Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Randall]

Something I've just realized from listening to the above, and would have made things so much less slippery from the start, is that much of this discussion isn't centered on consciousness per se, but on psychology and intelligence in the context of consciousness. This makes the discussion far more complex.

Additionally, comparing the views of the big-name philosophers with respect to the above, is something that is way beyond my library of philosophical trivia. Consequently, I'm not sure what the purpose of this discussion is anymore. I feel as though enough has been analyzed to answer the paranormal question of whether or not afterlives as people usually interpret the concept are possible, or whether or not computation alone can give rise to consciousness.

But beyond that, I hear the word "consciousness" often being tacked onto other ideas in ways that seem redundant, or if it's not redundant, doesn't seem to add anything of significant value. In other words we could simply leave the word "consciousness" out of it, and still understand the point, e.g. "scientific consciousness" vs "perceptual consciousness".

Given that there are so many possible of combinations of the above, can someone please let me know exactly what combination of individual concepts we're dealing with here in this discussion now? In other words, can someone please fill in the blanks below?

We are discussing how consciousness as a fundamental concept:

1. in the context of a
2. illuminates b
3. leading to the understanding of c

Anyone?

 

[Soupie]

This one has been made into many a meme - 2001 A Space Odyssey

And this list goes on ...​

Do any of these films really explore AI psychology in any depth though? I’m familiar with most of them, and I’d say no.

While film and television could explore AI psychology in depth, I doubt that any do. On the other hand, I’m sure there’s some sci-fi books that do. One author in particular was identified as exploring this topic over a number of different books. I’ll post his name here in the future.

 

[Soupie]

Something I've just realized from listening to the above, and would have made things so much less slippery from the start, is that much of this discussion isn't centered on consciousness per se, but on psychology and intelligence in the context of consciousness. This makes the discussion far more complex.

Additionally, comparing the views of the big-name philosophers with respect to the above, is something that is way beyond my library of philosophical trivia. Consequently, I'm not sure what the purpose of this discussion is anymore. I feel as though enough has been analyzed to answer the paranormal question of whether or not afterlives as people usually interpret the concept are possible, or whether or not computation alone can give rise to consciousness.

But beyond that, I hear the word "consciousness" often being tacked onto other ideas in ways that seem redundant, or if it's not redundant, doesn't seem to add anything of significant value. In other words we could simply leave the word "consciousness" out of it, and still understand the point, e.g. "scientific consciousness" vs "perceptual consciousness".

Given that there are so many possible of combinations of the above, can someone please let me know exactly what combination of individual concepts we're dealing with here in this discussion now? In other words, can someone please fill in the blanks below?

We are discussing how consciousness as a fundamental concept:

1. in the context of a
2. illuminates b
3. leading to the understanding of c

Anyone?

I can speak for anyone else but I’ve been pretty laser focused on the mbp from the start, and the somewhat related hp. I’ve discussed free will, mental causation, overdetermination, and the combination problems as well, but mostly in the context of understanding different approaches to the mbp.

 

[Soupie]

Can’t

 

[Randall]

Do any of these films really explore AI psychology in any depth though? I’m familiar with most of them, and I’d say no.

I suppose it depends on what one means by "explore" and "depth". If one expects an AI character in a sci-fi movie to sit in a psychologists chair and partake in a therapy session scripted by psychologists for 2 hours, it's not going to happen. But IMO there's enough depth in what is implied by the portrayals for some decent discussion.

 

[Randall]

I can speak for anyone else but I’ve been pretty laser focused on the mbp from the start, and the somewhat related hp. I’ve discussed free will, mental causation, overdetermination, and the combination problems as well, but mostly in the context of understanding different approaches to the mbp.

Are you satisfied that you have sufficiently unpacked and analyzed those concepts? If not, what is missing for you? Or are you simply content with collecting different viewpoints on them, without necessarily running any analysis on them?

 

[Constance]

Here is a flash from the past by Galen Strawson, a chapter from a book on the MPB published in the 90s, described as 'very close' to the more recent papers by Strawson on this subject. @smcder / Steve can clarify Strawson's more recent publications for us if they depart from this book chapter significantly since he's kept up with Strawson and other major philosophers of mind on the subject of consciousness. I received the pdf for this paper from academia.edu today in my email.

For Randle: I've never had to pay for papers from academia.edu or had to download them. For a number of years now, since Steve and I have been finding relevant papers in Consciousness Studies from this source, its computers have been linking me to papers concerning consciousness almost daily, and often these include links to dozens of related papers. The site also provides each person using it with a personal library in which to store links to papers we want to consult again. You can also search there for papers on a variety of other subjects.

Here's the conclusion of the Strawson chapter linked today and a link to it, which should provide you with a pdf of the chapter instead of a requirement to download it.

The Experiential and the Nonexperiential
in The Mind-Body Problem ed. T. Szubka & R. Warner (Oxford: Blackwell) [January 1], 1993

Galen Strawson
The ‘experience-matter’ problem is the only hard part of the so-called ‘mind–body problem’. Genuine materialists must be outright realists about experience/consciousness. They must think that experience/consciousness in all its phenomenological glory is wholly physical. Plainly, if materialism is true, we must be radically ignorant of the nature of the physical—the fundamental stuff of reality. Published 1993 [official pub. date January 1, 1994] Written 1991. Close to parts of Mental Reality, chapters 3-4.
Page Numbers: 69-86
Publication Date: 1993
Publication Name: in The Mind-Body Problem ed. T. Szubka & R. Warner (Oxford: Blackwell) [January 1]

Just open the pdf and scroll down to the concluding section, unless you want to read the whole paper.

https://www.academia.edu/42119490/T...he_Nonexperiential?email_work_card=view-paper

ps, academia.edu provides numerous papers by Strawson that are more recent; just search for 'Galen Strawson'.

 

[Soupie]

Very nice video explaining QFT. Get past the sponsorship and commercial. Well worth the 15 minutes.

 

[ALPHA ROMEO UNIFORM]

Just read this excellent scholarly paper on Oxygen in our Solar System :Astronomers Detect Large Amounts of Oxygen in Ancient Star’s Atmosphere – W. M. Keck Observatory and just on late Ingo Swan large event coming and odd activity of bird flocks last two weeks.

 

[Constance]

{responding to a post by @Soupie copied below}
Are you satisfied that you have sufficiently unpacked and analyzed those concepts? If not, what is missing for you? Or are you simply content with collecting different viewpoints on them, without necessarily running any analysis on them?

I think @Soupie has understood all of the concepts and problems he has taken up and pursued in his posts concerning the MBP, including those mentioned in the post you refer to, reproduced here:

I can't speak for anyone else but I’ve been pretty laser focused on the mbp from the start, and the somewhat related hp. I’ve discussed free will, mental causation, overdetermination, and the combination problems as well, but mostly in the context of understanding different approaches to the mbp.

Which of those concepts and problems are you interested in discussing at this point?

 

[Constance]

Linked below, from academia.edu, is a pdf of an entire issue of the Journal of Cognitive Semiotics devoted to 'The Intersubjectivity of Embodiment' in the evolution of species. The table of contents of the issue follows the front matter. Semiotics is critically important for philosophy of mind, for phenomenology in particular, for the understanding of animal behavior as well as our own, and for cognitive neuroscience. The second-last paper in this volume concerns the legacy of Merleau-Ponty's contributions to the discipline of Cognitive Linguistics. These disciplines are all essential in Consciousness Studies, and the papers in this journal issue are all extremely informative.

Extract from the Introduction:

"Although studies centering on both embodiment (Gibbs 2006, Johnson 1987, Violi 2007; Borghi &Pecher, 2012; Wilson, 2002) and intersubjectivity (Malle & Hodges 2005) are flourishing, it is only in recent years that cross talk and research bridging them has started being systematically pursued (Marsh et al. 2009, Tylén, et al. accepted, Zlatev et al. 2008). On the one hand, embodiment has often been presented as a sufficient explanation for all sorts of cognitive functions, grounding them in basic human sensorimotor skills. Thus, the body has implicitlybeen conceived as an unproblematic and pre-existing object, detached from its social and cultural contexts (cf Violi this volume). On the other hand, intersubjectivity has been conceived as a questionof independent individuals learning how to read each other’s mind in order to interact (cf De Bruinand De Haan
this volume). That said, embodied and intersubjective foci of research are coming together, deeply reshaping the human conception of human cognition.

Indeed, new signals are emerging in the last years, and two different movements can be recorded. Cognitive and neurocognitive scientists have started to devote more attention to the intersubjective aspects of cognition (e.g., Galantucci & Sebanz 2009, Semin & Smith 2008). The much debated discovery of the mirror neuron system (for a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004) has given a great impulse to this kind of research, as has the development of psychological theories – such as the common coding one, showing that humans rely on their own motor system while observing and predicting actions performed by others (e.g., Sebanz et al. 2006). Even if the enthusiasm for the social aspects is signalled by the birth of a novel discipline “social neuroscience”, it is still a matter of controversy among cognitive (neuro)scientists to what extent intersubjectivity is intended as foundational or not. At the same time, the influence of the bodily processes and the role of embodiment are starting to be recognized within disciplines that are traditionally more inclined to focus on the social dimension.

In the past twenty years, anthropology (Csordas 1994, 2008), linguistics (Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007), and semiotics (Landowski 2005) rediscovered the role of the body in shaping social interactions. However, this interest has sometimes led to an over-estimation of embodiment (cf Fontanille 2004, Violi this volume), and the body has become the isolated fundament of meaning for individuals who, only in a second moment, get to interact. The aim of this special issue is to bring together researchers embracing different approaches –neuroscientists, psychologists, semioticians, linguists, philosophers, and anthropologists – to outline principles that could provide an intersubjective foundation for embodiment. The perspective that emerges is that one’s body and basic sensorimotor skills, which constitute a crucial structure for most of one’s cognitive processes, are, in important ways, intersubjectively distributed. Emotional and interactional rhythms in early infancy are crucial in shaping cognitive development (cf. Reddy 2008, Violi this volume, Trevarthen this volume). Slightly later in development, narrative frames and other sociocultural practices also play a crucial role in defining a shared structure for joint attention, pointing, and re-enactment of both successful and unsuccessful acts (Sinha & de Lopez 2000). These mechanisms are not limited to crucial periods in cognitive development but keep unfolding during the whole existence of the organisms. Dance is a wonderful example of this: the continuous interaction between the bodies of the participants, partially constrained by the sociocultural constraints of the specific dance enacted, gives rise to self-organized collective patterns of movements not reducible to the individual (cf. Kimmel this volume).

Not only are these embodied bases of cognition emerging, at least partially, from intersubjective interactions; but also, intersubjectivity is a much more basic and embodied activity than previously thought. Intersubjectivity is shared bodily engagement that partially defines the subjects that take part in it. Cultural practices and semiotic systems – such as language – build upon and extend these mechanisms. In this way, one can finally see the possibility for a more polyphonic dialogue, in which more socially oriented approaches (anthropology, semiotics, linguistic, sociology, etc.) contribute to the grounding of cognitive phenomena. Such dialogue is expressed in the eight contributions to this thematic issue of Cognitive Semiotics. All of the papers in this issue take a social perspective on embodiment: that is, they all dispense with the long-held assumption in cognitive science that perception, action, and cognition can be understood fully by investigating single individuals. The papers are also connected because they all investigate intersubjectivity as composed of at least two levels:

1. Intersubjectivity as the articulation of continuous interactions in praesentia between two or more subjects.

2. Intersubjectivity as sedimented socio-cultural normativity: i.e., of habits, beliefs, attitudes, and historically and culturally sedimented morphologies.

It is exactly within the network of connections between these two levels of intersubjectivity that embodiment takes on its semiotic status. Through this shared arena for cognition, the possibility for communication and for signs is established. Through embodied interactions – in early infancy, but not only then – the relevant body structures acquire their salience. In the remainder of this introduction, we provide a brief synopsis of the papers in this issue. . . ."

https://www.academia.edu/31160372/The_Intersubjectivity_of_Embodiment?email_work_card=view-paper

 

[smcder]

@Michael Allen asked if the word machine or mechanical is a distraction...I'm trying to understand if there is the possibility of something non-mechanical? If something is not mechanical, is not a mechanism, how would we recognize it scientifically?

Here's something from @Michael Allen:

@Constance: "Also, what persuades you that merely 'functional equivalence' between natural and artificial brains/neural nets can touch, much less exhaust, all the capacities of human consciousness and mind?"

I for one don't think that our understanding of "functional equivalence" is good enough to transport between what we consider "natural" and "artificial"--the problem is that we really don't need any transport. For what can "artificial" mean unless it's stated as some kind of "intention" to create something else? But a mind thinking and externalizing it's own processes into other modules and automata may be akin to the first molecular replicators prior to DNA--what does the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually give us beyond the results already obtained in absence of our "consciousness?"*

And what if consciousness is the presumption of self-ownership as something that lies outside the timeline of genetic and pre-genetic replicators bringing about the "feeling" of "self?"

**Maybe we should look very very hard (and long) at our own terms "natural" and "artificial."
--------

The italics indicate to me that @Michael Allen would say there is no such criteria, but would answering the question marked "*" above with anything other than "nothing" provide such critieria?:

(quoting Michael again) "what does the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually give us beyond the results already obtained in absence of our "consciousness?"

So the "feeling" of "self-awareness" isn't sufficient. Earlier posts ruled out complexity as a criteria, I can't find the post, but he said something like "we are no less mechanical (only more complex)".

 

[Randall]

@Michael Allen asked if the word machine or mechanical is a distraction...I'm trying to understand if there is the possibility of something non-mechanical? If something is not mechanical, is not a mechanism, how would we recognize it scientifically?

We might look at mechanicalness versus non-mechanicalness from the same point of view as physicists. For example they look at waves on water or sound waves as mechanical because they both require a material medium in order to propagate, whereas light waves don't, so they don't consider light waves to be a mechanical phenomenon. That is unless they're with the crowd that sees space itself as a medium.

If we apply that to the idea that consciousness is composed of some non-material field analogous to or existing as an EM field, then we would have some basis for saying that consciousness is non-mechanical. Whether or not that happens to be the case is another matter.

 

[smcder]

We might look at mechanicalness versus non-mechanicalness from the same point of view as a physicists look at it. For example they look at waves on water or sound waves as mechanical because they both require a material medium in order to propagate, whereas light waves don't, so they don't consider light waves to be a mechanical phenomenon. That is unless they're with the crowd that sees space itself as a medium.

If we apply that to the idea that consciousness is composed of some non-material field analogous to or existing as an EM field, then we would have some basis for saying that consciousness is non-mechanical. Whether or not that happens to be the actual case is another matter.

Post #1340 above:

"

Constance said:
That sentence doesn't respond to the statement I made about 'AI+Consciousness' developers.

Let's revisit then

"But as I tried to suggest before, those involved over the last half-century in the project of attempting to produce 'consciousness' in computers and robots have obviously had some idea [at least a vague idea] of what it is they are trying to produce mechanically. Yet evidently they proceed in their AI experiments without studying 'consciousness' as it has developed organically in living organisms. This seems to me to be absurd. "

Perhaps this is the best way to proceed--I am not sure why "understanding" is required. And we are as much "mechanical" (but more complicated) and yet are confused about our own origins. What I am trying to make clear is that 'consciousness' can evolve itself without understanding itself through it's own basis in (and through) time and space. We are already proof."

end of quoted material

------------


@Michael Allen writes: "And we are as much "mechanical" (but more complicated) and yet are confused about our own origins."

My question is how to make sense of the words "mechanical" in this sentence - and the objection to "natural vs artificial" and to look at sentences like this:

"But a mind thinking and externalizing it's own processes into other modules and automata may be akin to the first molecular replicators prior to DNA--what does the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually give us beyond the results already obtained in absence of our "consciousness?"

(note: the paper "Soft Landing" rejects epiphenomenalism)

There is also a sentence about replicators and evolutionary space, so we can't say organisms are evolved.

So what do we make of:

"Maybe we should look very very hard (and long) at our own terms "natural" and "artificial."

Because all of the above protests the connotation of machine, mechanical ... but the denotation precludes things like should if the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually gives us nothing beyond the results already obtained in the absence of our consciousness. So how can we trust these conclusions?

 

[Randall]

... those involved over the last half-century in the project of attempting to produce 'consciousness' in computers and robots have obviously had some idea [at least a vague idea] of what it is they are trying to produce mechanically. ... note: the paper "Soft Landing" rejects epiphenomenalism ... Maybe we should look very very hard (and long) at our own terms "natural" and "artificial ...

Because all of the above protests the connotation of machine, mechanical ... but the denotation precludes things like should if the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually gives us nothing beyond the results already obtained in the absence of our consciousness. So how can we trust these conclusions?

Sorry but you've lost me someplace. I see different views that make sense within certain contexts, but I don't see any conclusions. Maybe if you try stating the specific concept you're trying to nail down. BTW I also reject epiphenomenalism. In doing so, perhaps there is something relevant in understanding that non-mechanical things ( like EM fields ) can influence mechanical things ( like relays ).

 

[Constance]

Post #1340 above:

@Michael Allen writes: "And we are as much "mechanical" (but more complicated) and yet are confused about our own origins."

My question is how to make sense of the words "mechanical" in this sentence - and the objection to "natural vs artificial" and to look at sentences like this:

"But a mind thinking and externalizing it's own processes into other modules and automata may be akin to the first molecular replicators prior to DNA--what does the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually give us beyond the results already obtained in absence of our "consciousness?"

(note: the paper "Soft Landing" rejects epiphenomenalism)

There is also a sentence about replicators and evolutionary space, so we can't say organisms are evolved.

. . . "so we can't say organisms are evolved."

This confusion is seeded by more of Michael's tosh.

So what do we make of:

"Maybe we should look very very hard (and long) at our own terms "natural" and "artificial."

Because all of the above protests the connotation of machine, mechanical ... but the denotation precludes things like should if the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually gives us nothing beyond the results already obtained in the absence of our consciousness.

The 'results' obtained by what unconscious, thus unminded, entity?

So how can we trust these conclusions?

Obviously we can't.

. . . how to make sense of the words "mechanical" in this sentence - and the objection to "natural vs artificial" and to look at sentences like this:

"But a mind thinking and externalizing it's own processes into other modules and automata may be akin to the first molecular replicators prior to DNA--what does the "feeling" of "self-awareness" actually give us beyond the results already obtained in absence of our "consciousness?"

Wherefrom does Michael get this stuff? And do we really want to entertain his 'may be's' seriously? I don't.

So what do we make of:

"Maybe we should look very very hard (and long) at our own terms "natural" and "artificial."

You bet we should. Let's start now, and let's begin with investigating the etymology of the terms 'artificial'. 'artifice', 'artifact and artefact' -- the kind of thing Heidegger would do. We might find as much 'forgetfulness' of 'language' as he found 'forgetfulness of being' in contemporary thinking, and they will be fatally linked.

 

[Constance]

Sorry but you've lost me someplace. I see different views that make sense within certain contexts, but I don't see any conclusions. Maybe if you try stating the specific concept you're trying to nail down. BTW I also reject epiphenomenalism. In doing so, perhaps there is something relevant in understanding that non-mechanical things ( like EM fields ) can influence mechanical things ( like relays ).

Actually I think what you are seeing is "different views that 'make sense' within certain contexts" that amount to presuppositionally theory-laden speculations and postulations, far from hypotheses that could be tested by our sciences from the temporal place where we have our current existence. Might as well be talking, as our Medieval forebears did, about how many angels can stand on the head of a pin.

 

[Randall]

Actually I think what you are seeing is "different views that 'make sense' within certain contexts" that amount to presuppositionally theory-laden speculations and postulations, far from hypotheses that could be tested by our sciences from the temporal place where we have our current existence. Might as well be talking, as our Medieval forebears did, about how many angels can stand on the head of a pin.

I'm not sure you're interpreting my meaning the way I'm intending, but it might be interesting for you to post an example of what you think I was getting at. In the meantime, one example that appears to be entirely proven, and is not a presupposition or theory laden, is that understanding consciousness isn't required in order for consciousness to come about, and as @Michael Allen and I have both pointed out, we humans are perfect examples.

Where presuppositions start to creep in, is when we assume that other creatures with similar neural designs also have consciousness. From there we get onto the slippery slope where assumptions about modeling neural nets or creating them non-biologically might also yield consciousness, and finally out into the deep fringe with similar assumptions about everyday objects.

 

[Soupie]

Where presuppositions start to creep in, is when we assume that other creatures with similar neural designs also have consciousness. From there we get onto the slippery slope where assumptions about modeling neural nets or creating them non-biologically might also yield consciousness, and finally out into the deep fringe with similar assumptions about everyday objects.

(1) How can we be sure other humans are conscious?

(2) Can we be sure some humans aren’t zombies?

(3) Do you think neuroscientific knowledge is so course grained that the brains of humans and other organisms are radically different but this radical difference escapes biologists? Or do you think the biological mechanics that creates consciousness is just that subtle?

(4) Just to be clear, panpsychists don’t explore the deep fringe for biomechanical reasons. They do so due to the hard problem of consciousness and the hard problem of matter.

 

[Constance]

I'm not sure you're interpreting my meaning the way I'm intending, but it might be interesting for you to post an example of what you think I was getting at. In the meantime, one example that appears to be entirely proven, and is not a presupposition or theory laden, is that understanding consciousness isn't required in order for consciousness to come about, and as @Michael Allen and I have both pointed out, we humans are perfect examples.

What work do you or MA want that observation to do? That is, what conclusions do you think you can draw from it? . . . ETA: Aside from MA's argument that AI/AC projects should proceed full steam ahead despite the radically limited understanding in our time of the complexity of consciousness and mind as these phenomena have evolved and developed in nature -- a position which many people, including insiders at high levels in those projects, consider to be short-sighted and risky).