Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Soupie]

@Soupie said: What would be the function of such modeling? Im only in the beginnings of looking into this, but my understanding/thought is that it would be for control. For example, a nuclear power plant may operate with the assistance of a virtual model to monitor, make predications about, and control the various processes going on.

@smcder said: And does all of that without subjective awareness/experience... computers beat humans at chess and at Jeopardy, with enough brute force I think a computer will beat the Turing Test (without being conscious) and eventually do anything a human can do (without subjectivity) so there's your zombie. See also my arguments above as to how our subjective experience is often detached from whatever task we are doing - including very complex ones like learning ... I've had the experience of being in a complex argument or writing a story while my mind was on other things ... so who was writing the story then and why is consciousness necessary at all? (on the physicalist position)​

Do we know (objectively) that such machines are not sentient (experiencing sensations)? No, and by the same token, we can't know (objectively) that anything is conscious. We "know" that others humans are conscious because we are humans and we feel and/or think they, like us, are conscious.

So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't. We can't even say, for sure, at what stage of development humans become sentient and conscious. When sperm and egg meet? When the zygote consists of X number of cells? When the first neuron is formed? When it first fires? When it first looks and acts like us? How about a virus, a bacterium, a crab, cuttlefish, or tit mouse?

@Soupie said: As for me, yes I think the objective and subjective are dual aspects of matter/energy. In my perhaps incoherenet way of thinking, that the subjective cannot be objectively described does not mean the subjective is not constituted of matter/energy.

@smcder said: Nagel didn't think so either, initially and McGinn still doesn't ... but what you missing in making this statement is that if the subjective can be objectively described ... then it's no longer subjective, is it? It's an object like every other object in the universe - right now, then consicousness is uniquely in that position. So once you can objectively describe subjectivity, there will no longer be a category "subjective" - it won't make any sense.

So right now by saying saying

1. that the subjective cannot be objectively described
2. the subjective is constituted of matter and energy

we can arrive at "matter and energy" cannot be completely objectively described - is that what you want to say?

In other words, I can take objects - things you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure ... I can hide them from you and from science. Again, is that what you want to say?​

Yes, that is what I want to say. However, I disagree with this: "you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure." That's obviously a contradiction.

A child's medicine is designed with a sweet flavor. Why? So the child will like it. Why does the child like it? Because it's sweet. Likewise, children generally do not like broccoli. Why? Because it tastes bitter.

That all makes intuitive sense. The problem is we can't prove any of it objectively. We can't even know for sure that (1) the child is really sentient, and (2) we don't know what she tastes when she eats the medicine and broccoli.

However, we can describe the whole scenario objectively: Medicine and broccoli have different atomic compositions. When these two clusters of atoms interact with the large cluster of atoms (the child) two different, complex chains of cause and effect are set in motion. Likewise, we could say that medicine and broccoli have different chemical compositions, when these two clusters of chemical interact with the large cluster of chemicals (the child) two different, complex chemical reactions take place.

This is to say, theoretically, we can always objectively describe the arrangement of matter/energy. This does not preclude a subjective description of matter/energy. In fact, as you have noted many times, an objective description will needs be a subjective description.

Our statements about W come from W*, where W* is our experience of W.

W is objective, W* is subjective. We assume W because W*. And we assume W* because W.

@smcder: Final question, let's [say] you are proven to be an object - your subjective experience - in other words "you" - what follows as a consequence? The hard problem and the noumenal problem (assuming they are different) have been solved. What follows as a consequence?

People have acted on this from the beginning of time and many decision makes today fully accept this - but what will be different is that there will be rigorous, virtually undeniable proof that everyone is simply an arrangement of matter according to chance and necessity. What consequences follow?
​

Honestly, I would say nothing would change. When a child takes the medicine, we don't think to ourselves "I'm glad this large cluster of chemicals absorbed this liquid concoction of chemicals. Now we can both interface with our large, cushy clusters of chemicals without disturbing air molecules, etc."

Likewise, children and laypersons who've never devoted a minute to contemplating consciousness project sentience and intentions onto other humans, animals, and other objects all the time. Sharing with them that scientists have proven that their feelings are identical to brain states will not change this. Even with this knowledge, this new W*, we will still experience feelings, thoughts, and intentions, and project feelings, thoughts, and intentions onto others, both cognitively and affectively. (Although not all people do in the first place.)

I've found a very interesting paper by Rosenthal (2008). For some very frustrating reason, I haven't been able to copy/paste from PDFs without the formatting getting really messed up. I'd prefer to post several excerpts. Here is the whole paper for now. (It's got HOTs all over it!) However, I will post the interesting conclusion.

http://www.rifters.com/real/articles/Neuropsychologia_Rosenthal_2008.pdf

The consciousness of thoughts, desires, and volitions adds
little if any benefit for rational thinking, intentional action,
executive function, or complex reasoning. Nonetheless, an
explanation is available of why those states are often conscious
that makes no appeal to beneficial effects or evolutionary adaptive
value.​

 

[smcder]

@smcder I'm sure PM is fine by me... whatever that is.
@Constance what you describe in #772 is true and relevant.
HCT expresses an underlying unity and undoubtedly there is a lot of complexity that can be interpreted by HCT principles.
You bring up many queries that require substantial comment so I wouldn't quite know where to start.
When an animal uses sticks and solves puzzles etc it is creative application, but such animals do not identify creativity (as an expression) as a process for application as a principle of general endeavour. It is difficult to comment generally about specific examples... a book could be written on this alone.

What you say about protocultures protolanguages with hominid etc is very true... a fascinating area for hypothesising about what might have been going on then in relation to HCT.

A human can intentionally go about creating a social environment (say,for example, an online forum). This is an active and deliberate endeavour. Non-human animals do have social dynamics but they don't go about thinking about developing social dynamics. Their social world just evolves "by accident" , meaning; in a way that is not deliberate, considered, understood by the creature for what it is...
Similarly, a species' mutations are not controlled by the species... evolutionary direction is "accidental". Conversely, Humans can control evolution initially through breed selection and then through gene manipulation. To confuse things a little, learning animals (as individuals - thereby transcending the species teleology) manipulate evolutionary direction through the considered selection of a mate too, unlike with organisms that have only innate mechanisms (plants and very primitive animals)

HCT does have an account for learning. It's explanation of phen exp is contentous enough without adding that learning capabilities correlate with the possession of phen exp: It is an understanding of the qualitative relevancy of experience that compels a creature to adjust its behavioural responses in association with its identified (and thereby represented) environmental cause... this leads to the process we call learning, or the process I refer to as "behavioural adaptation" (innate mechanism can only alter behaviour through physiological adaptation over generations - alternatively, behavioural adaptation is realtime response to evaluated realtime qualitative experience and relevancy)
These are all big subjects. I can elaborate on any if you wish one at a time... for clarity.

PM is what I told you Id by ... I sent you a PM to see if it was alright to PM ... I will print off the stuff and work with it by hand - as I said remember that I think out loud, so a lot will be effluvia or epiphenomenal output, the steam of the engine, then I'll ask you some questions unless all is clear ... and it is clearing up

 

[smcder]

@Soupie said: What would be the function of such modeling? Im only in the beginnings of looking into this, but my understanding/thought is that it would be for control. For example, a nuclear power plant may operate with the assistance of a virtual model to monitor, make predications about, and control the various processes going on.

@smcder said: And does all of that without subjective awareness/experience... computers beat humans at chess and at Jeopardy, with enough brute force I think a computer will beat the Turing Test (without being conscious) and eventually do anything a human can do (without subjectivity) so there's your zombie. See also my arguments above as to how our subjective experience is often detached from whatever task we are doing - including very complex ones like learning ... I've had the experience of being in a complex argument or writing a story while my mind was on other things ... so who was writing the story then and why is consciousness necessary at all? (on the physicalist position)​

Do we know (objectively) that such machines are not sentient (experiencing sensations)? No, and by the same token, we can't know (objectively) that anything is conscious. We "know" that others humans are conscious because we are humans and we feel and/or think they, like us, are conscious.

So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't. We can't even say, for sure, at what stage of development humans become sentient and conscious. When sperm and egg meet? When the zygote consists of X number of cells? When the first neuron is formed? When it first fires? When it first looks and acts like us? How about a virus, a bacterium, a crab, cuttlefish, or tit mouse?

@Soupie said: As for me, yes I think the objective and subjective are dual aspects of matter/energy. In my perhaps incoherenet way of thinking, that the subjective cannot be objectively described does not mean the subjective is not constituted of matter/energy.

@smcder said: Nagel didn't think so either, initially and McGinn still doesn't ... but what you missing in making this statement is that if the subjective can be objectively described ... then it's no longer subjective, is it? It's an object like every other object in the universe - right now, then consicousness is uniquely in that position. So once you can objectively describe subjectivity, there will no longer be a category "subjective" - it won't make any sense.

So right now by saying saying

1. that the subjective cannot be objectively described
2. the subjective is constituted of matter and energy

we can arrive at "matter and energy" cannot be completely objectively described - is that what you want to say?

In other words, I can take objects - things you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure ... I can hide them from you and from science. Again, is that what you want to say?​

Yes, that is what I want to say. However, I disagree with this: "you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure." That's obviously a contradiction.

A child's medicine is designed with a sweet flavor. Why? So the child will like it. Why does the child like it? Because it's sweet. Likewise, children generally do not like broccoli. Why? Because it tastes bitter.

That all makes intuitive sense. The problem is we can't prove any of it objectively. We can't even know for sure that (1) the child is really sentient, and (2) we don't know what she tastes when she eats the medicine and broccoli.

However, we can describe the whole scenario objectively: Medicine and broccoli have different atomic compositions. When these two clusters of atoms interact with the large cluster of atoms (the child) two different, complex chains of cause and effect are set in motion. Likewise, we could say that medicine and broccoli have different chemical compositions, when these two clusters of chemical interact with the large cluster of chemicals (the child) two different, complex chemical reactions take place.

This is to say, theoretically, we can always objectively describe the arrangement of matter/energy. This does not preclude a subjective description of matter/energy. In fact, as you have noted many times, an objective description will needs be a subjective description.

Our statements about W come from W*, where W* is our experience of W.

W is objective, W* is subjective. We assume W because W*. And we assume W* because W.

@smcder: Final question, let's [say] you are proven to be an object - your subjective experience - in other words "you" - what follows as a consequence? The hard problem and the noumenal problem (assuming they are different) have been solved. What follows as a consequence?

People have acted on this from the beginning of time and many decision makes today fully accept this - but what will be different is that there will be rigorous, virtually undeniable proof that everyone is simply an arrangement of matter according to chance and necessity. What consequences follow?
​

Honestly, I would say nothing would change. When a child takes the medicine, we don't think to ourselves "I'm glad this large cluster of chemicals absorbed this liquid concoction of chemicals. Now we can both interface with our large, cushy clusters of chemicals without disturbing air molecules, etc."

Likewise, children and laypersons who've never devoted a minute to contemplating consciousness project sentience and intentions onto other humans, animals, and other objects all the time. Sharing with them that scientists have proven that their feelings are identical to brain states will not change this. Even with this knowledge, this new W*, we will still experience feelings, thoughts, and intentions, and project feelings, thoughts, and intentions onto others, both cognitively and affectively. (Although not all people do in the first place.)

I've found a very interesting paper by Rosenthal (2008). For some very frustrating reason, I haven't been able to copy/paste from PDFs without the formatting getting really messed up. I'd prefer to post several excerpts. Here is the whole paper for now. (It's got HOTs all over it!) However, I will post the interesting conclusion.

http://www.rifters.com/real/articles/Neuropsychologia_Rosenthal_2008.pdf

The consciousness of thoughts, desires, and volitions adds
little if any benefit for rational thinking, intentional action,
executive function, or complex reasoning. Nonetheless, an
explanation is available of why those states are often conscious
that makes no appeal to beneficial effects or evolutionary adaptive
value.​

So right now by saying saying

1. that the subjective cannot be objectively described
2. the subjective is constituted of matter and energy

we can arrive at "matter and energy" cannot be completely objectively described - is that what you want to say?

In other words, I can take objects - things you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure ... I can hide them from you and from science. Again, is that what you want to say?

That is a contradiction and it's yours, not mine!

 

[smcder]

@Soupie said: What would be the function of such modeling? Im only in the beginnings of looking into this, but my understanding/thought is that it would be for control. For example, a nuclear power plant may operate with the assistance of a virtual model to monitor, make predications about, and control the various processes going on.

@smcder said: And does all of that without subjective awareness/experience... computers beat humans at chess and at Jeopardy, with enough brute force I think a computer will beat the Turing Test (without being conscious) and eventually do anything a human can do (without subjectivity) so there's your zombie. See also my arguments above as to how our subjective experience is often detached from whatever task we are doing - including very complex ones like learning ... I've had the experience of being in a complex argument or writing a story while my mind was on other things ... so who was writing the story then and why is consciousness necessary at all? (on the physicalist position)​

Do we know (objectively) that such machines are not sentient (experiencing sensations)? No, and by the same token, we can't know (objectively) that anything is conscious. We "know" that others humans are conscious because we are humans and we feel and/or think they, like us, are conscious.

So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't. We can't even say, for sure, at what stage of development humans become sentient and conscious. When sperm and egg meet? When the zygote consists of X number of cells? When the first neuron is formed? When it first fires? When it first looks and acts like us? How about a virus, a bacterium, a crab, cuttlefish, or tit mouse?

@Soupie said: As for me, yes I think the objective and subjective are dual aspects of matter/energy. In my perhaps incoherenet way of thinking, that the subjective cannot be objectively described does not mean the subjective is not constituted of matter/energy.

@smcder said: Nagel didn't think so either, initially and McGinn still doesn't ... but what you missing in making this statement is that if the subjective can be objectively described ... then it's no longer subjective, is it? It's an object like every other object in the universe - right now, then consicousness is uniquely in that position. So once you can objectively describe subjectivity, there will no longer be a category "subjective" - it won't make any sense.

So right now by saying saying

1. that the subjective cannot be objectively described
2. the subjective is constituted of matter and energy

we can arrive at "matter and energy" cannot be completely objectively described - is that what you want to say?

In other words, I can take objects - things you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure ... I can hide them from you and from science. Again, is that what you want to say?​

Yes, that is what I want to say. However, I disagree with this: "you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure." That's obviously a contradiction.

A child's medicine is designed with a sweet flavor. Why? So the child will like it. Why does the child like it? Because it's sweet. Likewise, children generally do not like broccoli. Why? Because it tastes bitter.

That all makes intuitive sense. The problem is we can't prove any of it objectively. We can't even know for sure that (1) the child is really sentient, and (2) we don't know what she tastes when she eats the medicine and broccoli.

However, we can describe the whole scenario objectively: Medicine and broccoli have different atomic compositions. When these two clusters of atoms interact with the large cluster of atoms (the child) two different, complex chains of cause and effect are set in motion. Likewise, we could say that medicine and broccoli have different chemical compositions, when these two clusters of chemical interact with the large cluster of chemicals (the child) two different, complex chemical reactions take place.

This is to say, theoretically, we can always objectively describe the arrangement of matter/energy. This does not preclude a subjective description of matter/energy. In fact, as you have noted many times, an objective description will needs be a subjective description.

Our statements about W come from W*, where W* is our experience of W.

W is objective, W* is subjective. We assume W because W*. And we assume W* because W.

@smcder: Final question, let's [say] you are proven to be an object - your subjective experience - in other words "you" - what follows as a consequence? The hard problem and the noumenal problem (assuming they are different) have been solved. What follows as a consequence?

People have acted on this from the beginning of time and many decision makes today fully accept this - but what will be different is that there will be rigorous, virtually undeniable proof that everyone is simply an arrangement of matter according to chance and necessity. What consequences follow?
​

Honestly, I would say nothing would change. When a child takes the medicine, we don't think to ourselves "I'm glad this large cluster of chemicals absorbed this liquid concoction of chemicals. Now we can both interface with our large, cushy clusters of chemicals without disturbing air molecules, etc."

Likewise, children and laypersons who've never devoted a minute to contemplating consciousness project sentience and intentions onto other humans, animals, and other objects all the time. Sharing with them that scientists have proven that their feelings are identical to brain states will not change this. Even with this knowledge, this new W*, we will still experience feelings, thoughts, and intentions, and project feelings, thoughts, and intentions onto others, both cognitively and affectively. (Although not all people do in the first place.)

I've found a very interesting paper by Rosenthal (2008). For some very frustrating reason, I haven't been able to copy/paste from PDFs without the formatting getting really messed up. I'd prefer to post several excerpts. Here is the whole paper for now. (It's got HOTs all over it!) However, I will post the interesting conclusion.

http://www.rifters.com/real/articles/Neuropsychologia_Rosenthal_2008.pdf

The consciousness of thoughts, desires, and volitions adds
little if any benefit for rational thinking, intentional action,
executive function, or complex reasoning. Nonetheless, an
explanation is available of why those states are often conscious
that makes no appeal to beneficial effects or evolutionary adaptive
value.​

Do we know (objectively) that such machines are not sentient (experiencing sensations)? No, and by the same token, we can't know (objectively) that anything is conscious. We "know" that others humans are conscious because we are humans and we feel and/or think they, like us, are conscious.

So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't. We can't even say, for sure, at what stage of development humans become sentient and conscious. When sperm and egg meet? When the zygote consists of X number of cells? When the first neuron is formed? When it first fires? When it first looks and acts like us? How about a virus, a bacterium, a crab, cuttlefish, or tit mouse?

If you are a physicalist, in both cases you look for a physical basis on which it is reasonable to assume that it would be conscious - ie does it look like a brain or could it function like one - if its artificial, you dissect it ... or you just stick one of Tononandonandonandoni's Conscio-to-meter's (TM) on its forehead and read the output.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie said: What would be the function of such modeling? Im only in the beginnings of looking into this, but my understanding/thought is that it would be for control. For example, a nuclear power plant may operate with the assistance of a virtual model to monitor, make predications about, and control the various processes going on.

@smcder said: And does all of that without subjective awareness/experience... computers beat humans at chess and at Jeopardy, with enough brute force I think a computer will beat the Turing Test (without being conscious) and eventually do anything a human can do (without subjectivity) so there's your zombie. See also my arguments above as to how our subjective experience is often detached from whatever task we are doing - including very complex ones like learning ... I've had the experience of being in a complex argument or writing a story while my mind was on other things ... so who was writing the story then and why is consciousness necessary at all? (on the physicalist position)​

Do we know (objectively) that such machines are not sentient (experiencing sensations)? No, and by the same token, we can't know (objectively) that anything is conscious. We "know" that others humans are conscious because we are humans and we feel and/or think they, like us, are conscious.

So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't. We can't even say, for sure, at what stage of development humans become sentient and conscious. When sperm and egg meet? When the zygote consists of X number of cells? When the first neuron is formed? When it first fires? When it first looks and acts like us? How about a virus, a bacterium, a crab, cuttlefish, or tit mouse?

@Soupie said: As for me, yes I think the objective and subjective are dual aspects of matter/energy. In my perhaps incoherenet way of thinking, that the subjective cannot be objectively described does not mean the subjective is not constituted of matter/energy.

@smcder said: Nagel didn't think so either, initially and McGinn still doesn't ... but what you missing in making this statement is that if the subjective can be objectively described ... then it's no longer subjective, is it? It's an object like every other object in the universe - right now, then consicousness is uniquely in that position. So once you can objectively describe subjectivity, there will no longer be a category "subjective" - it won't make any sense.

So right now by saying saying

1. that the subjective cannot be objectively described
2. the subjective is constituted of matter and energy

we can arrive at "matter and energy" cannot be completely objectively described - is that what you want to say?

In other words, I can take objects - things you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure ... I can hide them from you and from science. Again, is that what you want to say?​

Yes, that is what I want to say. However, I disagree with this: "you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure." That's obviously a contradiction.

A child's medicine is designed with a sweet flavor. Why? So the child will like it. Why does the child like it? Because it's sweet. Likewise, children generally do not like broccoli. Why? Because it tastes bitter.

That all makes intuitive sense. The problem is we can't prove any of it objectively. We can't even know for sure that (1) the child is really sentient, and (2) we don't know what she tastes when she eats the medicine and broccoli.

However, we can describe the whole scenario objectively: Medicine and broccoli have different atomic compositions. When these two clusters of atoms interact with the large cluster of atoms (the child) two different, complex chains of cause and effect are set in motion. Likewise, we could say that medicine and broccoli have different chemical compositions, when these two clusters of chemical interact with the large cluster of chemicals (the child) two different, complex chemical reactions take place.

This is to say, theoretically, we can always objectively describe the arrangement of matter/energy. This does not preclude a subjective description of matter/energy. In fact, as you have noted many times, an objective description will needs be a subjective description.

Our statements about W come from W*, where W* is our experience of W.

W is objective, W* is subjective. We assume W because W*. And we assume W* because W.

@smcder: Final question, let's [say] you are proven to be an object - your subjective experience - in other words "you" - what follows as a consequence? The hard problem and the noumenal problem (assuming they are different) have been solved. What follows as a consequence?

People have acted on this from the beginning of time and many decision makes today fully accept this - but what will be different is that there will be rigorous, virtually undeniable proof that everyone is simply an arrangement of matter according to chance and necessity. What consequences follow?
​

Honestly, I would say nothing would change. When a child takes the medicine, we don't think to ourselves "I'm glad this large cluster of chemicals absorbed this liquid concoction of chemicals. Now we can both interface with our large, cushy clusters of chemicals without disturbing air molecules, etc."

Likewise, children and laypersons who've never devoted a minute to contemplating consciousness project sentience and intentions onto other humans, animals, and other objects all the time. Sharing with them that scientists have proven that their feelings are identical to brain states will not change this. Even with this knowledge, this new W*, we will still experience feelings, thoughts, and intentions, and project feelings, thoughts, and intentions onto others, both cognitively and affectively. (Although not all people do in the first place.)

I've found a very interesting paper by Rosenthal (2008). For some very frustrating reason, I haven't been able to copy/paste from PDFs without the formatting getting really messed up. I'd prefer to post several excerpts. Here is the whole paper for now. (It's got HOTs all over it!) However, I will post the interesting conclusion.

http://www.rifters.com/real/articles/Neuropsychologia_Rosenthal_2008.pdf

The consciousness of thoughts, desires, and volitions adds
little if any benefit for rational thinking, intentional action,
executive function, or complex reasoning. Nonetheless, an
explanation is available of why those states are often conscious
that makes no appeal to beneficial effects or evolutionary adaptive
value.​

So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't.

Waittttt ... haven't you argued against Zombies ... ?

The consciousness of thoughts, desires, and volitions adds
little if any benefit for rational thinking, intentional action,
executive function, or complex reasoning. Nonetheless, an
explanation is available of why those states are often conscious
that makes no appeal to beneficial effects or evolutionary adaptive
value.

Yes, that is the argument I am making to @Pharoah ... not really an argument, but a question ... which is if subjective states are invisible to natural selection why then do they match reality or why do we think they do ... or, do they?

Why don't we think of green cream cheese when we stub our toes. Maybe you do?

 

[Soupie]

So right now by saying saying

1. that the subjective cannot be objectively described
2. the subjective is constituted of matter and energy

we can arrive at "matter and energy" cannot be completely objectively described - is that what you want to say?[\quote]
No, I'm saying matter/energy can be described objectively and subjectively. Objective and subjective descriptions are ways of describing

In other words, I can take objects - things you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure ... I can hide them from you and from science. Again, is that what you want to say?

That is a contradiction and it's yours, not mine!

What I'm suggesting is that matter/energy can be described subjectively and objectively. (And it's probably better to substitute what-is for matter/energy as the concept of matter/energy is an objective description of what-is.)

What you seem to be suggesting is that one needs to describe a subjective description of what-is objectively. I agree that this is not possible.

That is, red is a subjective description of what-is, just as wave length X and brain process Z is an objective description of what-is.

A subjective description of what-is would consist of feelings and thoughts, an objective description would consist of matter/energy.

W* is subjective and it "contains" an objective description of W. W as known via W* may not exist. We assume that W contains W*, but we only know this via W*.

 

[Pharoah]

I have said on a few occasion I think, that HCT is a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience. i.e. it solves the hard problem. That is my view and I back it 99.9%

Physical to phenomenal
You want an answer to the hard problem... Let's play 21 questions, see where it gets us. I have no idea beyond the first quation what I will ask you. You can answer yes, no, or say the question does not have a yes or no answer.

Q1. Replication leads to the evolution of mechanisms that make a difference to the survival potential of the replicating species'.

1. OK - first we have to be in agreement as to what the hard problem is, I need to figure out if I'm right that it's what you call the noumenal problem, if so, we are on the same side.
2. I'm interested in the phenomeonal to the physical - I now understand you to say that the phenomenal has a causal impact, my subjective experience has a causal impact. Right? If so, will 21 questions show me how this happens?
3. I need to look at Dowell's argument and the counter-arguments to it.

In the meantime:

Q1. Replication leads to the evolution of mechanisms that make a difference to the survival potential of the replicating species'.

from your London Philosophy Club Talk:
3.7 Billions of years ago a unique systems construct emerged as an accidental consequence of the uncontrolled evolution of atomic compounds.
What was so special about this systems construct?
Well… this construct was able to control the evolution of its systems structures.

It did this by replication.

So I would say you need replication with variation. If you have something that can replicate with variations, then those variations (which aren't the same thing obviously as the thing replicating - may not even be the same species ultimately) have different survival potential depending on the environment (including chance occurences - ie environment includes everything that can happen to an organism/construct/ replicator).

Question two?

21 questions doesnt work like that!!

You agree or disagree with the question... that is all. It ensures a logical path of reason. Having said that, you can say "agree" with a proviso, like "if replication must lead to mutations". We can include this proviso, because with out it, crystals and/or prions may be deemed to be examples of replicating constructs (which they are not)

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie said: So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't.

@smcder said: Waittttt ... haven't you argued against Zombies ... ?​

If there were a physical object that was an exact, physical clone of me, yes, I'd argue that logically it would have to be conscious. Of course, I could be wrong. Good logic /= truth. (Which leads to your next statement/question.)

@smcder said: if subjective states are invisible to natural selection why then do they match reality or why do we think they do ... or, do they?​

Why don't we think of green cream cheese when we stub our toes. Maybe you do?
​

You and I have discussed this in the past. Why can't the experience of red really be the experience of green, and the experience of green the experience of blue? Why does an orgasm feel good and a broken toe feel bad? Couldn't the reverse be the case?

I wonder if HOT can help us here. HOT suggests there are subconscious mental/subjective states. A subconscious mental state becomes a conscious mental state when it becomes the object of another subconscious mental state.

If we grant HOT, we have to be careful about what we are asking. Are we asking why subjective states approximate reality or are we asking why we are aware of subjective states that approximate reality?

Models of models. We don't ask why a virtual model of a nuclear reactor would need to match (as approximate as possible) the pressure or heat inside a reactor. Rather, the question is why might a nuclear reactor, say, be conscious of the model of the heat/pressure inside its reactor.

Therefore, the better R* approximates R, the safer and more effecient it will be. The question is, why is there R**. What purpose might it serve? From an objective description of what-is, it would seem R** has no function.

 

[Soupie]

And I think again of the Minsky paper above when he said W* is clearly contained in W, but as to whether W** was contained in W, he couldn't say.

What is that supposed to mean? HOT implies that W** is consciousness, and I assume that's what Minksy meant (but maybe not).

I still think we need a "physics" of consciousness. Phenomenology and psychology do give us this to an extent, but as the subjective is personal, there may need to be a personal "physics" for every individual.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie said: So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't.

@smcder said: Waittttt ... haven't you argued against Zombies ... ?​

If there were a physical object that was an exact, physical clone of me, yes, I'd argue that logically it would have to be conscious. Of course, I could be wrong. Good logic /= truth. (Which leads to your next statement/question.)

@smcder said: if subjective states are invisible to natural selection why then do they match reality or why do we think they do ... or, do they?​

Why don't we think of green cream cheese when we stub our toes. Maybe you do?
​

You and I have discussed this in the past. Why can't the experience of red really be the experience of green, and the experience of green the experience of blue? Why does an orgasm feel good and a broken toe feel bad? Couldn't the reverse be the case?

I wonder if HOT can help us here. HOT suggests there are subconscious mental/subjective states. A subconscious mental state becomes a conscious mental state when it becomes the object of another subconscious mental state.

If we grant HOT, we have to be careful about what we are asking. Are we asking why subjective states approximate reality or are we asking why we are aware of subjective states that approximate reality?

Models of models. We don't ask why a virtual model of a nuclear reactor would need to match (as approximate as possible) the pressure or heat inside a reactor. Rather, the question is why might a nuclear reactor, say, be conscious of the model of the heat/pressure inside its reactor.

Therefore, the better R* approximates R, the safer and more effecient it will be. The question is, why is there R**. What purpose might it serve? From an objective description of what-is, it would seem R** has no function.

If there were a physical object that was an exact, physical clone of me, yes, I'd argue that logically it would have to be conscious. Of course, I could be wrong. Good logic /= truth. (Which leads to your next statement/question.)

I thought your argument was around the time of Tononandonandoni and that it was based on level of complexity, I think you said anything with that level of complexity or that could act at the level of complexity would have to be conscious. I can look for the post to see if that's what you said? That's one thing I wish were better on this forum, finding posts.

You and I have discussed this in the past. Why can't the experience of red really be the experience of green, and the experience of green the experience of blue? Why does an orgasm feel good and a broken toe feel bad? Couldn't the reverse be the case?

I'm not sure that's the same thing ... or maybe I wasn't conscious at the time.

Does HOT (I forget what that stands for?) say that there is "something it is like to be unconscious"? That seems weird but I don't want to get into the whole stubbed my toe and got distracted thing again.

That's what my whole point revolves around anyway ... that what I am aware of has a causal effect - if I have an unconscious urge to jump up and down or write the great American novel, I guess I don't care as long as it doesn't disturb my conscious life - what I want is to say that "I WILL walk to school and carry my lunch by G(g)-od" that that, this present intentional subjective state (sitting here typing this) has a causal effect ...

 

[smcder]

And I think again of the Minsky paper above when he said W* is clearly contained in W, but as to whether W** was contained in W, he couldn't say.

What is that supposed to mean? HOT implies that W** is consciousness, and I assume that's what Minksy meant (but maybe not).

I still think we need a "physics" of consciousness. Phenomenology and psychology do give us this to an extent, but as the subjective is personal, there may need to be a personal "physics" for every individual.

If we have a physics of consciousness, then the subjective, personal or not, becomes subject to an objective description and is no longer subjective - in effect we'd be showing that there never was anything subjective to begin with.

Plug

HOT*W((W)W*)W'

into



and let me know what you get.

 

[smcder]

21 questions doesnt work like that!!

You agree or disagree with the question... that is all. It ensures a logical path of reason. Having said that, you can say "agree" with a proviso, like "if replication must lead to mutations". We can include this proviso, because with out it, crystals and/or prions may be deemed to be examples of replicating constructs (which they are not)

Ugh I was never any good at following rules ... but this does sound lot like my hypotheticals game.

Q1. Replication leads to the evolution of mechanisms that make a difference to the survival potential of the replicating species'.

I would like to use a lifeline, Regis.

OK, let's go with replication + variation for 500, Alex ... see what happens.

Question #2

 

[Constance]

How do phenomenal experiences have a causal impact? Many people accept that subjective experience is physically caused but these same folks generally believe it can't cause anything itself. The 21 questions won't show that or will it?

And why are they needed when the mechanisms that give rise to them also can take care of fulfilling the needs? Our conscious awareness, our very specific here and now and what I am conscious of - is very narrow and it also focuses on different things, what specific function can phenomenal experience fulfill that can't be done without awareness? If I cut my hand while I'm distracted (@Soupie) all the pain mechanisms are in place and I may have my hand to my mouth or be rubbing it before I am consciously aware (have a phenomenal experience) of pain - so my phenomenal awareness doesn't seem necessary in that instance. In very complicted, intentional situations or learning something, then it does seem we have to pay attention and have phenomenal experiences - but then that can move into subconsious realm (in my sleep, I sometimes speak in German, my wife tells me) some claim that you can learn languages and other subjects subliminally and even in your sleep, the millitary studied this and I actually had a German professor who did an accelerated course with relaxation and listening to tapes ... so the question is still why is consciousness necessary at all?

Just joining y'all today. The above caught my eye. I think the problem buried beneath our attention in this discussion is a misunderstanding of phenomenal experience -- a notion of it that is too narrow, being addressed only to that which we focus our attention on. In Steve's example (highlighted in blue above) it's clear that phenomenal experience is responded to by the body itself in processing of events before we become fully conscious of them. We are in such cases subconsciously aware of them. The subconscious is part of consciousness, a region of the complex nature of consciousness which includes subliminal and also supraliminal experiences (such as those achieved by skilled meditators, mystics, psychics, etc.). The regions of consciousness are not closed off from one another like individual modules in a computer which do not share information or interact directly in terms of information. Consciousness includes subconscious ideation/mentality/mind as well as the waking mind that is alert to immediate, present, circumstances, situations, other beings significant and less significant to us, external events, problems to be solved, demands to be met, goals to be achieved, risks to be avoided, etc.

Consciousness is often described by comparison with the structure of an iceberg, only ten percent of which exists above the waterline, corresponding to waking consciousness. The other ninety percent corresponds to the subconscious. And the whole exists in and is open to the environment, subject to the melting of the structure into the water in which it is contained and dissipating into the air above the waterline. The whole of consciousness, like the iceberg, is radically in touch with the world in which it exists. The subconscious, as in Steve's example, senses, feels, is aware of the impingements of the external world and informs the waking consciousness of significant events, even awakens the individual organism from a sleeping state in extreme situations, and also expresses awareness of impingements of the immediate environment in dreams already in process {the phone rings at 3 am and is worked into the dream; depending on the depth of the dream state, the individual might awaken fully to the sound of the ringing telephone and then awaken sufficiently to answer it). The borders between or among regions of consciousness are permeable. We should recall also Evan Thompson's report in his most recent book that beneath the dreaming states in sleep there remains a minimal state of brain activity that looks like a minimal state of awareness, providing a seamlessness in the continuation of consciousness, a kind of placeholder for the individuality of each consciousness and its immense store of remembered experience and learning. Is it not a marvel that, except in cases of brain injury or amnesia, we each awaken each day with the whole sense of our personhood and history intact?

 

[Constance]

@smcder I'm sure PM is fine by me... whatever that is.
@Constance what you describe in #772 is true and relevant.
HCT expresses an underlying unity and undoubtedly there is a lot of complexity that can be interpreted by HCT principles.
You bring up many queries that require substantial comment so I wouldn't quite know where to start.
When an animal uses sticks and solves puzzles etc it is creative application, but such animals do not identify creativity (as an expression) as a process for application as a principle of general endeavour. It is difficult to comment generally about specific examples... a book could be written on this alone.

What you say about protocultures protolanguages with hominid etc is very true... a fascinating area for hypothesising about what might have been going on then in relation to HCT.

A human can intentionally go about creating a social environment (say,for example, an online forum). This is an active and deliberate endeavour. Non-human animals do have social dynamics but they don't go about thinking about developing social dynamics. Their social world just evolves "by accident" , meaning; in a way that is not deliberate, considered, understood by the creature for what it is...
Similarly, a species' mutations are not controlled by the species... evolutionary direction is "accidental".

It does seem that you are fixed on the belief that everything that occurs in nature is random -- until we get to humans who reflect on their experiences and begin to think and act on the basis of what they understand. Thus we are "all that and a bag of chips," as my daughter would say -- completely different from all of our forebears. I don't think that's true.

Not all theoretical scientists and other thinkers these days accept that hard Darwinian premise of 'randomness' as the 'rule' of nature. You will have many other thinkers to convince of your premises and presuppositions. You can find them among the critiques of Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism.

Our capacity for reflection on our prereflective experience in/of the world and our increasing ability to comprehend the various levels of consciousness and mind involved in what we think is the problem to be solved -- how mind emerges from our evolutionary history in a thousand, a million, a billion different ways, not in just one giant step. It seems to me that to make the case for HCT's giant step at the 'stage 4 construct', you need to identify great numbers of examples of types of development over eons of evolutionary time from the beginnings of awareness and seeking behavior that Panksepp sees in primitive organisms to the present state of our species and its fumbling attempts to understand itself.

Conversely, Humans can control evolution initially through breed selection and then through gene manipulation.

We can manipulate genes, for better or worse, and without understanding the longterm consequences of doing so vis a vis nature's own evolutionary processes. We already have seen some near-catastrophic changes in bionanotechnology. We're most likely to escape evolution of our species entirely by producing a local world in which we cannot survive to evolve further.

HCT does have an account for learning. It's explanation of phen exp is contentous enough without adding that learning capabilities correlate with the possession of phen exp:

But you do have to deal with learning capabilities provided in phenomenal experience all the way back, contentious or not for your theory, nicht wahr?

It [HCT's account of learning] is an understanding of the qualitative relevancy of experience that compels a creature to adjust its behavioural responses in association with its identified (and thereby represented) environmental cause... this leads to the process we call learning, or the process I refer to as "behavioural adaptation" (innate mechanism can only alter behaviour through physiological adaptation over generations - alternatively, behavioural adaptation is realtime response to evaluated realtime qualitative experience and relevancy)
These are all big subjects. I can elaborate on any if you wish one at a time... for clarity.

I think you will need to deal with those big subjects in the presentation of HCT to readers in general. It seems to me that to do so here in the forum would require writing half your book on these pages, which would probably be acceptable and do-able here, but I wonder why you would want to proceed that way.

 

[Constance]

21 questions doesnt work like that!!

You agree or disagree with the question... that is all. It ensures a logical path of reason. Having said that, you can say "agree" with a proviso, like "if replication must lead to mutations". We can include this proviso, because with out it, crystals and/or prions may be deemed to be examples of replicating constructs (which they are not)

It is not yet known by scientists whether prions can replicate. There is considerable evidence that they do, but the means by which they propagate is not understood by molecular biologists. See:

Prions: On the Trail of Killer Proteins

 

[Constance]

Mental processes are mostly "easy" according to Chalmers, it's when subjectivity comes in that the problem becomes hard. Subjectivity has no other referents except its own awareness. To say subjectivity is illusory is to undefine it. I prove my subjectivity by being aware of it. That's just what it is, so eliminativism isn't taken very seriously by many people.

In phenomenological philosophy, subjectivity is grounded not only in an individual's experience but recognized as the common property of others of one's species [and potentially of some other species]. In primordial experience of consciousness {experience of evolving primates and experience of very young children} an individual gradually recognizes that others like/resembling itself physically experience a common environment/world and respond to it in similar ways (with similar reactions, feelings, thoughts). In existential phenomenology, philosophers such as Max Scheler and Emanual Levinas pursue the consequences of this discovery in the individual's moral realization of his or her obligation to treat the other as a subject rather than as an object. Sartre in particular pursued intersubjectivity in the formation of the "We-subject" in political solidarity formed out of common needs and goals. But the interinvolvement of one subjectivity with another is always already founded in the prereflective experience of the offspring nurtured by its parent(s) or caregivers. Bonds are implicit before they become available to explicit thinking, reasoning.

And maybe those who do [take eliminativism seriously] have a very different kind of interior life?

How to account for that? I marvel endlessly at people met here and elsewhere who do not seem to be in touch with, aware of, familiar with their own moment-by-moment experience in and of the world, even for periods of time long enough for their personal stream of consciousness to become a subject of awareness calling for exploration. The cure for that, in intractable cases, is available in the major works of phenomenological philosophy, though many humans achieve its insights on their own simply by paying attention to what they think and feel.

I don't think anyone has explored this -

Jung and his followers and also Western existentialist psychologists and some Eastern philosophers have.

but I have heard that when Dawkins put on the "God Helmet" (what was the inventors name?) he claimed to feel nothing. So maybe he has a very different kind of mind/brain?

Michael Persinger. Very funny anecdote about Dawkins, and not surprising. I doubt he has "a very different kind of mind/brain"; rather, he apparently hasn't chosen to pay attention to what goes on in his own consciousness, his experience of his own and others' existence. This is probably an occupational hazard of assuming, and then dedicating oneself to the support of, objectivist premises concerning the nature of reality.

 

[Constance]

Apropos of the above, someone has quipped about the Churchlands sitting down to breakfast and asking one another "how are your neurons today?".

 

[smcder]

Apropos of the above, someone has quipped about the Churchlands sitting down to breakfast and asking one another "how are your neurons today?".

I've always wondered how these folks (without folk psychology) act at home.

I picture them pulling off the masks and heaving a big sigh and then sitting down to watch episodes of "Amish Mafia".

 

[Constance]

Ugh I was never any good at following rules ... but this does sound lot like my hypotheticals game.

Q1. Replication leads to the evolution of mechanisms that make a difference to the survival potential of the replicating species'.

I would like to use a lifeline, Regis.

OK, let's go with replication + variation for 500, Alex ... see what happens.

Question #2

I'm not quite ready to answer 'yes'. 'Leads to' is too vague in my opinion. What else might enter in to changes/adaptations in the offspring of an organism by virtue of which it is not identical to its parents? And indeed can we claim that the parents are identical to one another? That's clearly not the case. So what you seem to be claiming relates to potential changes incipient in the 'mechanisms' of reproduction, realizations of combinations of some of a variety of potentials.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie said: What would be the function of such modeling? Im only in the beginnings of looking into this, but my understanding/thought is that it would be for control. For example, a nuclear power plant may operate with the assistance of a virtual model to monitor, make predications about, and control the various processes going on.

@smcder said: And does all of that without subjective awareness/experience... computers beat humans at chess and at Jeopardy, with enough brute force I think a computer will beat the Turing Test (without being conscious) and eventually do anything a human can do (without subjectivity) so there's your zombie. See also my arguments above as to how our subjective experience is often detached from whatever task we are doing - including very complex ones like learning ... I've had the experience of being in a complex argument or writing a story while my mind was on other things ... so who was writing the story then and why is consciousness necessary at all? (on the physicalist position)​

Do we know (objectively) that such machines are not sentient (experiencing sensations)? No, and by the same token, we can't know (objectively) that anything is conscious. We "know" that others humans are conscious because we are humans and we feel and/or think they, like us, are conscious.

So, yes, what happens when an artificial organism looks just like us, acts just like us, and reports just like us that it is conscious? How do we know that it is or is not? We can't and we won't. We can't even say, for sure, at what stage of development humans become sentient and conscious. When sperm and egg meet? When the zygote consists of X number of cells? When the first neuron is formed? When it first fires? When it first looks and acts like us? How about a virus, a bacterium, a crab, cuttlefish, or tit mouse?

@Soupie said: As for me, yes I think the objective and subjective are dual aspects of matter/energy. In my perhaps incoherenet way of thinking, that the subjective cannot be objectively described does not mean the subjective is not constituted of matter/energy.

@smcder said: Nagel didn't think so either, initially and McGinn still doesn't ... but what you missing in making this statement is that if the subjective can be objectively described ... then it's no longer subjective, is it? It's an object like every other object in the universe - right now, then consicousness is uniquely in that position. So once you can objectively describe subjectivity, there will no longer be a category "subjective" - it won't make any sense.

So right now by saying saying

1. that the subjective cannot be objectively described
2. the subjective is constituted of matter and energy

we can arrive at "matter and energy" cannot be completely objectively described - is that what you want to say?

In other words, I can take objects - things you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure ... I can hide them from you and from science. Again, is that what you want to say?​

Yes, that is what I want to say. However, I disagree with this: "you can objectively describe and measure and arrange them in a form that you then cannot describe objectively and measure." That's obviously a contradiction.

A child's medicine is designed with a sweet flavor. Why? So the child will like it. Why does the child like it? Because it's sweet. Likewise, children generally do not like broccoli. Why? Because it tastes bitter.

That all makes intuitive sense. The problem is we can't prove any of it objectively. We can't even know for sure that (1) the child is really sentient, and (2) we don't know what she tastes when she eats the medicine and broccoli.

However, we can describe the whole scenario objectively: Medicine and broccoli have different atomic compositions. When these two clusters of atoms interact with the large cluster of atoms (the child) two different, complex chains of cause and effect are set in motion. Likewise, we could say that medicine and broccoli have different chemical compositions, when these two clusters of chemical interact with the large cluster of chemicals (the child) two different, complex chemical reactions take place.

This is to say, theoretically, we can always objectively describe the arrangement of matter/energy. This does not preclude a subjective description of matter/energy. In fact, as you have noted many times, an objective description will needs be a subjective description.

Our statements about W come from W*, where W* is our experience of W.

W is objective, W* is subjective. We assume W because W*. And we assume W* because W.

@smcder: Final question, let's [say] you are proven to be an object - your subjective experience - in other words "you" - what follows as a consequence? The hard problem and the noumenal problem (assuming they are different) have been solved. What follows as a consequence?

People have acted on this from the beginning of time and many decision makes today fully accept this - but what will be different is that there will be rigorous, virtually undeniable proof that everyone is simply an arrangement of matter according to chance and necessity. What consequences follow?
​

Honestly, I would say nothing would change. When a child takes the medicine, we don't think to ourselves "I'm glad this large cluster of chemicals absorbed this liquid concoction of chemicals. Now we can both interface with our large, cushy clusters of chemicals without disturbing air molecules, etc."

Likewise, children and laypersons who've never devoted a minute to contemplating consciousness project sentience and intentions onto other humans, animals, and other objects all the time. Sharing with them that scientists have proven that their feelings are identical to brain states will not change this. Even with this knowledge, this new W*, we will still experience feelings, thoughts, and intentions, and project feelings, thoughts, and intentions onto others, both cognitively and affectively. (Although not all people do in the first place.)

I've found a very interesting paper by Rosenthal (2008). For some very frustrating reason, I haven't been able to copy/paste from PDFs without the formatting getting really messed up. I'd prefer to post several excerpts. Here is the whole paper for now. (It's got HOTs all over it!) However, I will post the interesting conclusion.

http://www.rifters.com/real/articles/Neuropsychologia_Rosenthal_2008.pdf

The consciousness of thoughts, desires, and volitions adds
little if any benefit for rational thinking, intentional action,
executive function, or complex reasoning. Nonetheless, an
explanation is available of why those states are often conscious
that makes no appeal to beneficial effects or evolutionary adaptive
value.​

Did you read Dreyfus' critique of Minsky?