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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

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Still catching up but I brought this point up again recently (or did I only bring it up in my mind?) it came up when I was thinking about technicity and whether we were in charge of our technology or vice-versa. I think there was a Cyborg Manifesto in there too ... the idea that any tool was an extension (Merleau Pony uses similar examples in the recent articles I posted and in discussion of artificial limbs) our ability (and some other apes and birds?) to do that, to extend our bodies does make us pre-cyborgs. When the fella above picked up the stick, he became one - he augmented himself and his abilities. The defintion of a cyborg is a being with both organic and biomechanical parts. In this case a stick is biomechanical. So the image above is a cyborg. ehhhh waving hand back and forth ... it at least is going that way, fair? Or not?
Our technology has changed us but it appears to be something that invites itself. So much of invention is chance, dumb luck, or without any forethought to know what it will lead to. In this way the sticks, wheels, gears, computer chips and nano-bots all call each other forward in succession. And as much as the tool, be it hammer, needle, axe, or paintbrush, may appear to be a fluid extension of the body engaged in acts of creation or lawnmowing mundanity, the devices remain indifferent to we emotional bio bags.

With our tech we recklessly change and alter our trajectory as if operating under remote control. The legs are shackled and the arms swing the hammers in rhythmic repetition, a well oiled machine that transformative chain gang. We passively surrender ourselves to the surveillance camera. We invite the machines to monitor us closely and they direct us to the next task. Millions of hands clicking the mouse and swiping the screens on demand. We are on command.

Dewdney said our destiny was to create Artificial Intelligence, to give birth to a new form. Perhaps we evolved humans are just an interim organic feature, until some new silicon creature, fueled by primate indifference, rises up out of the morass of civilization to take its rightful place in the patterned matrix of consciousness. I wonder, if in time, it will master time and space and eventually come to resemble the technology we call the UFO? I bet it will come back to visit us in the past to encourage us to accelerate our next technological discovery.
 
... Perhaps we evolved humans are just an interim organic feature, until some new silicon creature, fueled by primate indifference, rises up out of the morass of civilization to take its rightful place in the patterned matrix of consciousness. I wonder, if in time, it will master time and space and eventually come to resemble the technology we call the UFO? I bet it will come back to visit us in the past to encourage us to accelerate our next technological discovery ...
It sure does seem to be headed in that direction, and it reminds me of at least a couple of sci-fi plots to that effect. A scene from one of my favorite series Babylon 5 ( now deserving of classic status IMO ):

 
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That link you posted PDF is the only copy of Stevens poem I can find.

It's probably the only one available online, except in the online version of the Collected Poems, which I linked in one of the earlier parts of this thread. Would you like me to link that source again?
 
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Here's your post after @Soupie's:

"It seems to me that the artificial organs and other devices you're discussing facilitate nervous transmissions in injured or absent parts of the body that enable those parts to function again sufficient to the degree that qualia experienced through those injured or missing parts are restored. Again, the body does not "produce" qualia; it experiences qualia, and it is this capacity for qualitative experience that is restored to the individual through technologies that reintegrate the sense of the bodily capacity to interact again with the world through the agency it formerly experienced through the amputated limb. Not only the 'brain' but the conscious self and the mind of an amputee are shocked and estranged from the local world, the environment, when a primary means of access to and agency in it are cut off. This is a measure of the holistic integration of the mind and the body it inhabits.

"That which a being is made to bear it is not made to bear the want of." I don't remember who wrote or said that. The statement was cited several times by a professor of mine in graduate school and it has stayed with me for years."

If I read it right, not made to bear the wont of is why I don't want them taking any of my body parts - I can't really remember how it used to be before the illness, how it felt - or honestly if it is actually worse - you get into a way of being in the body gradually, with sharp pain of course there's a quick adjustment but when sharp, occasional pain, though unpredictable is a normal part of things ... then you get into that as a way of being too.

If I read it right, not made to bear the wont of is why I don't want them taking any of my body parts - I can't really remember how it used to be before the illness, how it felt - or honestly if it is actually worse - you get into a way of being in the body gradually, with sharp pain of course there's a quick adjustment but when sharp, occasional pain, though unpredictable is a normal part of things ... then you get into that as a way of being too.

That seems to be part of the flexibility of consciousness that Catherine Marabou writes about. It also seems to me to verify the extent to which consciousness can be said to be located in the body as well as in itself as 'mind'. While we live in an organically embodied state our consciousness is to a great extent integrated with/in our bodies. Yet we are also capable while embodied of experiences in which the sense of embodiment falls away (in OBEs, NDEs, deep meditation). Those are evidently some of the experiences that need to be investigated and understood before we can understand the layered nature of consciousness and what it means, signifies, about what we are.

About that statement "that which a being is made to bear it is not made to bear the want of," it seems to have been intended to go in both directions of our being, toward the materiality of our bodies and the spirituality expressed throughout our recorded history (and visible in prehistorical cultures we study in archaeology). This statement was cited in some lectures by Sherman Paul at the University of Iowa in his courses in American Criticism and Culture. As I recall (this was years ago) he foregrounded two prominent perspectives in historical American culture, one marked by the prevalence of what he referred to as 'organicism' expressed in American literature {Whitman would be a good example} and the other expressed in the spiritually oriented practices of early alternative communities that sprang up in many places in the 19th century in this country. The latter were influenced by the thought of Emerson and his group in Concord. What I think Sherman was getting at with the citation to 'that which a being is not made to bear the want of' concerned both bodily {physical} and mental/spiritual needs of the human being, needs not met [and indeed forgotten] in the directions in which American society and culture were heading during the 19th c. As Thoreau expressed it, "things are in the saddle and ride mankind."

What you say in the first paragraph is very much in my idea of a cyborg ... I read a book called Man Plus as a kid - where an astronaut was cybernetically altered to live on Mars and the story was about how hard it was for him to adapt, how lonely he was and it made a big impression on me. Robocop had a similar message, when they tried to create more cybernetic police officers they went crazy or killed themselves ... only Peter Weller's character was strong enough, devoted enough to make it and be a good cop.

Those figures in popular culture seem to me to express the sense of the inherent needs of human beings and a hopeful belief that that which is 'human' will survive technological adaptation.

My idea for a human technology - humorously illustrated in the idea of the Heideggerean hammer (always at hand!) is that technology is transparent and we can put on and take off the technology, we can wear it - it's not embedded ... but it now seems to me, having carried a new smart phone around for a few weeks, that there may not be as much of a difference ... for a long time I didn't carry a cell phone and now I see the effects - on balance I don't think I've gained anything and the past few days it's been sort of drifting away from me ... now there's the issue of this laptop.

I think Heidegger hoped we could learn to use technology intelligently -- to enhance the well-being of the living, including our own life -- but that in the end he doubted that we would do so given the organized pressure of the powerful economic structures and interests exploiting technology as a means of control. Part of the problem is our adaptability, the ease with which we 'get used to changing situations'. The other part is the prevalence of calculative thinking trickled down in the modern period in which most humans live "in the forgetfulness of being" -- i.e., forgetfulness of the nature of being as we are capable of experiencing it, and thus gradually losing our natural access to the question of what Being is as a whole.
 
Donna Haraway - A Cyborg Manifesto

A Cyborg Manifesto is an essay written by Donna Haraway. Haraway began writing the Manifesto in 1983 to address the Socialist Review request of American socialist feminists to ponder over the future of socialist feminism in the context of the early Reagan era and the decline of leftist politics. The first versions of the essay had a strong socialist and European connection that the Socialist Review East Coast Collective found too controversial to publish. The Berkeley Socialist Review Collective published the essay in 1985 under the editor Jeff Escoffier.[1] The essay is most well known for being published in Donna Haraway's 1991 book Simians, Cyborgs and Women.
In Donna Haraway's essay, the concept of the cyborg is a rejection of rigid boundaries, notably those separating "human" from "animal" and "human" from "machine." She writes: "The cyborg does not dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust."[2]
The Manifesto criticizes traditional notions of feminism, particularly feminist focuses on identity politics, and encouraging instead coalition through affinity. She uses the metaphor of a cyborg to urge feminists to move beyond the limitations of traditional gender, feminism, and politics.[2] Marisa Olson summarized Haraway's thoughts as a belief that there is no distinction between natural life and artificial man-made machines.[3]

Haraway's Cyborg Manifesto was originally written in the 80s and rewritten in the version she published in a more recent book. It was never a manifesto on behalf of cyborgs [more recently 'digital AI constructions' in common usage] in the sense that she attempted to speak for them or from their perspective. What she wrote in the original version needs to be understood in the context of Feminist Studies {subsequently referred to in academia as Womens' Studies}, as does the second version. In both she writes predominantly for feminists, a category much more diverse than people in general recognize, and in the midst of numerous disagreements concerning how feminist thinking should proceed. SEP has a very good article on developments in 'feminist' thought at this link:

Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Btw, that article is immensely instructive concerning the development of feminism vis a vis postmodernist ideas characterizing cultural studies in America and elsewhere beginning in the mid-20th century.

At the time Haraway wrote the "Cyborg Manifesto" she was also influenced by the few books (by Wiener and Shannon) generating what came to be called Cybernetics. She seems to have thought at that time that the impending cybernetic revolution could provide another, more radical, more complete escape for women from the historically sedimented patriarchal thinking that disadvantaged women in most all societies up to the present (the present of the 80s). One thing feminist studies accomplished beyond advancing the study of women's situations in human history and providing directions for 'liberation thinking' for women was to lead the way to cultural criticism in even broader contexts (racism, colonialism, genderism, classism, etc.) Haraway's first cyborg manifesto was, in my opinion and the opinion of many others, a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Kind of like 'it's hard to be human, esp a female human, so stop being human as soon as possible'.
 
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Ufology wrote: "Maybe this discussion wasn't a complete waste of time after all."

It hasn't been all about you, ufology. Your tendency to try to make it so is the problem.
 
Where is this post from @Pharoah?

Here's the link to it:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

I think we should read it and take up further discussion of it with Pharoah if he is interested and willing.


From one of my posts ...

From "I sing the body electric" - Whitman
And if the body does not do fully as much as the soul?
And if the body were not the soul, what is the soul?


Which reminds me, I still haven't figured out the Wallace Stevens poem but I made a connection with the Varela paper I posted above.

Don't worry about the Stevens poem. His poetry has to be read again and again, and in great quantities, to grok what he's doing and saying in it.

Which is the Varela paper you linked in part 2?

There's a book on Stevens and Whitman that is in my yet-to-read stack(s). If I read it while we and this thread are still extant, I'll share the essence of it.
 
Here is the post by @Soupie that I thought we might take off from in our current discussion, embedded in a discussion with you:


smcder said:

1. Did you not expect something like this? I may be missing something but it seems like that's the way it would work. Cochlear implants and implants for vision, I think using sonar sound similar to me?

2. It surprised me that the effect of relieving phantom pain was "unexpected" for the researchers?


SOUPIE: No, I do expect this. And yes, I believe researchers have now been able to create artificial organs that generate stimuli that the body (?) uses to produce (?) qualia.

The rest of Soupie's post:

. . . So do we think these artificial patterns of information are translated by the body into a non-material, dual substance, or is it possible that qualia are patterns of information? Obviously, once the body-brain receives the stimuli from the artificial organs, there is still a lot going on. However, I do continue to be amazed at how adeptly our bodies integrate with artificial sensory devices. Again, it makes me wonder of the universal nature of information. Information is substrate neutral.

I also think the illusion of the artificial hand being integrated with the body is important. I believe current research indicates that it is actually the same phenomena happening with our native body as well. And Velmans touched on this as well. To a large extent, the brain is projecting and estimating what is the body and what is not-body. (It makes me wonder about obe when the body-brain are in crises.)

There was a researcher who wore a belt with a compass that would vibrate in the direction of north. Im not sure how often. Apparently the researcher said his nervous sytem began to integrate this information into his being. It became one of his senses, so to speak. I wonder did it have a qualitative feel to it, beyond just the vibrations around his waist.”

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2


Note to Soupie: The vibrations around his waist were "a qualitative feel." He did not 'produce' them or the qualia by virtue of which he felt them. We're saturated with qualia in our embodied experience in the world and they all inform our thinking.


Getting to the point that I think we should foreground:

Steve a few posts later: “How is the pencil example different, fundamentally from the artificial arm example? Both take some kind of ultimately physical input and in the end you have an experience.

Do the experiment - pick up a pencil and run it along some different surfaces ... you should be able to switch back and forth between feeling it 1) at the tip of the pencil, as if it were part of your hand and 2) where your hand and the pencil touch."


smcder,Oct 14, 2014Report

#1365 1365 in part 2
 
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Ufology wrote: "Maybe this discussion wasn't a complete waste of time after all."
It hasn't been all about you, ufology. Your tendency to try to make it so is the problem.
You seem to be confusing me with a subjective idealist.
 
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What are we to make of a statement like:
... We're saturated with qualia in our embodied experience in the world and they all inform our thinking ....
  1. Embodied vs. disembodied? If not. Then what does it mean?
  2. How exactly does qualia "inform" our thinking?
  3. Can qualia not be a component of thinking?
Before such statements are put forward as assumptions, readers should consider the questions above.
 
Here's the link to it:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

I think we should read it and take up further discussion of it with Pharoah if he is interested and willing.




Don't worry about the Stevens poem. His poetry has to be read again and again, and in great quantities, to grok what he's doing and saying in it.

Which is the Varela paper you linked in part 2?

There's a book on Stevens and Whitman that is in my yet-to-read stack(s). If I read it while we and this thread are still extant, I'll share the essence of it.
I'm not happy with any of the interpretations Ive found - all seem to claim him for there purposes.

Yes, I've read it out loud and recorded it - I remember you said he would walk out the rhythm, so Ive tried that to see if I could get the rhythm internalized.

There's a collected poems and a biography in our library ... I didn't have time to go down and pull them today - back on Tues.

I'll have to find the Varela article.



Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
 
Here's the link to it:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

I think we should read it and take up further discussion of it with Pharoah if he is interested and willing.




Don't worry about the Stevens poem. His poetry has to be read again and again, and in great quantities, to grok what he's doing and saying in it.

Which is the Varela paper you linked in part 2?

There's a book on Stevens and Whitman that is in my yet-to-read stack(s). If I read it while we and this thread are still extant, I'll share the essence of it.

Sorry, Velmans - not Varela, my bad -
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys

CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Max Velmans

Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.

In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.
 
Sorry, Velmans - not Varela, my bad -
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys

CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Max Velmans

Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.

In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.

According to this page: Philosophy

Reflexivity takes for granted the existence of these phenomena, but offers only limited explanation for their processes. Reflexivity offers no explanation for the “hard part”, that is, how a material process creates a non-material, “experience, feeling or sensation”.
Instead we have:

"... the Reflexive model states that external events as-perceived are "projected" by the brain to the judged location of the initiating stimulus."​

Such "projections" are of course the result of the way our visual processing system maps the stimulus onto consciousness, particularly that part of consciousness that reflexivity offers no explanation for. Consequently this line of inquiry appears on first inspection to be a dead end.
 
Sorry, Velmans - not Varela, my bad -
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys

CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Max Velmans

Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.

In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.

"The physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world."

Excellent. This seems to be the right paper at the right time to bring forward at this point in the discussion. I'll read it this afternoon.
 
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