@Pharoah I'm still very interested in reading your take on the so-called Hard Problem. How do we account for the apparent gap between the objective and subjective poles of reality? Is the gap illusory?
Chalmers is wrong to say that the hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. I think the problem of experience is explained by hierarchical construct theory, and that the hard problem is the 'elephant in the room' that no philosophers seem to want to mention:
Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
'Facing up to the problem of consciousness' is the much debated philosophy paper by David Chalmers that has ploughed not so much a line, but a demarcation trench through the central battleground of the philosophy of consciousness. The article, written in 1995, is celebrated for articulating the view that there is a uniquely "hard problem" in deciphering consciousness in that any theory must adequately explain the specific characteristics and the textural qualities of experience. As an article, it might well have been intended to clarify the problem of consciousness or even to unite opinion. Instead, it has had the effect of entrenching opposing views, heightening the sense that between the ranks lies an inhospitable no-mans-land with an assortment of booby-traps and razor-wire to catch the unsuspecting.
Deciphering the requirements of an explanation of ‘consciousness’ is considered by most, a unique problem. This is evident when examining the plethora of attempts to explain consciousness and explore the enigmatic features of its phenomenal characteristics (e.g., Armstrong, 1968, 1984; Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1978, Flanagan, 1992; Gennaro, 1996; Kirk, 1994; Lycan, 1987, Nelkin, 1996; Rosenthal, 1986, 1993; Tye, 1995). Some argue that such a problem does not exist, others that a reductive explanation is impossible (Chalmers, 1996, 1999; Chalmers & Jackson, 2001; Jackson, 1982, 1986; Levine, 1983, 1993, 2001; McGinn, 1991; Sturgeon, 1994, 2000), whilst some claim to have already provided one (Carruthers, 2000a; Dennett, 1991; Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996; Tye, 2000a).
Chalmers (2003) identifies six classes which he says, categorise “the most important views on the metaphysics of consciousness”. Of the six classes, three see consciousness as a physical process that requires no extension of mankind's understanding of what comprises physics, i.e. no expansion of a physical ontology:
i) Type A materialism – There is no epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths; or at least, any apparent epistemic gap is easily closed (Dennett, 1991; Dretske, 1995; Harman, 1990; Lewis, 1988; Rey, 1995; and Ryle, 1949);
ii) Type B materialism – There is an epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal domains, but there is no ontological gap, a gap that exists between a knowable and an unknowable alternative reality (Block & Stalnaker, 1999; Hill, 1997; Levine, 1983; Loar, 1990/1997; Lycan, 1996; Papineau, 1993; Perry, 2001; and Tye 1995); and
iii) Type C materialism – There is a deep epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal domains, but it is closable in principle (whose sympathisers are Churchland, 1997; McGinn, 1989; and Nagel, 1974).
Three of the six classes regard consciousness as involving some 'thing', irreducible in nature, requiring expansion or the re-conception of a physical ontology:
iv) Type D dualism or interactionism – Phenomenal properties play a causal role in affecting the physical world such that physical states cause phenomenal states, and phenomenal states cause physical states. (Foster, 1991; Hodgson, 1991; Popper & Eccles, 1977; Sellars, 1981; Stapp, 1993; and Swinburne 1986);
v) Type E dualism or epiphenomenalism – Phenomenal properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties. Phenomenal properties have no effect on the physical. (Campbell, 1970; Huxley, 1974; Jackson, 1982; and Robinson 1988); and
vi) Type F monism - Consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities (Chalmers, 1996; Feigl, 1958/1967; Griffin, 1998; Lockwood, 1989; Maxwell, 1979; Russell, 1926; Stoljar, 2001; and Strawson, 2000).
Crucially, in this classification Chalmers’ assumption is that the phenomenal domain of 'experience'
is consciousness i.e., the concept of 'the phenomenal' encapsulates ‘consciousness’. It is from this incorrect assumption that he concludes that the Hard Problem of consciousness is the Problem of Experience.
The Distinction between Personal Identity and Phenomenal Consciousness
Is an explanation of phenomenal experience truly an explanation of consciousness? HCT informs us that it is not.
One may explain the how and why of the chemistry of ripening apples, but this insight need not by necessity explain what it might be to ripen for an individual apple. Alternatively, the insight of gravity and how it relates to a falling apple does not give insights as to what it is like to be a particular individual falling apple. Now it is true we assume, that it is nothing to be ‘what it is like’ as a individual ripening or falling apple. But this is not the assumption we make of other human individuals. We do assume that there is 'something it is like' to be other individual conscious humans. We assume that human individuals experience phenomena in such a way that gives substance to the quality behind their feelings of experiencing the world.
One can 'imagine' that there is the potential to explain the chemistry of the brain, just as one might explain the chemistry of ripening apples. One can imagine being able to understand the physiology of cerebral structures in great detail. And yet whilst we may be content knowing the chemistry and physiology of ripening and falling apples, or might understand the chemistry and physiology of the brain, there is yet more to answer when it comes to consciousness.
Understanding consciousness is more than understanding the causal or correlative mechanisms and physiology of the organ that appears to produce it (see section 4 below ‘Of Causation, correlation, and explanation’). If philosophers or scientists were to provide an explanation of phenomenal consciousness, it would by necessity tell us with clarity and certainty what it feels like, if anything, to be an apple. Even so, this still is not a sufficient conclusion to the problem of consciousness. To describe why and how individuals with a conscious first-person perspective of experience must exist, is not necessarily to explain how any given individual’s first-person perspective actually exists:
If you decide to recognise your own distinctive conscious identity, then you are also compelled to recognise that there is no current scientific knowledge or philosophical framework that can hope to encompass the identity of your particular self as distinct from anyone else’s; for any such explanation must be not just person specific, but specifically individuated to you. And so, a full account of consciousness, in contrast to an explanation of phenomenal experience, requires an explanation that identifies, not just the uniqueness of the first-person phenomenal perspective, but the distinctly personal consciousness of every viable individual. Such an explanation would have to explain, unlikely as it may seem, you and me individually, rather than merely explain how and why phenomenal of conscious experience, for example, is an emergent consequence of physics.
A reductive explanation of the phenomenon of experience, which us humans identify as consciousness, is not going to provide a full account of the conscious identity we each possess about ourselves in contrast to any other selves. This re-enforces the point I made at the conclusion to the book’s Introduction:
When a human looks in a mirror and sees his or her face, he or she sees a material incarnation of an exceptional event that has never before occurred in the history of the universe nor will ever occur in the future of the universe - namely, that particular conscious individual has looked at themselves. What elements of nature or physics could possibly determine one’s own specific frame of reference?
Whilst I claim that HCT provides a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, I am of the view that an explanation of every individual’s self requires an additional level of explanation. This additional level requires explaining all that is not yet phenomenal but that which could be. This aspect of consciousness I interpret, as the problem of noumenal consciousness. In chapter 7, I take this particular and additional problem of personal self-identity head on. For now, the point to emphasise is that the problem of consciousness is not entirely encapsulated by the notion of the ‘problem of experience’. It is for this reason that I express the view that the Hard Problem of consciousness is not the problem of providing an explanation of phenomenal experience as Chalmers suggests, but that of providing an explanation of noumenal consciousness. This distinction between the phenomenon of consciousness (which does necessitate the possession of a first-person perspective but is nevertheless, non-self identity specific) and the individuated self (which is curiously affiliated to, specifically us, and only us individually), is what I call ‘The Elephant in the Philosophy of Consciousness Room’ issue because it is not a distinction that is often made. The distinction is important, because, for example, if one were to hold the view as I do, that one can reductively explain phenomenal consciousness without explaining noumenal consciousness, then one must also conclude that such a reductive explanation need not infringe on the dualist’s stance or decisively determine the nature of the battleground to be waged for or against physicalism. In other words, a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience does not prove or disprove physicalism - it has no impact or bearing on the physicalism versus dualism debate whatsoever. It is clear from Chalmers' writing and others, that this distinction is entirely unappreciated (hence the "elephant in the room") - for Chalmers the problem of consciousness is the problem of experience and in being so, pits physicalism up against dualism over the question of phenomenal experience. My stance, which is enabled by Hierarchical Construct Theory, allows one to come to terms with a reductive explanation of first-person phenomenally conscious experiences, and yet still hold dear the mystery of self-existence - the explanation of which might yet be shown to have dual aspects to it or to be entirely physical.
Earlier, I listed the six classes which Chalmers identifies to categorise the most important views on the "metaphysics of consciousness". Here, Chalmers contrasts the materialist positions against the two dualist and one monist positions explicitly illustrating my point. Clearly, Chalmers is of the view that you cannot have a reductive materialist explanation of phenomenal consciousness and yet be a dualist. In his collation of the views expressed by philosophers, Chalmers expresses the mutual incompatibility of the two camps thereby illustrating that the vast majority of philosophers - whichever side of the divide they maintain their affiliation - are mistakenly of the view that phenomenal consciousness is inextricably tied conceptually to the problem of self-consciousness. What I am saying is that philosophical orthodoxy is mistaken. By way of contrast, HCT shows that explaining the phenomenon of consciousness need have no bearing on one’s dualist or monist or materialist leanings.
More on ‘The Elephant in the Philosophy of Consciousness Room’
When we conceive of alternative life scenarios we make certain assumptions.
Conceive of scenario 1 where at birth, a midwife mistakenly placed you in the wrong cot. As a consequence, you were taken home by the wrong parents to live an entirely different life to the one you have actually lived. In our conception of such a scenario, we assume that an alternative life individual would hold alternative views; different beliefs or concepts about the nature of reality to our own. We assume that being such an alternative individual would entail holding different memories. But if you were this alternative individual with these types of differences, you would nonetheless, remain the same individuated identity. Likewise with the following second alternative scenario: you are born of a family that decide to live with a sect that seeks in every way to re-enact the life of 17th century peasants. We assume that such an alternative life individual might possess not just different beliefs or concepts and a different set of memories, but different tastes, sensitivities, and impressions about life. With scenario 2, phenomenal qualities might be more vivid due to a lifestyle that is closer to nature: perhaps a more 'earthy' way of living would have the tendency of more acutely attuning the senses of smell and hearing. It may also be the case that for this individual, the passage of time might feel different: perhaps a life of toil in the fields makes the experience of time differ to that of the individual brought up in a fast-paced twentieth century city.
Of these assumptions perhaps the greatest of all is that we can actually have a conception of any alternative life scenario that holds true validity. For if one were, in reality, to change rather drastically, even one's innately acquired characterisations overnight let alone one's experiential characterisation, one would still be the same individuated identity the following morning. Were this to happen, innate characterisation might make one more inclined to become aggressive or more sensitive, more scatty perhaps, or male rather than female, more or less paternal etc. Similarly, changing the content of the 'feeling' of one's phenomenal experiences would not by necessity, impact on the identity of the individual experiencing the change. Whilst everyone has a first-person perspective - and each and every alternative scenario does undoubtedly have a first-person perspective - and whilst the characterisation of their persona might be altered by degree, they retain their individuated identity. By this, what I am suggesting is that the character of a persona may change greatly, but this need not change their individuated identity: does a patient suffering from acute Alheizmer’s stop being the identity they were? The innate, experiential, or conceptual characterisation of a first-person perspective does not clearly differentiate an individuated identity. What nails our individuated identity to the first-person yet changeable persona that we are? When we conceive of an alternative life scenario, we assume the identity ‘through the eyes of the same person' but imagine different contents of experience, attitude, and the such like. But these imaginings are ignoring that which actually delineates the individuation of an individual from any other many many trillions of alternative life scenarios.
What is it to conceive?
In these alternative first-person scenarios, what is meant by "conceive of a scenario"? Truly, we can conceive the possibilities of these and other alternative-life scenarios, but is it possible to have a true concept of what it would be, to 'actually' be these alternative lives? What is the truth-value of a conception of being an alternative individual scenario? Is not the exercise of conceiving of "actually being" these scenarios, as inconceivable as conceiving being a bat? In truth, we can only imagine what these conceivable scenarios would actually be like, and by imagining find that the further removed from our own experiences and understandings, the more approximate these imaginings or assumptions must be. Though conceivable scenarios, perhaps these modes of living are not conceived truthfully at all.
We think that we can conceive accurately of alternative human lives because as thinking individuals we are in the business of appraising our own learning and our own conceptual worldview, and from this, are in the habit of believing that alternative life scenarios are but an extension of this kind of thinking. Undoubtedly, the further from our ‘selves’ that we conceive, the greater assumptions become by degree. And yet, importantly, fundamental assumptions are necessary for all alternative scenarios regardless of how similar or distant to one's actual life they happen to be.
The language of translating one lifestyle conception to another by "conceiving" is fraught with potential inaccuracies; inaccuracies that are filled in by assumption and imagination. At the heart of this is the problem associated with the meaning of the 'first-person'. There is an assumed meaning guarded by the notion of what it would be like to be another, but there is no objective stipulation of the true nature of individuated first-persons.
What is the true, rather than the assumed differentiation between one first-person perspective and another?
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Conclusion
Explaining why the first-person perspective must exist in certain complex systems constructs does not provide an explanation for the intrinsic property of the first-person perspective. In other words, one might provide a correlative explanation of consciousness through an understanding of neural anatomy and mechanisms, or articulate a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness (with its associated characteristics), but there is no understanding of what is personal identity in the deeper sense of its meaning. A reductively explanation of first-person characterisations does not explain any particular unique frame of reference. Similarly, an explanation of the phenomenon of experience does not explain why you have are associated with your particular phenomenal experiences and I mine. We can understand through various correlative mechanisms, and can understand what creates phenomenal consciousness and how, but everything outside of phenomenal consciousness, is left untouched. An understanding of personal identity entails understanding why it is, that "when a human first looks in a mirror and sees its own face, it sees a material incarnation of an exceptional event that has never before occurred in the history of the universe".
Imagine that in the future, all the properties that lead to the emergence of consciousness are explained. That is, neuroscience has explained all experience and motor processing mechanism. Thus science understands how the brain creates the experience types such that they result in self recognising individuals with all the possible A, B, and C, experience types. Additionally, science has developed a complete understanding of the dynamics of the relationships between all versions of experience types A, B, and C. In this manner, such knowledge will show that the first-person perspective must exist through known processes. It may even show how each first-person perspective differs, one from another. In as much that they would explain how the first-person individual self-aware or self-consciously sentient being emerges from known processes, would such reductions decipher the problem of 'actual' identity? Do people really know to what is being referred when speaking of the first-person, or are they making the assumption that we are all basically the same, except for our different experiential phenomenal perspectives?
The extrinsic nature of 'conscious individuals' may be reductively explained, but why should the intrinsic individual that is you, happen to be you, in the 13.7 billion year history of the universe and 100 trillion year plus future of the universe? This question is the philosopher's 'elephant in the room' question. The elephant in the room question is a question that, whilst relating to consciousness, is I submit, entirely distinct from the problem of the phenomenon of experience.
