I'll read this, but I think you meant to address it to Steve.
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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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I'll read this, but I think you meant to address it to Steve.
Like Steve, I am eager to understand what you mean by "the actual structure" of human consciousness and what the evidence is to support its being "the actual structure." If possible, could you clarify the hypothesis you are arguing for in relation to the evolutionary insights recently developed in the paper Steve cited first yesterday?
I'm afraid that this too abstract to help much in our current discussion here. It seems to me that you are drawing your conclusions about how brain and consciousness work from computer systems theory in particular, perhaps from systems theory in general. Your assumption is that there is a one for one correspondence between what has been understood about computational systems and consciousness as it has evolved in human beings and other higher primates, birds, caetaceans, and some other species. It seems obvious to me that since consciousness as we experience it is the result of a long process of evolution, we need to trace and understand the development of consciousness in nature [ETA: in order to understand its 'structure'].
This last paragraph, imo, needs the greatest effort at explication on your part. I don't think Heidegger side-stepped the embeddedness of human consciousness in the world in which it exists primordially and in given historical/cultural situations. You'd have to support that claim. Do you think your attempt to dismiss metaphysics and human understanding in general coincides with {carries the same meaning as} the later Heidegger's call for a "destruction of metaphysics"? Have you read Heidegger's writings concerning what he referred to as 'techne'? What do you take to be the meaning of his critique of technological thinking and the expansion of technology in the modern period? He had another term for this kind of thinking which I'm forgetting at the moment, but Steve will likely remember it. Oh yes, it just came back: 'calculative thinking'.
ps, I've highlighted in red the place where your syntax seems to break down in that last paragraph. If you see what I mean, would you clarify what you meant to write there?
ETA: Perhaps there is some text you can cite for an alternative expression of what you are claiming and the grounds on which the claim is made? Or is the claim and the argument your own?
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smcder
Guest
I was looking for something specific to his argument on free will here - if that's contained in your writing above, would it be possible to provide an excerpt/summary of that portion?
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Don't have the time to get into those in detail, but I will say ( again ) that the idea that decisions occur before we're consciously aware of them was something I independently deduced, and I've learned since then that it has also been experimentally confirmed. However as I've also pointed out, this doesn't necessitate determinism, at least not classical determinism, that assumes that if we had all the information about the state of the universe at any given time, we could predict what would happen at any point in the future, which means our futures are already determined. That doesn't work out because of the uncertainty principle that introduces an element of randomness.
However it does mean that the popular notion of free will, the idea that we have conscious choice, is illusory. This doesn't mean consciousness doesn't play a role in the decision making process ( it does ), but from a sheer cause and effect perspective, or in other words it's only along for the ride. I've likened this to a surfer on a wave, where all the conditions that give rise to the wave reside in the great ocean below, while the surfer, supported by little more than surface tension and inertia, skims above the depths, experiencing the blue sky, spray, wind and all the sensations that flood into our conscious awareness while awake. We might ( and I emphasize the word might ) have some minimal control over the direction of the board ( but one could argue that such control is pure reflex ), but we certainly have no control over the direction of the wave itself.
In relation to the question of evolution, I can see how consciousness on a purely perceptual level wold be beneficial. What is harder to give a "why" answer for is why concepts such as free will became so important to the construct. The idea, even if not expressed in those exact words, seems to be reflected as far back as our mythology takes us. Is this simply an accidental extra bit of "junk consciousness" so to speak, that serves no real purpose, or is it more complex than that?
In other words, does the belief in free will induce physical actions that gives someone with that belief an advantage for survival and reproduction? Maybe. When I ask people if they believe in free will, the overwhelming number of them say "yes", and therefore anyone who doesn't agree has less in common with others, than most people around them, and are therefore less likely to enter into a harmonious relationship with them, which one might presume, would make it less likely for them to mate.
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Anthropology and archaeology are of course essential for our understanding of the evolution of consciousness and the interpretation of developing human behavior. The discovery of a new hominid, Homo naledi, in South Africa announced today, is especially significant because it strongly suggests human burial practices in a very early protohuman.
Seven signs the Rising Star Cave is a fossil burial site | eNCA
Seven signs the Rising Star Cave is a fossil burial site | eNCA
This article from the Guardian provides more information about this research:
Homo naledi: New species of ancient human discovered, claim scientists
Homo naledi: New species of ancient human discovered, claim scientists
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smcder
Guest
john searle free will as a problem in neurobiology
I can't seem to get the link to copy, there is more than one possible site - let me know if you don't find it
I'm working on digesting his argument and then exploring the responses to it - I think it offers some alternatives to very similar discussions we've had on this thread, I'll try to at least pull those out -
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Thanks for providing that excellent and extensive reading list here, Steve. Only an informed understanding of the types of research reported in that list can break through the reductiveness of physicalism and the blindness of epiphenomenalism..
The point which we as a group have been circling around in recent posts is confrontation with the issue of the subconscious mind and its relation to consciousness in humans. We had to get here finally, and I'm glad we have. As I see it, we can't describe consciousness without investigating the subconscious (both personal and collective), which informs waking and dreaming consciousness in manifold and paradigm-shifting ways. .
The point which we as a group have been circling around in recent posts is confrontation with the issue of the subconscious mind and its relation to consciousness in humans. We had to get here finally, and I'm glad we have. As I see it, we can't describe consciousness without investigating the subconscious (both personal and collective), which informs waking and dreaming consciousness in manifold and paradigm-shifting ways. .
Thanks. I'll google it and check to see if it's the paper/discussion you are working from.
This seems to the relevant paper by Searle:
http://www.summer12.isc.uqam.ca/pag...le_Free_Will_as_a_Problem_in_Neurobiology.pdf
This link goes to a review of the book in which Searle includes this paper and another one:
Freedom and Neurobiology by John Searle | Issue 66 | Philosophy Now
http://www.summer12.isc.uqam.ca/pag...le_Free_Will_as_a_Problem_in_Neurobiology.pdf
This link goes to a review of the book in which Searle includes this paper and another one:
Freedom and Neurobiology by John Searle | Issue 66 | Philosophy Now
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smcder
Guest
John Searle address to google - it looks like he covers some of the ideas on free will
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
NOTE: For clarification, the subconscious mind and unconsciousness are two entirely different concepts. Rather than assuming we all have that part straight: Here's the basic differences: States of consciousness, like awareness of subjective experiences while awake or during sleep like REM states ( dreams ) and while rising out of unconsciousness into a state of normal full consciousness, as opposed to being asleep and experiencing nothing consciously are both entirely separate from the idea of the "subconscious mind" :
"The subconscious mind is a composite of everything one sees, hears and any information the mind collects that it cannot otherwise consciously process to make meaningful sense. The conscious mind cannot always absorb disconnected information, as it would be an information overload, so the subconscious mind stores this information where it can be retrieved by the conscious mind when it needs to defend itself for survival (and for other reasons, such as solving puzzles)." ( Wikipedia ).
Also @smcder and I touched on a couple of points back in 2013:
@smcder: This gets into Free Will and Searle, I think it is - argues that free will is necessary for rationality and that has implications for the role of consciousness
"Sure, the above is coherent and deserves to be addressed, but before that, let me say that I've been discussing the issue you mentioned with respect to Dennett for years because it's obvious that because of how the brain works, we cannot possibly have free will in the way that people usually define it ( as the ability to freely make conscious decisions ). In recent years EEG and other scanning techniques have provided empirical evidence that also proves it scientifically rather than logically."
"The effect of sleep on identity is one of the first problems that comes up with respect to how we look at the brain in relation to identity. One facet of this problem is the importance assigned to continuity of consciousness, and I think that is an important issue, but it needs to be considered in the context of how it affects our unconscious ( including our sleep ) state, and what we consider to be a normal rate of change in our biological structure and the resulting consequences of such change."
Location: Philosophy, Science, and the Unexplained
"The effect of sleep on identity is one of the first problems that comes up with respect to how we look at the brain in relation to identity. One facet of this problem is the importance assigned to continuity of consciousness, and I think that is an important issue, but it needs to be considered in the context of how it affects our unconscious ( including our sleep ) state, and what we consider to be a normal rate of change in our biological structure and the resulting consequences of such change."
Location: Philosophy, Science, and the Unexplained
Also ran across this while reviewing the Libet experiments
Conscious Mental Field Theory ( Libet )
"Libet further elaborated on CMF:
The CMF is not a Cartesian dualistic phenomenon; it is not separable from the brain. Rather, it is proposed to be a localizable system property produced by appropriate neuronal activities, and it cannot exist without them. Again, it is not a ‘‘ghost’’ in the machine. But, as a system produced by billions of nerve cell actions, it can have properties not directly predictable from these neuronal activities. It is a non-physical phenomenon, like the subjective experience that it represents. The process by which the CMF arises from its contributing elements is not describable. It must simply be regarded as a new fundamental ‘‘given’’ phenomenon in nature, which is different from other fundamental ‘‘givens,’’ like gravity or electromagnetism."
So it seems a number of thinkers have been musing on this idea. Seems Libet wrote something about it in 2006 ( if you check the Wikipedia reference ), but unfortunately the PDF link to the reference is dead.The CMF is not a Cartesian dualistic phenomenon; it is not separable from the brain. Rather, it is proposed to be a localizable system property produced by appropriate neuronal activities, and it cannot exist without them. Again, it is not a ‘‘ghost’’ in the machine. But, as a system produced by billions of nerve cell actions, it can have properties not directly predictable from these neuronal activities. It is a non-physical phenomenon, like the subjective experience that it represents. The process by which the CMF arises from its contributing elements is not describable. It must simply be regarded as a new fundamental ‘‘given’’ phenomenon in nature, which is different from other fundamental ‘‘givens,’’ like gravity or electromagnetism."
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smcder
Guest
1. Did you finish M&C - if so, have your thoughts on his thoughts on teleology changed?
2. So what is the specific claim for HCT in regards to Nagel's call for a psycho-physical bridge and in regards to the hard problem? Last time I remember, you did not claim that HCT (re)solved the hard problem?
Your response is to this sentence: "As I see it, we can't describe consciousness without investigating the subconscious (both personal and collective), which informs waking and dreaming consciousness in manifold and paradigm-shifting ways." The link below discusses the various ways in which the term 'the unconscious' has been used in psychology and even in neuroscience -- i.e., not to refer to unconscious states such as dreamless sleep and coma. Jung's concept of the 'collective unconscious' needs to be understood within developments in psychology over the last century as the linked article indicates.
Both the personal subconscious and the collective unconscious influence consciousness and mind and thus should be understood as parts of consciousness as a whole complex combining interrelated levels of mentation. That's what I was trying to get at.
Unconscious mind - New World Encyclopedia
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smcder
Guest
Thanks for bringing the collective unconscious into the discussion, I'm reading this article now ...
Collective unconscious - New World Encyclopedia
Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
One is "Plato's Cave" -- another might be Metzinger's "Ego Tunnel" in discussions on the phenomenal self-model. Also worth looking at is Dennett's parallel sensory/feedback systems and automata underlying the virtual machine combining and synthesizing multiple streams into one--also consider his heterophenomenology notion (whereby we invent fictions to aid in our own understanding and comprehension).
We should remember that computer systems and system theory grew out of the mechanization of our own patterns of thinking and logic -- in effect these systems are an externalization of many structural relations we've become accustomed too (and sometimes take for granted) in our daily interactions. I don't assume one-to-one correspondence between systems of understanding -- but it may turn out that such correspondences (isomorphisms) are a basis for self-modeling embodied systems of replicators--I am just saying that we may have to push away some accumulated fictions in our brain that have aided us in our evolutionary development in the past, but are no longer effective.
I think I had too many glasses of wine when I wrote that first statement, which almost appears like a troll to me when I read it now. A few other things I should correct while I am thinking about it: I do not dismiss metaphysics and human understanding; I do not think we need to destroy metaphysics -- but we may wish to flush out the accretion of useless terms from our vocabulary. I also do not like the division of calculative and meditative thinking -- meditative thinking is just elevator music to put the ego to sleep while millions of automata underlying are busy cranking out their individually discrete systems of interrelated tasks
I take the "we are survival machines" viewpoint of evolution--our brains are machines to help us regulate our interactions with the environment. As for the ultimate "why" question, techne, and Heidegger's critique of technological thinking, I'll get back to you.
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smcder
Guest
One is "Plato's Cave" -- another might be Metzinger's "Ego Tunnel" in discussions on the phenomenal self-model. Also worth looking at is Dennett's parallel sensory/feedback systems and automata underlying the virtual machine combining and synthesizing multiple streams into one--also consider his heterophenomenology notion (whereby we invent fictions to aid in our own understanding and comprehension).
We should remember that computer systems and system theory grew out of the mechanization of our own patterns of thinking and logic -- in effect these systems are an externalization of many structural relations we've become accustomed too (and sometimes take for granted) in our daily interactions. I don't assume one-to-one correspondence between systems of understanding -- but it may turn out that such correspondences (isomorphisms) are a basis for self-modeling embodied systems of replicators--I am just saying that we may have to push away some accumulated fictions in our brain that have aided us in our evolutionary development in the past, but are no longer effective.
I think I had too many glasses of wine when I wrote that first statement, which almost appears like a troll to me when I read it now. A few other things I should correct while I am thinking about it: I do not dismiss metaphysics and human understanding; I do not think we need to destroy metaphysics -- but we may wish to flush out the accretion of useless terms from our vocabulary. I also do not like the division of calculative and meditative thinking -- meditative thinking is just elevator music to put the ego to sleep while millions of automata underlying are busy cranking out their individually discrete systems of interrelated tasks
I take the "we are survival machines" viewpoint of evolution--our brains are machines to help us regulate our interactions with the environment. As for the ultimate "why" question, techne, and Heidegger's critique of technological thinking, I'll get back to you.
"we are survival machines" -
credit where due: “We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.” - Richard Dawkins
Danny Hillis
Notions like Selfish Genes, memes, and extended phenotypes are powerful and exciting. They make me think differently. Unfortunately, I spend a lot of time arguing against people who have overinterpreted these ideas. They're too easily misunderstood as explaining more than they do. So you see, this Dawkins is a dangerous guy. Like Marx. Or Darwin.
Do we do perverse and self-destructive things then for lack of selective pressure?
The Average American carbon-based survival machine, male variety:
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smcder
Guest
... and back when the pressure was on:
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