Pharoah wrote:
The trouble is, I feel that the text has an unstated undercurrent: "This is what I write... but can you work out what I mean: what I really think".
Steve wrote:
Some context for that:
"The style he preferred in responding to his admirers—like Sartre–as well as his critics, such as Hannah Arendt—was never unconditionally generous, leaving the impression that Heidegger saw his particular mode of expression as appropriate to the subjects he tackled and most interpretation as being either reductionist, or erroneous.
He was not unaware of the power of double-speak as a tool in both political and philosophical discourse. In a 1966 Der Spiegel interview concerning his alleged Nazi sympathies (which finally cost him his teaching career and diminished his reputation in Germany), Heidegger said that in 1935 he had counted on the power of words to convey different meanings to two constituencies (his cleverest students and determined Nazi informants) when he praised the “inner truth and greatness of our movement.”
My $.02: That last statement by H is a crock, an attempt to defend himself from legitimate criticism, another reason to question H's good faith. The same is true of what's described in the first paragraph quoted, a demonstration of H's arrogance and his inability to see philosophy itself as necessarily interactive discourse, a collective attempt to reach more accurate descriptions of what-is and how it is experienced and potentially understood. I also have to find fault with the following defense of H:
"His sense of how words shape reality and can thus misshape perception and meaning is a constant prickle for anyone who wants to “interpret” Heidegger. It makes equally difficult the task of determining his influence on other thinkers, especially the French philosophers in whose eyes he found grace after 1967.
This is why I think you can't just jump into a text without putting it into historical and biographical (and linguistic) context."
While I completely agree with your last statement, I have to agree with Pharoah that H's writing is unnessarily difficult, even abstruse, a generally failed attempt to communicate his insights. His insights into the relation between being and Being were valuable, but he more often hides them rather than disclosing them. (It's possible that he was trying to demonstrate in his own texts the 'hiddenness' of being/Being. If so, what is the final result of that demonstration if his meaning continually escapes expression?) I also disagree with Heidegger's claim that 'language is the house of being'. Language covers up at least as much as it discloses, and as you suggest, Steve, language rarely touches that which we understand directly about the nature of being before language, outside of language, without the fundamentally categorical thinking embedded in language.
I no longer enjoy reading, trying to read, Heidegger. Even the essays in Poetry, Language, Thought, which I found clarifying when I first read them many years ago, are plagued with the same needless indirectness and endless repetitions found in B&T. Reading some of them again now it seems to me that what H needed and most lacked was an editor adequate to the task of penetrating to the core of his insights and clarifying them for generations of readers. Perhaps his thought is clarified in the text we've recently noticed, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. I've ordered it and will try to read it.
The trouble is, I feel that the text has an unstated undercurrent: "This is what I write... but can you work out what I mean: what I really think".
Steve wrote:
Some context for that:
"The style he preferred in responding to his admirers—like Sartre–as well as his critics, such as Hannah Arendt—was never unconditionally generous, leaving the impression that Heidegger saw his particular mode of expression as appropriate to the subjects he tackled and most interpretation as being either reductionist, or erroneous.
He was not unaware of the power of double-speak as a tool in both political and philosophical discourse. In a 1966 Der Spiegel interview concerning his alleged Nazi sympathies (which finally cost him his teaching career and diminished his reputation in Germany), Heidegger said that in 1935 he had counted on the power of words to convey different meanings to two constituencies (his cleverest students and determined Nazi informants) when he praised the “inner truth and greatness of our movement.”
My $.02: That last statement by H is a crock, an attempt to defend himself from legitimate criticism, another reason to question H's good faith. The same is true of what's described in the first paragraph quoted, a demonstration of H's arrogance and his inability to see philosophy itself as necessarily interactive discourse, a collective attempt to reach more accurate descriptions of what-is and how it is experienced and potentially understood. I also have to find fault with the following defense of H:
"His sense of how words shape reality and can thus misshape perception and meaning is a constant prickle for anyone who wants to “interpret” Heidegger. It makes equally difficult the task of determining his influence on other thinkers, especially the French philosophers in whose eyes he found grace after 1967.
This is why I think you can't just jump into a text without putting it into historical and biographical (and linguistic) context."
While I completely agree with your last statement, I have to agree with Pharoah that H's writing is unnessarily difficult, even abstruse, a generally failed attempt to communicate his insights. His insights into the relation between being and Being were valuable, but he more often hides them rather than disclosing them. (It's possible that he was trying to demonstrate in his own texts the 'hiddenness' of being/Being. If so, what is the final result of that demonstration if his meaning continually escapes expression?) I also disagree with Heidegger's claim that 'language is the house of being'. Language covers up at least as much as it discloses, and as you suggest, Steve, language rarely touches that which we understand directly about the nature of being before language, outside of language, without the fundamentally categorical thinking embedded in language.
I no longer enjoy reading, trying to read, Heidegger. Even the essays in Poetry, Language, Thought, which I found clarifying when I first read them many years ago, are plagued with the same needless indirectness and endless repetitions found in B&T. Reading some of them again now it seems to me that what H needed and most lacked was an editor adequate to the task of penetrating to the core of his insights and clarifying them for generations of readers. Perhaps his thought is clarified in the text we've recently noticed, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. I've ordered it and will try to read it.
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