Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Maybe this discussion wasn't a complete waste of time after all ... LOL.Ah, if you only had free will ... no one could make you regret anything!
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Maybe this discussion wasn't a complete waste of time after all ... LOL.Ah, if you only had free will ... no one could make you regret anything!
Our technology has changed us but it appears to be something that invites itself. So much of invention is chance, dumb luck, or without any forethought to know what it will lead to. In this way the sticks, wheels, gears, computer chips and nano-bots all call each other forward in succession. And as much as the tool, be it hammer, needle, axe, or paintbrush, may appear to be a fluid extension of the body engaged in acts of creation or lawnmowing mundanity, the devices remain indifferent to we emotional bio bags.Still catching up but I brought this point up again recently (or did I only bring it up in my mind?) it came up when I was thinking about technicity and whether we were in charge of our technology or vice-versa. I think there was a Cyborg Manifesto in there too ... the idea that any tool was an extension (Merleau Pony uses similar examples in the recent articles I posted and in discussion of artificial limbs) our ability (and some other apes and birds?) to do that, to extend our bodies does make us pre-cyborgs. When the fella above picked up the stick, he became one - he augmented himself and his abilities. The defintion of a cyborg is a being with both organic and biomechanical parts. In this case a stick is biomechanical. So the image above is a cyborg. ehhhh waving hand back and forth ... it at least is going that way, fair? Or not?
It sure does seem to be headed in that direction, and it reminds me of at least a couple of sci-fi plots to that effect. A scene from one of my favorite series Babylon 5 ( now deserving of classic status IMO ):... Perhaps we evolved humans are just an interim organic feature, until some new silicon creature, fueled by primate indifference, rises up out of the morass of civilization to take its rightful place in the patterned matrix of consciousness. I wonder, if in time, it will master time and space and eventually come to resemble the technology we call the UFO? I bet it will come back to visit us in the past to encourage us to accelerate our next technological discovery ...
That link you posted PDF is the only copy of Stevens poem I can find.
1336+1=1337That post of yours is number 1336 in Part 2. The post of @Soupie's I wanted to call attention to is numbered 1356. That whole section is worth rereading at this point, so I recommend that all involved here at present review it.
Will do1336+1=1337
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Here's your post after @Soupie's:
"It seems to me that the artificial organs and other devices you're discussing facilitate nervous transmissions in injured or absent parts of the body that enable those parts to function again sufficient to the degree that qualia experienced through those injured or missing parts are restored. Again, the body does not "produce" qualia; it experiences qualia, and it is this capacity for qualitative experience that is restored to the individual through technologies that reintegrate the sense of the bodily capacity to interact again with the world through the agency it formerly experienced through the amputated limb. Not only the 'brain' but the conscious self and the mind of an amputee are shocked and estranged from the local world, the environment, when a primary means of access to and agency in it are cut off. This is a measure of the holistic integration of the mind and the body it inhabits.
"That which a being is made to bear it is not made to bear the want of." I don't remember who wrote or said that. The statement was cited several times by a professor of mine in graduate school and it has stayed with me for years."
If I read it right, not made to bear the wont of is why I don't want them taking any of my body parts - I can't really remember how it used to be before the illness, how it felt - or honestly if it is actually worse - you get into a way of being in the body gradually, with sharp pain of course there's a quick adjustment but when sharp, occasional pain, though unpredictable is a normal part of things ... then you get into that as a way of being too.
What you say in the first paragraph is very much in my idea of a cyborg ... I read a book called Man Plus as a kid - where an astronaut was cybernetically altered to live on Mars and the story was about how hard it was for him to adapt, how lonely he was and it made a big impression on me. Robocop had a similar message, when they tried to create more cybernetic police officers they went crazy or killed themselves ... only Peter Weller's character was strong enough, devoted enough to make it and be a good cop.
My idea for a human technology - humorously illustrated in the idea of the Heideggerean hammer (always at hand!) is that technology is transparent and we can put on and take off the technology, we can wear it - it's not embedded ... but it now seems to me, having carried a new smart phone around for a few weeks, that there may not be as much of a difference ... for a long time I didn't carry a cell phone and now I see the effects - on balance I don't think I've gained anything and the past few days it's been sort of drifting away from me ... now there's the issue of this laptop.
Donna Haraway - A Cyborg Manifesto
A Cyborg Manifesto is an essay written by Donna Haraway. Haraway began writing the Manifesto in 1983 to address the Socialist Review request of American socialist feminists to ponder over the future of socialist feminism in the context of the early Reagan era and the decline of leftist politics. The first versions of the essay had a strong socialist and European connection that the Socialist Review East Coast Collective found too controversial to publish. The Berkeley Socialist Review Collective published the essay in 1985 under the editor Jeff Escoffier.[1] The essay is most well known for being published in Donna Haraway's 1991 book Simians, Cyborgs and Women.
In Donna Haraway's essay, the concept of the cyborg is a rejection of rigid boundaries, notably those separating "human" from "animal" and "human" from "machine." She writes: "The cyborg does not dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust."[2]
The Manifesto criticizes traditional notions of feminism, particularly feminist focuses on identity politics, and encouraging instead coalition through affinity. She uses the metaphor of a cyborg to urge feminists to move beyond the limitations of traditional gender, feminism, and politics.[2] Marisa Olson summarized Haraway's thoughts as a belief that there is no distinction between natural life and artificial man-made machines.[3]
Where is this post from @Pharoah?
From one of my posts ...
From "I sing the body electric" - Whitman
And if the body does not do fully as much as the soul?
And if the body were not the soul, what is the soul?
Which reminds me, I still haven't figured out the Wallace Stevens poem but I made a connection with the Varela paper I posted above.
. . . So do we think these artificial patterns of information are translated by the body into a non-material, dual substance, or is it possible that qualia are patterns of information? Obviously, once the body-brain receives the stimuli from the artificial organs, there is still a lot going on. However, I do continue to be amazed at how adeptly our bodies integrate with artificial sensory devices. Again, it makes me wonder of the universal nature of information. Information is substrate neutral.
I also think the illusion of the artificial hand being integrated with the body is important. I believe current research indicates that it is actually the same phenomena happening with our native body as well. And Velmans touched on this as well. To a large extent, the brain is projecting and estimating what is the body and what is not-body. (It makes me wonder about obe when the body-brain are in crises.)
There was a researcher who wore a belt with a compass that would vibrate in the direction of north. Im not sure how often. Apparently the researcher said his nervous sytem began to integrate this information into his being. It became one of his senses, so to speak. I wonder did it have a qualitative feel to it, beyond just the vibrations around his waist.”
You seem to be confusing me with a subjective idealist.Ufology wrote: "Maybe this discussion wasn't a complete waste of time after all."
It hasn't been all about you, ufology. Your tendency to try to make it so is the problem.
... We're saturated with qualia in our embodied experience in the world and they all inform our thinking ....
I'm not happy with any of the interpretations Ive found - all seem to claim him for there purposes.Here's the link to it:
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2
I think we should read it and take up further discussion of it with Pharoah if he is interested and willing.
Don't worry about the Stevens poem. His poetry has to be read again and again, and in great quantities, to grok what he's doing and saying in it.
Which is the Varela paper you linked in part 2?
There's a book on Stevens and Whitman that is in my yet-to-read stack(s). If I read it while we and this thread are still extant, I'll share the essence of it.
1336+1=1337
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Here's the link to it:
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2
I think we should read it and take up further discussion of it with Pharoah if he is interested and willing.
Don't worry about the Stevens poem. His poetry has to be read again and again, and in great quantities, to grok what he's doing and saying in it.
Which is the Varela paper you linked in part 2?
There's a book on Stevens and Whitman that is in my yet-to-read stack(s). If I read it while we and this thread are still extant, I'll share the essence of it.
Sorry, Velmans - not Varela, my bad -
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys
CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Max Velmans
Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.
In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.
Sorry, Velmans - not Varela, my bad -
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys
CONSCIOUSNESS, BRAIN AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Max Velmans
Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.
In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.
Reference/support site for Consciousness and the Paranormal
consciousness & the paranormal
I've started adding links from the discussion here.