I recently came across the phrase "Embodied Functionalism," which was described as a leading approach to mind. That was news to me. I did some Google searching but haven't been able to find a nice summary of this approach. I did do a little more reading about embodied, extended, and enactive approaches to mind. As always, I come away confused. It seems that these approaches are not standardized in any agreed way. The main takeaway seems to be that they are anti-representational.
Yes, they are anti-representional. This article on Enactivism from wikipedia should be clarifying for you not only in terms of enactivism but also in the context of the embodiment, embeddedness, and extendedness of consciousness as clarified by phenomenologists. Here are the first several paragraphs:
"
Enactivism argues that
cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting
organism and its environment.
[1] It claims that our environment is one which we selectively create through our capacities to interact with the world.
[2] "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions:
they enact a world."
[3] These authors suggest that the increasing emphasis upon enactive terminology presages a new era in thinking about cognitive science.
[3] How the actions involved in enactivism relate to age-old questions about
free will remains a topic of active debate.
[4]
The term 'enactivism' is close in meaning to 'enaction', defined as "the manner in which a subject of perception creatively matches its actions to the requirements of its situation".
[5] The introduction of the term
enaction in this context is attributed to
Francisco Varela,
Evan Thompson, and
Eleanor Rosch,
[5][6] who proposed the name to "emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs".
[7] This was further developed by Thompson and others,
[1] to place emphasis upon the idea that experience of the world is a result of mutual interaction between the sensorimotor capacities of the organism and its environment.
[6]
The initial emphasis of enactivism upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal",
[8] but it has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions.
[3] "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with its environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."
[9]
Enactivism is closely related to
situated cognition and
embodied cognition, and is presented as an alternative to
cognitivism,
computationalism, and
Cartesian dualism.
Philosophical aspects
Enactivism is one of a cluster of related theories sometimes known as the
4Es, the others being
embodied, embedded and
extended aspects of cognition.
[10][11] It proposes an alternative to
dualism as a philosophy of mind, in that it emphasises the interactions between mind, body and the environment, seeing them all as inseparably intertwined in mental processes.
[12] The self arises as part of the process of an embodied entity interacting with the environment in precise ways determined by its physiology. In this sense, individuals can be seen to "grow into" or arise from their interactive role with the world.
[13]
"Enaction is the idea that organisms create their own experience through their actions. Organisms are not passive receivers of input from the environment, but are actors in the environment such that what they experience is shaped by how they act."
[14]
In
The Tree of Knowledge Maturana & Varela proposed the term
enactive[15] "to evoke the view of knowledge that what is known is brought forth, in contraposition to the more classical views of either cognitivism
[Note 1] or connectionism.
[Note 2] They see enactivism as providing a middle ground between the two extremes of
representationalism and
solipsism. They seek to "confront the problem of understanding how our existence-the
praxis of our living- is coupled to a surrounding world which appears filled with regularities that are at every instant the result of our biological and social histories.... to find a
via media: to understand the regularity of the world we are experiencing at every moment, but without any point of reference independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our descriptions and cognitive assertions. Indeed the whole mechanism of generating ourselves, as describers and observers tells us that our world, as the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will always have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that combination of solidity and shifting sand, so typical of human experience when we look at it up close."[
Tree of Knowledge, p. 241]
Enactivism also addresses the
hard problem of consciousness, referred to by Thompson as part of the
explanatory gap in explaining how consciousness and subjective experience are related to brain and body.
[16] "The problem with the dualistic concepts of consciousness and life in standard formulations of the hard problem is that they exclude each other by construction".
[17] Instead, according to Thompson's view of enactivism, the study of consciousness or
phenomenology as exemplified by
Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty is to complement science and its objectification of the world. "The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression" (Merleau-Ponty,
The phenomenology of perception as quoted by Thompson, p. 165). In this interpretation, enactivism asserts that science is formed or enacted as part of humankind's interactivity with its world, and by embracing phenomenology "science itself is properly situated in relation to the rest of human life and is thereby secured on a sounder footing."
[18][19] . . . . .
continues at
Enactivism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia