great!
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smcder
Guest
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smcder
Guest
And this - an update from Nagel (2000) - may be closer to what you are working on, or be of help?
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/nexus.pdf
"The alternative I wish to explore can be thought of as a response to the challenge issued by Saul Kripke at the end of Naming and Necessity:
That the usual moves and analogies are not available to solve the problems of the identity theorist is, of course, no proof that no moves are available....I suspect, however, that the present considerations tell heavily against the usual forms of materialism.
Materialism, I think, must hold that a physical description of the world is a complete description of it, that any mental facts are ‘ontologically dependent’ on physical facts in the straightforward sense of following from them by necessity. No identity theorist seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case.
Kripke’s view of functionalism and causal behaviorism is the same as mine: that the inadequacy of these analyses of the mental is self-evident. He does not absolutely rule out a form of materialism that is not based on such reductionist analyses, but he says that it has to defend the very strong claim that mental phenomena are strictly necessary consequences of the operation of the brain--and that the defense of this claim lies under the heavy burden of overcoming the prima facie modal argument that consciousness and brain states are only contingently related, since it seems perfectly conceivable about any brain state that it should exist exactly as it is, physically, without any accompanying consciousness.
The intuitive credibility of this argument, which descends from Descartes’ argument for dualism, is considerable. It appears at first blush that we have a clear and distinct enough grasp on both phenomenological consciousness and physical brain processes to see that there can be no necessary connection between them.
That is the position that I hope to challenge. It seems to me that post-Kripke, the most promising line of attack on the mind-body problem is to see whether any sense can be made of the idea that mental processes might be physical processes necessarily but not analytically. I would not, however, try to defend the claim that “a physical description of the world is a complete description of it,” so my position is not a form of materialism in Kripke’s sense. It is certainly not a form of physicalism. But there may be other forms of noncontingent psychophysical identity. So I shall argue.
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/nexus.pdf
"The alternative I wish to explore can be thought of as a response to the challenge issued by Saul Kripke at the end of Naming and Necessity:
That the usual moves and analogies are not available to solve the problems of the identity theorist is, of course, no proof that no moves are available....I suspect, however, that the present considerations tell heavily against the usual forms of materialism.
Materialism, I think, must hold that a physical description of the world is a complete description of it, that any mental facts are ‘ontologically dependent’ on physical facts in the straightforward sense of following from them by necessity. No identity theorist seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case.
Kripke’s view of functionalism and causal behaviorism is the same as mine: that the inadequacy of these analyses of the mental is self-evident. He does not absolutely rule out a form of materialism that is not based on such reductionist analyses, but he says that it has to defend the very strong claim that mental phenomena are strictly necessary consequences of the operation of the brain--and that the defense of this claim lies under the heavy burden of overcoming the prima facie modal argument that consciousness and brain states are only contingently related, since it seems perfectly conceivable about any brain state that it should exist exactly as it is, physically, without any accompanying consciousness.
The intuitive credibility of this argument, which descends from Descartes’ argument for dualism, is considerable. It appears at first blush that we have a clear and distinct enough grasp on both phenomenological consciousness and physical brain processes to see that there can be no necessary connection between them.
That is the position that I hope to challenge. It seems to me that post-Kripke, the most promising line of attack on the mind-body problem is to see whether any sense can be made of the idea that mental processes might be physical processes necessarily but not analytically. I would not, however, try to defend the claim that “a physical description of the world is a complete description of it,” so my position is not a form of materialism in Kripke’s sense. It is certainly not a form of physicalism. But there may be other forms of noncontingent psychophysical identity. So I shall argue.