Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[smcder]

Within this framework it must be noticed that Francisco’s approach was radically mechanistic: “our approach will be mechanistic. We won’t appeal to any forces or principles not belonging to the universe of physics [...]

We adopt in fact the basic principles of the Cybernetics and the Theory of systems. What is just the essence of the modern mechanism. Living systems are ‘machines’” (Varela, 1979). Thus, for Francisco, living beings were “mechanistic(dynamical) systems defined by their organization” (Varela, 1981).
Starting from these considerations, Francisco and Humberto Maturana proposed a general but powerful biophysical mechanism, foundational to what Varela called the “bio-logic” (Varela, 1991).
Contrary to the usual way a machine functions, with a product that is different from the machine itself, in the case of living machines autonomy of the organism (Maturana andVarela, 1973).
Thus, in the particular caseof living organisms, the mechanism of autonomy was baptized autopoiesis or self production:“An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components that: 1) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produce them; and 2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network” (Varela, 1979).

 

[Soupie]

"Great. Just how phenomenal experience comes to be associated with (not possessed by!) the brain is quite an interesting puzzle!"

associated with versus possessed by? Can you clarify this distinction for me pls?

That was a nod to my recent back and forth with @smcder.

It seems the most we can say at this point about phenomenal experience and the brain is that they are related, just how they are related remains to be determined. Thus, the brain/brain processes may generate phenomenal experiences, or the brain/brain processes may manipulate some generic "phenomenal" property that exists external to the brain. Or something else altogether or perhaps some combination of both. Until humans are able to make strong predictions about the brain/mind or manipulate consciousness at will, all options are on the table.

 

[Soupie]

As I've said many times before - be very careful of TM ... you think I'm a Trickster ... ;-)

Duly noted.

Where was supernatural soul or realm appealed to? I missed that. I think Kelly's paper ends with the idea of mind being in tune with our deepest physical science.

In general, (supernatural) dualism has been one of the main models of consciousness.

 

[Pharoah]

I would strongly urge my fellow threadsters to read the following Tononi abstract below. Treat it as an exercise.
In doing so, I want you to identify how the abstract reveals why IIT - note, only necessarily as a theory of consciousness - must be deeply flawed. Don't read simply to get the flavour of the ideas, but instead, take out your scalpal and do some conceptual surgery on it... please. In the meantime I will grind my way through the paper, but for now I wager a Hershey bar and a cup of Earl grey (never let it be said I never push the boat out), that in 10 years time IIT will be yet another lost but unfortunately not dead cause that will have led to a lot of wasted reasearch money - It is I suspect, the potential research grants that give these ideas legs, when what the philosophy community should be doing from inception is removing the head from the body and stabbing it as many times as is necessary - that is a metaphor btw.

Incidentally, on the subject of defining consciousness, I always think a good place to start is with a word's derivation. Thus, 'con' with, 'scire' to know, to be conscious is to be with knowledge. From this one then is compelled to contemplate such things as what is a 'thing' that it is with knowledge, and what is it exactly that it is knowledgeable of or about? For example, a human is uniquely knowledgeable about knowledge itself. All animals are knowledgeable about the qualitative feeling impact of experiences... etc

Tononi's abstract
The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioral and neuronal correlates of experience. However, correlates are not enough if we are to understand even basic facts, for example, why the cerebral cortex gives rise to consciousness but the cerebellum does not, though it has even more neurons and appears to be just as complicated. Moreover, correlates are of little help in many instances where we would like to know if consciousness is present: patients with a few remaining islands of functioning cortex, pre*term infants, non*mammalian species, and machines that are rapidly outperforming people at driving, recognizing faces and objects, and answering difficult questions. To address these issues, we need not only more data, but also a theory of consciousness – one that says what experience is and what type of physical systems can have it. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) does so by starting from conscious experience itself via five phenomenological axioms of existence, composition, information, integration, and exclusion. From these it derives five postulates about the properties required of physical mechanisms to support consciousness. The theory provides a principled account of both the quantity and the quality of an individual experience (a quale), and a calculus to evaluate whether or not a particular system of mechanisms is conscious and of what. Moreover, IIT can explain a range of clinical and laboratory findings, makes a number of testable predictions, and extrapolates to a number of unusual conditions. The theory vindicates some intuitions often associated with panpsychism * that consciousness is an intrinsic, fundamental property, is graded, is common among biological organisms, and even some very simple systems may have some of it. However, unlike panpsychism, IIT implies that not everything is conscious, for example aggregates such as heaps of sand, a group of individuals or feed*forward networks. Also, in sharp contrast with widespread functionalist beliefs, IIT implies that digital computers, even if their behavior were to be functionally equivalent to ours, and even if they were to run faithful simulations of the human brain, would experience next to nothing.

 

[Constance]

Just how phenomenal experience comes to be associated with (not possessed by!) the brain is quite an interesting puzzle!

Try this hypothesis by Axel Cleeremans, which I find clarifying and persuasive:

"The radical plasticity thesis: how the brain learns to be conscious"

Frontiers | The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the Brain Learns to be Conscious | Consciousness Research

 

[Constance]

Another text (a book chapter) by Cleeremans, entitled "Conscious and unconscious cogition":

http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/06-IJP.pdf

Cleeremans has made almost all of his publications accessible in pdfs at
Axel Cleeremans: Papers

 

[Soupie]

...I want you to identify how the abstract reveals why IIT - note, only necessarily as a theory of consciousness - must be deeply flawed.

This seems akin to saying that Natural Selection — as a theory of evolution — must be deeply flawed. That is, the theory itself is not flawed, but only in the context of explaining evolution.

Do we know that much about consciousness to say that IIT itself is coherent, but is incoherent in regards to explaining consciousness?

If so, you'll have to point it out to me. As it is, the only "flaw" I see is that it assumes consciousness — particularly phenomenal experience — is generated by the brain.

 

[Constance]

As it is, the only "flaw" I see is that it assumes consciousness — particularly phenomenal experience — is generated by the brain

Does he actually express that idea in IIT.3? It seems to me that he shows signs of opening up to the phenomenology of embodied experience and recognizing that phenomenal experience is gradually recognized and indeed realized in the brain.

 

[Pharoah]

This seems akin to saying that Natural Selection — as a theory of evolution — must be deeply flawed. That is, the theory itself is not flawed, but only in the context of explaining evolution.

Do we know that much about consciousness to say that IIT itself is coherent, but is incoherent in regards to explaining consciousness?

If so, you'll have to point it out to me. As it is, the only "flaw" I see is that it assumes consciousness — particularly phenomenal experience — is generated by the brain.

That is not "the only 'flaw'".
What does anyone else think? Any other flaws?

 

[Constance]

As a phenomenologist I've objected all along to the basic premise of IIT, that consciousness can be accounted for entirely by information processing and integration in the brain.

 

[Pharoah]

As a phenomenologist I've objected all along to the basic premise of IIT, that consciousness can be accounted for entirely by information processing and integration in the brain.

I realise this to be the case. However, your stance in this respect is not a critique as such but a point of view. What I am suggesting is that you objectively review the abstract for what it is and says.
Perhaps I should write about the abstract tomorrow before I delve into the substance of the paper. I just thought I would encoursge everyone to think about this short section first.

 

[Constance]

Perhaps I should write about the abstract tomorrow before I delve into the substance of the paper.

It might be more practical to read the paper(s) first before critiquing the substance of Tonini's theory as it presently stands, perhaps through the abstract at that point but probably also referring to extracts from the papers. The abstract itself might not be an adequate summary of what he is asserting and what is trying to do.

 

[Soupie]

As I've said many times before - be very careful of TM ... you think I'm a Trickster ... ;-)

I'm not advocating the use of DMT; and I'm especially not advocating its use for the goal of obtaining anything like "enlightenment."

I'm merely pointing out the similarities between DMT, NDE, and dream states.

Also, while you may be wary of TM, many dozens of people who have had DMT experiences report the same alien landscape and encounters with similar sentient entities with their "egos" also apparently intact.

http://www.organiclab.narod.ru/books/DMT-The-spirit-molecule.pdf

Erowid DMT Vault : Apparent Communication with Discarnate Entities, by Peter Meyer

Its hypothesized that DMT is common to all three experiences, and I wonder if it even plays a central role in phenomenal experience during the waking state, similar to the concept of the Lovheim cube. The idea that the "feel" of affectivity is modulated by three chemicals:

In the model, the three monoamine neurotransmitters serotonin, dopamine and noradrenalineform the axes of a coordinate system, and the eight basic emotions, labeled according to the affect theory of Silvan Tomkins, are placed in the eight corners.​

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lövheim_cube_of_emotion

Im not suggesting these chemicals solve the hard problem in any way shape or form, but their apparently very close relationship with "what its like" is interesting.

 

[Soupie]

As a phenomenologist I've objected all along to the basic premise of IIT, that consciousness can be accounted for entirely by information processing and integration in the brain.

As far as I have ever been able to determine, the discipline of phenomenology doesn't concern itself with the ontology of consciousness, but rather on describing what it's like to be consciousness itself.

Thus, a phenomenologist wouldn't be concerned with whether consciousness was ontologically some non-physical substance, an energy field, constituted of an as-yet-unknown particle, a property of certain brain states, a property of certain chemical reactions, information, etc. A phenomenologist is only concerned with describing what its like to be consciousness. Right, wrong, neither, or both?

 

[Constance]

As far as I have ever been able to determine, the discipline of phenomenology doesn't concern itself with the ontology of consciousness, but rather on describing what it's like to be consciousness itself.

Thus, a phenomenologist wouldn't be concerned with whether consciousness was ontologically some non-physical substance, an energy field, constituted of an as-yet-unknown particle, a property of certain brain states, a property of certain chemical reactions, information, etc. A phenomenologist is only concerned with describing what its like to be consciousness. Right, wrong, neither, or both?

Wrong. I'm not going to explain why, though, since I've provided you with dozens of links to read in and about phenomenological philosophy including phenomenological-existentialist ontology over the last what-feels-like 150 pages and you've evidently read none of them. How are you coming, btw, with the paper on Varela and the paper by Thompson on experimentation in neurophenomenology beyond Varela's ground work in developing it?

 

[Constance]

A phenomenologist is only concerned with describing what its like to be consciousness.

Also wrong. Chalmers and Nagel did a disservice to subsequent consciousness researchers and philosophers of mind when they reduced all that's involved in the explanatory gap to that phrase "what it's like" and to the term 'qualia'. Who did that first, btw? A pox on whichever it was.

 

[Soupie]

Wrong.

I certainly may be, but I don't see how. Sorry.

From the entry on phenomenology at SEP:

Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy.

The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong action), etc.

The historical movement of phenomenology is the philosophical tradition launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. In that movement, the discipline of phenomenology was prized as the proper foundation of all philosophy — as opposed, say, to ethics or metaphysics or epistemology. The methods and characterization of the discipline were widely debated by Husserl and his successors, and these debates continue to the present day. (The definition of phenomenology offered above will thus be debatable, for example, by Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point in characterizing the discipline.)

In recent philosophy of mind, the term “phenomenology” is often restricted to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what it is like to have sensations of various kinds. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Accordingly, in the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these things arise and are experienced in our “life-world”.
​

By describing phenomenology as the study of what its like to be consciousness, I didnt mean phenomenal experience only. I understand that phenomenologists study much more than that.

And I think it's interesting that the author in this entry makes a distinction between "us," our experiences, and consciousness.

Do you think those three things are ontologically distinct?

The entry continues:

The discipline of phenomenology forms one basic field in philosophy among others. How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy?

Traditionally, philosophy includes at least four core fields or disciplines: ontology, epistemology, ethics, logic. Suppose phenomenology joins that list. Consider then these elementary definitions of field:

• Ontology is the study of beings or their being — what is.
• Epistemology is the study of knowledge — how we know.
• Logic is the study of valid reasoning — how to reason.
• Ethics is the study of right and wrong — how we should act.
• Phenomenology is the study of our experience — how we experience.

The domains of study in these five fields are clearly different, and they seem to call for different methods of study. ...
​

So, again, I don't see where a phenomenologist would necessarily be concerned with, or needs have an opinion about, the ontology of consciousness. Indeed, I can see why a phenomenologist might think any attempt to explain the origin and/or ontological nature of consciousness as being reductive.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah I'm still very interested in reading your take on the so-called Hard Problem. How do we account for the apparent gap between the objective and subjective poles of reality? Is the gap illusory?

 

[smcder]

I'm not advocating the use of DMT; and I'm especially not advocating its use for the goal of obtaining anything like "enlightenment."

I'm merely pointing out the similarities between DMT, NDE, and dream states.

Also, while you may be wary of TM, many dozens of people who have had DMT experiences report the same alien landscape and encounters with similar sentient entities with their "egos" also apparently intact.

http://www.organiclab.narod.ru/books/DMT-The-spirit-molecule.pdf

Erowid DMT Vault : Apparent Communication with Discarnate Entities, by Peter Meyer

Its hypothesized that DMT is common to all three experiences, and I wonder if it even plays a central role in phenomenal experience during the waking state, similar to the concept of the Lovheim cube. The idea that the "feel" of affectivity is modulated by three chemicals:

In the model, the three monoamine neurotransmitters serotonin, dopamine and noradrenalineform the axes of a coordinate system, and the eight basic emotions, labeled according to the affect theory of Silvan Tomkins, are placed in the eight corners.​

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lövheim_cube_of_emotion

Im not suggesting these chemicals solve the hard problem in any way shape or form, but their apparently very close relationship with "what its like" is interesting.

I just said be careful of Terrance McKenna. I didn't say any of that other stuff.

See also Dennis McKenna. (also be wary of)

Dozens? Hundreds or thousands! I've read Spirit Molecule book (after you read it - see his new book on DMT and the prophets - and am familiar with Erowid, I also posted a link on discarnate entities some time back and I read the Lovheim cube stuff you posted.

Like meditation the only way to know is to try. If you do I'd like to hear about your experiences.

 

[smcder]

I certainly may be, but I don't see how. Sorry.

From the entry on phenomenology at SEP:

Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy.

The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong action), etc.

The historical movement of phenomenology is the philosophical tradition launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. In that movement, the discipline of phenomenology was prized as the proper foundation of all philosophy — as opposed, say, to ethics or metaphysics or epistemology. The methods and characterization of the discipline were widely debated by Husserl and his successors, and these debates continue to the present day. (The definition of phenomenology offered above will thus be debatable, for example, by Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point in characterizing the discipline.)

In recent philosophy of mind, the term “phenomenology” is often restricted to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what it is like to have sensations of various kinds. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Accordingly, in the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these things arise and are experienced in our “life-world”.
​

By describing phenomenology as the study of what its like to be consciousness, I didnt mean phenomenal experience only. I understand that phenomenologists study much more than that.

And I think it's interesting that the author in this entry makes a distinction between "us," our experiences, and consciousness.

Do you think those three things are ontologically distinct?

The entry continues:

The discipline of phenomenology forms one basic field in philosophy among others. How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy?

Traditionally, philosophy includes at least four core fields or disciplines: ontology, epistemology, ethics, logic. Suppose phenomenology joins that list. Consider then these elementary definitions of field:

• Ontology is the study of beings or their being — what is.
• Epistemology is the study of knowledge — how we know.
• Logic is the study of valid reasoning — how to reason.
• Ethics is the study of right and wrong — how we should act.
• Phenomenology is the study of our experience — how we experience.

The domains of study in these five fields are clearly different, and they seem to call for different methods of study. ...
​

So, again, I don't see where a phenomenologist would necessarily be concerned with, or needs have an opinion about, the ontology of consciousness. Indeed, I can see why a phenomenologist might think any attempt to explain the origin and/or ontological nature of consciousness as being reductive.

SEP is a good starting point - but keep reading, preferably the source material itself.

real life Boundaries aren't as rigid as in encyclopedia articles.

Ontology of Consciousness | The MIT Press