• NEW! LOWEST RATES EVER -- SUPPORT THE SHOW AND ENJOY THE VERY BEST PREMIUM PARACAST EXPERIENCE! Welcome to The Paracast+, eight years young! For a low subscription fee, you can download the ad-free version of The Paracast and the exclusive, member-only, After The Paracast bonus podcast, featuring color commentary, exclusive interviews, the continuation of interviews that began on the main episode of The Paracast. We also offer lifetime memberships! Flash! Take advantage of our lowest rates ever! Act now! It's easier than ever to susbcribe! You can sign up right here!

    Subscribe to The Paracast Newsletter!

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

Free episodes:

Status
Not open for further replies.
@Soupie - it occured to me this morning that there is a distinction somewhere in
  • "not getting it"
  • and "missing the point"
- in the sense that "getting it" means you see the problem with statements like:

@ufology

I'm not surprised some people don't get the Hard Problem, because being incoherent, it's impossible to actually "get it" in the first place. What's more difficult is to recognize that if people think they get it, then they only have a partial understanding of it or are inserting some sort of assumption of their own along the way that reconciles the incoherence

and

More precisely, I stated: "... it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved."

You see the misunderstanding right away but its the very "missing the point" that doesn't allow you to show that to the person making those statements ... because if they got it, they wouldn't make those kind of statements ... it's a kind of divide ... the hard problem of the hard problem ... ! :-)

So that "aha" moment or just the getting the point that occurs for some people seems to allow a discussion but of course it doesn't force agreement. That's another thing that to me ishows the misunderstanding. I suspect teacher's run into this time and again and they would be the experts on if and how to compel this understanding.

I don't think it's exactly "literal" thinking that stands in the way - but it's along those lines and it's a focusing on the words themselves and the surface logic instead of the greater point that keeps one from seeing. The notes but not the music. I suspect that's a risk Nagel was conscious of when he wrote the paper -(or shortly thereafter!) but as the Conscious Entities article says
"If he could describe it straightforwardly, he'd be contradicting his own theory."
As far I as I can tell you can't make that happen for any particular person - thats why I was interested in all the formulations of the hard problem - to see if one or the other would pop out in another way like the optical illusion of the rabbit and the lady - I do think if there's a kind of mental relaxation while holding the argument in mind it may appear - but you can only provide the conditions for someone to have that experience.

The comparison to optical illusion is interesting, the difference is that the visual cortex seems to brings that intelligence to bear on something - since you wouldn't know ahead of time its an optical illusion - its as if the VC says look at this from every possible direction, as if it knows when to relax or thats just part of looking at the world, "better this way?" or "this way?" and then maybe passing it along for us to consciously look at and decide - thats not in our conscious cognition since that's a step by step process but it can be a discipline we develop. One part of the mind learning from another. I wrote up a few things and posted them in the past about ways to look at a problem that really has you stumped - how to do that from every angle, the visual cortex seems to do that as a matter of course.

Maybe if there were a visual representation of the hard problem - an illustrated cognitive illusion ... whatever the case, if anyone comes up with the area of the brain to stimulate that compels people to believe the hard problem ... ;-)
 
This thread is REALLY hard to follow while at work.. lol the posts are so long and take a lot of effort on my part to understand

Sent from my SCH-I545 using Tapatalk
 
@Soupie - it occured to me this morning that there is a distinction somewhere in
  • "not getting it"
  • and "missing the point"
I wouldn't be so sure that I've missed the point. As indicated, I do believe that the "what it's like to be us" part of us is a valid observation, and it is worthy of discussion. I just don't agree that accounting for it by mapping it's associated physical structures and processes can't eventually be accomplished. To attempt an analogy using the triangles versus color wheel illustration in the video ( you may have unfortunately not been able to view ), it's not that there aren't color wheels ( there are and they're rather beautiful and interesting ), it's that they have no relevance to triangles. Sure we can arbitrarily label each angle with a color so that makes it look coherent e.g. red squared + green squared = blue squared, but that doesn't mean there is any such thing as "blue squared".
 
Last edited:
I wouldn't be so sure that I've missed the point. As indicated, I do believe that the "what it's like to be us" part of us is a valid observation, and it is worthy of discussion. I just don't agree that accounting for it by understanding it's associated physical structures and processes can't eventually be accomplished. To attempt an analogy using the triangles versus color wheel illustration in the video ( you may have unfortunately not been able to view ), it's not that there aren't color wheels ( there are and they're rather beautiful and interesting ), it's that they have no relevance to triangles. Sure we can arbitrarily label each angle with a color so that makes it look coherent e.g. red squared + green squared = blue squared, but that doesn't mean there is any such thing as "blue squared".

You missed that point too! ;-) lol

Missed the very specific point of Nagel's argument in terms of who it applied to and all the associated assumptions, caveats and fine legal print ... just like with "causal closure" - part of the issue I think is unfamilliarity with how philosophers think and argue - the "spirit" of the discussion as opposed to the "letter" ... that's fine, it's not for everyone, you tend not to place much value on it - I think and that's fine too.

Nagel didn't (at the time) think it couldn't be eventually accomplished either - my point is about getting it on its own terms - if you don't get the point of Nagel's argument - the essence of which is in how he had to make the point (at the time - which means understanding the times the point was made in, historically) - and if you don't get that the incoherence you see is part of the argument, then discussion about the hard problem as he defines it, isn't likely to be fruitful ... I can't think of a good analogy, but there are plenty of examples where people don't get something and you understand you can't go down that line of discussion with them.

On causal closure, you are hung up on one cause, two cause red cause blue cause - again, look at Jaegwon's argument on its own terms - you're not a non-reductive physicalist so it doesn't directly apply, but understanding the argument facilitates discussion (at least, for me!) and causal closure isn't a universal law, its a heuristic like Ockham's razor, a rule of thumb - all it says is if you have sufficient cause (singular, plural whatever - the emphasis is on sufficient) if you have sufficient cause for something to happen - you should at least question other causes ... his analysis is about mental causation and he says that there is sufficient physical cause to make everything happen, so evoking mental cause (and this is the part you don't seem to get) isn't necessary - what you are calling mental cuauses (fields or other things) is what Kim would say are physical causes - the very last part of his argument says:

Kim argues that mental causation can only be preserved by rejecting the premise of irreducibility in favor of reduction; in order for mental properties to be considered causally efficacious, they must be reducible to physical properties.

That's your view ... so that's what makes me think you don't understand the idea of mental causes ... Kim is arguing against the same kind of thing I think you are - which is to argue that the subjective experience itself not the underlying physical causes (and if you say there is no difference, all the better) is what causes the hand to move ... My hand doesn't move because I have the experience of saying "hand move" - but because physical processes cause the hand to move and the thought to occur or ... the experience of "hand move" is itself something physical.
 
what we're doing now is actually academic - in the sense of trying come up with a common vocabulary - a way to talk about concepts ... the problem is that already exists - philosophy has methods and a history, so the frustration is that you come at it from your own idiosyncratic approach - you have your own jargon and terminology but you're not aware of the existing body of thought - it's a real mess, I'll admit, but at least it's out there in texts we can look at and talk about with a common language. We can also be (more) sure we haven't reinvented the wheel. I think unfamiliarity with philosophy as a discipline is the source of your talk about academics and ivory towers and minutiae - all have their pitfalls to be sure, but there is also benefit in it - and you are just substituting your version of these things for the mainstream or academic version anyway.

So the idea is to read the source material, get a sense of history and terminology and formal and informal methods of philosophical reasoning and then join the conversation and reform it from the inside if you feel it needs to be. But like science philosophy has a self-correcting aspect. The boundaries between science and philosophy are porous anyway, though I maintain they are distinct.

People have noted that they feel like they need a PhD to read this thread ... but no one would say that if the thread was "quantum mechanics" ... at least, they would recognize it would be easier if you did have some education in the field ... right?
 
@ufology

You also seem at least as smart as I am, and that probably means you're even smarter

I've read something on this - somebody's principle or dictum or lemma about how we are good at knowing who we are smarter than but not who is smarter than us ... but another approach is to take the working assumption that whoever you are dealing with is smarter than you in at least some way and/or knows something you do not ... in my experience that has virtually always been the case ... the other thing I'd note is that the thing that causes real problems, no matter how smart you are (and in fact seems to apply the smarter you are), is when you think you are smarter than you are ...
 
@ufology

You also seem at least as smart as I am, and that probably means you're even smarter

I've read something on this - somebody's principle or dictum or lemma about how we are good at knowing who we are smarter than but not who is smarter than us ... but another approach is to take the working assumption that whoever you are dealing with is smarter than you in at least some way and/or knows something you do not ... in my experience that has virtually always been the case ... the other thing I'd note is that the thing that causes real problems, no matter how smart you are (and in fact seems to apply the smarter you are), is when you think you are smarter than you are ...
LOL ... I'm sure you wouldn't be surprised if I told you that I've been accused of that more than once. Funny how it's always been by people who have involved themselves in a debate and are losing. I may not be a genius, but I can still recognize a cheap shot when I see one.
 
what we're doing now is actually academic - in the sense of trying come up with a common vocabulary - a way to talk about concepts ... the problem is that already exists - philosophy has methods and a history, so the frustration is that you come at it from your own idiosyncratic approach - you have your own jargon and terminology but you're not aware of the existing body of thought - it's a real mess, I'll admit, but at least it's out there in texts we can look at and talk about with a common language. We can also be (more) sure we haven't reinvented the wheel. I think unfamiliarity with philosophy as a discipline is the source of your talk about academics and ivory towers and minutiae - all have their pitfalls to be sure, but there is also benefit in it - and you are just substituting your version of these things for the mainstream or academic version anyway.

So the idea is to read the source material, get a sense of history and terminology and formal and informal methods of philosophical reasoning and then join the conversation and reform it from the inside if you feel it needs to be. But like science philosophy has a self-correcting aspect. The boundaries between science and philosophy are porous anyway, though I maintain they are distinct.

People have noted that they feel like they need a PhD to read this thread ... but no one would say that if the thread was "quantum mechanics" ... at least, they would recognize it would be easier if you did have some education in the field ... right?

Im going to stay watching this thread and reading... it may have my head spinning right now but I can't get enough of the intellectual conversation. Eventually I'll be able to chim in with something useful. :)
 
LOL ... I'm sure you wouldn't be surprised if I told you that I've been accused of that more than once. Funny how it's always been by people who have involved themselves in a debate and are losing. I may not be a genius, but I can still recognize a cheap shot when I see one.

I dont follow you ... what is the cheap shot?

Its not been useful to me to think in terms of who is smarter - someone is always smarter in some way or other and knows something I dont. If the group works well its smarter than any one member.

Ive watched smart people and there is a tendency to think they are smarter than they are or that being smart is enough. In my own experience whenever I get to feeling smart Ive found Im headed for trouble so now I try to slow down and see what others are thinking and doing. Does that make sense?

What is the debate? And or how can we turn it into a constructive discussion?

I do think there is a way you misunderstand some things ... a characteristic way - and there are some lines of discussion it doesnt appear will be useful to go down.

What do others think?
 
You missed that point too! ;-) lol

Missed the very specific point of Nagel's argument in terms of who it applied to and all the associated assumptions, caveats and fine legal print ... just like with "causal closure" - part of the issue I think is unfamilliarity with how philosophers think and argue - the "spirit" of the discussion as opposed to the "letter" ... that's fine, it's not for everyone, you tend not to place much value on it - I think and that's fine too.
I deal with specific issues as they are presented so that they can be checked off during the process of analysis. So if you think that I've missed something due to "assumptions", "caveats", and "fine legal print", then it is up to you to cite them with specificity and explain how they are relevant to what you think it is that I've missed. Otherwise I have no reason to believe that kind of assessment carries any weight.
Nagel didn't (at the time) think it couldn't be eventually accomplished either - my point is about getting it on its own terms - if you don't get the point of Nagel's argument - the essence of which is in how he had to make the point (at the time - which means understanding the times the point was made in, historically) - and if you don't get that the incoherence you see is part of the argument, then discussion about the hard problem as he defines it, isn't likely to be fruitful ... I can't think of a good analogy, but there are plenty of examples where people don't get something and you understand you can't go down that line of discussion with them.
I see a glimmer of hope in that I seem to recall you saying in past posts that you don't think there is an incoherency in the formulation of the Hard Problem. Now you are indicating that you see the incoherency, but see it as part of what gives the formulation its value. So let's have a closer look at that common ground. Assuming we're seeing the same incoherence in the argument, I would agree that it is the nature of that incoherence that is the focus of the problem itself. In other words, in one sense, if you get the incoherence you also get the problem.

However the relevance of that understanding to the issue at hand is was where we seemed to be encountering the problem, which was the assertion that the incoherence needs to be reconciled before we can physically account for the existence of consciousness as a subjective experience, and that is where we seemed to disagree. IMO, although it is impossible to reconcile the incoherence, IMO it's also not required in order to "account for" on a "physical" level ( not simply a material level ) the phenomenon of subjective experience. At some point the material and non-material structures ( which are all in the realm of the physical universe ) will be detectable and measureable to a degree that is sufficient to accurately determine whether or not patient A is experiencing consciousness.

On causal closure, you are hung up on one cause, two cause red cause blue cause - again, look at Jaegwon's argument on its own terms - you're not a non-reductive physicalist so it doesn't directly apply, but understanding the argument facilitates discussion (at least, for me!) and causal closure isn't a universal law, its a heuristic like Ockham's razor, a rule of thumb - all it says is if you have sufficient cause (singular, plural whatever - the emphasis is on sufficient) if you have sufficient cause for something to happen - you should at least question other causes ... his analysis is about mental causation and he says that there is sufficient physical cause to make everything happen, so evoking mental cause (and this is the part you don't seem to get) isn't necessary - what you are calling mental cuauses (fields or other things) is what Kim would say are physical causes - the very last part of his argument says:

Kim argues that mental causation can only be preserved by rejecting the premise of irreducibility in favor of reduction; in order for mental properties to be considered causally efficacious, they must be reducible to physical properties.
I looked at not only the paper you referenced but as always, did a little cross referencing by searching the phrase "causal closure", and I don't think that it's as flexible as Occham's Razor. The Wikipedia description is as good as any and it says: CCP states that "Physical effects have only physical causes.". If by physical they mean both material and non-material, but still in the realm of the physical universe, then it's circular logic and trivial, if not, then it falls apart. Either way, even as a heuristic it has little value.
That's your view ... so that's what makes me think you don't understand the idea of mental causes ... Kim is arguing against the same kind of thing I think you are - which is to argue that the subjective experience itself not the underlying physical causes (and if you say there is no difference, all the better) is what causes the hand to move ... My hand doesn't move because I have the experience of saying "hand move" - but because physical processes cause the hand to move and the thought to occur or ... the experience of "hand move" is itself something physical.
In the case of moving ones's hand, I guess it depends on how you define "cause". Is the experience of pain a "cause" to move one's hand? Or is the cause only restricted to neuro-muscular mechanics? I submit that if pain induces neuro-muscular mechanics then pain is a link in a causal chain, and therefore we have more than one cause.
 
I dont follow you ... what is the cheap shot? . . . What do others think?

I saw nothing in your post that I could construe as a 'cheap shot', Steve. Indeed, I find myself continuously noting the efforts you make to avoid confrontation and to express your responses to others' expressed ideas/claims in the most open-handed and tolerant way possible.
 
The nut of the hard problem is the still-unaccounted-for 'subjectivity' experienced in consciousness, sensed and subsequently reflected upon within experience itself, and thus an untouched explanandum to be accounted for in any effort to define mind, world, and existence in exclusively objective terms.

Here's a relevant paragraph from a major paper by Varela on neurophenomenology, from which I'm about to post further extracts.

"Chalmers opens up the discussion of the 'hard problem' by focusing on the problem that seems central: the experience associated with cognitive or mental events. Sometimes terms such as 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'qualia' are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of 'conscious experience' or simple 'experience' (Chalmers, 1995, p. 201). After describing case studies of some popular functionalist explanations, Chalmers moves to qualify the remaining challenge as some necessary 'extra ingredient'. The choice of the term is already revealing, for Chalmers seems to assume from the outset that

[1 The use of 'neuro' should be taken here as a nom de guerre. It is chosen in explicit contrast to the current usage of 'neurophilosophy', which identifies philosophy with anglo-american philosophy of mind. Further, 'neuro' refers here to the entire array of scientific correlates which are relevant in cognitive science. But to speak of a neuro-psycho-evolutionary-phenomenology would be unduly cumbersome.]

the only avenue is to find theoretical principles that will bridge the gap between cognition and experience. As I will detail below, it seems that another fundamental alternative is to change the entire framework within which the issue is discussed. In any case '[t]he moral of all this is that you can't explain conscious experience on the cheap' (p. 208; his italics). I entirely agree but hasten to add that the price we need to pay is heavier than most people are willing to concede. Again the central difficulty is that experience is 'not an explanatory posit, but an explanandum in its own right, and so it is not a candidate for [reductive] elimination' (p. 209). What is needed, he concludes, is a form of non-reductive explanation. Here again, I concur with Chalmers, but one of my tasks will be to detail how different our options are from this point onwards."
 
Last edited:
I’m copying here extracts from Francisco Varela’s last paper in the hope that those in doubt or confusion about the hard problem will read it in its entirety. Varela clarifies, either directly or by obvious implication, every issue circulated in this thread over these last several hundred pages. I think I linked it long ago, but that it was never engaged in discussion. Varela thought and wrote very clearly, and his reading in and knowledge of philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and consciousness studies was thorough. Even so, his clarity here might not be enough to produce a full recognition/understanding of the hard problem in human experience, but I think this paper if anything will be helpful at this point. The best option to take beyond this is to read Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, as Maturana, Varela, Thompson and their colleagues themselves did.


“NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem”

Abstract: This paper starts with one of Chalmers’ basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no ‘theoretical fix’ or ‘extra ingredient’ in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenology. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences. It needs to expand into a widening research community in which the method is cultivated further.


This paper responds to the issues raised by D.J. Chalmers (1995) by offering a research direction which is quite radical in the way in which some basic methodological principles are linked to the scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I am using here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thus placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of phenomenology.1 My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special Issues of the Journal of Consciousness Studies can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools enabling them to develop a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I open my proposal by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness in the light of Chalmers’ hard problem. Next, I outline the (neuro)phenomenological strategy. I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy. . . . .

. . . One day the intellectual history of the peculiar twists and turns of this problem space will be reviewed thoroughly. But it has a deja-vu aura to it, reminding us of many swings of the pendulum, between rejecting and total fascination with the scientific discussions of conscious experience. This can hardly be otherwise, since any science of cognition and mind must, sooner or later, come to grips with the basic condition that we have no idea what the mental or the cognitive could possibly be apart from our own experience of it. . . . .

. . . Now we may move to the heart of the matter, the nature of the circulation between a first person and an external account of human experience, which describes the phenomenological position in fertile dialogue with cognitive science.

. . . Method: moving ahead

We need to examine, beyond the spook of subjectivity, the concrete possibilities of a disciplined examination of experience that is at the very core of the phenomenological inspiration. To repeat: it is the re-discovery of the primacy of human experience and its direct, lived quality that is phenomenology’s foundational project. This is the sense in which Edmund Husserl inaugurated this thinking in the West, and established a long tradition that is well and alive today not only in Europe but world-wide. In fact, between 1910 and 1912, while Husserl was at the peak of his creative formulation of phenomenology, in the United States William James was following very parallel lines in his pragmatic approach to cognitive life. And to complete the planetary ‘synchronicity’ of this turn, a very innovative philosophical renewal appeared in Japan, the so-called Kyoto School, initiated by Nishida Kitaro and then followed by Nishitani Keiji and others. Husserl and James knew and read each other, and the members of the Kyoto school read widely in western phenomenology and spent extensive periods of training in Germany. Thus I believe we should consider these anni mirabiles for phenomenology, akin to the years 1848-52 for the birth of modern evolutionary biology.

It is fair to say that phenomenology is, more than anything else, a style of thinking, which Husserl started in the West, but it is not exhausted by his personal options and style (Lyotard, 1954). I do not want to engage in an account of the diversity and complexity of western phenomenology (see e.g. Spiegelberg, 1962). The contributions of individuals such as Eugen Fink, Edith Stein, Roman Ingarden, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to cite only a few have attested to a continuing development of phenomenology. More recently various links with modern cognitive science have been explored (see for instance Dreyfus, 1982; Varela et al., 1991; Klein and Wescott, 1994; Petitot, 1995; Petitot et al., 1996; Thompson and Varela, 1996). I mention this explicitly because it has been my observation that most people not familiar with the phenomenological movement automatically assume that phenomenology is some sort of Husserlian scholasticism, a trade better left to dusty continental philosophers who can read German. At best cognitive scientists might have read the collection edited by Dreyfus (1982), which presents Husserl as some form of proto-computationalist, and they assume that this bit of history is all there is to know about phenomenology. This has become an oft-quoted interpretation, but critics have made clear that Dreyfus’ cognitive reading of Husserl is seriously flawed. This is not the occasion to expand on this issue, but it is essential to flag a caveat here lest the reader with a scientific background thinks it has been settled once and for all.3

My position cannot be ascribed to any particular school or sub-lineage but represents my own synthesis of phenomenology in the light of modern cognitive science and other traditions focusing on human experience. Phenomenology can also be described as a special type of reflection or attitude about our capacity for being conscious. All reflection reveals a variety of mental contents (mental acts) and their correlated orientation or

[3 For a critique of Dreyfusí take on Husserl see Langsdorf (1985) and also the objections of R. McIntyre (1986). For a recent account of this controversy through a contrast between Fodor and Husserl see J.M. Roy (1995).]

intended contents. Natural or naive attitude assumes a number of received claims about both the nature of the experiencer and its intended objects. The Archimedean point of phenomenology is to suspend such habitual claims and to catalyse a fresh examination. Whence Husserlís famous dictum: ‘Back to the things themselves!’,4 which for him meant -- the opposite of a third-person objectification -- a return to the world as it is experienced in its felt immediacy. It was Husserl’s hope, and still the basic inspiration behind phenomenological research, that a true science of experience would be gradually established which could not only stand on equal footing to the natural sciences, but in fact would give them a needed ground, for all knowledge necessarily emerges from our lived experience.

On the one hand experience is suffused with spontaneous pre-understanding, so that it might seem that all ‘theory’ about it is quite superfluous. But on the other hand this pre-understanding must itself be examined since it is not clear what kind of a knowledge it stands for. Experience demands a specific examination in order to free it from its status as habitual belief. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:

“To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign language, as the discipline of geography would be in relation to a forest, a prairie, a river in the countryside we knew beforehand (M. Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. ix)."

I insist on bringing to the fore this basic principle of the phenomenological approach since it is often quickly translated into an empirical quest for mental correlates. We need to return repeatedly to this issue since it is only by appreciating its depth that phenomenological bridges can claim to keep a meaningful link to lived experience and to be a remedy for the hard problem. Phenomenology grounds its movement towards a fresh look at experience in a specific gesture of reflection or phenomenological reduction (PhR).5 I need now to unfold the bare bones of this attitude or gesture through which is the habitual way we have to relate to our lived-world changes. This does not require us to consider a different world but rather to consider this present one otherwise. As we said before this gesture changes a naive or unexamined experience into a reflexive or second-order one. Phenomenology correctly insists in this shift from the natural to the phenomenological attitude, since only then the world and my experience appears as open and in need of exploration. The meaning and pragmatics of PhR have taken several variants from this common trunk. It is not my intention to recapitulate them here.6

[5 The reader should resist the temptation to assimilate this usage of the word 'reduction' to that of ‘theoretical reduction’ as it appears for instance in the neuroreductionist framework and well articulated in the writings of P.S. Churchland. The two meanings run completely counter to one another; it is therefore convenient to append a qualifier.

6 For a recent discussion about the varieties of reduction see: R. Bernet (1994), pp. 5ñ36. Husserl’s own first articulation can be found in his breakthrough lectures of 1907 (Husserl, 1962).]


The conscious gesture that is at the base of PhR can be analysed into four intertwined moments or aspects:

(1) Attitude: reduction The attitude of reduction is the necessary starting point. It can also be defined by its similarities to doubt: a sudden, transient suspension of beliefs about what is being examined, a putting in abeyance our habitual discourse about something, a bracketing of the pre-set structuring that constitutes the ubiquitous background of everyday life. Reduction is self-induced (it is an active gesture), and it does seek to be resolved (dissipating our doubts) since it is here as a source of experience. It is a common mistake to assume that suspending our habitual thinking means stopping the stream of thoughts, which is not possible. The point is to turn the direction of the movement of thinking from its habitual content-oriented direction backwards towards the arising of thoughts themselves. This is no more nor less than the very human capacity for reflexivity, and the life-blood of reduction. To engage in reduction is to cultivate a systematic capacity for reflection on the spot thus opening new possibilities within our habitual mind stream. For instance, right now the reader is very likely making some internal remarks concerning what reduction is, what it reminds her of, and so on. To mobilize an attitude of reduction would begin by noticing those automatic thought-patterns, let them flow away, and turn reflection towards their source.

(2) Intimacy: intuition The result of reduction is that a field of experience appears both less encumbered and more vividly present as if without the habitual fog separating experiencer and world. As William James saw, the immediacy of experience thus appears surrounded by a diversity of horizons to which we can turn our interest. This gain in intimacy with the phenomenon is crucial, for it is the basis of the criteria of truth in phenomenological analysis, the nature of its evidence. If intimacy or immediacy is the beginning of this process, it continues by a cultivation of imaginary variations, considering in the virtual space of mind multiple possibilities of the phenomenon as it appears. These ideal variations are familiar to us from mathematics, but here they are put into the service of whatever becomes the focus of our analysis: perception of three-dimensional form, the structure of ‘nowness’, the manifestations of empathy, and so on. It is through these multiple variations that a new stage of understanding arises, an ‘Aha!’ experience which adds new evidence that carries a force of conviction. This moving intimacy with our experience corresponds well to what is traditionally referred to as intuition, and represents, along with reflection, the two main human capacities that are mobilized and cultivated in PhR.

(3) Description: invariants To stop at reduction followed by imaginary variations would be to condemn this method to private ascertainment. The next component is as crucial as the preceding ones: the gain in intuitive evidence must be inscribed or translated into communicable items, usually through language or other symbolic inscriptions (think of sketches or formulae). The materialities of these descriptions however are also a constitutive part of the PhR and shape our experience as much as the intuition that forms them. In other words we are not merely talking about an ‘encoding’ into a public record, but rather of an ‘embodiment’ that incarnates and shapes what we experience. I like to refer to these public descriptions as invariants, since it is through ‘variations that one finds broad conditions under which an observation can be communicable. This is not so different from what mathematicians have done for centuries: the novelty is to apply it to the contents of consciousness.

(4) Training: stability As with any discipline, sustained training and steady learning are key. A casual inspection of consciousness is a far cry from the disciplined cultivation of PhR. This point is particularly relevant here, for the attitude of reduction is notoriously fragile. If one does not cultivate the skill to stabilize and deepen one’s capacity for attentive bracketing and intuition, as well as the skill for illuminating descriptions, no systematic study can mature. This last aspect of the PhR is perhaps the greatest obstacle for the constitution of a research programme since it implies a disciplined commitment from a community of researchers (more on this below). . . . .


. . . IV: In Conclusion: Consciousness: hard problem or time bomb?

Practically since its inception cognitive science has been committed to a very explicit set of key ideas and metaphors which can be called representationalism, for which the inside-outside distinction is the centre piece: an outside (a feature-full world) represented

[ 9 Incidentally, Chalmersí own theoretical fix (or extra ingredient) is his notion of ‘double information’ derived from the old Shannonian theory of signs, incorrectly known as a ‘theory of information’ . In a book which displays such clear intellectual acuity, I was dumbfounded to see that in the end Chalmers argues that the best choice is to revive a cybernetic tradition, largely transformed after its inception into truly informational tools by the work done in computationalist, connectionist or embodiment approaches to cognition, not once discussed by Chalmers in this context. Even assuming the position that an ‘extra ingredient’ is needed, I simply do not see what could possibly be derived from this move, and neither do some of the scientists that have commented on it. See for instance Kochís otherwise rather positive review (Koch, 1996).]

inside through the action of complex perceptual devices. In recent years there has been a slow but sure change towards an alternative orientation, one that I have contributed to and defended for many years (see Varela, 1979; Varela et al., 1991). This orientation differs from representationalism by treating mind and world as mutually overlapping, hence the qualifying terms embodied, situated, or enactive cognitive science.

I cannot elaborate here the current state of embodied cognitive science, but my present proposal concerning the study of consciousness aligns itself with those larger concerns. It seems inescapable to take the trend towards embodiment one step further in the direction of a principled consideration of embodiment as lived experience. In our book (The Embodied Mind, Varela et al., 1991) we first highlighted the intrinsic circularity in cognitive science wherein the study of mental phenomena is always that of an experiencing person. We claimed that cognitive science cannot escape this circulation, and must cultivate it instead. We explicitly draw from Asian traditions, Buddhism in particular, as living manifestations of an active, disciplined phenomenology. It was not the intention of that book to dwell on Asian traditions per se but to use them as a distant mirror of what we needed to cultivate in our science and the western tradition.

The present proposal takes what was started in that book one step further by concentrating on the key issue of methodology. I hope I have seduced the reader into considering that we have in front of us the possibility of an open-ended quest for resonant passages between human experience and cognitive science. The price however is to take first person accounts seriously as valid domain of phenomena. And beyond that, to build a sustained tradition of phenomenological examination that is almost entirely nonexistent today in our western science and culture at large.

One must take seriously the double challenge my proposal represents. First, it demands a re-learning and a mastery of the skill of phenomenological description. There is no reason why this should be any different from the acquisition of any know-how, like learning to play an instrument or to speak a new language. Anyone who engages in learning, be it in music, language, or thinking, will be bringing forth a change of everyday life. This is what is listed as the fourth item in PhR: sustained, disciplined learning does entail transformation, and so does anything else we do in a sustained mode. This is fine if we reject the assumption (as I do) that there is some kind of well-defined standard for what should count as real or normal experience: experience appears to be inherently open-ended and pliable, and hence there is no contradiction in saying that sustained training in a method can make available aspects of experience that were not available before. The point of PhR is to overcome the habit of automatic introspection among others, and we need not carry with us a mourning for what may be lost, but an interest in what can be learned.10

The second challenge that my proposal represents is that of a call for transforming the style and values of the research community itself. Unless we accept that at this point in intellectual and scientific history some radical re-learning is necessary, we cannot hope to move forward and break the historic cycle rejection-fascination with consciousness in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. My proposal implies that every good student

[10 H. Dreyfus (1993) in a critical review of our book chided us for emphasizing the transformation that accompanies the learning of phenomenological observation since this itself interferes with ‘everyday experience’. This would be a mistake if one believes that one exposes a ‘deeper layer’ by acquiring some skill such as stable reduction or engaging in a practice such as mindfulness/awareness, which was not at all our claim. Even Dreyfus would have to conclude that there is no privileged vantage point to tell us what counts as ërealí experience. He has plainly misunderstood the main point: phenomenological reduction does not ëuncoverí some objective ground, but it does bring forth new phenomena within the experiential realm, in an unfolding of multiple possibilities.]

of cognitive science who is also interested in issues at the level of mental experience, must inescapably attain a level of mastery in phenomenological examination in order to work seriously with first-person accounts. But this can only happen when the entire community adjusts itself -- with a corresponding change of attitude in relation to acceptable forms of argument, refereeing standards and editorial policies in major scientific journals -- so that this added competence becomes an important dimension for a young researcher. To the long-standing tradition of objectivist science this sounds anathema, and it is. But this is not a betrayal of science: it is a necessary extension and complement. Science and experience constrain and modify each other as in a dance. This is where the potential for transformation lies. It is also the key for the difficulties this position has found within the scientific community. It requires us to leave behind a certain image of how science is done, and to question a style of training in science which is part of the very fabric of our cultural identity. . . . .”

The paper as a whole is available at https://unstable.nl/andreas/ai/langcog/part3/varela_npmrhp.pdf
 
Last edited:
I dont follow you ... what is the cheap shot?
When someone enters into some sort of challenge like a debate or a game and they say to their opponent, "You're not as smart as you think you are." it's just a cheap shot, an epithet that carries no weight. Note here that I'm not saying you have done that ( as @Constance seems to have assumed ). It's just part of the discussion we were having. I've noticed that almost every time it's happened to me, it's when the person who says it is on the losing end. One time however, during a chess game in which I was losing, my opponent hammered me with it. But even in that case it was still a cheap shot because it made an assertion about what I was thinking which reflected on my personality that simply wasn't accurate. However it did make for an effective distraction. So again, a cheap shot, or should I say in light of the fact that I was losing, an even cheaper shot ... LOL.
Its not been useful to me to think in terms of who is smarter - someone is always smarter in some way or other and knows something I dont. If the group works well its smarter than any one member.
Great attitude, but I also like to give credit where credit is due while trying to convey the idea that I'm not the only one in the discussion with a brain. The stuff you and @Michael Allen and @Constance and @Soupie have brought up isn't just a casual read for most people, and therefore one cannot make casual assumptions about it. So when I come across as confident of a position, it's not just flapping off the top of my head, plus I'm always prepared to admit when I may be in error provided that someone is prepared to illustrate why.
Ive watched smart people and there is a tendency to think they are smarter than they are or that being smart is enough. In my own experience whenever I get to feeling smart Ive found Im headed for trouble so now I try to slow down and see what others are thinking and doing. Does that make sense?
I think it's smart to see what others are thinking and doing, so I think it's safe to consider yourself to be pretty damned smart either way :).
What is the debate? And or how can we turn it into a constructive discussion?

I do think there is a way you misunderstand some things ... a characteristic way - and there are some lines of discussion it doesnt appear will be useful to go down.

What do others think?
I think that all discussion, especially healthy debate and argument has the potential to shake out new insights and therefore can be very constructive. So, as always, if someone makes a claim or states a position, then it is something not to be simply taken at face value, but examined for accuracy and relevance to the discussion. If that process reveals some chink in its armor, then the responsible thing for participants to do is to recognize that maybe there is a problem and adapt their views accordingly rather than engaging in personal criticism. To that end, we seem to do pretty well here.
 
Last edited:
“NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem” ....
An interesting paper, but too much to be commented on here as a whole. So I'm only going to comment on a couple of specific things:

Better Pragmatics are needed ( p. 10 ):

"On the whole, my claim is that neurophenomenology is a natural solution that can allow us to move beyond the hard problem in the study of consciousness. It has little to do with some theoretical or conceptual ?extra ingredient?, to use Chalmers? expression. Instead, it acknowledges a realm of practical ignorance that can be remedied. It is also clear that ? like all solutions in science which radically reframe an outstanding problem rather than trying to solve it within its original setting ? it has a revolutionary potential, a point to which I shall turn at the end of this article. In other words, instead of finding ?extra ingredients? to account for how consciousness emerges from matter and brain, my proposal reframes the question to that of finding meaningful bridges between two irreducible phenomenal domains."​

( My comment ): The above sets the agenda for the whole paper and IMO should have been expanded on at the outset. I like the attitude and think it's an approach worth pursuing.

"There is life beyond the objective/subjective duality." ( p. 9 ):

( My comment ): I'm fine with the idea that we can consider some situations as examples of intersubjectivity, but that doesn't eliminate duality. If the "phenomenonological attitude" arbitrarily discards dualism, seeking as the paper says to "move beyond the split", then that attitude IMO is the same as choosing to remain wilfully ignorant of objective/subjective duality as a factor in the examination of the conscious experience. On the other hand, if the phenomenologist is permitted to acknowledge dualism, but chooses not to focus on it as part of their study, then that's OK, provided that it's kept in the back of one's mind so as not to erroneously paint over it as though it doesn't exist. I'd be interested in hearing opinions on that question: Are phenomenologists allowed to acknowledge the reality of dualism, must they arbitrarily reject it, or is there some middle ground?

In brief: what's the story? (p, 17 )

( Begin Quote ):

Let me conclude by summarizing the main points I have raised in this reaction to the 'hard' problem of consciousness based on an explicit proposal for its remedy.

The argument:
• In line with Chalmers? basic point, I take lived, first-hand experience is a proper
field of phenomena, irreducible to anything else. My claim there is no theoretical
fix or ?extra? ingredient in nature can possibly bridge this gap.
• Instead, this field of phenomena requires a proper, rigorous method and pragmatics
for its exploration and analysis.
• The orientation for such method is inspired from the style of inquiry of phenomenology
in order to constitute a widening research community and a research programme.
• This research programme seeks articulations by mutual constraints between the
field of phenomena revealed by experience and the correlative field of phenomena
established by the cognitive sciences. I have called this point of view neurophenomenology.
( End Quote )

( My comment ): I tend to get a very positive feeling from this paper on an intuitional level ;). IMO it shows promise so long as phenomenology recognizes that in addition to the insights gained by "moving past" dualism, the reality of dualism still needs to be factored in someplace or the picture will remain incomplete.
 
Last edited:
clarification:

However when active, consciousness becomes part of the causal loop along with the rest of the loops that are processed in the system, and therefore consciousness is not causally impotent ( if I understand that phrase correctly? ), but causally important.

causal impotence is associated with epiphenomenalism, which states that consciousness is an effect of physical causes or a by-product, but it doesn't do any work itself, it is normally analyzed in terms of two principles

causal closure over physics states that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause
causal exclusion holds that normal event can have more than one sufficient cause

The example of pain is only one of many scenarios that could be constructed to show the benefit of having conscious experience, which I take to be synonymous with the state of consciousness itself.

Your response to Jaegwon Kim's analysis of non-reductive physicalism may be diagnostic here:

The non-reductive physicalist is committed to following three principles: the irreducibility of the mental to the physical, some version of mental-physical supervenience, and the causal efficaciousness of mental states. The problem, according to Kim, is that when these three commitments are combined with a few other well-accepted principles, an inconsistency is generated that entails the causal impotence of mental properties. The first principle, which most ontological physicalists would accept, is the causal closure of the physical domain, according to which, every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. The second principle Kim notes is that of causal exclusion, which holds that no normal event can have more than one sufficient cause. The problem is that a behavior cannot have as its cause, both a physical event and a (supervening) mental event, without resulting in a case of overdetermination (thus violating the principle of causal exclusion). The result is that physical causes exclude mental states from causally contributing to the behavior.

Where/how does this apply and not-apply to your position?
@smcder
epiphenomenalism: I am curious about this.
Image an ant that seeks to move a big leaf from A to B, but the leaf is too heavy.
After some assistance from its colony, 10 ants begin to move the leaf.
The leaf sways from side to side, and gradually motions from A to B in a zig zag path.

Now... if we are to say that the swaying is the equivalent to phenomenal experience, would this be epiphenomenal?
What I am trying to get at is that individual ants are pushing this way and that causing the swaying... at any moment in time, on observing the swaying, one might say the ants don't know where they are going. The swaying looks arbitrary and purposeless and the ants are heaving with all their might in a haphazard fashion. And of course, each sway is purposeless.
But curiously the swaying feeds back to the ants and they adjust their motivations accordingly.
The leaf zig zags rather clumsily. To what purpose? In its isolation, it might look inept or random.
But sure enough the leaf gets from A to B.

I am not sure whether this analogy is missing the point of epiphenomenalism...
 
What do you think of this:

In ‘The View from Nowhere’ (1986), Nagel expresses his opinion that bridging the objective-subjective divide will require a radical theory of reality, a theory that is probably centuries away (p.51). It is a curious kind of optimism, namely, that he should both conceive of the possibility of a bridge and yet think of its realisation as requiring hundreds of years. What should we expect to be happening in the intervening centuries? Surely, all that is required is the requisite keystone concepts. Why should such a visionary idea require time any more than an individual? Perhaps the key ideas are presently brewing in the mind of an individual working at a post office, a retired primary school teacher, a lab technician, or in the head of the quiet taxi driver that dropped you off at the airport the other day. Stranger things have happened. Perhaps all that might be required is a way of thinking or a certain thought inspired by the movement of milk being stirred into tea or by the passage of landscapes viewed through a train window. Like the journalist that anticipates tragic events about which to write, but then writes about them when they occur as regrettable and most unfortunate, so too the philosopher’s craft is perpetually in danger of anticipating no immediate solutions because of a perverse yearning motivation to vigorously debate the conceivability of answers; a craft in both denying yet relinquishing defeat. Is the conclusion regarding Nagel’s opinion really that he is a negative optimist?
 
okay so im trying really hard to understand what is being said in this tread but i keep seeing this issue of "the hard problem". can someone please clarify what this problem is? i sure hope i didnt just miss something obvious.

From what i have gathered, the "hard problem" is the question of "what it is like?" the experience of consciousness rather than the explanation. is that accurate or am i wrong?
 
Last edited:
I think you grasp what the hard problem is, sylithan. This article at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy will help you gather an orientation to current discussions and disputes concerning the hard problem.

"The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject. The usual methods of science involve explanation of functional, dynamical, and structural properties—explanation of what a thing does, how it changes over time, and how it is put together. But even after we have explained the functional, dynamical, and structural properties of the conscious mind, we can still meaningfully ask the question, Why is it conscious? This suggests that an explanation of consciousness will have to go beyond the usual methods of science. Consciousness therefore presents a hard problem for science, or perhaps it marks the limits of what science can explain. Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness: the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness. These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, dynamics, and structures are present. This is the hard problem.

In more detail, the challenge arises because it does not seem that the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”—fit into a physicalist ontology, one consisting of just the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements. It appears that even a complete specification of a creature in physical terms leaves unanswered the question of whether or not the creature is conscious. And it seems that we can easily conceive of creatures just like us physically and functionally that nonetheless lack consciousness. This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical world and consciousness. All these factors make the hard problem hard.

The hard problem was so-named by David Chalmers in 1995. The problem is a major focus of research in contemporary philosophy of mind, and there is a considerable body of empirical research in psychology, neuroscience, and even quantum physics. The problem touches on issues in ontology, on the nature and limits of scientific explanation, and on the accuracy and scope of introspection and first-person knowledge, to name but a few. Reactions to the hard problem range from an outright denial of the issue to naturalistic reduction to panpsychism (the claim thateverything is conscious to some degree) to full-blown mind-body dualism.

Table of Contents
  1. Stating the Problem
    1. Chalmers
    2. Nagel
    3. Levine
  2. Underlying Reasons for the Problem
  3. Responses to the Problem
    1. Eliminativism
    2. Strong Reductionism
    3. Weak Reductionism
    4. Mysterianism
    5. Interactionist Dualism
    6. Epiphenomenalism
    7. Dual Aspect Theory/Neutral Monism/Panpsychism
  4. References and Further Reading"
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy


This article from scholarpedia might also be helpful:

Hard problem of consciousness - Scholarpedia


I'll also check at the Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy, a source we frequently cite here.
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top