Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[Constance]

We should probably also read this paper by Chalmers if we are to understand where his philosophy of mind is coming from and what he's been concentrating on for the last decade or two:

A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
David J. Chalmers

[This paper was written in 1993 but never published (although section 2 was included in "On Implementing a Computation", published in Minds and Machines in 1994). It is now forthcoming in the Journal of Cognitive Science (2012), where there will be a special issue devoted to commentaries on it and a reply. Because the paper has been widely cited over the years, I have not made any changes to it (apart from adding one footnote), instead saving any further thoughts for my reply in the special issue. In any case I am still largely sympathetic with the views expressed here, in broad outline if not in every detail.]

ABSTRACT
Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions.

Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.

Keywords: computation; cognition; implementation; explanation; connectionism; computationalism; representation; artificial intelligence.

A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition

 

[Randall]

The Whispering Mind

 

[Randall]

Another Way to Put It:

"T.H. Huxley famously said “How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp”.

"We do not see how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness." - Ned Block

It's really too bad you don't have the bandwidth for video because the Whispering Mind video I posted above is an excellent summary of much of what we've been discussing, and more than coincidentally the Huxley quote is presented. Maybe you can find a transcript someplace, but the video itself, though nearly an hour and a half in length went by for me very quickly, with only a small break to have some dinner. The time passed quickly in part because of the dynamic between the participants as much as the content itself, and I'm not sure you would pick that up in a transcript. Here's some info about the video and the participants: The Whispering Mind: The Enduring Conundrum of Consciousness - World Science Festival

Something I suggest that you might want to consider doing if your connection speed is minimal, and you have a half decent PC to watch in full screen on, is to try to download the video and then watch it when you have the time. It's in full HD and the sound is very clear. Check out this link: YouTube Video Converter and Download

 

[Constance]

[Chalmers] did write a paper in which he attempted to deal with the phenomenology of consciousness, which I linked here sometime during the last year. I want to read it again and will also post it.

Here is the paper I referred to, "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief:

http://consc.net/papers/belief.pdf

Extract:

"(Phenomenal realists (e.g. Loar 1997; Hawthorne 2001) analysing what Mary learns have occasionally suggested that her phenomenal concept is a demonstrative concept. This is particularly popular as a way of resisting anti-materialist arguments, as it is tempting to invoke the distinctive epistemic and referential behavior of demonstrative concepts in explaining why an epistemic gap does not reflect an ontological gap. But on a closer look it is clear that Mary’s central phenomenal concept R (the one that captures what she learns) is distinct from her central demonstrative concept E, as witnessed by the non-trivial identity E = R, and is not a demonstrative concept in the usual sense. This is not just a terminological point. Those who use these analyses to rebut anti-materialist arguments typically rely on analogies with the epistemic and referential behavior of ordinary (Kaplan-style) demonstratives. In so far as these analyses rely on such analogies, they mischaracterize Mary’s new knowledge. Something similar applies to analyses that liken phenomenal concepts to indexical concepts (e.g. Ismael 1999; Perry 2001). If my analysis is correct, then pure phenomenal concepts (unlike demonstrative phenomenal concepts) are not indexical concepts at all.)"

 

[Constance]

A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
David J. Chalmers

Companion piece: Taylor Carman, "On the Inescapability of Phenomenology."

Extract

"'Some people presume that this intuition is supported by phenomenology. They are under the impression that they actually observe themselves judging things to be such as a result of
those things seeming to them to be such. No one has ever observed any such thing ‘in their phenomenology’ because such a fact about causation would be unobservable (as Hume noted long ago).(Dennett 1991: 133)'⁷

This conclusion, that perceptual content is itself constituted by acts of thought or judgment, is what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘intellectualism’.⁸
Indeed, it almost seems as if Merleau-Ponty has a premonition of Dennett’s view when in Phenomenology of Perception he criticizes intellectualism for in effect obliterating the phenomenon it purports to analyze. Intellectualist accounts of perception, he argues, fail to acknowledge the embodiment and environmental situatedness of experience, reducing perceptual content to the abstract, free-floating judgments of a disembodied subject:

'Perception is thus thought about perceiving. Its incarnation furnishes no positive characteristic that has to be accounted for, and its hæcceity is simply its own ignorance of itself. Reflective analysis becomes a purely regressive doctrine, according to which every perception is just confused intellection, every determination a negation. It thus does away with all problems except one: that of its own beginning. The finitude of a perception, which gives me, as Spinoza put it, ‘conclusions without premises’, the inherence of consciousness in a point of view, all this reduces to my ignorance of myself, to my negative power of not reflecting. But that ignorance, how is it itself possible?' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 44)."

On the Inescapability of Phenomenology

 

[smcder]

I underwent anesthesia - a third experience in two years, each different - this was conscious anesthesia but I fell asleep anyway.

I have two articles to post on the evolution of consciousness and anesthesia and the common basis of consciousness among animals.

But first, Im going to eat.

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[Randall]

I underwent anesthesia - a third experience in two years, each different - this was conscious anesthesia but I fell asleep anyway.

So you're a living example of how material and physical processes ( anesthetic ) directly affects your consciousness.. Seems the debate over that part should be settled then. Or do you think those who might say it's only a "correlation" and therefore the debate remains would still have a reasonable argument?

 

[smcder]

So you're a living example of how material and physical processes ( anesthetic ) directly affects your consciousness.. Seems the debate over that part should be settled then. Or do you think those who might say it's only a "correlation" and therefore the debate remains would still have a reasonable argument?

Thats's not for me to say.

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[smcder]

Evolution of p-consciousness

(This is an ingenious experimental approach, I read about it last night and tried to pay attention this morning as I went under - but I didnt do too well ... zzzz

a reproducible experimental model

(i) consciousness emerges from unconsciousness at a discrete and measurable point,
*(ii) phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness are closely juxtaposed or collapsed

(iii) assessment of neural structure and function is possible.

In this article, we consider top-down and bottom-up approaches to consciousness, nonhuman consciousness, and the emergence of consciousness from general anesthesia as a model for the evolution of subjectivity.

Evolution of consciousness: Phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia

"We propose that the stepwise emergence from general anesthesia can serve as a reproducible model to study the evolution of consciousness across various species and use current data from anesthesiology to shed light on the phylogeny of consciousness.

Ultimately, we conclude that the neurobiological structure of the vertebrate central nervous system is evolutionarily ancient and highly conserved across species and that the basic neurophysiologic mechanisms supporting consciousness in humans are found at the earliest points of vertebrate brain evolution. Thus, in agreement with Darwin’s insight and the recent “Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Non-Human Animals,” a review of modern scientific data suggests that the differences between species in terms of the ability to experience the world is one of degree and not kind."



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[smcder]

• Fundamental - A fundamental property of nature analogous to an EM field.
• Emergent - A phenomenon that in humans arises as the result of a normally functioning BBS ( brain-body system ).
• Transcendental - Things are similar to the way they appear to us implying a fundamentally subject-based component, rather than being an activity that directly (and therefore without any obvious causal link) comprehends the things as they are in themselves ( See Transcendental Idealism ).
• Experiential - as opposed to autonomic.
• Transient - Existing intermittently depending on the situation.
• Dependent - Cannot exist independent of the conditions that give rise to it.
• Independent - Can exist independently of the conditions that give rise to it.
• Unique - Not duplicable.
• Dynamic - Changing in response to perceptions and actions.

Probably more out there. I'll add as they come to mind. Or were you seeking an opinion as well on what the situation actually is?

Thinking out loud there ...

Im on the road and only have the phone so its partly note taking ... visualizing a tree with roots of agreement here:

...mind <~~~~~~> brain ...

(correlation)

And then we see where the branches diverge.

Maybe I can sketch it.

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[smcder]

Companion piece: Taylor Carman, "On the Inescapability of Phenomenology."

Extract

"'Some people presume that this intuition is supported by phenomenology. They are under the impression that they actually observe themselves judging things to be such as a result of
those things seeming to them to be such. No one has ever observed any such thing ‘in their phenomenology’ because such a fact about causation would be unobservable (as Hume noted long ago).(Dennett 1991: 133)'⁷

This conclusion, that perceptual content is itself constituted by acts of thought or judgment, is what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘intellectualism’.⁸
Indeed, it almost seems as if Merleau-Ponty has a premonition of Dennett’s view when in Phenomenology of Perception he criticizes intellectualism for in effect obliterating the phenomenon it purports to analyze. Intellectualist accounts of perception, he argues, fail to acknowledge the embodiment and environmental situatedness of experience, reducing perceptual content to the abstract, free-floating judgments of a disembodied subject:

'Perception is thus thought about perceiving. Its incarnation furnishes no positive characteristic that has to be accounted for, and its hæcceity is simply its own ignorance of itself. Reflective analysis becomes a purely regressive doctrine, according to which every perception is just confused intellection, every determination a negation. It thus does away with all problems except one: that of its own beginning. The finitude of a perception, which gives me, as Spinoza put it, ‘conclusions without premises’, the inherence of consciousness in a point of view, all this reduces to my ignorance of myself, to my negative power of not reflecting. But that ignorance, how is it itself possible?' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 44)."

On the Inescapability of Phenomenology

Grokking now ... please wait ...

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[Pharoah]

I'm wondering whether your above critique applies to Nagel's current thought?

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@smcder
1. Yes it does... I have read most of mind and cosmos now.
2. The alternative? Of course... HCT is narrow expansionism.
@Constance - fair point... though I did say reinterpret not interpret (i think). Reinterpreting is to say what you think someone else has said. Interpreting is to try to understand what someeone has said.

 

[smcder]

@smcder
1. Yes it does... I have read most of mind and cosmos now.
2. The alternative? Of course... HCT is narrow expansionism.
@Constance - fair point... though I did say reinterpret not interpret (i think). Reinterpreting is to say what you think someone else has said. Interpreting is to try to understand what someeone has said.

Drats ... that means now I have to go back and try to understand your critique ... ;-)

 

[smcder]

Companion piece: Taylor Carman, "On the Inescapability of Phenomenology."

Extract

"'Some people presume that this intuition is supported by phenomenology. They are under the impression that they actually observe themselves judging things to be such as a result of
those things seeming to them to be such. No one has ever observed any such thing ‘in their phenomenology’ because such a fact about causation would be unobservable (as Hume noted long ago).(Dennett 1991: 133)'⁷

This conclusion, that perceptual content is itself constituted by acts of thought or judgment, is what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘intellectualism’.⁸
Indeed, it almost seems as if Merleau-Ponty has a premonition of Dennett’s view when in Phenomenology of Perception he criticizes intellectualism for in effect obliterating the phenomenon it purports to analyze. Intellectualist accounts of perception, he argues, fail to acknowledge the embodiment and environmental situatedness of experience, reducing perceptual content to the abstract, free-floating judgments of a disembodied subject:

'Perception is thus thought about perceiving. Its incarnation furnishes no positive characteristic that has to be accounted for, and its hæcceity is simply its own ignorance of itself. Reflective analysis becomes a purely regressive doctrine, according to which every perception is just confused intellection, every determination a negation. It thus does away with all problems except one: that of its own beginning. The finitude of a perception, which gives me, as Spinoza put it, ‘conclusions without premises’, the inherence of consciousness in a point of view, all this reduces to my ignorance of myself, to my negative power of not reflecting. But that ignorance, how is it itself possible?' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 44)."

On the Inescapability of Phenomenology

I got a free print out of the paper here at the hotel ... too hard to read on phone

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... "phenomenology understood as a coherent descriptive enterprise distinct from the physical sciences" ...

(that helped me)

Dennett denies this as he denies the existence of phenomenal experience ... for him experience is (nothing other than) the judgements we form about it, judgements he is content to describe in purely funtional, physicalistic terms

...
smcder
But could it be this way for Dennett?

Could it be that for him experience IS nothing other than the judgements we form about it which can be described in purely functional, physicalist terms?

PE us phenomenal experience

1. Dennett doesnt have PE (is a zombie) or have access to it in a way that he can describe it or recognize it as whats being described by phenomenologists (I think of the study that shows variable ability to introspect)

2 or theres an honest disagreement about PE? Dennett has it, gets it but disagrees about what it is?

cf to Blocks experience that half his students dont get the HP... philosophy as biography or biology ... See also the fear of becoming an epiphenomenalist ...

So for how many is there a living choice between the two posutions?

Am I a philosophical chameleon to be able to look inside and see it as Dennett does and then again as Carman/MP does?

But I think Im just understanding that the phenomenological is prior, is the prior - and appreciating the point you made about interpretation / Derrida - Malabou's analysis of plasticity too ... thats what I think is the power of philosophy such that it will never stand in a "hand off" relationship to science, thus a reminder that there are enterprises distinct from science (at the least) if not capable of subsuming science at least always able to critique it and very powerfully, any given position/explanation for which a scientific basis is claimed (see "Is Evolution a Social Construct?" - Michael Ruse)

 

[smcder]

Taylor Carman's discussion of the Phi Effect (p72) brought me back to Libet's "free won't" argument - with 50ms to go can we still reject the decision once we are aware off it?

The first article here:

Conscious Entities » Libet

offers an interesting analysis of our assumptions about free will, consciousness and self.

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[smcder]

@Constance

The Taylor Carman article is very helpful to me in understanding some ideas of phenomenology - by comparing it to Dennet's analysis I can see it moreso than when I just try to read phenomenology, the first thing that helped was understanding the history of phenomenology, what it was in response to - the problem it solved, but this helps me appreciate the rigor of the method by putting it side by side with another (Dennets approach) -



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[smcder]

So you're a living example of how material and physical processes ( anesthetic ) directly affects your consciousness.. Seems the debate over that part should be settled then. Or do you think those who might say it's only a "correlation" and therefore the debate remains would still have a reasonable argument?

Experiments can be interpreted to show that cognitive exercises physically change the brain - for example CBT for OCD (Schwartz) being as effective as drugs and Im also a living example of that.

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[smcder]

Searle on Free Will -

"the definitions of these terms that I am using, determinism and freewill are not compatible. The thesis of determinism asserts that all
actions are preceded by sufficient causal conditions that determinethem. The thesis of free will asserts that some actions are not pre-
ceded by sufficient causal conditions. Free will so defined is thenegation of determinism."

II. How Consciousness Can Move Bodies

hint: higher level features

I'll see where that goes.

Then I'll look at critiques and how the paper is received now.

And then maybe there's a phenomenological analysis to compare, something on "seeming".

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[Constance]

Evolution of p-consciousness

(This is an ingenious experimental approach, I read about it last night and tried to pay attention this morning as I went under - but I didnt do too well ... zzzz

a reproducible experimental model

(i) consciousness emerges from unconsciousness at a discrete and measurable point,
*(ii) phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness are closely juxtaposed or collapsed

(iii) assessment of neural structure and function is possible.

In this article, we consider top-down and bottom-up approaches to consciousness, nonhuman consciousness, and the emergence of consciousness from general anesthesia as a model for the evolution of subjectivity.

Evolution of consciousness: Phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia

"We propose that the stepwise emergence from general anesthesia can serve as a reproducible model to study the evolution of consciousness across various species and use current data from anesthesiology to shed light on the phylogeny of consciousness.

Ultimately, we conclude that the neurobiological structure of the vertebrate central nervous system is evolutionarily ancient and highly conserved across species and that the basic neurophysiologic mechanisms supporting consciousness in humans are found at the earliest points of vertebrate brain evolution. Thus, in agreement with Darwin’s insight and the recent “Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Non-Human Animals,” a review of modern scientific data suggests that the differences between species in terms of the ability to experience the world is one of degree and not kind."



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I cannot wait to read this.

 

[Constance]

@Constance - fair point... though I did say reinterpret not interpret (i think). Reinterpreting is to say what you think someone else has said. Interpreting is to try to understand what someeone has said.

Given the ambiguity of/in language, and given the holistic way our minds work in maintaining innumerable points of connection between what we are reading at the present moment and other texts we have read that bear on the same subject matter, reading is always interpretation and generally works from our own premises -- but we are also capable of recognizing the premises of the author of the text we are reading and their difference from our own. This is truly critical reading that enables us to follow an argument presented in the text while considering in the margins the premises we have arrived at in our education in the subject matter expressed from various perspectives. It's possible to both follow what the author of a given text is arguing and critique it at the same time in the light of knowing the different interpretations of words, terms, used by the author and others including oneself. Do you see what I'm saying?