Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[Michael Allen]

How much work do you want that quotation from Heidegger to do? Do you take it to represent his deepest insight into the structure of being? I see it as a statement of Dasein's initial confusion on the way to contemplating its own situatedness within the being of its physical environment – i.e., the situation of the be-ing/the existence of its own consciousness that is primordially sensed before it is thought.

The question 'what-is?' already arises from the sense of what-is, at least locally. The posing of the question "what is?," as the primordial articulation of this situation (adumbrated in Dasein's pre-reflective experience in the world) does not presuppose a metaphysics but rather opens the way to thinking in terms of both physics and metaphysics. In Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, it is the recognition of the traversable 'depth' of the physical environment and its changing horizons as the individual moves about in it (encountering physical things and other beings similar to itself) that opens the path to thinking. Eventually, in Heidegger, thinking leads to the conception of the four-fold structure of Being as it can be thought from the position of situated, existential, consciousness in its (and the physical world's) be-ing together within cognizable horizons.

Your position seems to be that our thinking this existential situatedness as real is an illusion produced by computational mechanisms, structures, evolved in the brain by the time of our species' current level of evolution. It's an interesting hypothesis, but I'm not seeing evidence to support it in what you've written so far. If you want to make your hypothesis clear, I think you will have to express it -- and what you see as the grounds for it -- more directly, in plain language. I, for one, would need such clarification, and perhaps others here also will. I would like to understand what you are saying.

You are correct of course--I put more weight on that quote than I should, its one of the more memorable ones I typically pick out when I am making a point.

Firstly I would want to run the "illusion" and "real" terms through the existential analytic--or at least extract the primitives behind them under the analytic of Dasein (i.e. and the world). The shared experiences of individual situatedness may provide a higher level of "reality" -- we may see mechanisms and structures that fall within our own bodies and in others and certainly causation is itself a model abstraction of our senses. By stating causes from one model (our existential situatedness in the PSM) to another (i.e. physical structures, mechanisms, etc) we end up with a PSM attempting to use its own framework to prove the entire process is real...but even as I say this I am injecting terms that are tainted. Just as well we could impose an extended PSM on the "computational mechanisms, structures, etc." and state them as illusions where the reality lies in the existential situatedness of the observer. Either way we fall into a kind of ontological tyranny toward the foundationlism based on a deworded environment (physics) or one based on a deworded dasein (oxymoron). So to be clear I do not think saying that it is an "illusion" helps--primarily because its this "illusion" that allows for the varying degrees of abstraction and layered modelling in the emergent dasein-world totality.

I won't claim to have evidence at this time for these theories--other than an argument based on our (often taken for granted) shared reflection of the phenomena.
Metzinger seems to be moving toward the hypothesis as you stated, although I think even "illusion" is saying too little.

The question that needs answering seems to be "what is the source of the question 'what is?'" How and why does that question arise? My own point of view is that it evolves over the course of the evolution of species of life. I agree with Nagel's argument expressed in the NYT article Steve linked today:

". . . the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory.

This means that the scientific outlook, if it aspires to a more complete understanding of nature, must expand to include theories capable of explaining the appearance in the universe of mental phenomena and the subjective points of view in which they occur – theories of a different type from any we have seen so far."

Well, as long as we don't confuse a well thought out framework of physicalism (monism) with the strawman of physical sciences...remembering of course that anything involving "science" is an iterative trial-error-hypothesis information extraction machine that extends disciplined and directed targeting of systems in the world by human action attempting to answer a question. Science will be full of flawed assumptions, theories, hypotheses...and like Dasein will fall into a degenerate notion if one takes a "snapshot" of its long chain of cumulative organization of data as the entire process (i.e. "Science")

It may be better to say that our current understanding of physical processes are not sufficient to fully explain the appearance of mental phenomena...but we've already turned in the wrong direction when we started positing "mental" and "physical" from the start--as these directions tend to move us away from the existential analytic which probably dissolves these "mysteries."--I don't really know, just a thought. Algorithmic processes in the universe somehow cumulatively pulled together systems that were able to replicate and sustain PSMs...it may be that to completely understand ourselves would be tantamount to a complete understanding of the universe (again, don't know).

Thanks for your reply

 

[smcder]

Great. BTW It was just mentioned as a general qualifier, not as an accusation or statement of fact.

Where we were ( if you don't mind being reminded ) was on the concepts of causality and how it relates to the experience of consciousness and there were statements being made that I don't understand a couple of philosophical principles, namely causal closure and the Hard Problem of consciousness. It seemed to me that my comments on both were interpreted in a manner that led to the assumption I didn't understand them, and I don't know from which specific comments I had made, that that situation arose. If you're satisfied now that I do understand the concepts, then we can move on to the points you say I missed in your post here: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5 which links back to a previous one and seems to be grounded way back here in my post: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

If you don't want to review all that then I'll attempt to summarize:

My belief is that the experience of consciousness ( the Hard Part ) when active, serves as a vital link in a chain of causal events that can be observed in human behavior ( e.g. pain causes behavior that relieves pain ), and that if causal closure ( as a materialist principle ) fails to take this into account, then they are arbitrarily discarding evidence, but if one materialist philosopher or another says it can be taken into account because in their view of materialism includes not only the "material", but all physical phenomena as well, then their logic becomes circular and therefore trivial, so either way we're no further ahead. We still have the issue of the Hard Part performing a causal role without an adequate explanation for how it comes to exist.

This leads to thinkers like Chalmers, Nagel, and I who theorize that the experience of consciousness is a property analogous to an electromagnetic field, which science attributes to a 'fundamental' force. Just like electricity passing through wire coiled around a ferrite core results in the emergence of a magnetic field, the physical structure of the BBS in its waking state causes the emergence of conscious experience, and therefore IMO, consciousness can be considered to be a physical phenomenon ( part of the set of all phenomena of nature as opposed to something supernatural ). To be fair, I'm not 100% sure Chalmers and Nagel would agree with my reasoning that it's the BBS that is causal. That is just my way of illustrating the idea.

If there's something in there ( above ) that needs clearing up please let me know. There are a couple of potential spots for the trickster to sneak in and tie our shoelaces together. For example I came up with my take on 'fundamental' independently of both of Chalmers and Nagel, and I'm not sure if Chalmers and Nagel each came up with it independently as well, but it just happens that we all seem to be thinking along the same lines as opposed "Chalmers, Nagel, and I" as a group. I realize this is rather obvious to you because you are familiar with me here on a somewhat personal level. But hypothetically someone new to the thread could read it differently.

Additionally, Chalmers ( or someone he's based the idea on - not sure which ) has divided the idea of emergence up into two parts similar to the way he does with consciousness, only he ( Chalmers ) refers to it as "Weak Emergence" and "Strong Emergence" and he submits that consciousness is a form of Strong Emergence. I've also tried to get the point across that just like the Easy and Hard parts of consciousness, if we're assuming a physical approach as opposed to a supernatural approach, the distinctions are actually illusory because waves on the water are as much a part of the natural physical universe as electromagnetic fields.

I think that the preceding point has been construed in the past as me not getting the ideas behind the Easy Part and the Hard Part and the Weak Part and the Strong Part, when in fact I do, and as I attempted to get across before, while I think they are useful tools to illustrate the issues, they also have this divisive facet that somewhat ironically is dangerously close reductionist ( reducing the natural world down into simpler elements like weak and strong or easy and hard ) when IMO they're all part of the same thing.

Which papers or books of Chalmers and Nagel have you read? These four are basic to the discussion:

http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0199919755/?tag=rockoids-20
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
Consciousness and its Place in Nature

 

[Randall]

Which papers or books of Chalmers and Nagel have you read? These four are basic to the discussion:

http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0199919755/?tag=rockoids-20
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
Consciousness and its Place in Nature

No books. Why? Do you want to include citations from those books as apart of the discussion?

 

[Randall]

... Well, as long as we don't confuse a well thought out framework of physicalism (monism) with the strawman of physical sciences ...

I don't think that the straw man argument there is entirely warranted. To Quote Stanford ( underlined part mine ):

"However, while physicalism is certainly unusual among metaphysical doctrines in being associated with a commitment both to the sciences and to a particular branch of science, namely physics, it is not clear that this is a good reason for calling it ‘physicalism’ rather than ‘materialism." | SOURCE |​

At the same time I recognized your comment in the context of, "a well thought out framework", and in that regard, there appears to be more than one model, each based on a particular way of defining the meaning of "physical", so during discussion it would be prudent to identify which model we're referring to, or if we're referring to something of our own that doesn't seem to adhere to anything in particular.

Personally, when I refer to the word "physical" I'm not referring to any particular philosophical model, but to the idea that existence is composed of materials and/or properties that are an inherent part of the natural world as opposed to some notion of the supernatural. This appears to fall inline with major elements of any given version of Physicalism, but might discard certain specifics that one materialist or another may have held, like the notion that only substances like solids, liquids, gasses, plasmas etc. are what compose things, e.g. as Thales reportedly suggested, the nature of matter was a single material substance: water ( Wikipedia ).

I also think that the idea of supervenience plays a part in that although the experience of consciousness is the result of it's physical structure, the experience itself is transcendent of it. So there cannot be some change in our consciousness without some correlation in the physical chain that leads to it, and this seems to be well established by experimentation and observation. It is also the reason that I changed my previously held view that all consciousness is, is an emergent property of a sufficiently powerful sensory processing system and adaptive programming. It may very well be the case that just like magnetism requires a specific set of material circumstances to emerge, so perhaps the phenomena of conscious experience might require a specific set of material circumstances that is not present in microchips and wires, but is inherent in the materials, and the organization of the materials, that make up the human Brain Body System ( BBS ).

 

[smcder]

No. Why? Do you want to include citations from those books as apart of the discussion?

To clarify:

Have you read any papers or books by Chalmers or Nagel?

 

[Randall]

To clarify:
Have you read any papers or books by Chalmers or Nagel?

No books.Why? Do you want to include citations from those books as apart of the discussion?

 

[smcder]

No.Why? Do you want to include citations from those books as apart of the discussion?

Page 7 of PS&U is an early if not first mention of WILTBAB, you indicate there that you gave the paper a "once over".

Discussion about the HP continues from p7 to page 30 at least without a final resolution - I think we have started to repeat some of that discussion here.

I suggest reading WILTBAB and "Facing Up to the Hard Problem" linked above and re-reading the dialogue in PSU before further discussion on the hard problem.

 

[Randall]

Page 7 of PS&U is an early if not first mention of WILTBAB, you indicate there that you gave the paper a "once over".

Discussion about the HP continues from p7 to page 30 at least without a final resolution

I suggest reading WILTBAB and "Facing Up to the Hard Problem" linked above and re-reading the dialogue in PSU before further discussion on the hard problem.

Please allow me to back-up a bit. I went back and specified "No books." As in complete published books available from Amazon or whatever, but I've been through most papers posted in the thread, some in greater detail than others, sufficiently enough in any case to get a grasp of the content. Sometimes that involved a point by point and cross reference with other sources, including video lectures by the authors themselves, so as to verify certain meanings and contexts and to see what other people had to say about it.

- I think we have started to repeat some of that discussion here.

Yes, we've had a couple of participants reflect back on past content, which is fine with me because in restating some of the ideas I think maybe we've been able to identify where some of the miscommunication has taken place.

 

[smcder]

If consciousness is necessary to some functions of the brain, there should be specific mental states that are always conscious - what are these states and for what functions are they necessary?

In other words, for what functions to be completed is it required that at some point there is a phenomenal feel, a something it is like to be?

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[Randall]

If consciousness is necessary to some functions of the brain, there should be specific mental states that are always conscious

What is the rationale for that claim?

... In other words, for what functions to be completed is it required that at some point there is a phenomenal feel, a something it is like to be?

If behavior can be considered synonymous with function, the answer is: Behavior initiated by conscious experience. That is of course true, but also circular ( though not necessarily trivial ) . So let's continue: All questions imply a reason for asking, so in order to provide an answer that is in context, please indicate what gave rise to the question in the first place. e.g. Answering the question it this way or that will help make sense of what particular situation or problem? Because?

 

[smcder]

Consciousness, phenomenal feel, something it is like is:

• Epiphenomenal- a result of physical processes that is per se causally impotent, has no function "is along for the ride" a by product and is preserved evolutionarily because ________ (fill in the blank)
• Is causal ... if so how does phenomenal feel effect physical change?
  • Mental states are physical states - if so are all physical states mental or only some, if only some which ones and why
  • There is a psycho physical nexus we dont yet understand

What else goes on this list?

 

[smcder]

What is the rationale for that claim?

If behavior can be considered synonymous with function, the answer is: Behavior initiated by conscious experience. That is of course true, but also circular ( though not necessarily trivial ) . So let's continue: All questions imply a reason for asking, so in order to provide an answer that is in context, please indicate what gave rise to the question in the first place. e.g. Answering the question it this way or that will help make sense of what particular situation or problem? Because?

Is that from a critical thinking checklist? If so can you post a link?

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[Randall]

What would you ask your Echo?

 

[Randall]

Is that from a critical thinking checklist? If so can you post a link?

You might say I employ a sort of "Critical thinking attitude" and due to the informal nature of this discussion it is more of a "Weak Version" than a "Strong Version". But here's the link to the Elements and Standards page again:

CriticalThinking.org - Critical Thinking Model 1

As you can see there, purpose, goals, and objectives, come before questions. So what is the purpose, goal, or objective behind the question?

 

[Constance]

Page 7 of PS&U is an early if not first mention of WILTBAB, you indicate there that you gave the paper a "once over".

Hi Steve. Hope you're safely arrived at your destination.

What's PS&U?

 

[Constance]

. . . It may be better to say that our current understanding of physical processes are not sufficient to fully explain the appearance of mental phenomena ...but we've already turned in the wrong direction when we started positing "mental" and "physical" from the start--as these directions tend to move us away from the existential analytic which probably dissolves these "mysteries."

What 'existential analytic' do you think "probably dissolves these 'mysteries'"? Do you think modern physics, computational neuroscience, or information theory have undertaken 'an existential analytic', and if so when and how? Do you think Metzinger is working out 'an existential analytic'?

--I don't really know, just a thought. Algorithmic processes in the universe somehow cumulatively pulled together systems that were able to replicate and sustain PSMs...it may be that to completely understand ourselves would be tantamount to a complete understanding of the universe (again, don't know).

It does seem to be a presupposition for Metzinger (and, indications are, for you as well) that the evolution of the universe from the Big Bang forward {if that theory is valid} has occurred according to well-designed algorithmic processes that include and can account for the eventual development of life and consciousness/mind, which can stand back and question the nature of 'what-is'. What are the scientific arguments [or even the scientific premises] for this hypothesis?

 

[Randall]

Consciousness, phenomenal feel, something it is like is:

• Epiphenomenal- a result of physical processes that is per se causally impotent, has no function "is along for the ride" a by product and is preserved evolutionarily because ________ (fill in the blank)
• Is causal ... if so how does phenomenal feel effect physical change?
  • Mental states are physical states - if so are all physical states mental or only some, if only some which ones and why
  • There is a psycho physical nexus we dont yet understand

What else goes on this list?

• Fundamental - A fundamental property of nature analogous to an EM field.
• Emergent - A phenomenon that in humans arises as the result of a normally functioning BBS ( brain-body system ).
• Transcendental - Things are similar to the way they appear to us implying a fundamentally subject-based component, rather than being an activity that directly (and therefore without any obvious causal link) comprehends the things as they are in themselves ( See Transcendental Idealism ).
• Experiential - as opposed to autonomic.
• Transient - Existing intermittently depending on the situation.
• Dependent - Cannot exist independent of the conditions that give rise to it.
• Independent - Can exist independently of the conditions that give rise to it.
• Unique - Not duplicable.
• Dynamic - Changing in response to perceptions and actions.

Probably more out there. I'll add as they come to mind. Or were you seeking an opinion as well on what the situation actually is?

 

[smcder]

Hi Steve. Hope you're safely arrived at your destination.

What's PS&U?

Just arrived.

"Philosophy Science and the Unexplained" thread ...

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[Constance]

Ah, thanks. Glad you're safe and sound.

 

[smcder]

Nagel and Consciousness

"Ned Block is a philosopher of mind at NYU. We had a conversation years ago as we walked to the subway after a talk he had just given at Columbia University. He was fascinated by the fact that, every year when teaching Nagel at NYU, about half the students in his class found the 'What is it like to be a bat' description understandable and half didn't. It didn't seem to have anything to do with the intelligence of the student. Among the top students, Nagel's description resonated for some and not for others. What, Block wondered, distinguishes these two groups? Of course this is another question altogether, and one that goes beyond Nagel's question of consciousness. For each of Block's students, if one were to ask "Is it like something to be [Sally, Bob, James...]?" the answer would surely be yes, whether or not the student appreciated the question."

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