I've read the second-last draft of HCT but need to read the most recent one, and I'll look for it at mind-phronesis. At the moment, above, I was asking for a link to what you've written about Rovelli's RQM.
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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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I've read the second-last draft of HCT but need to read the most recent one, and I'll look for it at mind-phronesis. At the moment, above, I was asking for a link to what you've written about Rovelli's RQM.
S
smcder
Guest
OK, now I really believe this can get worked down to a paragraph or two with specific claims and how they are answered, I'm still working on the HCT paper and outlining the essentially claims and arguments, step by step, a framework that shows the chain of reasoning, in the meantime we have:
claim
HCT binds theory (philosophical theory) to empirical sciences in a way that no other philosophy model has before
- it has an evolutionary and developmental foundation that is consistent with current understandings
- It helps identify what the sciences need to look for in terms of mechanisms and function in their quest to understand phenomenal consciousness.
That is a move toward concrete, specific claims.
HCT binds philosophy to empirical sciences in a unique way
1. so can we get a short statement as to what the evolutionary and developmental foundation is that is consistent with current understandings?
2. it helps identify what the sciences need to look for in terms of mechanisms and functions ... to understand phenomenal consciousness
how far along does 2 go ... ? you say it will take decades to work out the details and you were early on looking for ideas for experiments, so I now we can't expect fine grain detail, but you should be able to make a statement as to what is wrong about how or where current science is looking ... I know that's what the paper does and I'm working on getting that into a compact format, but you must have this is in your head ... something along the lines of
"look here, you fellows are looking in the wrong place entirely, your thinking about what knowledge, etc means in a wrong-headed sort of way ... "
if that's in the HCT paper in 15 pages and if, as it appears much of the early part is working to get the reader to understand the coming shift in thinking, then once we have the paper down, we should be able to line that out in a series of logical steps that we can look at critically (assuming we've read and understand the paper before hand) ... right?
Excellent.
S
smcder
Guest
It is excellent! we just have to get down to exactly precisely what that means, make it transparent
Steve, if you're referring to the direction neuroscience needs to take, I think Maturana-Varela-Thompson-Panksepp have already pointed it out and the latter two are working it.
S
smcder
Guest
I'm referring there to HCT - see @Pharoah's claims above in terms of HCT directing the next decades of science ... if I understand him correctly, @Pharoah would say HCT points in a different direction (and not just a different direction, but a different understanding) from Maturana-Varela-Thompson- Panksepp and any other and that HCT points us in the correct direction:
@Pharoah
I think the model HCT binds theory (philosophical theory) to empirical sciences in a way that no other philosophy model has before (it has an evolutionary and developmental foundation that is consistent with current understandings). It helps identify what the sciences need to look for in terms of mechanisms and function in their quest to understand phenomenal consciousness.
S
smcder
Guest
I wasn't sure if you realized @Pharoah was making this claim for HCT? Or do I have a misunderstanding about what you are saying in the last couple of posts - a connection with Varela/Thompson Panksepp and HCT I am missing?
S
smcder
Guest
I haven't finished the HCT paper and I really need to focus on that next, but @Soupie has some of the same questions I do, so I'll post this line of thought that I have as I finish the HCT paper:
@Pharoah - responding to @Soupie, we can go back and look at the previous post, but I think we can start here without losing too much:
@Pharoah writes:
Rather, something is red because our construct—our physiological makeup and neural mechanisms—has needed the feeling of "redness" because this qualitative correspondence has benefited the construct's (that being the human physiology) survival.
smcder So I expect the HCT paper to help me understand the word "needed the feeling of "redness" and the causal role that "redness" has (which should be a direct response to the Nagel paper - as the HCT paper is a direct response to that paper -)
@Soupie writes:
What TENS theory of evolution and natural selection and HCT show is indeed how a correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes has evolved over time.
What TENS and HCT have failed to show is why this correspondence is accompanied by—in some but not all cases—a phenomenal feel, such as redness.
@Pharaoh responded "I think HCT has."
so the claim is that
HCT shows why the correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes is accompanied by - in some but not all cases - a phenomenal feel, such as redness.
BUT @Phraoah you have claimed that HCT does not solve the mind - body problem, the hard problem and so the mental causation problem.
So where the semantics must come in is here:
How does a theory claim to the show why the correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes is accompanied by - in some but not all cases - a phenomenal feel, such as redness - but not claim to solve the hard problem?
@Pharoah - responding to @Soupie, we can go back and look at the previous post, but I think we can start here without losing too much:
@Pharoah writes:
Rather, something is red because our construct—our physiological makeup and neural mechanisms—has needed the feeling of "redness" because this qualitative correspondence has benefited the construct's (that being the human physiology) survival.
smcder So I expect the HCT paper to help me understand the word "needed the feeling of "redness" and the causal role that "redness" has (which should be a direct response to the Nagel paper - as the HCT paper is a direct response to that paper -)
@Soupie writes:
What TENS theory of evolution and natural selection and HCT show is indeed how a correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes has evolved over time.
What TENS and HCT have failed to show is why this correspondence is accompanied by—in some but not all cases—a phenomenal feel, such as redness.
@Pharaoh responded "I think HCT has."
so the claim is that
HCT shows why the correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes is accompanied by - in some but not all cases - a phenomenal feel, such as redness.
BUT @Phraoah you have claimed that HCT does not solve the mind - body problem, the hard problem and so the mental causation problem.
So where the semantics must come in is here:
How does a theory claim to the show why the correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes is accompanied by - in some but not all cases - a phenomenal feel, such as redness - but not claim to solve the hard problem?
S
smcder
Guest
@Constance
@Pharoah
@Soupie
@ufology
I am reading part 2 about E-DNA this expansion of "knowledge" is at the heart of the later response to the "knowledge argument" against physicalism (Jackson) that @Pharoah will end the paper with ... this was as issue with the last paper's rejection ... so what we have to come to see is how this redefintion of knowledge refutes Jackson's "something about mary" objection to physicalism
@Pharoah
@Soupie
@ufology
I am reading part 2 about E-DNA this expansion of "knowledge" is at the heart of the later response to the "knowledge argument" against physicalism (Jackson) that @Pharoah will end the paper with ... this was as issue with the last paper's rejection ... so what we have to come to see is how this redefintion of knowledge refutes Jackson's "something about mary" objection to physicalism
S
smcder
Guest
Here is that argument from section two (please read the text, this is a combination of my notes and summary and I may have it wrong, the point is to show what I am working through to understand, how I am trying to analyze this)- what I visualize, what I am looking for is the underlying logic, the move step by step through the argument:
the plant did not possess conceptually constructed knowledge about her species and the environment
I would argue that the complex environmentally informed construction that constitutes Edna’s physiology must qualify as an
However, one might counter that the plant’s E-DNA is not knowledge but merely information—information upon which the human geneticists then construct their knowledge.
response
I would retort(?) that there is an important distinction between
Alternatively, our geneticists are reading and interpreting the coherent and unified informational construct of a fully functioning and self-realizing system; they are analyzing a construct that existed, and therefore was meaningful, solely by virtue of its historic environmental discourse and translating that knowledge into an alternative informational format.
Edna alone, possessed a qualitatively relevant physiological knowledge whose pertinent accuracies and comparative merits ensured the survival of its species’ replicants (that is, until the global catastrophe devastated the planet’s life-forms).
I maintain that the human geneticists derive all their conceptually constructed knowledge about Edna and her environment solely from the study and interpretation—interpretation being analogous to translation—of her physiologically constructed knowledge which was accurately and responsively informed by the environment in which the species replicated and evolved.
smcder the key here is translation "interpretation being analogous to translation" is what we have to evaluate
So a relationship (of translation) is claimed between an innately acquired and justified class of knowledge (the complex environmentally informed construction that constitues Edna's physiology) and the conceptually constructed knowledge of the scientists.
So the human geneticists derive all their conceptually constructed knowledge about Edna and her environment solely from the study and interpretation (interpretation = translation) from the environmentally informed construct (knowledge) of Edna's physiology
the claim is about the equivalence or tranlatability of two knowledges
so one claim is that there is a translation between knowledge as conceptual construction and knowledge as environmentally informed construct
and this claim rests on:
Compiling from separate sources might entail calling on the expertise of the geologist, climatologist, archaeologist, chemist, biologist and so on, and thereby collating information from separate data about the species and its planetary environment i.e., constructing knowledge from disparate sources.
Alternatively, our geneticists are reading and interpreting the coherent and unified informational construct of a fully functioning and self-realizing system; they are analyzing a construct that existed, and therefore was meaningful, solely by virtue of its historic environmental discourse and translating that knowledge into an alternative informational format.
and concludes that
Edna alone, possessed a qualitatively relevant physiological knowledge whose pertinent accuracies and comparative merits ensured the survival of its species’ replicants (that is, until the global catastrophe devastated the planet’s life-forms)
*crucial
So the claim really rests on whether geneticists from the chromosomes, from E-DNA alone would be able to derive extensive knowledge about the organism EDNA and the planetary environment
1. determine things about the organism
· produce a graphic illustration of EDNA’s appearance
· determine from biochemical sequences that Edna was a plant-like organism (in what way? How is that relevant to the argument?)
· biochemistry indicates the details of energy, respiration, reproduction, etc
2. from the analysis of her structure, color, size, (from the fragments or from the illustration? Does it matter? They would have that knowledge from recovering the fragments from the planet) biochemical mechanisms and other characteristics.
· the light from the planet’s sun was weak
· gravity half that of earth’s
· and the planet’s environment evidently arid and very windy.
The knowledge they acquire both about Edna, and her planetary environment is extensive.
the plant did not possess conceptually constructed knowledge about her species and the environment
- the plant did not believe anything and did not have cause to think.
- (however if the humans can be justified in believing in the facts pertaining to Edna and her environment, what are they basing that justification on if not exclusively on Edna’s physiological makeup?)
I would argue that the complex environmentally informed construction that constitutes Edna’s physiology must qualify as an
- *innately acquired and justified class of knowledge.
However, one might counter that the plant’s E-DNA is not knowledge but merely information—information upon which the human geneticists then construct their knowledge.
response
I would retort(?) that there is an important distinction between
- compiling information to derive meaning from contrasting sources
- and acquiring meaning from one unified source.
Alternatively, our geneticists are reading and interpreting the coherent and unified informational construct of a fully functioning and self-realizing system; they are analyzing a construct that existed, and therefore was meaningful, solely by virtue of its historic environmental discourse and translating that knowledge into an alternative informational format.
Edna alone, possessed a qualitatively relevant physiological knowledge whose pertinent accuracies and comparative merits ensured the survival of its species’ replicants (that is, until the global catastrophe devastated the planet’s life-forms).
I maintain that the human geneticists derive all their conceptually constructed knowledge about Edna and her environment solely from the study and interpretation—interpretation being analogous to translation—of her physiologically constructed knowledge which was accurately and responsively informed by the environment in which the species replicated and evolved.
smcder the key here is translation "interpretation being analogous to translation" is what we have to evaluate
So a relationship (of translation) is claimed between an innately acquired and justified class of knowledge (the complex environmentally informed construction that constitues Edna's physiology) and the conceptually constructed knowledge of the scientists.
So the human geneticists derive all their conceptually constructed knowledge about Edna and her environment solely from the study and interpretation (interpretation = translation) from the environmentally informed construct (knowledge) of Edna's physiology
the claim is about the equivalence or tranlatability of two knowledges
so one claim is that there is a translation between knowledge as conceptual construction and knowledge as environmentally informed construct
and this claim rests on:
- compiling information to derive meaning from contrasting sources
- and acquiring meaning from one unified source.
Compiling from separate sources might entail calling on the expertise of the geologist, climatologist, archaeologist, chemist, biologist and so on, and thereby collating information from separate data about the species and its planetary environment i.e., constructing knowledge from disparate sources.
Alternatively, our geneticists are reading and interpreting the coherent and unified informational construct of a fully functioning and self-realizing system; they are analyzing a construct that existed, and therefore was meaningful, solely by virtue of its historic environmental discourse and translating that knowledge into an alternative informational format.
and concludes that
Edna alone, possessed a qualitatively relevant physiological knowledge whose pertinent accuracies and comparative merits ensured the survival of its species’ replicants (that is, until the global catastrophe devastated the planet’s life-forms)
*crucial
So the claim really rests on whether geneticists from the chromosomes, from E-DNA alone would be able to derive extensive knowledge about the organism EDNA and the planetary environment
1. determine things about the organism
· produce a graphic illustration of EDNA’s appearance
· determine from biochemical sequences that Edna was a plant-like organism (in what way? How is that relevant to the argument?)
· biochemistry indicates the details of energy, respiration, reproduction, etc
2. from the analysis of her structure, color, size, (from the fragments or from the illustration? Does it matter? They would have that knowledge from recovering the fragments from the planet) biochemical mechanisms and other characteristics.
· the light from the planet’s sun was weak
· gravity half that of earth’s
· and the planet’s environment evidently arid and very windy.
The knowledge they acquire both about Edna, and her planetary environment is extensive.
S
smcder
Guest
@Constance
@Pharoah
@Soupie
@ufology
Working down from all that above - see if I have missed anything, I get:
claim
The human scientist's conceptually constructed knowledge is a translation of EDNA's innately acquired and justified knowledge (the organism's physiology).
This claim is dependent on the human scientist's being able to derive extensive knowledge of the organism and its environment
from the genetic essence (EDNA and chromosomes) alone.
(HCT argues that there is a difference between compiling information to derive meaning from contrasting sources and acquiring meaning from one unified source. So the geneticists did not need the services of the geologist, climatologist, archaeologist, chemist, biologist, etc)
because EDNA has all of that knowledge in the form of an innately acquired and justified knowledge (her physiology) - in other words, EDNA embodies all the knowledge of her self as an organism and her environment.
@Pharoah
@Soupie
@ufology
Working down from all that above - see if I have missed anything, I get:
claim
The human scientist's conceptually constructed knowledge is a translation of EDNA's innately acquired and justified knowledge (the organism's physiology).
This claim is dependent on the human scientist's being able to derive extensive knowledge of the organism and its environment
- gravity
- climate
- sunlight
- etc
from the genetic essence (EDNA and chromosomes) alone.
(HCT argues that there is a difference between compiling information to derive meaning from contrasting sources and acquiring meaning from one unified source. So the geneticists did not need the services of the geologist, climatologist, archaeologist, chemist, biologist, etc)
because EDNA has all of that knowledge in the form of an innately acquired and justified knowledge (her physiology) - in other words, EDNA embodies all the knowledge of her self as an organism and her environment.
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
Wait!@smcder Let's pull back on the reins a bit.
I don't make the claim in the paper that,
"HCT binds theory (philosophical theory) to empirical sciences in a way that no other philosophy model has before
- it has an evolutionary and developmental foundation that is consistent with current understandings
- It helps identify what the sciences need to look for in terms of mechanisms and function in their quest to understand phenomenal consciousness."
"look here, you fellows are looking in the wrong place entirely, your thinking about what knowledge, etc means in a wrong-headed sort of way ... "
The main aim of the paper is to provide the subjectivity–objectivity link as per intro. This necessarily requires a rethink on orthodoxy etc.
Iff this HCT stance is taken to be a plausible account of phen cs etc, the cards are there to be put on the table for empirical work in biochemistry and neuroscience.
S
smcder
Guest
OK, you say:
I don't make the claim in the paper that
but where I got that from is your post #758 in response to me
I ask:
I'm still working through the HCT paper you linked and I printed a copy for my father to read ... but is this correct:
is the overall idea that HCT is a narrow expansion – using what we now know but transforming the way we understand knowledge, information, representation, intentionality - that HCT will give an account of how subjectivity emerges from objectivity ... and this will provide a guide for the next decades of research in biochemistry and neurology, is that correct? And it will do so in a way that is revolutionary compared to current models?
@Pharoah you reply:
pharoah Yes to first question.
the first question was:
smcder is the overall idea that HCT is a narrow expansion – using what we now know but transforming the way we understand knowledge, information, representation, intentionality - that HCT will give an account of how subjectivity emerges from objectivity ... and this will provide a guide for the next decades of research in biochemistry and neurology, is that correct?
the second question was:
smcder And it will do so in a way that is revolutionary compared to current models?
pharoah Second question: I think the model binds theory (philosophical theory) to empirical sciences in a way that no other philosophy model has before (it has an evolutionary and developmental foundation that is consistent with current understandings). It helps identify what the sciences need to look for in terms of mechanisms and function in their quest to understand phenomenal consciousness.
I think it moves the philosophy goal posts quite a bit...
the other quote is mine, just to show my way of thinking - but the words above are in your post, right?
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
@smcder you say,
"BUT @Phraoah you have claimed that HCT does not solve the mind - body problem, the hard problem and so the mental causation problem.
So where the semantics must come in is here:
How does a theory claim to the show why the correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes is accompanied by - in some but not all cases - a phenomenal feel, such as redness - but not claim to solve the hard problem?"
@smcder Hold your horses.
Have you read footnote 1?
In it I say that narrow expansionism, in my opinion, is the kind of explanation that will answer an objective–subjective question—to a point! i.e. it answers The View from Nowhere.
The Mind-body problem is not satisfied with this View-from-nowhere answer, however! For the Mind-body problem to be satisfied requires, in my opinion, a wide expansionist solution to 'The View from Somewhere' (Chapter 4). The view from somewhere is addressed by phenomenological enquiry.
They are two separate kinds of enquiry.
The HP is not a problem that seems to be defined concretely enough for me to say whether it is answered by HCT. On my understanding of the HP, HCT provides an answer. But the HP is too problematic a concept for me to have added it to the paper.
S
smcder
Guest
I am not through analyzing the whole paper, what I hope to do is come up with a chain of reasoning like I did for section two that I can follow, hopefully anyone can follow, from start to finish and clearly understand what specific claims HCT is making. Is that not an appropriate goal?
Yes, I have read footnote 1.
My question above is how it appears to me (and I think @Soupie maybe sees this too?) because it's from the exchange between the two of you:
@Soupie writes:
What TENS theory of evolution and natural selection and HCT show is indeed how a correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes has evolved over time.
What TENS and HCT have failed to show is why this correspondence is accompanied by—in some but not all cases—a phenomenal feel, such as redness.
your direct response is:
@Pharaoh responded "I think HCT has."
meaning: HCT has shown why a correspondence between environmental stimuli and neurophysiological processes have evolved over time is acommpanied by - in some but not all cases - a phenomenal feel, such as redness.
From this, it seems you are saying that HCT goes a step beyond TENS which only accounts for how the correspondence evolved over time, but not why? HCT say why ... what I am asking then, is what exacly does that mean? And how does it translate into guidance for experimentation?
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Right.
Right.Pharoah said:
OK now we're drilling into the heart of the issue. When you say, "... neurology might facilitate this ... ", it implies that none of the currently known material components and objectively measurable phenomena of the brain-body system ( BBS ) are consciousness, but rather act as "facilitators". On that we seem to be in a general agreement, and it leads naturally to a question something like this: OK then, if we look at the BBS as a facilitator, then what is being facilitated? Answer: It's facilitating the translation of objective reality into conscious awareness of that reality ( subjective reality ). However that's still not the same as consciousness itself.Pharoah said:
In other words, the BBS as facilitator is only acting as a go between, and while that role is true, it isn't really the core of the issue. Instead I tend to fall into Searle's camp on this when I say that consciousness is a natural part of the BBS in its waking state. In other words, when whatever mechanisms are engaged within the BBS that are responsible for causing the emergence of consciousness, then consciousness is the result and it becomes part of the unified BBS as a physical entity. So there is then only the entity, and it's environment, rather than the environment, an entity, and this "other thing" we call consciousness.
Notice however that this view doesn't negate the particular type of duality which accepts that mental phenomena and material existence are two separate realities, e.g. a subjective visualization in our mind of an object vs. the objectively real material version of that object. The old labels "objective" and "subjective" still apply.
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Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
This is very good... I like the fact that you picked up on the translation thing without me actually giving a detailed exposition. You have got from it what I would have said had I decided to say it.
I think you are getting the gist off section 2: the idea that knowledge can be constructed by biochemical mechanism and that such mechanisms are justified over generational timescales and have environmental correspondence. i.e. knowledge not TJB(Belief—as found in individual human discourse/thinking) but TJP(Physiology—of species' environmental discourse)
S
smcder
Guest
@Pharoah
this is an exchange with @ufology
ufology However some might still argue that there isn't an adequate explanation for exactly where "capacity" comes from: e.g. "the capacity to evaluate the comparative importance (or value)." "
This is a neuroscientific question imo. How might neural mechanisms function in a way that, essentially, prioritises one qualitative stance over another?
I obviously don't have the answer to these kinds of questions, but it seems highly plausible to me that such mechanisms are possible if not extremely likely.
@Pharoah you respond:
The objective of the paper is to give an account of how subjectivity emerges from objectivitiy.
Hiw the buichemisty and neurology might facilitate this will take decades of research. In its more abstract rendition, HCT indicates that the maintenance and acquisition of states of equilibria is key at the different levels... in this regard
I am still reading the paper - not the entirety of HCT with these claims or ideas in mind ... my qorking question is what does this mean? how does the claim that maintenance and acquisition of states of equilibria etc (which I don't yet understand as a unique claim - but part of current physics, chemistry, etc) translate into a new way of looking at things that could guide experimental design
there has to be a lot of this kind of theorizing out there, but the crux is out how it can be verified, how it can be tested - which I think that it can be is a claim you make, right?
this is an exchange with @ufology
ufology However some might still argue that there isn't an adequate explanation for exactly where "capacity" comes from: e.g. "the capacity to evaluate the comparative importance (or value)." "
This is a neuroscientific question imo. How might neural mechanisms function in a way that, essentially, prioritises one qualitative stance over another?
I obviously don't have the answer to these kinds of questions, but it seems highly plausible to me that such mechanisms are possible if not extremely likely.
@Pharoah you respond:
The objective of the paper is to give an account of how subjectivity emerges from objectivitiy.
Hiw the buichemisty and neurology might facilitate this will take decades of research. In its more abstract rendition, HCT indicates that the maintenance and acquisition of states of equilibria is key at the different levels... in this regard
I am still reading the paper - not the entirety of HCT with these claims or ideas in mind ... my qorking question is what does this mean? how does the claim that maintenance and acquisition of states of equilibria etc (which I don't yet understand as a unique claim - but part of current physics, chemistry, etc) translate into a new way of looking at things that could guide experimental design
there has to be a lot of this kind of theorizing out there, but the crux is out how it can be verified, how it can be tested - which I think that it can be is a claim you make, right?
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
HCT yes... the paper: not explicitly... but perhaps it should. Keep those criticisms on the back-burner. I have clocked them
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