Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

[Pharoah]

I sometimes get this sneaking suspicion that my hippocampus is a different person to my neocortex. It reminds me of the time I woke to find my left hand trying to gouge out my right eye.

 

[Pharoah]

B&T seems deeply anti-theistic which is fascinating... another striking contradiction between MH's writing and persona perhaps.

Say more?

Holy Atheism: The Puzzle of Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” | The New Oxonian

The author argues that H was working on very specific problems with a level of despair such that paradox, aphorism and obscurity are the only tools to adequately express their intractability. The author compares this to the negative (apophatic) theology of Gregory of Nyssa, Catherine of Sienna and Meister Eckhart.

The "Letter on Humanism" proposed to locate modernity's ills in history - his solution was the humanism of the Western philosophical tradition.

humanism “lies at the root of the reification, technologization, and secularization characteristic of the modern world"

humanism is a philosophy which defines man either:

1. in terms of a universal essence as a rational animal of voluntary action
or
2. in terms of the denial of an essence: existentialism as a pure form of humanism through choice and action

Heidegger says that man's essence has been misconstrued:

“Man as a rational animal”

predetermines the nature of man at a metaphysical level and shuts off discussion of the relationship between Being and being human, it determines the essence of man "downward" choosing a definition that equates science and reason with the sufficient definition/essence of humanity.

umanism as we understand the term can not provide an understanding of throwness, does not provide an “analytic” that can help us to understand authenticity, mortality, responsibility and provides no escape from the “vulgarity of calculation” or a sense of the temporality of existence.

That (my summary of the article to this point) then is followed by this sentence:

This leads to the question of God and the matter of Heidegger’s atheism.

Tasty, indeed!

Wow... cool. Need to look at this more.
From my ignorance, I would suspect that despair was not the correct evaluation. It is too calculated and deliberate to be despair in my limited reading. Sadism comes to mind (but I don't mean that nastily)... I used to think sometimes that Mozart was a bit of a musical sadist: teasing and playing with the mind with great skill - like a game.
"Say more"? - looks like others have said it or similar

 

[smcder]

The Moral Stance of Theism Without the Transcendent God

The relation between the two phases of Wieman’s thought poses an interesting problem. What is the relation of the later concept of creative interchange, a phenomenon in human life, to cosmic creativity? Wieman evidently became increasingly skeptical of the value of speculative ideas, and more convinced of the need for a concept of creativity which was empirical and could guide human action in quite specific ways. Brief consideration of this will facilitate later discussion of Heidegger’s criticism of those who, like Wieman, seek for great clarity and specificity in their concepts of that upon which the good of human life depends.

Wieman thus does have a sense of the mystery and richness of that reality in which our lives are embedded, but in a way which is typical of American pragmatism, he also insists on the need of precise concepts to guide human life within the encircling mist. As we proceed to a consideration of the theistic stance in the great existentialist Heidegger, we will encounter one who insists that we must not make statements about the mystery of Being except to acknowledge it.

Tasty ... tasty sadism!

"Too many notes!"

 

[smcder]

 

[smcder]

The Moral Stance of Theism Without the Transcendent God

The Moral Stance of Theism Without the Transcendent God

Section IV

"responsiveness" reminds me of the Tao!

"Yet in nonwilling we enter a mode which is not merely passive, but entirely beyond the active-passive dichotomy. To understand this, I think we must distinguish two meanings of "non-willing"; firstly, there is the act, and secondly, the mode of being which ensues. Both being active and being passive are modes of the will, but when we decide to set aside willing, we enter a way of being which is neither active nor passive. We need a term for this, and for reasons which will become clear later, Thomas Hora suggests the term "responsiveness." This is neither activity nor passivity, or perhaps it is both activity and passivity; it is "a higher activity which is no activity"

 

[Constance]

The author argues that H was working on very specific problems with a level of despair such that paradox, aphorism and obscurity are the only tools to adequately express their intractability.

I'll have to read that paper. My personal feeling is that Heidegger was disposed to despair by a lifelong sense of alienation from life/living beings and consequent suppressed vitality. Look at the personal choices he made in the Nazi era, his anti-Semitism, his abject cruelty toward his teacher and mentor Husserl. All this and more in terms of his lived existence makes it impossible for me to sympathize with H as a human being. Only his intellectual contributions to the understanding of the meaning of 'being' through his phenomenological analytic can be admired, from a technical philosophical perspective. Read against Merleau-Ponty's luminous writing, H's shows up as colorless and almost lifeless abstraction.

 

[Constance]

This looks interesting. Graham Harman, "Levinas and the Triple Critique of Heidegger":

http://dar.aucegypt.edu/bitstream/handle/10526/2776/LevinasHeidegger.pdf?sequence=1

 

[Pharoah]

Thanks for the links. A bit of light relief from B&T has given me renewed zest

Was a bit disappointed with "holy atheism...". He seemed to lack the were withal to state what he thought. But interesting!

 

[smcder]

Thanks for the links. A bit of light relief from B&T has given me renewed zest

Was a bit disappointed with "holy atheism...". He seemed to lack the were withal to state what he thought. But interesting!

LOL ... you have impossibly high standards! (You did read the subtitle of the blog?)

This is referring to Heidegger or Hoffman? The piece reminded me of a puzzle paper - don't know if that's a term of art but it's what my philosophy professor called them.

 

[smcder]

There is a group that just started on The Partially Examined Life - they are reading Heidegger's later works, starting with What is Metaphysics:

What is Metaphysics? (BW) 1929
On the Essence of Truth (BW) 1930
The Origin of the Work of Art (BW and PLT) 1936
What are Poets For? (PLT) 1946
Letter on Humanism (BW) 1947
Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics (BW) 1936
The Question Concerning Technology (BW and PLT) 1949
The Thing (PLT) June 6 1950
Language (PLT) October 7 1950
Building Dwelling Thinking (BW and PLT) 1951
What Calls for Thinking? (BW) 1951
”…Poetically Man Dwells…” (PLT) 1954
The Way to Language(BW) 1959
The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking (BW) 1962

Weekly meetings on Sundays at Google hangour ... it's $5/month to be a member of the Citizen's forum - the Being and Time group was good and had lots of resources.

 

[smcder]

Here is Hoffman saying what he means:

Being Humanist: The Atheist “Disqualification” | The New Oxonian

 

[Pharoah]

LOL ... you have impossibly high standards! (You did read the subtitle of the blog?)

This is referring to Heidegger or Hoffman? The piece reminded me of a puzzle paper - don't know if that's a term of art but it's what my philosophy professor called them.

Hoffman. It is just a short blog. I was hoping for a more detailed conversation that's all. I should browse his writing for more on this. I am very interested in this though I should try not to be. It is like the enigma of Dali... all part of the intrigue; part of the marketing act. A modern day Heraclitus maybe.

 

[smcder]

Hoffman. It is just a short blog. I was hoping for a more detailed conversation that's all. I should browse his writing for more on this. I am very interested in this though I should try not to be. It is like the enigma of Dali... all part of the intrigue; part of the marketing act. A modern day Heraclitus maybe.

Very interested in what and why should you try not to be? Nietzsche would say that is most unhealthy!

(But,

Hoffman

ca
lls

Nietzsche a "

la-
zy

b
a
s
t
a
r
d"

... as a waterfall flowing over an alpine cliff

Many of the blog posts have comments after them for furthered conversation ... what is this marketing act? Is anyone getting rich off blogs? If you mean a calculated way of presenting yourself ... that's persona and we're all guilty? As I said, your standards are impossibly high - a tendency to acetisim, at least. Stop shoulding on yourself! ;-)

Of Heraclitus ... we have,

appropriately,

only

....

fragments

<FIN>

 

[smcder]

Hoffman. It is just a short blog. I was hoping for a more detailed conversation that's all. I should browse his writing for more on this. I am very interested in this though I should try not to be. It is like the enigma of Dali... all part of the intrigue; part of the marketing act. A modern day Heraclitus maybe.

Oops ... I almost missed this ...

"I was hoping for a more detailed conversation that's all."

Well then why don't you just say what you think! ;-)

 

[Pharoah]

Very interested in what and why should you try not to be? Nietzsche would say that is most unhealthy!

(But,

Hoffman

ca
lls

Nietzsche a "

la-
zy

b
a
s
t
a
r
d"

... as a waterfall flowing over an alpine cliff

Many of the blog posts have comments after them for furthered conversation ... what is this marketing act? Is anyone getting rich off blogs? If you mean a calculated way of presenting yourself ... that's persona and we're all guilty? As I said, your standards are impossibly high - a tendency to acetisim, at least. Stop shoulding on yourself! ;-)

Of Heraclitus ... we have,

appropriately,

only

....

fragments

<FIN>

Hoffman isn't the marketing act. Being deliberately obscure for effect is a marketing trick, that is, unless there is internal conflict or shame inderlying obscurity's cause, or you don't actually have anything meaningful to say.
What's with the insults and then the wink? Or is it a mad tick?
I generally do say what I think, unless I think it is not worth saying.
On impossible standards. (hands up... Fair cop), but does anyone have more than one hero(ine)?

 

[smcder]

Hoffman isn't the marketing act. Being deliberately obscure for effect is a marketing trick, that is, unless there is internal conflict or shame inderlying obscurity's cause, or you don't actually have anything meaningful to say.
What's with the insults and then the wink? Or is it a mad tick?
I generally do say what I think, unless I think it is not worth saying.
On impossible standards. (hands up... Fair cop), but does anyone have more than one hero(ine)?

No one says what they think ... no one allowed in public anyway, it's supposed to go through several layers before you'll even admit it to yourself. It's why you put the vague modifier "generally" in there.

Don't take this at all too seriously .... where's the insult?

You said:

"He seemed to lack the were withal to state what he thought."

and then you said:

"I was hoping for a more detailed conversation that's all."

So I pointed out that you should just say what you think. Which might be one or the other but most likely both ... it's not an insult, we all do this sort of thing and it's funny.

I have several heroes and I thought everyone did?

 

[Constance]

The Moral Stance of Theism Without the Transcendent God

The Moral Stance of Theism Without the Transcendent God

Section IV

"responsiveness" reminds me of the Tao!

"Yet in nonwilling we enter a mode which is not merely passive, but entirely beyond the active-passive dichotomy. To understand this, I think we must distinguish two meanings of "non-willing"; firstly, there is the act, and secondly, the mode of being which ensues. Both being active and being passive are modes of the will, but when we decide to set aside willing, we enter a way of being which is neither active nor passive. We need a term for this, and for reasons which will become clear later, Thomas Hora suggests the term "responsiveness." This is neither activity nor passivity, or perhaps it is both activity and passivity; it is "a higher activity which is no activity"

I'm reading this paper, which I think is very informative about the modernist crisis in faith of any kind that what we feel and think possesses, somehow, intrinsic meaning. The paper has recalled for me Eliot's great poem "Ash Wednesday," which I submit as a supplement to what lies in the background of the paper -- the emotion (the crippled emotion) afflicting the modernists. Too long to quote, so please read it at this link:

Ash Wednesday: Ash Wednesday by TS Eliot

What's being called 'theism without God' is something we need to understand, if possible in Heidegger (though he was tortured by his own psychological demons and therefore unable to speak for those still possessing a more whole and hale sense of the possibilities of the human spirit). Given Heidegger's emotional limitations, an immense burden on his thinking, I do think we need to look also to other thinkers such as Wieman, whose ideas are presented in the paper Steve linked. I'm trying to catch up on the conversation since last night and hope we can actually discuss what was at stake in the modernist effort to maintain a conviction of purposefulness and value in human existence after the 'death of God'. I hope you both agree to read the paper on Wieman and also Ash Wednesday and discuss them here without misunderstandings if possible.

 

[Constance]

Extract from Shaw paper on Wieman:

"In what follows, I will attempt to show that Martin Heidegger also embodies the theistic stance without the transcendent God. As we will see, he rejects dualistic metaphysics and doctrines about a supernatural God, and yet recommends a posture of openness to a source of fulfillment beyond ourselves.

In recommending what he takes to be the authentic attitude toward our existence, Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of thinking. Calculative thinking is goal-directed; it has an intention in mind, wants definite results and serves a specific purpose. It selects for attention only those features of experience which are relevant to its ends, and thus it rushes ahead and does not gain a sense of the fullness of Being.

For this reason, this way of thinking is sometimes called "re-presenting" or objectifying thought. Since it is rooted in willfulness and goal-seeking, it does not attend to things in their wholeness, but abstracts from things what is typical of them and re-presents them to itself in a mental image. We re-present to ourselves what is typical of a tree, a bowl, a stone, and thus we are able to relate to things functionally, but as in Wieman, there is a waste of experience here in that the being of the object is missed. In the world dominated by technology, this mentality seems to many the only way to be or to think.

Heidegger wishes to transport us to the premodern sense that Being is prior to our thought about it. The way in which modern philosophy misleads us is that it stresses the activity of thought in constituting experience.

'But does the tree stand ‘in our consciousness,’ or does it stand on the meadow? Does the meadow lie in the soul, as experience, or is it spread Out there on earth? Is the earth in our head? Or do we stand on the earth? (WICT 43)'

For the modern sense that thoughts are a kind of representational idea, he wishes to substitute an awareness of that which is prior.

'We stand outside of science. Instead we stand before a tree in bloom, for example -- and the tree stands before us. The tree faces us. The tree and we meet one another as the tree stands there and we stand face to face with it. As we are in this relation of one to the other and before the other, the tree and we are. This face-to-face meeting is not, then, one of these ‘ideas’ buzzing about in our heads. (WICT 41)'"


In an age of 'reproduction' (Walter Benjamin} and 're-presentation', had the modernists lost the foothold of an earlier 'presence' to the actual world and the being it expresses? I think the answer is clearly yes. Do either of you disagree? If so, now is the time to state your objections.

 

[smcder]

Extract from Shaw paper on Wieman:

"In what follows, I will attempt to show that Martin Heidegger also embodies the theistic stance without the transcendent God. As we will see, he rejects dualistic metaphysics and doctrines about a supernatural God, and yet recommends a posture of openness to a source of fulfillment beyond ourselves.

In recommending what he takes to be the authentic attitude toward our existence, Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of thinking. Calculative thinking is goal-directed; it has an intention in mind, wants definite results and serves a specific purpose. It selects for attention only those features of experience which are relevant to its ends, and thus it rushes ahead and does not gain a sense of the fullness of Being.

For this reason, this way of thinking is sometimes called "re-presenting" or objectifying thought. Since it is rooted in willfulness and goal-seeking, it does not attend to things in their wholeness, but abstracts from things what is typical of them and re-presents them to itself in a mental image. We re-present to ourselves what is typical of a tree, a bowl, a stone, and thus we are able to relate to things functionally, but as in Wieman, there is a waste of experience here in that the being of the object is missed. In the world dominated by technology, this mentality seems to many the only way to be or to think.

Heidegger wishes to transport us to the premodern sense that Being is prior to our thought about it. The way in which modern philosophy misleads us is that it stresses the activity of thought in constituting experience.

'But does the tree stand ‘in our consciousness,’ or does it stand on the meadow? Does the meadow lie in the soul, as experience, or is it spread Out there on earth? Is the earth in our head? Or do we stand on the earth? (WICT 43)'

For the modern sense that thoughts are a kind of representational idea, he wishes to substitute an awareness of that which is prior.

'We stand outside of science. Instead we stand before a tree in bloom, for example -- and the tree stands before us. The tree faces us. The tree and we meet one another as the tree stands there and we stand face to face with it. As we are in this relation of one to the other and before the other, the tree and we are. This face-to-face meeting is not, then, one of these ‘ideas’ buzzing about in our heads. (WICT 41)'"


In an age of 'reproduction' (Walter Benjamin} and 're-presentation', had the modernists lost the foothold of an earlier 'presence' to the actual world and the being it expresses? I think the answer is clearly yes. Do either of you disagree? If so, now is the time to state your objections.

I remember focusing on this section when I read it ... being of particular interest.

I agree and think that McGilchrist argues much the same happening in the course of Western history. Heidegger and Nietzsche think it happened with Socrates.

The presence of an actual world and the being it expresses is an excellent way to put it ... the article discussing a theistic stance without a traditional, supernatural idea of God interested me very much ... the idea of God, I think, is with us always - whether or not God him/her/itself is ... so this is an interesting way to deal with it - then the person being written about in that article went off to define it as relationships between people and then came back again ... so the idea of something greater than us, yes, I think we have to deal with that ... I think we need it.

 

[Constance]

I agree that we need it, and 'it' is not an invention out of abstract thought but rather the capability inherent in living organisms to interact with their physical environments, to experience their being in contact with things and other creatures in those environments. Their 'being-present' to the actual world is prereflective but even primordially involves 'affectivity' (the sense of, and response to, the presence of the physical environmental mileau in which it moves) and also involves 'seeking behavior' as Panksepp has recognized. (These seeds of consciousness are present also in the early experience of the newborn of our own species.) Panksepp's recognition is as formidable a recognition as Maturana and Varela's recognition of autopoiesis in the single cell. What does this mean? It means that life (being-alive) really does reveal a bifurcation of nature, the birth of a different kind of be-ing than that which existed before the instantiation of life and its evolution in species, in their capacities for increasingly complex experience in the world, and eventually in the developments of protoconsciousness, consciousness, and mind. The collective of living organisms experiencing presence in the world is the pressure of a different kind of 'reality' on this planet {and doubtless others); it requires a different kind of thinking on our part than nonliving being requires. It demonstrates a different expression of being than that which physics understands as preceding it.