Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[smcder]

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.” - Richard Dawkins

What fills me with astonishment is that we are anything more than survival machines, that the blind can lead the blind into so many interesting forms ... that survival itself means, makes us poets and bankers and suicides, lovers and takers, sadists and martyrs, Sumo wrestlers and couch potatoes and perennial Darwin-award winners, individually and species wide. Eaters of puffer fish and walkers on wires ... we are clowns and jesters and tricksters and yet we are made in nature's image ... behold the platypus!

Viruses are survival machines, bacteria are survival machines - and yet they came in for all the mutlicellular fun just as soon as they could. We feed our adolescent fantasies with a nature red in tooth and claw and yet we have a home here too and when separated and sanitized we become sickly and long-lived.

 

[smcder]

One is "Plato's Cave" -- another might be Metzinger's "Ego Tunnel" in discussions on the phenomenal self-model. Also worth looking at is Dennett's parallel sensory/feedback systems and automata underlying the virtual machine combining and synthesizing multiple streams into one--also consider his heterophenomenology notion (whereby we invent fictions to aid in our own understanding and comprehension).





We should remember that computer systems and system theory grew out of the mechanization of our own patterns of thinking and logic -- in effect these systems are an externalization of many structural relations we've become accustomed too (and sometimes take for granted) in our daily interactions. I don't assume one-to-one correspondence between systems of understanding -- but it may turn out that such correspondences (isomorphisms) are a basis for self-modeling embodied systems of replicators--I am just saying that we may have to push away some accumulated fictions in our brain that have aided us in our evolutionary development in the past, but are no longer effective.



I think I had too many glasses of wine when I wrote that first statement, which almost appears like a troll to me when I read it now. A few other things I should correct while I am thinking about it: I do not dismiss metaphysics and human understanding; I do not think we need to destroy metaphysics -- but we may wish to flush out the accretion of useless terms from our vocabulary. I also do not like the division of calculative and meditative thinking -- meditative thinking is just elevator music to put the ego to sleep while millions of automata underlying are busy cranking out their individually discrete systems of interrelated tasks

I take the "we are survival machines" viewpoint of evolution--our brains are machines to help us regulate our interactions with the environment. As for the ultimate "why" question, techne, and Heidegger's critique of technological thinking, I'll get back to you.

I take the "we are survival machines" viewpoint of evolution--our brains are machines to help us regulate our interactions with the environment.

Is that enough to get us where we are? (setting aside if it's enough to get a universe started, though I'll note Deists could admire such a clever God that starts it all with one thing and gets such a profusion out of it) I think it may well be ... and if it is, what do you see the implications are for our philosophizing and our science? How do we get to a notion (a popular, I think long discredited idea) of setting science aside as a Platonic machine, an objective perch, something to get us to closer and closer approximations of Truth and Reality? What are the survival credentials, the selection-cred of such machinery as churns out and clings to these ideas?

For my part, I can't let a good idea go to far ... go all the way ... become the only idea ... I can let it survive, but only if it takes a place in the jungle of my mind ... I can't let it wipe everything else out. So for me there have to be other principles that do allow us to, basically, know what's going on.

That's why, like four out of five doktors surveyed, I'm a Melvillean polytheist rather than a monotonotheist - better to live among many gods than under one.

 

[Pharoah]

@Pharoah - you asked if I was sorted on website ... its a technology issue right now, Wordpress wont run at all and Weebly is limited ... Blogger I can limp along, right now Im actually using the forum as an editor, then saving text files -

Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk

@smcder Wordpress technology issue? more info pls...
Finished M&C yes.
In my opinion, ‘the view from nowhere’ requires expansionism in the narrow sense, whilst ‘the view from somewhere’ (1986, cf. chapter 4) requires expansionism in the wide sense. The view from nowhere is Nagel's expression that incorporates the idea that bridging the objective–subjective gap does not require an explanation of any specific personal perspective i.e., an explanatory bridge need not account for specific identities, v.g., yours as opposed to mine. In contrast, the view from somewhere is an altogether different problem of explaining why particular subjective identities happen to correspond with their specific body of experience within the totality of the universe’s time and space. These two are very often conflated. 'Consciousness and its place in nature' Chalmers (2003) is an example of their conflation. One's attitude here, influences the way one looks at the HP and clearly influences the way Chalmers thinks.

Don't have an opinion of Searle's stance on FW.
But I have a problem with the concept of determinism:
As a microphysical component of the solar system I have no influence on its evolution and behaviour.
As microphysical components of me, my atoms have no influence on my evolution and behaviour.
So in what way is the concept of determinism powerful. To all intents and purposes, I am equally free of and yet succumb to these causal mechanisms. To understand how I might not be free, would be to have a fuller understanding of the nature of reality... Until then, Or until a compelling argument to the contrary, I have free will.

 

[smcder]

@smcder Wordpress technology issue? more info pls...
Finished M&C yes.
In my opinion, ‘the view from nowhere’ requires expansionism in the narrow sense, whilst ‘the view from somewhere’ (1986, cf. chapter 4) requires expansionism in the wide sense. The view from nowhere is Nagel's expression that incorporates the idea that bridging the objective–subjective gap does not require an explanation of any specific personal perspective i.e., an explanatory bridge need not account for specific identities, v.g., yours as opposed to mine. In contrast, the view from somewhere is an altogether different problem of explaining why particular subjective identities happen to correspond with their specific body of experience within the totality of the universe’s time and space. These two are very often conflated. 'Consciousness and its place in nature' Chalmers (2003) is an example of their conflation. One's attitude here, influences the way one looks at the HP and clearly influences the way Chalmers thinks.

Don't have an opinion of Searle's stance on FW.
But I have a problem with the concept of determinism:
As a microphysical component of the solar system I have no influence on its evolution and behaviour.
As microphysical components of me, my atoms have no influence on my evolution and behaviour.
So in what way is the concept of determinism powerful. To all intents and purposes, I am equally free of and yet succumb to these causal mechanisms. To understand how I might not be free, would be to have a fuller understanding of the nature of reality... Until then, Or until a compelling argument to the contrary, I have free will.

No laptop technology issue ... it is no longer the lean, mean survival machine it once was.
Internet (DSL) technology issue ... we get dial-up speed during the day.

The forum is actually the bet editor I have right now, then I save them down as text and then put them in Weebly as pages until I can get better technology. It's mostly my online notebook for now. In fact, I may be better off with an analog version, like Wittgenstein and Nietzsche used. ;-) - very powerful and flexible, with built in graphics generator.

 

[smcder]

@smcder Wordpress technology issue? more info pls...
Finished M&C yes.
In my opinion, ‘the view from nowhere’ requires expansionism in the narrow sense, whilst ‘the view from somewhere’ (1986, cf. chapter 4) requires expansionism in the wide sense. The view from nowhere is Nagel's expression that incorporates the idea that bridging the objective–subjective gap does not require an explanation of any specific personal perspective i.e., an explanatory bridge need not account for specific identities, v.g., yours as opposed to mine. In contrast, the view from somewhere is an altogether different problem of explaining why particular subjective identities happen to correspond with their specific body of experience within the totality of the universe’s time and space. These two are very often conflated. 'Consciousness and its place in nature' Chalmers (2003) is an example of their conflation. One's attitude here, influences the way one looks at the HP and clearly influences the way Chalmers thinks.

Don't have an opinion of Searle's stance on FW.
But I have a problem with the concept of determinism:
As a microphysical component of the solar system I have no influence on its evolution and behaviour.
As microphysical components of me, my atoms have no influence on my evolution and behaviour.
So in what way is the concept of determinism powerful. To all intents and purposes, I am equally free of and yet succumb to these causal mechanisms. To understand how I might not be free, would be to have a fuller understanding of the nature of reality... Until then, Or until a compelling argument to the contrary, I have free will.

I fear no compelling argument ... no fuller understanding ... let the determinists do their worst!

As for the solar system, every morning, after I meditate on the Koan of the Hard Problem of course (answer: "mu"), I get up and I influence the sun and the planets, sometimes I don't stop there ... sometimes I tweak Alpha Centauri for fun or reach in and jerk a black hole up by its tail, Pecos Bill style.

 

[smcder]

It's just our old friend, nihilism, and the fact that it's willing to pursue even the Last Men with compelling arguments, shows how desperate a thing it is. It hounded Nietzsche in the form of the Eternal Recurrence - but racked with migraines and loneliness and madness, he looked the abyss in the eye and cried "more" and the abyss asked "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" and it blinked. The existentialists looked a real abyss in the eye and found an ethics of ambiguity ... so what have we to fear now that it's donned it's latest garb - white lab coat and statistics - just another tiresome trick ... I see you, Mara!

 

[smcder]

Oh yeah ... retroactively ... Purple Prose Alert! ;-)

 

[Randall]

@smcder ... To understand how I might not be free, would be to have a fuller understanding of the nature of reality... Until then, Or until a compelling argument to the contrary, I have free will.

The interpretation of the concepts of freedom and free will can vary widely and therefore the gap between how synonymous they are can also vary widely. The context of free will that I've been referring to here is in relation to the common notion that we have conscious control over the choices we make and therefore it is our consciousness that is at the helm of our decision making process. However, if we are assuming that the brain is responsible for consciousness and our decision making ability, then that simply cannot be the case for logical reasons that have been backed up by scientific experimentation.

On the other hand, if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems ( both can exist independent of the existence of the other ), then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will ( and some related paranormal phenomena ).

Personally, it's not that I wouldn't like to think the universe set us up with the latter situation, but I just don't see enough evidence to support that model. But who knows? Maybe somebody will stumble upon or otherwise discover through some experimentation or another some powerful new evidence, and although I think it's tantamount to a wild goose chase, if nobody explores that theory, there's certainly not much chance of that happening. In the meantime, as you put it, until I see some compelling argument to the contrary, not only is everything I perceive a rather fabulous VR simulation caused by our brain, the idea that I have any real-time conscious control over anything is equally illusory ( and fabulous ) .

 

[smcder]

The interpretation of the concepts of freedom and free will can vary widely and therefore the gap between how synonymous they are can also vary widely. The context of free will that I've been referring to here is in relation to the common notion that we have conscious control over the choices we make and therefore it is our consciousness that is at the helm of our decision making process. However, if we are assuming that the brain is responsible for consciousness and our decision making ability, then that simply cannot be the case for logical reasons that have been backed up by scientific experimentation.

On the other hand if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems, then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will. It's not that I wouldn't like to think the universe set us up with the latter situation, but I just don't see enough evidence to support that model. But who knows, maybe somebody will stumble upon or otherwise discover through some experimentation or another, and if nobody explores it we certainly don't have much chance of acquiring any really good evidence.

@ufology
then that simply cannot be the case for logical reasons that have been backed up by scientific experimentation

• see the several posts I've put up reviewing the scientific evidence ... it's not as clear-cut as you indicate

maybe somebody will stumble upon or otherwise discover through some experimentation or another, and if nobody explores it we certainly don't have much chance of acquiring any really good evidence

• it's not that it hasn't been explored - but you have to look at the evidence that has been collected, which I've also posted

 

[smcder]

People ask me why I wear steel toed boots to work in a library ... I tell them it's to stomp out any remaining bits of nihilism ... especially in the 170s and the low 500s ...

 

[smcder]

The interpretation of the concepts of freedom and free will can vary widely and therefore the gap between how synonymous they are can also vary widely. The context of free will that I've been referring to here is in relation to the common notion that we have conscious control over the choices we make and therefore it is our consciousness that is at the helm of our decision making process. However, if we are assuming that the brain is responsible for consciousness and our decision making ability, then that simply cannot be the case for logical reasons that have been backed up by scientific experimentation.

On the other hand, if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems ( both can exist independently of each other ), then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will. It's not that I wouldn't like to think the universe set us up with the latter situation, but I just don't see enough evidence to support that model. But who knows? Maybe somebody will stumble upon or otherwise discover through some experimentation or another some powerful new evidence, and if nobody explores it we certainly don't have much chance of that happening.

@ufology
Our Western version of Free Will is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition ... that's why you're reasoning about the mating potential of those who believe in free will doesn't work ... otherwise there wouldn't be any Calvinists left by now.

There are just as many problems with free will under a dualist conception ... think "pink bars of flesh" - Gnostic visions of soul trapped in body. Pre-destination.

What I'd hoped Searle's argument was based on was a puzzle about rational choice and determination. How do we exercise rationality in the sense of conscious deliberation in a deterministic set-up?

 

[smcder]

Buddhism and Free Will

@ufology

Your idea of consciousness entering the stream of causality and contributing it's effects that way (although I'm not sure you mean p-consciousness specifically) is somewhat similar to the Buddhist idea of free will and to an idea I posted above, about consciously altering or forming unconscious habits that then affect outcomes. This is what meditation does. You sit and work with everything that comes up - in some practices you think on situations that would make you angry or individuals you have an aversion to and you practice metta loving kindness - and so when you do encounter people and situations you don't like, you have a great deal of equanimity, because you have consciously set that in place ahead of time. The experiments I am familiar with don't look at those ideas of "free will" - which seems to me of a kind very much worth having.

*One of the things I've never seen about the Libet experiments is has anyone tried to "game" that system? In other words, bring the action potential (that's detected before the decision to move the finger becomes conscious) itself under conscious awareness? Or does such an awareness already play a role in the fact that, even under the newer, more precises experiments the experimenters are only right in their prediction 80% of the time? Are some of those 1/5 of misses accounted for by persons who are wired differently or who are simply more aware of the roots of the decision making process - are more conscious, in that sense? Not accounting for 20% of your data is kind of a big deal.

 

[smcder]

Buddhism and free will

The interpretation of the concepts of freedom and free will can vary widely and therefore the gap between how synonymous they are can also vary widely. The context of free will that I've been referring to here is in relation to the common notion that we have conscious control over the choices we make and therefore it is our consciousness that is at the helm of our decision making process. However, if we are assuming that the brain is responsible for consciousness and our decision making ability, then that simply cannot be the case for logical reasons that have been backed up by scientific experimentation.

On the other hand, if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems ( both can exist independent of the existence of the other ), then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will ( and some related paranormal phenomena ).

Personally, it's not that I wouldn't like to think the universe set us up with the latter situation, but I just don't see enough evidence to support that model. But who knows? Maybe somebody will stumble upon or otherwise discover through some experimentation or another some powerful new evidence, and although I think it's tantamount to a wild goose chase, if nobody explores that theory, there's certainly not much chance of that happening. In the meantime, as you put it, until I see some compelling argument to the contrary, not only is everything I perceive a rather fabulous VR simulation caused by our brain, the idea that I have any real-time conscious control over anything is equally illusory ( and fabulous ) .

nice edit - and if you go into it with that attitude ...

I've extended the offer before and I'll re-extend it, review the existing evidence with me, here online, step by step, side by side (or mano e mano if you prefer) ... if you don't have the background in statistics and experimental design, we can learn it as we go ... but if you're not willing to do that, then in my opinion you shouldn't snipe from the sidelines ... come on and get your hands dirty with me!

Also, can you explain to me how this:

On the other hand, if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems ( both can exist independent of the existence of the other ), then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will ( and some related paranormal phenomena ).

Is different from where you called me out for not addressing you directly? I can't see the difference.

@Constance is the above an accurate portrayal of your belief?

 

[Randall]

@ufology
Our Western version of Free Will is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition ... that's why you're reasoning about the mating potential of those who believe in free will doesn't work ... otherwise there wouldn't be any Calvinists left by now.

You'd have to elaborate on that, but I sense some humor in there someplace. My comment was simply based on my own informal polling of people. But apparently, Scientific American ran a poll that indicated about 60% believe in free will. I suspect that among non-scientific types the rate would even be higher. So from a social acceptance perspective I see no reason to discard the idea, and I'm confident that the idea of blame, which requires the assumption of free will, predates Judaism.

There are just as many problems with free will under a dualist conception ... think "pink bars of flesh" - Gnostic visions of soul trapped in body. Pre-destination. What I'd hoped Searle's argument was based on was a puzzle about rational choice and determination. How do we exercise rationality in the sense of conscious deliberation in a deterministic set-up?

I don't buy into any particular philosophical model. I use the term dualism only as a convenience term to delineate the difference between objective/subjective objects, and ultimately, they, like everything else, are part of the universe as a whole.

With respect to Serle, a quick glance at the problem indicates that it's not taking some of that left-brain/right-brain stuff you alluded to back there someplace into account and combining that with short and long-term memory. But regardless of that, I don't think we can, "exercise rationality in the sense of conscious deliberation". It's not possible because the results of any deliberation are set in place before we become aware of them. What seems to be happening is that when we're faced with a problem, let's say finding our way through a maze.

All the signals regarding that problem are processed, and the first step is to discarded what's not relevant or shelf it for later, and then assuming we're awake at the time, when enough left-over neurons dealing with the problem activate, those signals are interpreted as an experience that is relevant to the problem, which in turn has an effect on the brain, particularly memory, where the repository or past experiences resides, and if enough of those are activated, then those memories will become associated with the problem, and looped into the next round of neural activity that makes it to the surface, where we wash, rinse, repeat, until problem solved.

 

[smcder]

You'd have to elaborate on that, but I sense some humor in there someplace. My comment was simply based on my own informal polling of people. But apparently, Scientific American ran a poll that indicated about 60% believe in free will. I suspect that among non-scientific types the rate would even be higher. So from a social acceptance perspective I see no reason to discard the idea, and I'm confident that the idea of blame, which requires the assumption of free will, predates Judaism.

I don't buy into any particular philosophical model. I use the term dualism only as a convenience term to delineate the difference between objective/subjective objects, and ultimately, they, like everything else, are part of the universe as a whole.

With respect to Serle, a quick glance at the problem indicates that it's not taking some of that left-brain/right-brain stuff you alluded to back there someplace into account and combining that with short and long-term memory. But regardless of that, I don't think we can, "exercise rationality in the sense of conscious deliberation". It's not possible because the results of any deliberation are set in place before we become aware of them. What seems to be happening is that when we're faced with a problem, let's say finding our way through a maze.

All the signals regarding that problem are processed, and the first step is to discarded what's not relevant or shelf it for later, and then assuming we're awake at the time, when enough left-over neurons dealing with the problem activate, those signals are interpreted as an experience that is relevant to the problem, which in turn has an effect on the brain, particularly memory, where the repository or past experiences resides, and if enough of those are activated, then those memories will become associated with the problem, and looped into the next round of neural activity that makes it to the surface, where we wash, rinse, repeat, until problem solved.

Do you ever look to see if your ideas have been explored in the literature?
(there's humor in there someplace ;-)

 

[smcder]

@Constance - you'll be very familiar with this ... but these kinds of ideas are finding more and more purchase in the fissures and gyri, and sulci of my brain ... oh my!

CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Max Velmans
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys

smcder emphases mine

Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived.

According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics.

• Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate.

The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.

In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.

 

[Constance]

The context of free will that I've been referring to here is in relation to the common notion that we have conscious control over the choices we make and therefore it is our consciousness that is at the helm of our decision making process. However, if we are assuming that the brain is responsible for consciousness and our decision making ability, then that simply cannot be the case for logical reasons that have been backed up by scientific experimentation.

Yes, you are assuming that the brain is responsible for, produces, consciousness. You like it inside that box. The question is why you prefer to look at the world and yourself from that perspective.

maybe somebody will stumble upon or otherwise discover through some experimentation or another, and if nobody explores it we certainly don't have much chance of acquiring any really good evidence

• it's not that it hasn't been explored - but you have to look at the evidence that has been collected, which I've also posted

Ufology is caught inside his box because he will not consider the kinds of evidence that explode his presuppositions about the nature of reality. If you can finally get him to do that, Steve, we might move beyond square one in this discussion. His only hope of remaining in his box is to refuse to admit nonmaterial evidence, like all of materialist/physicalist-dominated science in our time. Fortunately, the paradigmatic thinking that is the root of the problem is being challenged by many scientists and thinkers. Ufology avoids this critical situation by not reading the texts in which it is foregrounded.

I don't think we can, "exercise rationality in the sense of conscious deliberation". It's not possible because the results of any deliberation are set in place before we become aware of them. What seems to be happening is that when we're faced with a problem, let's say finding our way through a maze.

And you know that how?

 

[Constance]

Also, can you explain to me how this:

On the other hand, if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems ( both can exist independent of the existence of the other ), then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will ( and some related paranormal phenomena ).

Is different from where you called me out for not addressing you directly? I can't see the difference.

@Constance is the above an accurate portrayal of your belief?

@Constance[/USER] is the above an accurate portrayal of your belief?

No.

 

[Constance]

@Constance - you'll be very familiar with this ... but these kinds of ideas are finding more and more purchase in the fissures and gyri, and sulci of my brain ... oh my!

CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Max Velmans
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys

smcder emphases mine

Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived.

According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics.

• Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate.

The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.

In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.

Can't do better than Velmans on these issues. We should all take a week off and read Velmans and then continue. And we should read the paper you cited a few days ago at

CORRECTED LINK: Evolution of consciousness: Phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia

 

[Constance]

I happened today upon a thread at ATS concerning interesting statuary found at Teotihuacán and elsewhere. It's a short and very interesting thread with many additional images, linked here: Teotihuacán Host Figurines, page 1


Teotihuacán Host Figurines, page 1