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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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smcder
Guest
Also excellent, Steve. A lot of work, but you never mind that.
I was going crazy trying to remember links and it's impossible to find them in the discussion format.
Ufology wrote:
"According to this page: Philosophy
Such "projections" are of course the result of the way our visual processing system maps the stimulus onto consciousness, particularly that part of consciousness that reflexivity offers no explanation for. Consequently this line of inquiry appears on first inspection to be a dead end.[/QUOTE]
The hypothesis offered in that ebook might turn out to be useful in discussion to come. The author expresses his presupposition and thus his inevitable conclusion up front in the Introduction:
"The Theory of Reflexivity is based exclusively on observations of the nature of our universe. It uses these observations as a starting point for the establishment of generally applicable materialist and positivist theoretical concepts."
Perhaps you can read ahead for us in that text and point to the place where he accounts for the observer in the "observations of the nature of our universe" on which he relies.
"According to this page: Philosophy
Reflexivity takes for granted the existence of these phenomena, but offers only limited explanation for their processes. Reflexivity offers no explanation for the “hard part”, that is, how a material process creates a non-material, “experience, feeling or sensation”.
Instead we have:
"... the Reflexive model states that external events as-perceived are "projected" by the brain to the judged location of the initiating stimulus."
Such "projections" are of course the result of the way our visual processing system maps the stimulus onto consciousness, particularly that part of consciousness that reflexivity offers no explanation for. Consequently this line of inquiry appears on first inspection to be a dead end.[/QUOTE]
The hypothesis offered in that ebook might turn out to be useful in discussion to come. The author expresses his presupposition and thus his inevitable conclusion up front in the Introduction:
"The Theory of Reflexivity is based exclusively on observations of the nature of our universe. It uses these observations as a starting point for the establishment of generally applicable materialist and positivist theoretical concepts."
Perhaps you can read ahead for us in that text and point to the place where he accounts for the observer in the "observations of the nature of our universe" on which he relies.
This paper by Velmans is likely to be a helpful guide to discussion of 'reflexivity':
http://cogprints.org/6453/1/How_to_define_consciousness.pdf
http://cogprints.org/6453/1/How_to_define_consciousness.pdf
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smcder
Guest
I hope to do a post on this on the website, but this is a nuanced discussion of free will:
Episode 120: A History of “Will” with Guest Eva Brann (Part Two) | The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast | A Philosophy Podcast and Blog
after the first fifteen minutes or so they end up with a dicussion of compatibilism, there's a succinct statement of the question/idea I had about rationality and free will:
The discussion continues for about ten more minutes on this topic as an excellent example of philosophical discussion.
Episode 120: A History of “Will” with Guest Eva Brann (Part Two) | The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast | A Philosophy Podcast and Blog
after the first fifteen minutes or so they end up with a dicussion of compatibilism, there's a succinct statement of the question/idea I had about rationality and free will:
- when I calculate, am I following the laws of arithmetic, or the laws of brain states?
The discussion continues for about ten more minutes on this topic as an excellent example of philosophical discussion.
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smcder
Guest
Getting to the point that I think we should foreground:
Steve a few posts later: “How is the pencil example different, fundamentally from the artificial arm example? Both take some kind of ultimately physical input and in the end you have an experience.
Do the experiment - pick up a pencil and run it along some different surfaces ... you should be able to switch back and forth between feeling it 1) at the tip of the pencil, as if it were part of your hand and 2) where your hand and the pencil touch."
Can you expand on this - where we are wanting to go with it? I don't think I have picked up the trail of the cyborg discussion ... ?
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Good audio. It brings up the various ideas of what constitutes free will as a "term of art" ( also see article here on free will ). So we have different concepts of what free will is depending on how we define "freedom" and "will" and "wilfulness" and a host of other terms that can all be woven together in various ways to support particular viewpoints. But the bottom line for me is:
20:05:00
"You'd have to solve the mind-body problem to get the explanation."
'Yes. Exactly, that's in the end what it comes to. One would have to show that in fact thought can emerge from matter or from force and matter ..."
16:50:00
"Neuroscientists are determinists, one and all. I've not read any who aren't. That is that they think that natural conditions determine everything in a deterministic way or in a probabilistic way. It doesn't matter one way or the other. But that the determining conditions of the will are totally naturalistic. The philosophers can't imagine a world without something like free will, so they invent the notion of a compatibility between determinism and freedom ..."
"Neuroscientists are determinists, one and all. I've not read any who aren't. That is that they think that natural conditions determine everything in a deterministic way or in a probabilistic way. It doesn't matter one way or the other. But that the determining conditions of the will are totally naturalistic. The philosophers can't imagine a world without something like free will, so they invent the notion of a compatibility between determinism and freedom ..."
So who has the most evidence? Neuroscientists or Philosophers? To remind the reader of context, I've been discussing free will as the idea that we are making real-time conscious decisions. Now turning to your question:
"When I calculate, am I following the laws of arithmetic, or the laws of brain states?
Assuming the "I" in question is the sum total of your mind-body state, the answer is that because your brain state during calculation is the result of it being programmed to perform calculations, the experience of "you" doing the math is a result of brain states that follow ( are encoded with ) the laws of math. However the notion of will tends to ask the deeper question: For what purpose do I need to perform the calculation? Having will tends to mean something more than being a human calculator. The calculations are but a means to a pre-existing end. Unfortunately nowhere along either line of reasoning do we escape the situation in the context I've laid it out above. In other words, in some sense we can be said to have "will", but is it really "free"? That all depends on how you look at the word "free".
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smcder
Guest
Why do you say "unfortunately"?
Also, the argument is made that the idea of free will you are arguing against is a straw man and incoherent, that the will free of any contingencies is useless.
EDIT the idea you seem to be arguing against is an idea of free will standing outside of any causal chain ... but that doesn't seem to be coherent? so you don't need science to disprove that
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smcder
Guest
@ufology
On the other hand, if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems ( both can exist independent of the existence of the other ), then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will ( and some related paranormal phenomena ).
1. what do you mean by, how do you define "the common notion of free will"?
2. why does the idea that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems make it easier to believe in that common notion?
On the other hand, if you're in @Constance's camp where you believe that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems ( both can exist independent of the existence of the other ), then it becomes easier to assume that consciousness controls what the brain does in terms of decision making, and that in-turn makes it easier to believe in the common notion of free will ( and some related paranormal phenomena ).
1. what do you mean by, how do you define "the common notion of free will"?
2. why does the idea that consciousness and the brain are two independent systems make it easier to believe in that common notion?
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
And how are the pencil and artificial arm different from a real arm?
What is physical input? It is a range of physical processes that the organism has a capacity to give meaning to (or that inform the organism). This is the germ of consciousness, for the physical is objective and meaning is subjective.
You say that these various physical inputs become experience in the end.
So are we to believe that organisms absorb electromagnetic waves and somehow convert them into a consciousness-substance, perhaps a bile, a molecule, or a 3D field of some sort?
If so, where is this substance? Why haven't we observed it yet? And of course we know, a la the hard problem, that consciousness is nothing like a physical substance that can be observed with the tools of objective science.
Is conscious therefore a supernatural substance? Is that why we can't see it with our X-ray machines or microscopes?
Or is it possible that it's "input" all the way down? That the input never gets converted into consciousness-substance, whether natural or supernatural.
Maybe consciousness is the meaning the body-system gives to the various physical stimuli it has evolved the capacity to recognize for purposes of adaptability. @Pharoah and other sources provide coherent narratives of how replicating systems such as organisms can evolve along with an environment in such a way that exogenous and endogenous stimuli can take on meaning.
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smcder
Guest
So who has the most evidence? Neuroscientists or Philosophers?
Have you read the posts I made about the limitations of free will experiments?
The question:
- when I calculate, do I follow the laws of arithmetic or the laws of brain states?
2. the laws or arithmetic and the laws of brain states converge toward a truth or a right answer, which is the answer given in the podcast - that both are true ...
even if I miscalculate, I do so lawfully and in response to the conditions ... wheras on 1 it's hard to see how circumstances and response would have anything to do with each other, much less mental states ... why when I sat down to take that exam wasn't I thinking that I was eating blue velveeta? (the fact that I'm color blind makes that point more forcefully)
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smcder
Guest
I lose you when you talk about consciousness as a substance or a supernatural substance ... where do those ideas come from?
I still can't make a distinction between @Phraoah's narrative about meaning and mainstream ideas about evolution.
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You say that these various physical inputs become experience in the end.
If you mean me specifically, I'd have to look at my exact statement that you draw this from, do you have a quote? ... the way this sentence is worded ... physical inputs become experience in the end ... I'm not sure about that, which various physical inputs? And I'm not sure about "become experience in the end" become and "in the end" - again, if it's from something I said - I'd need to see my statement and see if that's what I meant by it at the time or if I've changed my mind ... or, absent that, we'll have to work to tighten that all up a bit.
So are we to believe that organisms absorb electromagnetic waves and somehow convert them into a consciousness-substance, perhaps a bile, a molecule, or a 3D field of some sort?
No that doesn't seem right ... I wonder if the Velman's article is helpful? (I don't understand it, so looking at that would be helpful to me)
ARCHIVE: phil-mind, cross-references: phil-epist, cog-psy, psy-phys
Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.
In the present paper I wish to challenge some of our most deeply-rooted assumptions about what consciousness is, by re-examining how consciousness, the human brain, and the surrounding physical world relate to each other.
If so, where is this substance? Why haven't we observed it yet? And of course we know, a la the hard problem, that consciousness is nothing like a physical substance that can be observed with the tools of objective science.
Right ... although look at propositions 4 and 5 in the Velman's article, what do you make of those?
Is conscious therefore a supernatural substance? Is that why we can't see it with our X-ray machines or microscopes?
I wouldn't think so - I don't think of it as a substance ... and everyday consciousness seems associated with physical processes, so I'm not looking for something supernatural in the sense of beyond all possible laws of physics ... and I wouldn't think we'd go looking for it with any tool ... looking for it seems wrong-headed ... so I'm not sure what you're getting at here?
Or is it possible that it's "input" all the way down? That the input never gets converted into consciousness-substance, whether natural or supernatural.
That seems like a forced choice - not agreeing to "input" all the way doesn't commit one to saying that it's converted into consciousness-substance ...
Maybe consciousness is the meaning the body-system gives to the various physical stimuli it has evolved the capacity to recognize for purposes of adaptability. @Pharoah and other sources provide coherent narratives of how replicating systems such as organisms can evolve along with an environment in such a way that exogenous and endogenous stimuli can take on meaning.
A lot of semantic questions there ... if you define meaning in that way, sure ... I'm wary of any statement of the form:
such and such IS and especially such and such IS ONLY because it usually tries to convince us something isn't really there ... if we could substitute every instance of consciousness for "meaning the body-system (couldn't we just say "body" here? what does system add to it? or even "person" for that matter?) gives to the various physical stimuli it has evolved the capacity to recognize for purposes of adaptability" - (a little bit of circular logic or something at the very end there, I think) ... but can we make that substition in every instance?
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smcder
Guest
When you have time for another audio:
Episode 9: John Dupré
I'd be interested to know what you make of it.
Soupie wrote: "Maybe consciousness is the meaning the body-system gives to the various physical stimuli it has evolved the capacity to recognize for purposes of adaptability.[/QUOTE]
Half of what we need to adapt to is nature; the other half is culture [our own productions in the natural physical world]. Look around at the variety of human cultures and ways of being human existing on this planet and ask yourself if computable 'information' could have produced their variety, and then, if you can, show us how.
What needs to be understood is experience. We all know what the word designates in our language, or else need to realize what it designates. Dictionary.com provides eight definitions here:
the definition of experience
Half of what we need to adapt to is nature; the other half is culture [our own productions in the natural physical world]. Look around at the variety of human cultures and ways of being human existing on this planet and ask yourself if computable 'information' could have produced their variety, and then, if you can, show us how.
What needs to be understood is experience. We all know what the word designates in our language, or else need to realize what it designates. Dictionary.com provides eight definitions here:
the definition of experience
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
I used the word "unfortunate" because people tend to like the idea that they have conscious control over their actions, that they aren't in a more complex mode of sleep walking. It's use isn't necessary other than to speak to a hypothetical reason for having the discussion in the first place.
I don't argue that free will stands on any side of a causal chain. I maintain that in the context in which free will is commonly understood, it doesn't actually exist. I also didn't hear much of an argument in support of the assertion for the strawman viewpoint. Nevertheless that became irrelevant because as the discussion progressed, it still boiled down to the mind-body problem indicated in my last post, which itself speaks to the issues that are the focus of my reasoning. Perhaps at this point I should emphasize the importance of the "naïve folk version". It is neither incoherent nor trivial. But let's have Sam Harris explain it. Again, if you don't have high speed Internet, you can download it from the online app I linked you to in a previous post, and then stream it directly off your PC's hard drive.
Sam Harris - Speech on Free Will
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
The answer:
The experience of you doing the math ( calculating ) is a result of brain states that follow ( are encoded with ) the laws of math.
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Re 1. Most simply, the common notion of free will is that when we make what we believe to be a conscious choice, we believe our consciousness is in charge of the decision making. ( Go to the downloader and check out the Sam Harris video above. )
Re 2. If consciousness is a system independent of the brain, then it makes it easier to suppose that consciousness influences the brain first in the causal chain rather than the other way around. That opens the door to concepts that allow for transference of consciousness to other bodies ( reincarnation ), and continuity of consciousness after the death of the body ( life after death ), and the host of related mythology and the nonsense IMO that goes along with it.
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
It nearly put me to sleep
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smcder
Guest
What is ‘the soul’ and why does it matter? : RSA blogs
Video and transcript of Ian McGilchrist's "What is the Soul and Why Does It Matter?" ... rated RH for right hemisphere.
Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
Video and transcript of Ian McGilchrist's "What is the Soul and Why Does It Matter?" ... rated RH for right hemisphere.
Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
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smcder
Guest
Instead you remained in a more complex mode of sleep walking.It nearly put me to sleep.
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