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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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smcder
Guest
Which translation do you have of B&T? That should be in section 7, nicht wahr? If I'm right, 7 is pretty much a discussion of what it means ... I think I have a copy I can share, so we are all
@Constance
on the same page
@Soupie? Are you in?
This will be helpful, from the SEP article on Phenomenology:
". . .
Philosophers succeeding Husserl debated the proper characterization of phenomenology, arguing over its results and its methods. Adolf Reinach, an early student of Husserl's (who died in World War I), argued that phenomenology should remain allied with a realist ontology, as in Husserl's Logical Investigations. Roman Ingarden, a Polish phenomenologist of the next generation, continued the resistance to Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism. For such philosophers, phenomenology should not bracket questions of being or ontology, as the method of epoché would suggest. And they were not alone. Martin Heidegger studied Husserl's early writings, worked as Assistant to Husserl in 1916, and in 1928 succeeded Husserl in the prestigious chair at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger had his own ideas about phenomenology.
In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger unfurled his rendition of phenomenology. For Heidegger, we and our activities are always “in the world”, our being is being-in-the-world, so we do not study our activities by bracketing the world, rather we interpret our activities and the meaning things have for us by looking to our contextual relations to things in the world. Indeed, for Heidegger, phenomenology resolves into what he called “fundamental ontology”. We must distinguish beings from their being, and we begin our investigation of the meaning of being in our own case, examining our own existence in the activity of “Dasein” (that being whose being is in each case my own). Heidegger resisted Husserl's neo-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness and subjectivity, including how perception presents things around us. By contrast, Heidegger held that our more basic ways of relating to things are in practical activities like hammering, where the phenomenology reveals our situation in a context of equipment and in being-with-others.
In Being and Time Heidegger approached phenomenology, in a quasi-poetic idiom, through the root meanings of “logos” and “phenomena”, so that phenomenology is defined as the art or practice of “letting things show themselves”. In Heidegger's inimitable linguistic play on the Greek roots, “ ‘phenomenology’ means … — to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” (See Heidegger, Being and Time, 1927, ¦ 7C.) Here Heidegger explicitly parodies Husserl's call, “To the things themselves!”, or “To the phenomena themselves!” Heidegger went on to emphasize practical forms of comportment or better relating (Verhalten) as in hammering a nail, as opposed to representational forms of intentionality as in seeing or thinking about a hammer. Much of Being and Time develops an existential interpretation of our modes of being including, famously, our being-toward-death.
In a very different style, in clear analytical prose, in the text of a lecture course called The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger traced the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle through many other thinkers into the issues of phenomenology. Our understanding of beings and their being comes ultimately through phenomenology. Here the connection with classical issues of ontology is more apparent, and consonant with Husserl's vision in the Logical Investigations (an early source of inspiration for Heidegger). One of Heidegger's most innovative ideas was his conception of the “ground” of being, looking to modes of being more fundamental than the things around us (from trees to hammers). Heidegger questioned the contemporary concern with technology, and his writing might suggest that our scientific theories are historical artifacts that we use in technological practice, rather than systems of ideal truth (as Husserl had held). Our deep understanding of being, in our own case, comes rather from phenomenology, Heidegger held."
Phenomenology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
". . .
Philosophers succeeding Husserl debated the proper characterization of phenomenology, arguing over its results and its methods. Adolf Reinach, an early student of Husserl's (who died in World War I), argued that phenomenology should remain allied with a realist ontology, as in Husserl's Logical Investigations. Roman Ingarden, a Polish phenomenologist of the next generation, continued the resistance to Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism. For such philosophers, phenomenology should not bracket questions of being or ontology, as the method of epoché would suggest. And they were not alone. Martin Heidegger studied Husserl's early writings, worked as Assistant to Husserl in 1916, and in 1928 succeeded Husserl in the prestigious chair at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger had his own ideas about phenomenology.
In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger unfurled his rendition of phenomenology. For Heidegger, we and our activities are always “in the world”, our being is being-in-the-world, so we do not study our activities by bracketing the world, rather we interpret our activities and the meaning things have for us by looking to our contextual relations to things in the world. Indeed, for Heidegger, phenomenology resolves into what he called “fundamental ontology”. We must distinguish beings from their being, and we begin our investigation of the meaning of being in our own case, examining our own existence in the activity of “Dasein” (that being whose being is in each case my own). Heidegger resisted Husserl's neo-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness and subjectivity, including how perception presents things around us. By contrast, Heidegger held that our more basic ways of relating to things are in practical activities like hammering, where the phenomenology reveals our situation in a context of equipment and in being-with-others.
In Being and Time Heidegger approached phenomenology, in a quasi-poetic idiom, through the root meanings of “logos” and “phenomena”, so that phenomenology is defined as the art or practice of “letting things show themselves”. In Heidegger's inimitable linguistic play on the Greek roots, “ ‘phenomenology’ means … — to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” (See Heidegger, Being and Time, 1927, ¦ 7C.) Here Heidegger explicitly parodies Husserl's call, “To the things themselves!”, or “To the phenomena themselves!” Heidegger went on to emphasize practical forms of comportment or better relating (Verhalten) as in hammering a nail, as opposed to representational forms of intentionality as in seeing or thinking about a hammer. Much of Being and Time develops an existential interpretation of our modes of being including, famously, our being-toward-death.
In a very different style, in clear analytical prose, in the text of a lecture course called The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger traced the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle through many other thinkers into the issues of phenomenology. Our understanding of beings and their being comes ultimately through phenomenology. Here the connection with classical issues of ontology is more apparent, and consonant with Husserl's vision in the Logical Investigations (an early source of inspiration for Heidegger). One of Heidegger's most innovative ideas was his conception of the “ground” of being, looking to modes of being more fundamental than the things around us (from trees to hammers). Heidegger questioned the contemporary concern with technology, and his writing might suggest that our scientific theories are historical artifacts that we use in technological practice, rather than systems of ideal truth (as Husserl had held). Our deep understanding of being, in our own case, comes rather from phenomenology, Heidegger held."
Phenomenology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
This paper by Brian Bard is superb and most helpful in groking Heidegger's philosophy:
"Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus"
Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus
"Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus"
Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
Edition 1962 trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson
Intro II section 7.C (p.34 of later german originals)
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
I am curious how the project can extend beyond description. Taking Heidegger's meaning of phenomenology which is entirely sensible to me, I am wondering where there can be analysis without exiting from the presence of being and entering an interpretative outlook on being. So whilst I like the 'purity' of the idea, I look forward to where it can possibly go and how, and yet remain faithful to itself.
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smcder
Guest
ok - and @Constance I have a copy of this I can send to you if you don't have it ... can't remember, I also have a number of commentaries ...
it's a play on the Greek words phainomenon (sp?) and -ology ... the revealing of that which reveals itself ... etc
I'll be off the next couple of days and will look closer at this ...
also, it's an intentional going back to Husserl's original defintion ... the German I posted was just nonsense, ignore that ... I will pull the original German though ... I also have a resource, two I think, on the Greek that Heidegger uses - Dreyfus' commentary looks very closely at the German and he makes some unusual choices, if I am right, though, he does not speak German (Dreyfus)
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
I'm not sure what you're asking?
Do you mean a copy of Being and Time? If so, that's very generous of you, but I think I still have a copy of it around here somewhere. I have bookshelves in three different rooms of this house that I moved into six years ago, and many books still in unpacked boxes in the closet under the staircase.
You mean the long phrase Pharoah quoted and you cited to ch. 7 of B&T, which seems tortuously extended in reflexivity and recursion? I think H presented this maximally specified expression of the relationship of consciousness and phenomena for the same reason he used so many hyphenated compounds throughout B&T -- to force his readers to abandon embedded notions about the separateness of mind and world. As the paper I linked on Heidegger and Heraclitus demonstrates, Heidegger relied heavily on the phenomenal sense of 'being' expressed by several pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, especially Heraclitus -- a sense that Heidegger argued was already lost with Plato and Aristotle and subsequent Western philosophy until the phenomenological turn beginning in late 19th and 20th centuries.
That will be a very helpful resource for anyone reading the paper on Heidegger and Heraclitus (or any other papers that attempt to follow Heidegger's reasoning from the Greek words employed by Heraclitus).
Do you mean the 'project' of phenomenology itself as a self-conscious inquiry into what is understood through and in experience? Or the project of phenomenological philosophers in attempting to clarify phenomenology for those who are just coming to it
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smcder
Guest
Let me clarify that distinction further. Phenomenology is not a set of propositions and it does not originate in propositions. It is an exhaustive method of attention to and description of one's human experience, on the basis of which the integrated relationship of consciousness/mind and phenomenal reality can be clarified and understood -- and its ontological significance recognized.
You had also written: "I am wondering where there can be analysis without exiting from the presence of being and entering an interpretative outlook on being."
It's not possible to 'exit from the presence of being' (one's own and that of the world) except to a considerable degree in anesthesia, coma, or possibly in dreamless sleep {though Evan Thompson's latest book presents neurological evidence that the brain maintains an awareness of being even in dreamless sleep}. NDE research suggests that the sense of being does not disappear even in death. Can we analyze propositional and nonpropositional thinking without 'exiting the sense/presence of being? I do. So do you.
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Here is a link to four papers from an Affective Neuroscience Symposium led by Jaak Panksepp which clarify this discipline's revolutionary contributions to Brain-Mind science, psychology, consciousness studies, and philosophy of mind.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/sites/default/files/attachments/109303/jcs-articlefinal.pdf
https://www.psychologytoday.com/sites/default/files/attachments/109303/jcs-articlefinal.pdf
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
The former... In so far as MH's project is concerned. I can understand the interest in analytic description and ofdetermining the boundaries of enquiry. I feel I am on par with that... so I am curious where it could lead...
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
I did not mean that kind of exit. I meant intellectualish. As soon as one attempts to grasp being through meaningful analysis beyond mere description the ontological project (MHs) becomestarnished
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smcder
Guest
Hmmm ... This sounds familiar, give it all a chance on it's own terms before you start looking for ways to undermine it or prove it illogical ... or "wrong"?
In other words ... before you go Socratic on it. ;-)
(See Nietzsche on Socrates and Heraclitus and note Heidegger also goes back to Heraclitus.)
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smcder
Guest
From the series
Self Under Seige
1/5 Heidegger and the Rejection of Humanism - YouTube
Transcript
302 Heidegger and the Rejection of Humanism (1993) - Rick Roderick
@Soupie - around 7 minutes in, maybe earlier, check out his examples:
"Picking out patches of blue"
Vs
Certain west Texas rituals of machismo
It comes after a description of throwness.
Self Under Seige
1/5 Heidegger and the Rejection of Humanism - YouTube
Transcript
302 Heidegger and the Rejection of Humanism (1993) - Rick Roderick
@Soupie - around 7 minutes in, maybe earlier, check out his examples:
"Picking out patches of blue"
Vs
Certain west Texas rituals of machismo
It comes after a description of throwness.
Last edited by a moderator:
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smcder
Guest
302 Heidegger and the Rejection of Humanism (1993) - Rick Roderick
"Now what in the world could be a better example of Heidegger’s account of fleeing from our authentic projects than to imagine some poor sap who spends three hours a day just running up and down stairs that are just… In what kind of culture?
This is my question to you. Is there a human self left in a culture that produces people who run in place for hours doing nothing. Is there any reason to talk about humans like that? I mean Heidegger is old fashioned, I admit, and certainly I don’t advocate his politics. I think Fascism is a drastic solution, but the young Heidegger’s account of this “being towards death”, what it, sort of, steers you away from; this fleeing business – this stairmaster business, to make it a very contemporary example – is an authentic life.
I mean this is for Heidegger what you want to achieve. You want to achieve a life with authenticity, and this is the key word for him."
"Now what in the world could be a better example of Heidegger’s account of fleeing from our authentic projects than to imagine some poor sap who spends three hours a day just running up and down stairs that are just… In what kind of culture?
This is my question to you. Is there a human self left in a culture that produces people who run in place for hours doing nothing. Is there any reason to talk about humans like that? I mean Heidegger is old fashioned, I admit, and certainly I don’t advocate his politics. I think Fascism is a drastic solution, but the young Heidegger’s account of this “being towards death”, what it, sort of, steers you away from; this fleeing business – this stairmaster business, to make it a very contemporary example – is an authentic life.
I mean this is for Heidegger what you want to achieve. You want to achieve a life with authenticity, and this is the key word for him."
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