Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[smcder]

The way the Moravec/Kurzweil thing is set up, if I remember, is they cut your skull open, take a microtome and whittle away at your brain one molecular layer at a time - digitize the "contents" and then upload it to a computer. Would you have the requisite faith in your theory and that the hard problem is irrelevant or meaningless and that consciousness is an emergent phenomena (or in the case of eliminative materialism - an illusion) to submit to this process assured that you would wake up in a cybernetic realm?

 

[smcder]

No "ah ha moment" though eh? I guess I need to sharpen my kōan ( bad play on homonyms there ). Or how about this one, "It's better to be a kōanhead than a bonehead" . Sorry again ... I'll stop inflicting the pain now. So if the overflowing cup of tea represents one who is filled with so many opinions and speculations that they cannot absorb any new information, then what does the cup with the tea running out the holes represent? Yes it's a different story, but I think it kicks it up a notch. Indeed, according to the write-up in Wikipedia, we're doing exactly what we're supposed to do with this kōan without realizing it, and that is to study it to gain wisdom from the process.

My initial assumption about it was indeed filled with my own opinions and preconceptions. I had assumed that it was meant as an example that illustrates how the mystical Zen way is somehow superior to western thinking. But that's not what it was for at all. Recognizing the hypocrisy of the Master is something virtually anyone who reflects on this kōan long enough cannot help but see, and perhaps was meant to see ( as you also alluded to above ), and that in-turn leads to all sorts of other interesting issues as well. Realizing all this now just manifested yet another ( and even more profound ) ah ha moment for me ( thank you master smcder ) .

It could represent that the professor recognized the hypocrisy, maybe even recognized that the Zen master "built" the hypocrisy in to his demonstration and was thus showing respect to the professor after all and so, in return the professor showed the forethought to bring his holey cup (there's a homonym for you!) - in the remake, Gerard Butler (who is playing the professor) rips off his suit to reveal a simple robe beneath for he too, is a Zen master! Then they fight in slow motion kōan to kōan until they are both fulls of holes . . .

maybe

I think the hard problem of consciousness is like a kōan for me - I shift back and forth between feeling it is illusory to holding it really solid (but being unable to articulate this feeling of having a firm grasp) and in that it feels like an optical illusion - perhaps it's shifting back and forth between hemispheres (see The Master and His Emissary) - so pushing back each iteration isn't a rejection of your argument - in fact, one approach in philosophy is to be aware of the two possibilities, to side more with one for what are probably irrational (or supra-rational) reasons while acknowledging the value of the other side and waiting for another option to emerge (sort of a dialectical approach) and probably this is pretty much where every problem in philosophy ends up but ironically what also gave birth to McGinn's New Mysterianism - the third possibility being that some other kind of mind is required to make sense of it all - in this case, your simulacrum might be able to be constructed in such a way that although we couldn't definitively prove that there is something it is like to be the simulacrum, it nonetheless would be capable of solving, to its (and others of its kind) satisfaction - the hard problem.

maybe . . .

Crazy wisdom - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Randall]

... the third possibility being that some other kind of mind is required to make sense of it all - in this case, your simulacrum might be able to be constructed in such a way that although we couldn't definitively prove that there is something it is like to be the simulacrum, it nonetheless would be capable of solving, to its (and others of its kind) satisfaction - the hard problem.

maybe . . .

Thanks for hashing these ideas out with me. They're clearer now than they were before. I think your comment above hinges on what we mean by, " ... to its (and others of its kind) satisfaction ... ", the big word being satisfaction, and that is what I was trying to get across by the idea that if we can make something that operates on the same principles as identified in ourselves, and appears to demonstrate consciousness, then there is no reason so assume that it doesn't also possess consciousness. This fits with the idea that consciousness is an emergent property. What we might want to assess after that is how self-aware something else is. I think it's one thing for something to be aware of its surroundings and make reflexive decisions that lead to actions, but it's another layer to recognize one's own relationship to that process and modify behavior based on those complexities.

 

[smcder]

Thanks for hashing these ideas out with me. They're clearer now than they were before. I think your comment above hinges on what we mean by, " ... to its (and others of its kind) satisfaction ... ", the big word being satisfaction, and that is what I was trying to get across by the idea that if we can make something that operates on the same principles as identified in ourselves, and appears to demonstrate consciousness, then there is no reason so assume that it doesn't also possess consciousness. This fits with the idea that consciousness is an emergent property. What we might want to assess after that is how self-aware something else is. I think it's one thing for something to be aware of its surroundings and make reflexive decisions that lead to actions, but it's another layer to recognize one's own relationship to that process and modify behavior based on those complexities.

You're welcome! - I enjoyed the discussion.

Stephen

 

[Randall]

On a different note, have you all seen the video/concept of the 'kalam cosmological argument' - if so, what do you think of that?

After watching a couple of videos ( pro and con ) for the Kalam Cosmological Argument, I see no problem with the possibility that the universe ( our spacetime realm ) may have been created and that therefore there may be a universe creator. The problem I have with it is when people make the leap from that to, universe creator = God. Gods are things that have been arbitrarily assigned religious significance by religious minded people, nothing more. Or simply put, Gods are things ( entities, beings, objects, whatever ) that have been deified. No deification = no God. Therefore with respect to the question of universe creation, the real question isn't, "Is there a God?", it's, "Is there a universe creator?" In other words, it's entirely possible to believe that there is a universe creator without deifying it and creating a whole hierarchy of religious rights and ceremonies that involve kneeling and worshiping and praying to it like a bunch of backwoods jungle cargo cultists.

The ability to create a universe is purely an issue of power, and even most religious people recognize that power ≠ goodness, and most people who choose to worship some God or another do so because they believe their God to be good. That is a reasonable position to take if one feels the need to kneel before some supernatural entity, but there are also those who do it out of fear because they believe their God is so powerful that they will be punished for insubordination and relegated to some horrifying afterlife.

But I ask, is a God who rules by such fear worthy of true devotion? I don't think so. Demanding obedience under threat of everlasting torture is pure evil, and I'd sooner curse such a God from the depths of Hell than pledge my allegiance to such a morally corrupt deity. So when it comes right down to it, if one feels compelled for some reason to seek out some deity to kneel and pray and offer up sacrifices of time and money or whatever else is expected, then it seems that we have the choice to choose which God on the menu fits the criteria we believe our God should emulate.

So how do we know which God is better than the next? The Christian church laid claim to the one that came from the heavens ( sky ) and decided to play favorites in ancient Middle Eastern tribal warfare. And apparently, if we include all the cultures and Gods that have ever been documented, there are thousands more to pick from. So my advice is that if one feels it's really necessary to suspend one's disbelief, and pledge one's allegiance ( and whatever else is required ) to, any one of these mythological deities ( or their alleged representatives ), then one should be really certain that the deity they are choosing measures up.

Make a checklist of all the attributes that you think your God should possess, and then do some comparison shopping before writing the cheque. After all, we do the same thing when buying a house or a car or choosing a school, so why settle for a second or third rate deity? And don't be fooled. Every religion claims their religion is better than the other guy's religion. So take some time to look under the hood. You never know where some of these religions have been. The big brand names have a rather bloody and unsavory past despite what the guy on your TV seems to be selling. In the end you might decide that religion isn't really something you need that badly after all.

 

[smcder]

After watching a couple of videos ( pro and con ) for the Kalam Cosmological Argument, I see no problem with the possibility that the universe ( our spacetime realm ) may have been created and that therefore there may be a universe creator. The problem I have with it is when people make the leap from that to, universe creator = God. Gods are things that have been arbitrarily assigned religious significance by religious minded people, nothing more. Or simply put, Gods are things ( entities, beings, objects, whatever ) that have been deified. No deification = no God. Therefore with respect to the question of universe creation, the real question isn't, "Is there a God?", it's, "Is there a universe creator?" In other words, it's entirely possible to believe that there is a universe creator without deifying it and creating a whole hierarchy of religious rights and ceremonies that involve kneeling and worshiping and praying to it like a bunch of backwoods jungle cargo cultists.

The ability to create a universe is purely an issue of power, and even most religious people recognize that power ≠ goodness, and most people who choose to worship some God or another do so because they believe God to be good. That is a reasonable position to take if one feels the need to kneel before some supernatural entity, but there are also those who do it out of fear because they believe their God is so powerful that they will be punished for insubordination and relegated to some horrifying afterlife.

But I ask, is a God who rules by such fear worthy of true devotion? I don't think so. Demanding obedience under threat of everlasting torture is pure evil, and I'd sooner curse such a God from the depths of Hell than pledge my allegiance to such a morally corrupt deity. So when it comes right down to it, if one feels compelled for some reason to seek out some deity to kneel and pray and offer up sacrifices of time and money or whatever else is expected, then it seems that we have the choice to choose which God on the menu fits the criteria we believe our God should emulate.

So how do we know which God is better than the next? The Christian church laid claim to the one that came from the heavens ( sky ) and decided to play favorites in ancient Middle Eastern tribal warfare. And apparently, if we include all the cultures and Gods that have ever been documented, there are thousands more to pick from. So my advice is that if one feels it's really necessary to suspend one's disbelief for, and pledge one's allegiance ( and whatever else is required ) to, any one of these mythological deities ( or their alleged representatives ), then one should be really certain that the deity they are choosing measures up.

Make a checklist of all the attributes that you think your God should possess, and then do some comparison based shopping before writing the cheque. After all, we do the same thing when buying a house or a car or choosing a school, so why settle for a second or third rate deity? And don't be fooled. Every religion claims their religion is better than the other guy's religion. But take some time to look under the hood. You never know where some of these religions have been. The big brand names have a rather bloody and unsavory past despite what the guy on your TV seems to be selling.

Did I miss a post . . . ??

 

[Randall]

Did I miss a post . . . ??

In the quoted section there is a little arrow that links you to the original post that is quoted. I don't like putting responses in threads that aren't really related to the content I'm posting, and in this case, because @breddell said, "On a different note ..." with respect to his comment ( the Kalan Cosmological Argument ), the response was put on a different and better matching thread ( this one ). Specifically, Theology as it relates to Cosmology is more philosophical than the topic of whether or not Jesus was invented by the Romans. So it seems more appropriate for that topic can carry on over there, while this one carries on over here ( assuming anyone is interested ).

 

[smcder]

oh ok, thanks!

 

[smcder]

Thanks for hashing these ideas out with me. They're clearer now than they were before. I think your comment above hinges on what we mean by, " ... to its (and others of its kind) satisfaction ... ", the big word being satisfaction, and that is what I was trying to get across by the idea that if we can make something that operates on the same principles as identified in ourselves, and appears to demonstrate consciousness, then there is no reason so assume that it doesn't also possess consciousness. This fits with the idea that consciousness is an emergent property. What we might want to assess after that is how self-aware something else is. I think it's one thing for something to be aware of its surroundings and make reflexive decisions that lead to actions, but it's another layer to recognize one's own relationship to that process and modify behavior based on those complexities.

Did the Moravec/Kurzweil question hold any value for you? To me it is provocative - if consciousness is emergent or illusory or in any way not locatable in such a way that "you" is a meaningful concept (and Buddhism comes in in a very interesting way on these ideas) and if, any time you lost consciousness the material substrate of who you are changes (as it in fact does every moment) so that the "you" who goes to sleep each night never wakes up and a new "you" is born each morning - then you should have no objection to the process.

So why do I balk? Is it the idea of the physical destruction of my brain? But I can't find "me" in there anyway. I'm not locatable in that sense, so what do I care if one physical instance here is destroyed and another, identical (more identical than when I wake up in the morning) is created there - why wouldn't I jump at the chance to be "reborn" into say a powerful robot or in a more interesting cyberworld? How is it different anyway from traditional ideas of reincarnation . . . ?

 

[trainedobserver]

I think the proper way to think about your personal consciousness is to think of it as just another organ of your body. In my thinking at least, it is undeniably made up of the same material as the rest of your body and obeys the same natural physical laws, with the physical configuration of the organism dictating it's quality and characteristics. It's function is simply to facilitate the assimilation of raw material for the organism. The "I" that can't be found is a necessary device that allows us to differentiate between ourselves and the said raw materials necessary for the chemical factory that is the human organism.

Human consciousness seeing the situation for what it is, has imagined innumerable complexities elevating itself to lofty and cosmic significance. However, it seems undeniable. It's just there so we can find something to eat.

 

[smcder]

I think the proper way to think about your personal consciousness is to think of it as just another organ of your body. In my thinking at least, it is undeniably made up of the same material as the rest of your body and obeys the same natural physical laws, with the physical configuration of the organism dictating it's quality and characteristics. It's function is simply to facilitate the assimilation of raw material for the organism. The "I" that can't be found is a necessary device that allows us to differentiate between ourselves and the said raw materials necessary for the chemical factory that is the human organism.

Human consciousness seeing the situation for what it is, has imagined innumerable complexities elevating itself to lofty and cosmic significance. However, it seems undeniable. It's just there so we can find something to eat.

The "I" that can't be found is a necessary device that allows us to differentiate between ourselves and the said raw materials necessary for the chemical factory that is the human organism.

Do all organisms have this device? The zombie problem in philosophy is that it's conceivable for every human activity to occur without consciousness.

So, would you accept the Moravec/Kurzweil offer?

 

[Randall]

The Boy Who Lived Before - Documentary about a childs memories of another life | The Paracast Community Forums

Did the Moravec/Kurzweil question hold any value for you? ...

I am of the view that creating something new with its own consciousness is a completely different concept from translocation of consciousness, and that even if translocation of consciousness were possible, it is a different concept again from the idea that consciousness = you, and that therefore the idea that translocation of consciousness = translocation of you is a specious claim. Some of these details have been covered in a thread called The Boy Who Lived Before that discusses the topic of reincarnation. However to address your question specifically here as it relates to the idea of uploading digital information scanned from thin sections of brain material into consciousness software run on a computer: Although it is possible that someone might get some rather interesting results from that, I have serious reservations. However instead of expressing those reservations now, what I'm going to do instead is describe a process that I believe would work, and ask you to reflect on the differences.

The process I believe would work, is one whereby each neuron would be replaced, one by one, by a duplicate that performs the same function as it's predecessor in a nearly identical way ( See this video for an example ). This process would take place rather slowly over time while the person is alive so that any resulting perceptual changes can be merged into the flow of one's personal experience. Once the process is complete, I see no reason why the person ( let's call him Ralph ) shouldn't still be considered to be Ralph.

 

[smcder]

The Boy Who Lived Before - Documentary about a childs memories of another life | The Paracast Community Forums

I am of the view that creating something new with its own consciousness is a completely different concept from translocation of consciousness, and that even if translocation of consciousness were possible, it is a different concept again from the idea that consciousness = you, and that therefore the idea that translocation of consciousness = translocation of you is a specious claim. Some of these details have been covered in a thread called The Boy Who Lived Before that discusses the topic of reincarnation. However to address your question specifically here as it relates to the idea of uploading digital information scanned from thin sections of brain material into consciousness software run on a computer: Although it is possible that someone might get some rather interesting results from that, I have serious reservations. However instead of expressing those reservations now, what I'm going to do instead is describe a process that I believe would work, and ask you to reflect on the differences.

The process I believe would work, is one whereby each neuron would be replaced, one by one, by a duplicate that performs the same function as it's predecessor in a nearly identical way ( See this video for an example ). This process would take place rather slowly over time while the person is alive so that any resulting perceptual changes can be merged into the flow of one's personal experience. Once the process is complete, I see no reason why the person ( let's call him Ralph ) shouldn't still be considered to be Ralph.

So would you do this? And do you know if one retains any of the "same" material in your brain over time or if it is more or less completely exchanged as you age? I assume it is - it's just the pattern of material that more or less changes and more or less stays the same. And if so, how is that (functionally) different than this process?

 

[Randall]

So would you do this? And do you know if one retains any of the "same" material in your brain over time or if it is more or less completely exchanged as you age? I assume it is - it's just the pattern of material that more or less changes and more or less stays the same. And if so, how is that (functionally) different than this process?

I'm not sure I understand your question. Is what process different from what process? How is the nano-neuron version different than the Kurzweil slice & scan?

 

[smcder]

Sorry - no, how the nano-neuron version is different (other than the rate, which hasn't been specified) from the normal processes of life - assuming biological material is pretty much fully exchanged in time? And the rate raises interesting questions - "rather slowly over time" is undefined, but would it be desirable to look at some physical constant related to processing speed? If you agree to the above process, do you wish to specify how rapidly it occurs? Would you wish to be able to change that rate on the fly?

 

[Randall]

Sorry - no, how the nano-neuron version is different (other than the rate, which hasn't been specified) from the normal processes of life - assuming biological material is pretty much fully exchanged in time? And the rate raises interesting questions - "rather slowly over time" is undefined, but would it be desirable to look at some physical constant related to processing speed? If you agree to the above process, do you wish to specify how rapidly it occurs? Would you wish to be able to change that rate on the fly?

Thanks for clarifying. I think that for the rate of transformation to be considered acceptable, it would have to occur at a rate that facilitates continuity of consciousness and personal adaptation to changes in performance that manifest themselves as different from what we're used to.

 

[smcder]

Thanks for clarifying. I think that for the rate of transformation to be considered acceptable, it would have to occur at a rate that facilitates continuity of consciousness and personal adaptation to changes in performance that manifest themselves as different from what we're used to.

Do we determine that rate ahead of time (and how) - or is there some provision for control of the rate by the person undergoing the process?

Which neuron do you change first? Second? Third? Or, again, do you want some control on the fly?

Is each individual neural change irreversible? Once a replacement is made, we can't undo it?

 

[smcder]

Or, if you prefer - we can use an anesthetic - would the rate and order of change matter to you then? For that matter, we could use the more mechanical Kurzweilian procedure?

 

[trainedobserver]

The "I" that can't be found is a necessary device that allows us to differentiate between ourselves and the said raw materials necessary for the chemical factory that is the human organism.

Do all organisms have this device? The zombie problem in philosophy is that it's conceivable for every human activity to occur without consciousness.

So, would you accept the Moravec/Kurzweil offer?

No. I am the totality of my being. Destroying myself to make an inferior copy of some small portion of myself gains me nothing.

 

[Randall]

Do we determine that rate ahead of time (and how) - or is there some provision for control of the rate by the person undergoing the process?
Which neuron do you change first? Second? Third? Or, again, do you want some control on the fly?
Is each individual neural change irreversible? Once a replacement is made, we can't undo it?

Those questions are of secondary importance and something for the engineers and neurologists to work out.