Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[smcder]

@Constance

Neuronal Politics: A Review of Malabou

first let’s dwell on neuronal plasticity, which turns out to be an amazingly useful concept in Malabou’s hands. Primarily, as she observes, this means that “Humans make their own brain, but they do not know that they make it.”(1) In effect neuronal materialism does not imply a fixed or stable human nature, at least in so far as we are always able to change ourselves on a basic level. This means that instead of abrogating responsibility to our brain (my brain made me do it) we have to take ownership of our brain as both us and our most fundamental work in progress. The central feature of a new politics therefore is to take this plasticity seriously. We need to build a political order that both echoes the way our brains work and gives shape to brains that function as they should.

 

[smcder]

What is more, the plasticity of the brain is more than a metaphor and as such it means something that most neuroscientists are hesitant to acknowledge–“It’s not just that the brain has a history…but that it is a history.”(1). The past gives shape to the brain on a literal level. There is a tendency to view the brain as without history, but it is shaped by experience. Thus, while some neuroscientists might claim to be able to find the Republican center of the brain, this means not that Republicans have an inborn set of neuronal dispositions, but that their history and habits of thought have become instantiated in the material through which they have formulated their cognition.[iv] Culture too is not operating only at the level of discourse, but imposes specific features on the brain. Neuroscience therefore cannot afford to ignore individual history and experience. The plasticity of the brain seemingly subverts the tired dualisms between body and mind, nature and culture.

 

[smcder]

I assumed that the phrase causal impotence, in the context in which you used it, meant that consciousness has no effect on the BBS and is essentially only along for the ride, experiencing what is happening, but not having any influence on it. This seems to be in keeping ( at least in part ) with the interpretations described using philosophical jargon in the two locations I used as a reference point ( listed below ):

1. Epiphenomenalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2. LEZ give 'em something to talk about...: Causal Impotence

I didn't apply it in the sense of an ethical principle:

"There is a premise in the theory of ethics that asserts that there are some actions that an individual takes that have no extended relevance in the world; that there are some things you do that have no impact. In other words, what you do doesn't matter. Philosophers refer to this theory as 'causal impotence'", ​

I didn't apply it in an ethical context because of the nature of the question you posed, because if consciousness is capable of "taking action" then it implies that the question of it being capable of causation is already answered.

I'm not committed to any particular philosophical model as delineated by any particular textbook, and therefore some analysis might apply while other analysis doesn't. In the case of Non-Reductive Physicalism as defined above, the first issue I have is how we define the word "physical". I consider the word "physical" as separate from the word "material" in the sense that there are materials like solids, liquids, gasses, and plasmas, and there are non-material phenomena like magnetism, gravity, inertia, and other forces of nature. Together they constitute the physical universe of which we are a part, and therefore logically, we too, including our consciousness must be physical in nature. This doesn't mean we necessarily understand everything about that situation. There are physical phenomena that we have no fundamental explanation for. We only recognize that they exist and map out how they affect other physical things. So while the mental may not be reducible to the material, it is in my belief still physical in structure ( but not necessarily in meaning or other abstract concepts, but that's for another post ).

So let's see how this view of the physical applies to Kim's theory above: First there is no reason that an event can't have more than one cause. Note that I've excluded the words "normal" and "sufficient" because they either have some special philosophical connotation that arbitrarily imparts semantic coherence ( which means that reality may be entirely different ), or they imply a subjective valuation of causes and therefore introduce bias into the interpretation. The example I keep returning to, of an event that has, indeed requires, more than one cause, is the emergence of electromagnetism. It's gets more complex, but basically, here we have a phenomena that is a combination of an electric field and a magnetic field, and in turn, magnetic fields result from specific configurations of electric currents and magnetic materials ( e.g. Iron ). Because of this, it's clear that there are multiple root causes, because without any one ingredient the phenomena doesn't happen. And what's more, with electromagnetism, we have recognized physical and material factors working together to produce a new fundamental force.

So if we assume that consciousness is a physical phenomena analogous to magnetic fields with the property we call experience, then there's noting preventing behavior from having as its cause, both a physical ( material ) event and a mental event. Again, to simplify, a magnetic field is a fundamental interaction with more than one cause that can influence the behavior of the system to which it is attached. For example, a passive speaker crossover creates an electromagnetic field that stores energy in a particular manner so that when it is released back into the wires, the behavior of the transducer ( frequency produced ) is affected. Similarly, if consciousness has fields as its structure, then the evidence suggests that the material brain is producing those fields, which in turn interact back with material brain, causing new fields to form that affect behavior and the whole process repeats itself in a dynamic manner.

So let's see how this view of the physical applies to Kim's theory above: First there is no reason that an event can't have more than one cause. Note that I've excluded the words "normal" and "sufficient" because they either have some special philosophical connotation that arbitrarily imparts semantic coherence ( which means that reality may be entirely different ), or they imply a subjective valuation of causes and therefore introduce bias into the interpretation.

I don't think "sufficient" has a special philosophical connontation ... or that it implies a subjective valuation of causes ... I think it means enough or adequate.

Here is the original defintion of causal exclusion:

causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one sufficient cause.

And now re-written:

causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one adequate cause
causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one cause that is enough

... in other words, "enough" is enough

 

[Soupie]

Therefore from the context of another person, your consciousness is a part of you ( not me or anyone else ) and it is specifically that part of you ( as opposed to your arms or your knees or the rest of you ) that is doing the experiencing. So I'd say we're both doing just fine in terms of usage.

Again, no. There is a fundamental confusion here.

I would not say that my consciousness is doing any experiencing. I would not say that your consciousness is doing any experiencing.

Consciousness is experience. The following paper deals with this confusing aspect of consciousness studies.

Killing the Observer | Naturalism.org

I can't speak for Micheal Allen, but he seems to be asking/saying the same thing: some of us are looking for the observer, and there's no observer there. We can't see ourselves. And we can't see whence we come.

"We"—our phenomenal and narrative selves—exist on the personal, subjective level of what-is; we cannot access—subjectively, personally—the neurophysiological processes from whence we come.

 

[Randall]

So let's see how this view of the physical applies to Kim's theory above: First there is no reason that an event can't have more than one cause. Note that I've excluded the words "normal" and "sufficient" because they either have some special philosophical connotation that arbitrarily imparts semantic coherence ( which means that reality may be entirely different ), or they imply a subjective valuation of causes and therefore introduce bias into the interpretation.

I don't think "sufficient" has a special philosophical connontation ... or that it implies a subjective valuation of causes ... I think it means enough or adequate.

Here is the original defintion of causal exclusion:

causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one sufficient cause.

And now re-written:

causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one adequate cause
causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one cause that is enough

... in other words, "enough" is enough

Sure, we can look at it that way, but if we do it becomes the situation where ( as mentioned ) it sets up a sort of circular logic that although internally coherent, doesn't accurately reflect what's really going on in the world around us except in specific cases where it applies. Cases where it doesn't apply are arbitrarily excluded, so it's not a universal principle. Like you said, "enough is enough". So what? In situations where enough of one cause gets the job done, the rule applies, but that doesn't suddenly invalidate situations ( one of which was described ) where more than one cause is required in order for something to happen. So it's not a valid argument. That is the point there.

 

[sylithan]

Again, no. There is a fundamental confusion here.

I would not say that my consciousness is doing any experiencing. I would not say that your consciousness is doing any experiencing.

Consciousness is experience. The following paper deals with this confusing aspect of consciousness studies.

Killing the Observer | Naturalism.org

I can't speak for Micheal Allen, but he seems to be asking/saying the same thing: some of us are looking for the observer, and there's no observer there. We can't see ourselves. And we can't see whence we come.

"We"—our phenomenal and narrative selves—exist on the personal, subjective level of what-is; we cannot access—subjectively, personally—the neurophysiological processes from whence we come.

Okay I believe this Ted talk from Metzinger actually covers what yall are talking about. In his talk at TedxBarcelina Metzinger discusses how consciousness is a process and not an actually thing and how you really don't have a self.

Thomas Metzinger at TEDxBarcelona

 

[smcder]

Sure, we can look at it that way, but if we do it becomes the situation where ( as mentioned ) it sets up a sort of circular logic that although internally coherent, doesn't accurately reflect what's really going on in the world around us except in specific cases where it applies. Cases where it doesn't apply are arbitrarily excluded, so it's not a universal principle. Like you said, "enough is enough". So what? In situations where enough of one cause gets the job done, the rule applies, but that doesn't suddenly invalidate situations ( one of which was described ) where more than one cause is required in order for something to happen. So it's not a valid argument. That is the point there.

think ...

 

[Randall]

Again, no. There is a fundamental confusion here.

I would not say that my consciousness is doing any experiencing. I would not say that your consciousness is doing any experiencing.

Consciousness is experience. The following paper deals with this confusing aspect of consciousness studies.

Killing the Observer | Naturalism.org

I can't speak for Micheal Allen, but he seems to be asking/saying the same thing: some of us are looking for the observer, and there's no observer there. We can't see ourselves. And we can't see whence we come.

"We"—our phenomenal and narrative selves—exist on the personal, subjective level of what-is; we cannot access—subjectively, personally—the neurophysiological processes from whence we come.

I agree with you that we can look at consciousness as synonymous with awareness or experience, and therefore as you say, we can simply substitute one word for the other when speaking of it in a particular context. However there is also a possessive context that delineates consciousness as a part of a person that is separate from other parts. So, for example, it's not my right elbow that's experiencing pain right now, even if that seems to be where the pain is located. We see both contexts reflected in standard usage. To quote Encarta ( relevant parts in different colors. )

consciousness

con·scious·ness [kónsh?ssn?ss] noun
1. being awake and aware of surroundings: the state of being awake and aware of what is going on around you
• feelings of dizziness followed by loss of consciousness
2. somebody’s mind: somebody’s mind and thoughts
• In time, this experience will fade from your consciousness.
3. shared feelings and beliefs: the set of opinions, feelings, and beliefs of a group
4. being aware of specific issues: awareness of or sensitivity to issues in a particular field
5. awareness of thoughts and feelings: the part of the human mind that is aware of the feelings, thoughts, and surroundings
​

So consciousness as a noun, is used not only as a label for the phenomenon of experience ( as a transitive verb ), but for that part of us ( whether it be part of the mind or a part of us as a whole ) that is doing the experiencing. Again, this makes both types of usage perfectly acceptable depending on the context. BTW I did read the article and there's nothing in this view that is contradictory with it, only a context that is not included in it.

 

[Randall]

think ...

Explain ...

 

[Constance]

Okay I believe this Ted talk from Metzinger actually covers what yall are talking about. In his talk at TedxBarcelina Metzinger discusses how consciousness is a process and not an actually thing and how you really don't have a self.

Thomas Metzinger at TEDxBarcelona

Sylithan, I'm glad you're participating in this thread; your contributions are informative. I'm going to listen to the Metzinger Ted talk, and between you and Michael Allen we will probably receive good representation of Metzinger's ideas about consciousness. I just want to say at this point that it seems to me that the idea of a 'self' is what requires work toward a common definition or description -- a clarification -- that can be understood and agreed-upon, at least provisionally, among various consciousness researchers.

Some physicalists, in science and in philosophy, seem to think that having a 'self' means having a permanent identity somehow given from birth forward. If that's roughly correct, how is this 'identity' supposed to be produced? By the individual brain? Or by some other means? And if no such permanent identity is being supposed, how is it that we each feel a sense of identity [except in cases of schizophrenia, multiple personalities, and dissociative episodes] that is continuous with our temporal experience in the world and even extended into our dreams?

Coming to all this from phenomenological philosophy, it seems obvious to me that the ordinary sense of 'self' is not a fixed, closed, identity, but instead fluid, developing, changing during our lifetimes as existents in a fluid, temporally changing world. That we can speak of, and recognize our responsibility for, our selves makes the case that the ‘self’ evolves and expands (or can expand) in its perceptiveness and thought. It is, as the phenomenologists agree, open-ended in its continual interactions with things and others while we have our embodied existence.

I'm interested in the thinker Steve [smcder] has been posting about since last night who apparently postulates that the operative structures of our brains are the outgrowth, the result, of our experience in the world as opposed to the physicalist/informational concept that the brain/neural nets produce themselves sub rosa by integration of 'information' not received through sensual presence in the world as directly perceived and felt -- 'information' somehow (mechanically) producing our ability to navigate in the world and think about the whole nature of 'what-is' in the world, including our own consciousness.

In that physicalist theory, it seems, the categories into which our brains sort the parts of the world of which the brain is indirectly informed become the guides -- indeed constitute the presuppositions -- of our thinking itself. This theory makes no sense to me and I am glad to see that the French thinker that Steve is reading and posting about seems to foreground this critical difference in how various researchers approach the subject of consciousness and mind.

Hope that makes sense. Any comments are welcome.

 

[Randall]

Okay I believe this Ted talk from Metzinger actually covers what yall are talking about. In his talk at TedxBarcelina Metzinger discusses how consciousness is a process and not an actually thing and how you really don't have a self.
Thomas Metzinger at TEDxBarcelona

Checked it out and I'll draw an analogy using an example from the talk where he mentions the concept of transparency ( 10:35 ). "We do not see the window, but only the bird flying by." This is true, but at the same time, it doesn't mean that there is no window ( construct ) that is responsible for making the bird an observable experience, and we can refer to that construct as consciousness just as we can refer to the experience itself as consciousness. Similarly if you've ever become engrossed in a good work of written fiction, there is a point when you're no longer simply looking at words on paper, but are immersed in the plot. The book itself becomes the invisible window pane through which the story is experienced. So depending on the context, the book is both a physical thing and an abstract idea ( the story itself ), so saying the book contains the story is just as valid as referring to the book as the story.

Bob: What do you think of War and Peace?
Ted: Excellent book.​

See what I mean?

 

[sylithan]

Checked it out and I'll draw an analogy using an example from the talk where he mentions the concept of transparency ( 10:35 ). "We do not see the window, but only the bird flying by." This is true, but at the same time, it doesn't mean that there is no window ( construct ) that is responsible for making the bird an observable experience, and we can refer to that construct as consciousness just as we can refer to the experience itself as consciousness. Similarly if you've ever become engrossed in a good work of written fiction, there is a point when you're no longer simply looking at words on paper, but are immersed in the plot. The book itself becomes the invisible window pane through which the story is experienced. So depending on the context, the book is both a physical thing and an abstract idea ( the story itself ), so saying the book contains the story is just as valid as referring to the book as the story.

Bob: What do you think of War and Peace?
Ted: Excellent book.​

See what I mean?

That reminds me of a article I once read(tried finding it again, failed miserably. I'll try to explain the best I can). I talk about how we as humans have no clue what the world is or what reality really looks like or feels like or even if our reality truly exists. It used the example of a box with 5 holes on one side and 1 hole on the other. Reality enters the 5 holes in front as our 5 senses, sight, touch, sound, taste, and smell. The box representing the human brain and the one hole on the back of the box is what our conscious persceives. How ever there is no way to tell what was filtered out or added while the information was in the box. Basically that everything around could be nothing but clouds of energy or 1s and 0s, but due to our natural filter we have no way actually perceiving or understanding reality past what our brain will allow us to.

 

[Randall]

That reminds me of a article I once read(tried finding it again, failed miserably. I'll try to explain the best I can). I talk about how we as humans have no clue what the world is or what reality really looks like or feels like or even if our reality truly exists. It used the example of a box with 5 holes on one side and 1 hole on the other. Reality enters the 5 holes in front as our 5 senses, sight, touch, sound, taste, and smell. The box representing the human brain and the one hole on the back of the box is what our conscious persceives. How ever there is no way to tell what was filtered out or added while the information was in the box. Basically that everything around could be nothing but clouds of energy or 1s and 0s, but due to our natural filter we have no way actually perceiving or understanding reality past what our brain will allow us to.

The evidence definitely supports that sort of view. A lot of what comes in through our sensory system isn't routed to consciousness. It's a necessary filter for us to function normally, otherwise we'd be inundated with stimuli to the point of being overwhelmed, which would manifests itself as a type of sensory processing disorder.

 

[Soupie]

Checked it out and I'll draw an analogy using an example from the talk where he mentions the concept of transparency ( 10:35 ). "We do not see the window, but only the bird flying by." This is true, but at the same time, it doesn't mean that there is no window ( construct ) that is responsible for making the bird an observable experience, and we can refer to that construct as consciousness just as we can refer to the experience itself as consciousness. Similarly if you've ever become engrossed in a good work of written fiction, there is a point when you're no longer simply looking at words on paper, but are immersed in the plot. The book itself becomes the invisible window pane through which the story is experienced. So depending on the context, the book is both a physical thing and an abstract idea ( the story itself ), so saying the book contains the story is just as valid as referring to the book as the story.

Bob: What do you think of War and Peace?
Ted: Excellent book.​

See what I mean?

If you are looking for a physical, consciousness-substance (book) that contains experiences (story), I don't think you will ever find it.

You have said you think the Hard Problem is merely rhetoric. It's not. @smcder has noted that some people just don't get the hard problem.

Consciousness, subjectivity, experience, feeling, whatever you want to call it, is not a physical substance that will ever be observed from the objective, 3rd-person perspective. It is not a physical object or substance that will ever be measured objectively.

However, that does not mean it is non-natural. I believe that consciousness/mind is fully embodied by neurophysiological processes of the body.

Am I reducing consciousness to physical processes? I don't believe so. One can observe the physical working of the brain, but fail to observe consciousness.

My own view is that consciousness is (largely non-computational) information embodied by neurophysiological processes in the body-brain-system. These processes are subjective from the POV of the system. That is, these processes only subjectively inform the system itself, not external observers (other systems).

Consciousness/experience is always subjective in this way. It arises only within the system. It can't be observed from without.

 

[ALPHA ROMEO UNIFORM]

If that the case sytitan we only know about 8% of the brain function a few years back and look at technology advancements in last 150years still think science is a tool not the answers to all our questions and time will show science like any other tool can be used to help and also control the release of knowledge just as the church did over the centuries. Once they have A.I in full operation the end of humanity as we know to day.

 

[smcder]

Explain ...

Give a guy a chance to finish a post he never should have started at work ... !

 

[Randall]

If you are looking for a physical, consciousness-substance (book) that contains experiences (story), I don't think you will ever find it.

If by "substance" you mean "material", then I would agree. However if you mean synonymous with "physical" ( as I've explained it previously ), then I wouldn't count on never finding it.

You have said you think the Hard Problem is merely rhetoric. It's not.

More precisely, I stated: "... it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved." and to put this in context, that was in relation to the argument associated with the Hard Problem that says that unlike the Easy Problem, The Hard Problem can have no physical explanation. This argument is an intrinsic part of the formulation. To cite Chalmers: "Explaining consciousness requires more than explaining the Easy Part", so what he does is divide the problem up into mutually exclusive types of problems, one of which can have no solution because of the nature of the argument, and this is what makes the Hard Problem incoherent as an argument. I'm not alone in this view, and some other people have tried to explain it as well. Here's one example:

@smcder has noted that some people just don't get the hard problem.

I'm not surprised some people don't get the Hard Problem, because being incoherent, it's impossible to actually "get it" in the first place. What's more difficult is to recognize that if people think they get it, then they only have a partial understanding of it or are inserting some sort of assumption of their own along the way that reconciles the incoherence. This doesn't mean that the model of Easy and Hard problems of consciousness isn't worth reflecting on ( it is ). Essential parts of it are IMO certainly true. For example I believe that there is a structure that is responsible for the "what it's like to be us" experience, and that this structure is divided into two essential components, the material in the the brain which has been identified and mapped by neuroscience ( as seen in a previously posted video ), and the non-material ( but still physical ) component that we have yet to fully understand, that may involve such things as complex interactions between virtual particles.

Consciousness, subjectivity, experience, feeling, whatever you want to call it, is not a physical substance that will ever be observed from the objective, 3rd-person perspective. It is not a physical object or substance that will ever be measured objectively.

I think you're sort of correct. Taking us back to the analogy of the story book, we may not be able to objectively measure the story as experienced by reading the book, but we can certainly objectively measure the book itself and deduce from observation a number of important things about the story, not the least of which is that there is one. To translate this into terms of qualia, while it's impossible to subjectively experience the same color of red another person is experiencing, we can certainly determine from experimentation whether or not they can see red at all. We can even calculate what colors a person can and cannot experience, which is how we're able to create color blindness tests. We can even simulate the subjective experience of a person's color blindness if we wanted to.

However, that does not mean it is non-natural. I believe that consciousness/mind is fully embodied by neurophysiological processes of the body.

Am I reducing consciousness to physical processes? I don't believe so. One can observe the physical working of the brain, but fail to observe consciousness.

My own view is that consciousness is (largely non-computational) information embodied by neurophysiological processes in the body-brain-system. These processes are subjective from the POV of the system. That is, these processes only subjectively inform the system itself, not external observers (other systems).

Consciousness/experience is always subjective in this way. It arises only within the system. It can't be observed from without.

It seems to me that we actually agree on the fundamentals but are looking at the issue from two slightly different perspectives. For example, your belief that because consciousness ( as experience ) is subjective, it therefore cannot be objectively observed on a material level, is in complete agreement with what I believe. This is also the basis for the incoherence in the Hard Problem as described in the video above. So I would say let's not be too hard on each other here. It's a good discussion, and maybe something new will shake loose along the way if we don't let that ole tricky trickster get us at cross purposes .

 

[smcder]

You mean in the Gallagher book? I haven't finished it yet.

In part 3 or 4 of the C&P.

 

[smcder]

If by "substance" you mean "material", then I would agree. However if you mean synonymous with "physical" ( as I've explained it previously ), then I wouldn't count on never finding it.

More precisely, I stated: "... it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved." and to put this in context, that was in relation to the argument associated with the Hard Problem that says that unlike the Easy Problem, The Hard Problem can have no physical explanation. This argument is an intrinsic part of the formulation. To cite Chalmers: "Explaining consciousness requires more than explaining the Easy Part", so what he does is divide the problem up into mutually exclusive types of problems, one of which can have no solution because of the nature of the argument, and this is what makes the Hard Problem incoherent as an argument. I'm not alone in this view, and some other people have tried to explain it as well. Here's one example:

I'm not surprised some people don't get the Hard Problem, because being incoherent, it's impossible to actually "get it" in the first place. What's more difficult is to recognize that if people think they get it, then they only have a partial understanding of it or are inserting some sort of assumption of their own along the way that reconciles the incoherence. This doesn't mean that the model of Easy and Hard problems of consciousness isn't worth reflecting on ( it is ). Essential parts of it are IMO certainly true. For example I believe that there is a structure that is responsible for the "what it's like to be us" experience, and that this structure is divided into two essential components, the material in the the brain which has been identified and mapped by neuroscience ( as seen in a previously posted video ), and the non-material ( but still physical ) component that we have yet to fully understand, that may involve such things as complex interactions between virtual particles.

I think you're sort of correct. Taking us back to the analogy of the story book, we may not be able to objectively measure the story as experienced by reading the book, but we can certainly objectively measure the book itself and deduce from observation a number of important things about the story, not the least of which is that there is one. To translate this into terms of qualia, while it's impossible to subjectively experience the same color of red another person is experiencing, we can certainly determine from experimentation whether or not they can see red at all. We can even calculate what colors a person can and cannot experience, which is how we're able to create color blindness tests. We can even simulate the subjective experience of a person's color blindness if we wanted to.

It seems to me that we actually agree on the fundamentals but are looking at the issue from two slightly different perspectives. For example, your belief that because consciousness ( as experience ) is subjective, it therefore cannot be objectively observed on a material level, is in complete agreement with what I believe. This is also the basis for the incoherence in the Hard Problem as described in the video above. So I would say let's not be too hard on each other here. It's a good discussion, and maybe something new will shake loose along the way if we don't let that ole tricky trickster get us at cross purposes .

comments for anyone interested in the hard problem

We've discussed Pigliucci before on the C&P.

We've also made reference to the extensive collection of papers David Chalmers has posted on consciousness - here are 42 papers on the hard problem:

Online papers on consciousness

We've not discussed all of these papers on the C&P but we've covered many of the basic ideas around the hard problem - Mary the Color Scientist, Searle's Chinese Room, etc. Getting some familiarity with these ideas and a feel for how philosophers think and write is helpful in such discussions. The wheel tends to be re-invented.

One of the most clear discussions of WIILTBAB that I've found that discusses the rhetorical nature of the argument is here:

What is it like to be a bat?

@Soupie for background - @ufology and I had this same discussion before - in places almost word for word ... that may have been before you joined in ... I could be wrong, but I think it started even before the C&P. I believe there was even some variant of the phrase "tricky trickster" "ole trickster" etc that you could search for - and it might be helpful to read some of those exchanges.

One key phrase to search against is "predicate logic" - there was the idea of re-casting a particular formulation of the hard problem into formal logic and then showing the logical inconsistencies. @ufology was unable to produce this so it didn't get evaluated in detail - but ... Nagel's argument being rhetorical ... it shows a misunderstanding of Nagel's argument.

 

[smcder]

Dang that article makes me sad... so many good experiments are now unreliable.

I posted an article above on "Science isn't Broken" that may be of interest. Some of the ideas that can be searched on this topic are:

replication versus reproducibility
file drawer problem
p-values
peer review practices, etc - a lot here if you are interested in digging in

I also posted an article on part 4 of this thread that corrects a number of commonly held beliefs in the history of science/the nature and practice of science and explores some of the problems of funding, etc - it's not an anti-science article, the author is a scientist and I understand his intention to be constructive.