Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Soupie]

"I think there is something about his argument that I am missing. Any help would be appreciated."

This paper is rather brief. I suggest reading the other papers of his that he recommends for further clarification in his notes and bibliography. Or maybe searching out in C&P earlier links to and discussions of reflexive monism.

I'm glad you linked this delightful paper; I hadn't come across it before.

I haven't read Velmans' books, but I have read several papers and explanations of his Reflexive Monism. It it not clear to me how Reflexive Monism differs from the phenomenal internalism account. For instance Velmans says:

The reflexive model then adds what the subject actually experiences to the model, namely a phenomenal cat out in the world. Central to the model is the recognition that an entity in the external world is (reflexively) experienced by the subject to be a phenomenal object in the external world, not in the brain as reductionism would have it and not “in the soul” as the ancients supposed...​

The underlined assertion is absurd. I don't know any phenomenal internalist who would argue that people experience objects to be in the brain. Ridiculous.

As Sheldrake notes, this is an ancient problem, and one ancient solution was that some extromissive physical influence emanates from the eyes to light up or otherwise influence the world. Given the evidence from staring experiments in Sheldrake (2005a), this is a view that he adopts himself in Sheldrake (2005b). In the reflexive model, however, “perceptual projection” simply refers to an empirically observable effect, for example, to the fact that this print seems to be out here on this page and not in your brain. In short, perceptual projection is an effect that requires explanation; perceptual projection is not itself an explanation. We know that preconscious processes within the brain produce consciously experienced events that may be subjectively located and extended in the phenomenal space beyond the brain, but we don’t really know how this is done. We also know that this effect is subjective, psychological and viewable only from a first-person perspective. In the reflexive model, nothing physical is assumed to project from the brain. This raises a vexing question: some experiences might seem to be beyond the brain, but if they are not physically “projected”, are such experiences really where they seem?
​

Again, re the underlined statement, I don't see how Reflexive Monism differs from "standard" phenomenal internalism. Ie, experience of self, the world, and self-in-the-world, is generated in the brain and is perceptually (but not physically) projected/mapped onto/into the external real world.

My effort here is not to argue for or against external and internal approaches to consciousness, but to undertand how Velmans distinguishes his RM from phenomenal internalist approaches.

 

[Soupie]

@smcder @Constance I think the two of you in particular would appreciate the following long read. In this paper, Langlitz urges his fellow anthropologists, who—like him—favor externalist, extended mind approaches to consciousness, to consider the phenomena of dreaming and what this means for externalist and internalist approaches to consciousness.

He goes into depth regarding the social and political ramifications and motivations of internalist approaches to consciousness as well.

I learned a few things from this paper; that the concept of pure consciousness is supportive of the internalist, biological approach to consciousness; and that the assertion that all contents of consciousness are "about something" or intentional is contra to the internalist, biological approach.

http://www.nicolaslanglitz.de/nicol...es/Langlitz_VATTED DREAMS_JRAI_manuscript.pdf

 

[smcder]

I haven't read Velmans' books, but I have read several papers and explanations of his Reflexive Monism. It it not clear to me how Reflexive Monism differs from the phenomenal internalism account. For instance Velmans says:

The reflexive model then adds what the subject actually experiences to the model, namely a phenomenal cat out in the world. Central to the model is the recognition that an entity in the external world is (reflexively) experienced by the subject to be a phenomenal object in the external world, not in the brain as reductionism would have it and not “in the soul” as the ancients supposed...​

The underlined assertion is absurd. I don't know any phenomenal internalist who would argue that people experience objects to be in the brain. Ridiculous.

As Sheldrake notes, this is an ancient problem, and one ancient solution was that some extromissive physical influence emanates from the eyes to light up or otherwise influence the world. Given the evidence from staring experiments in Sheldrake (2005a), this is a view that he adopts himself in Sheldrake (2005b). In the reflexive model, however, “perceptual projection” simply refers to an empirically observable effect, for example, to the fact that this print seems to be out here on this page and not in your brain. In short, perceptual projection is an effect that requires explanation; perceptual projection is not itself an explanation. We know that preconscious processes within the brain produce consciously experienced events that may be subjectively located and extended in the phenomenal space beyond the brain, but we don’t really know how this is done. We also know that this effect is subjective, psychological and viewable only from a first-person perspective. In the reflexive model, nothing physical is assumed to project from the brain. This raises a vexing question: some experiences might seem to be beyond the brain, but if they are not physically “projected”, are such experiences really where they seem?
​

Again, re the underlined statement, I don't see how Reflexive Monism differs from "standard" phenomenal internalism. Ie, experience of self, the world, and self-in-the-world, is generated in the brain and is perceptually (but not physically) projected/mapped onto/into the external real world.

My effort here is not to argue for or against external and internal approaches to consciousness, but to undertand how Velmans distinguishes his RM from phenomenal internalist approaches.

@Soupie writes:

The reflexive model then adds what the subject actually experiences to the model, namely a phenomenal cat out in the world. Central to the model is the recognition that an entity in the external world is (reflexively) experienced by the subject to be a phenomenal object in the external world, not in the brain as reductionism would have it and not “in the soul” as the ancients supposed...​

The underlined assertion is absurd. I don't know any phenomenal internalist who would argue that people experience objects to be in the brain. Ridiculous.

What is the difference in "phenomenal obect" and "objects" in the two phrases below? If any?

1. an entity in the external world is experienced by the subject to be a phenomenal object in the external world, not in the brain as reductionism would have it

and

2. people experience objects to be in the brain

 

[smcder]

Secondly, we don’t have any experience of the object in our brains in addition to the object as perceived out in the world. The perceived objects are what we experience—and in terms oftheir phenomenology, an object as perceived and our experience of the object are one and the same. When looking at this print, for example, the print that one sees out here on the page is the only “print experience” that one has. So naïve realism is wrong in two ways—it is neither consistent with third person science, nor first person experience. How then are we to make sense of the fact that objects seem to be “out there” while our brainsand what they contain are, so to speak, “over here”?

The immediate question then is how would naive realism have ever come up as a view if it's inconsistent with first person experience?

When looking at this print, for example, the print that one sees out here on the page is the only “print experience” that one has.

If that were strictly true, then how would anyone ever make a mistake about it? We wouldn't even notice it.

How then are we to make sense of the fact that objects seem to be “out there” while our brains and what they contain are, so to speak, “over here”?

But our experience of our brains and what they contain is based on what we "know" or believe about the brain.

Central to the model is the recognition that an entity in the external world is (reflexively) experienced by the subject to be a phenomenal object in the external world, not in the brain as reductionism would have it and not “in the soul” as the ancients supposed—in the same way that this print is seen to be out here on this page. In short, when attending to the cat, the subject experiences more or less what the external observer experiences when he looks at the cat. The subject just sees it from a different angle.

The way I read this is not that Velmans says reductionists experience objects in the brain, but that they think of experiences as being in the brain - and this is what Velman's is trying to correct ... it's something that may be harder for us to see since we've looked at this from so many different ways ... but when he wrote this paper I think he was arguing against a dominant and assumed model that he said didn't make sense when you looked at it and at your own experience.

 

[smcder]

Have you read the paper from Lehar?

http://www.dartmouth.edu/~petertse/bladerunnerNEW.pdf

after the paper there is an "Open Peer Commentary" that includes Velmans response.

 

[Soupie]

What is the difference in "phenomenal obect" and "objects" in the two phrases below? If any?

1. an entity in the external world is experienced by the subject to be a phenomenal object in the external world, not in the brain as reductionism would have it

and

2. people experience objects to be in the brain

I don't think there is a difference.

(However, in (1.), if we want to be picky, I'd point out that people don't experience entities in the external world to be "phenomenal" objects in the external world. They experience them to simply be objects in the external world.)

 

[Soupie]

Have you read the paper from Lehar?

http://www.dartmouth.edu/~petertse/bladerunnerNEW.pdf

after the paper there is an "Open Peer Commentary" that includes Velmans response.

I havent but I will. Thanks.

The immediate question then is how would naive realism have ever come up as a view if it's inconsistent with first person experience?

Yes, I had that same thought/question when reading that. I didnt think it followed.

The way I read this is not that Velmans says reductionists experience objects in the brain, but that they think of experiences as being in the brain - and this is what Velman's is trying to correct ... it's something that may be harder for us to see since we've looked at this from so many different ways ... but when he wrote this paper I think he was arguing against a dominant and assumed model that he said didn't make sense when you looked at it and at your own experience.

Ok, but then I don't see how his own RM offers a different way of thinking about experience/consciousness. He seems to endorse the idea that experience is instantiated in the brain and then: perceptual projection.

He never quite defines/explains PP, but notes that it does not involve anything physical being projected from the brain into real external reality.

Is it possible Velmans is suggesting that some type of phenomenal substance is projected from the brain out into/onto external reality?

 

[smcder]

I don't think there is a difference.

(However, in (1.), if we want to be picky, I'd point out that people don't experience entities in the external world to be "phenomenal" objects in the external world. They experience them to simply be objects in the external world.)

(We can be picky if we like.) Why not? Couldn't we shift our sense of things and experience entities in the external world to be "phenomenal" objects in the external world? Would you think some philosophers already do? I am doing it right now ... I think.

 

[smcder]

I havent but I will. Thanks.


Yes, I had that same thought/question when reading that. I didnt think it followed.


Ok, but then I don't see how his own RM offers a different way of thinking about experience/consciousness. He seems to endorse the idea that experience is instantiated in the brain and then: perceptual projection.

He never quite defines/explains PP, but notes that it does not involve anything physical being projected from the brain into real external reality.

Is it possible Velmans is suggesting that some type of phenomenal substance is projected from the brain out into/onto external reality?

Is it possible Velmans is suggesting that some type of phenomenal substance is projected from the brain out into/onto external reality

No I don't think so.

I think the paper above may also include his response to others comments, maybe he has replied to Velmans' reply ... earlier in that paper, he writes:

"Another modern theorist, Max Velmans (1990), revived an ancient notion of perception as something projecting out of the head into the world, as proposed by Empedocles and promoted by Malebranche. But Velmans refined this ancient notion with the critical realist proviso that nothing physical actually gets projected from the head; the only thing that is projected is conscious experience, a subjective quality that is undetectable externally by scientific means."

BUT Velmans complains in his response that Lehar doesn't do a good job of representing him.

*Lehar's response to his critics begins on p. 56

 

[Soupie]

I found the following to be anpretty quick, helpful paper:

https://college.lclark.edu/live/files/13713-bryce--representational-and-hard-problempdf

I don't agree with all the thought experiments, but the overall conclusion seems right.

Author talks about the cases for content externalism and content internalism, and how both might relate to representationalism.

@Pharoah, would HCT be considered a content externalist or content internalist approach to consciousness? Either way, you might be interested to read the author's conclusion about what these approaches say about the HP.

 

[Soupie]

Is it possible Velmans is suggesting that some type of phenomenal substance is projected from the brain out into/onto external reality

No I don't think so.

I think the paper above may also include his response to others comments, maybe he has replied to Velmans' reply ... earlier in that paper, he writes:

"Another modern theorist, Max Velmans (1990), revived an ancient notion of perception as something projecting out of the head into the world, as proposed by Empedocles and promoted by Malebranche. But Velmans refined this ancient notion with the critical realist proviso that nothing physical actually gets projected from the head; the only thing that is projected is conscious experience, a subjective quality that is undetectable externally by scientific means."

BUT Velmans complains in his response that Lehar doesn't do a good job of representing him.

*Lehar's response to his critics begins on p. 56

Hm, but I came away with the same sense as Lehar. If Velmans asserts that conscious experience supervenes on the brain alone, but that conscious experience exists outside the real skull by way of perceptual projection, then it would seem that Velmans is endorsing the idea that conscious experience can move through physical space. Ie, it eminates from the brain out into/onto real spacetime.

Ill have to look for a richer explanation of Velmans' position.

 

[smcder]

"Stick your hands on your head. Is that the real physical skull thatyou feel or is that just a phenomenal skull inside your brain? . . .If we live in an inside-out world, as Lehar suggests, the skullthat we feel outside our brain is actually inside our brain, andthe real skull is outside the farthest reaches of the phenomenalworld, beyond the dome of the sky . . . Our real skulls are bigger than the experienced universe. Lehar admits that this possibility is “incredible.” I think it is absurd."


Lehar: And with this, I believe, Velmans touches on the principalreason this alternative has been given so little consideration. I am viscerally sympathetic with this objection, so much so that for years I too refused to accept the conclusion toward which all of the evidence points.

• It is indeed incredible to think that your physical head is larger than the dome of the sky.

But science has discovered many things whichwere initially considered to be at least equally incredible; like the vastness of the universe, and its cataclysmic genesis from a singularity in space and time, and the bizarre nature of black holes and of quantum phenomena. All of these theories were initially held to be incredible but have since been accepted as established fact. And the reason they were accepted is not that they became any less incredible. Scientific fact is accepted on the basis of the evidence, regardless of the incredible truth to which that evidence points. In fact, that is exactly what gives science the power to discover unexpected or incredible truth: When the obvious explanation is blocked by chronic paradoxes, it is time to give the seemingly incredible alternative a serious look.

 

[smcder]

Hm, but I came away with the same sense as Lehar. If Velmans asserts that conscious experience supervenes on the brain alone, but that conscious experience exists outside the real skull by way of perceptual projection, then it would seem that Velmans is endorsing the idea that conscious experience can move through physical space. Ie, it eminates from the brain out into/onto real spacetime.

Ill have to look for a richer explanation of Velmans' position.

from Velmans "Are we out of our minds?"

In the reflexive model, nothing physical is assumed to project from the brain.4

4 Although we don’t have a full understanding of how perceptual projection works, there is a large experimental literature about the information that is used by the brain to model distance and location. There are also many ways to demonstrate perceptual projection in action, for example inhallucinations, phantom limbs, stereoscopic pictures, holograms, and virtual realities. I have discussed this literature elsewhere, along with some potentially useful models to explain it (holography and virtual reality) in Velmans (1990, 1993, 1998b, 2000).

 

[Soupie]

Why not? Couldn't we shift our sense of things and experience entities in the external world to be "phenomenal" objects in the external world? Would you think some philosophers already do? I am doing it right now ... I think.

I think we could in certain situations. For example, if you are seeing an optical illusion, its possible to "experience" it as a "phenomenal" object (and object that your brain is generating).

Ex I was once hiking up the long slope of the side of a mountain. In front of me i could see a large black object hovering in the air a few feet off the ground. I thought nothing of it and figured what it was would become clear as i got closer. In fact it didnt and the dog i was with started to bark at it. I couldnt for the life of me figure out what it was. only when we started to walk way around the object did i see that it was the bottom root ball/trunk of a tree that had toppled over in a storm. It was held off the ground by the trunk the was parallel with the upward slope of the mountain.

Anyhow, in the case, i did wonder if i was hallucinating, ie, seeing a phenomnal object. However, in typical waking experience, inthinkmits a stretch to imagine even the hardest core phenomenal internalists as experience all the experiences as being "only" phenomenal and not real, direct reality.

I am viscerally sympathetic with this objection, so much so that for years I too refused to accept the conclusion toward which all of the evidence points.

• It is indeed incredible to think that your physical head is larger than the dome of the sky.

But if I understand Lehar and other phenomenal internalists, they statement should actually be:

It is indeed incredible to think that your physical head is larger than the [phenomenal] dome of the sky.

That is, the physical skull is not larger than the physical dome of the sky. But, yes, regardless, it is without a doubt a concept which does not correspond to our experience.

 

[smcder]

I think we could in certain situations. For example, if you are seeing an optical illusion, its possible to "experience" it as a "phenomenal" object (and object that your brain is generating).

Ex I was once hiking up the long slope of the side of a mountain. In front of me i could see a large black object hoovering in the air a few feet off the ground. I thought nothing of it and figured what it was would become clear as i got closer. In fact it didnt and the dog i was with started to bark at it. I couldnt for the life of me figure out what it was. only when we started to walk way around the object did i see that it was the bottom root ball/trunk of a tree that had toppled over in a storm. It was held off the ground by the trunk the was parallel with the upward slope of the mountain.

Anyhow, in the case, i did wonder if i was hallucinating, ie, seeing a phenomnal object. However, in typical waking experience, inthinkmits a stretch to imagine even the hardest core phenomenal internalists as experience all the experiences as being "only" phenomenal and not real, direct reality.


But if I understand Lehar and other phenomenal internalists, they statement should actually be:

It is indeed incredible to think that your physical head is larger than the [phenomenal] dome of the sky.

That is, the physical skull is not larger than the physical dome of the sky. But, yes, regardless, it is without a doubt a concept which does not correspond to our experience.

This is what Lehar says in response to Velmans:

Lehar: And with this, I believe, Velmans touches on the principalreason this alternative has been given so little consideration. I am viscerally sympathetic with this objection, so much so that for years I too refused to accept the conclusion toward which all of the evidence points.

• It is indeed incredible to think that your physical head is larger than the dome of the sky.

But science has discovered many things which were initially considered to be at least equally incredible; like the vastness of the universe, and its cataclysmic genesis from a singularity in space and time, and the bizarre nature of black holes and of quantum phenomena. All of these theories were initially held to be incredible but have since been accepted as established fact. And the reason they were accepted is not that they became any less incredible. Scientific fact is accepted on the basis of the evidence, regardless of the incredible truth to which that evidence points. In fact, that is exactly what gives science the power to discover unexpected or incredible truth: When the obvious explanation is blocked by chronic paradoxes, it is time to give the seemingly incredible alternative a serious look.

 

[smcder]

I think we could in certain situations. For example, if you are seeing an optical illusion, its possible to "experience" it as a "phenomenal" object (and object that your brain is generating).

Ex I was once hiking up the long slope of the side of a mountain. In front of me i could see a large black object hovering in the air a few feet off the ground. I thought nothing of it and figured what it was would become clear as i got closer. In fact it didnt and the dog i was with started to bark at it. I couldnt for the life of me figure out what it was. only when we started to walk way around the object did i see that it was the bottom root ball/trunk of a tree that had toppled over in a storm. It was held off the ground by the trunk the was parallel with the upward slope of the mountain.

Anyhow, in the case, i did wonder if i was hallucinating, ie, seeing a phenomnal object. However, in typical waking experience, inthinkmits a stretch to imagine even the hardest core phenomenal internalists as experience all the experiences as being "only" phenomenal and not real, direct reality.


But if I understand Lehar and other phenomenal internalists, they statement should actually be:

It is indeed incredible to think that your physical head is larger than the [phenomenal] dome of the sky.

That is, the physical skull is not larger than the physical dome of the sky. But, yes, regardless, it is without a doubt a concept which does not correspond to our experience.

However, in typical waking experience, inthinkmits a stretch to imagine even the hardest core phenomenal internalists as experience all the experiences as being "only" phenomenal and not real, direct reality.

Typical waking experience for who? I think you would if you grew up in a culture where experience is "only" phenomenal and not "real, direct reality" and there may well be or have been such cultures - the language would support this. And the very idea of a "real, direct reality" is the one our culture embraces now - your typical waking experience is instantiated and reinforced by language, culture, the people around you - experiences you've had and have not - brain function, etc ... there is no standard model human experience off the line free from those influences.

 

[Soupie]

This is what Lehar says in response to Velmans:

Lehar: And with this, I believe, Velmans touches on the principalreason this alternative has been given so little consideration. I am viscerally sympathetic with this objection, so much so that for years I too refused to accept the conclusion toward which all of the evidence points.

• It is indeed incredible to think that your physical head is larger than the dome of the sky.

But science has discovered many things which were initially considered to be at least equally incredible; like the vastness of the universe, and its cataclysmic genesis from a singularity in space and time, and the bizarre nature of black holes and of quantum phenomena. All of these theories were initially held to be incredible but have since been accepted as established fact. And the reason they were accepted is not that they became any less incredible. Scientific fact is accepted on the basis of the evidence, regardless of the incredible truth to which that evidence points. In fact, that is exactly what gives science the power to discover unexpected or incredible truth: When the obvious explanation is blocked by chronic paradoxes, it is time to give the seemingly incredible alternative a serious look.

I'm not sure if you saw my response (with slight correction) to this.

Even if phenomenal internalism is correct (and that is certainly my current approach) it still does not touch the HP.

But as you've said, smcder, you don't think the current approaches to consciousness are radical enough! The resolve the HP (i dont think it will "solved") will surely involve some type of paradigm shift. Somehow, someway, our current models of what-is are wrong. The question is just how wrong are they? A thrilling thought.

 

[smcder]

And as for waking experience, you have to subtract out:

daydreaming, distraction, television watching, internet time, periods of intense focus, highway hypnosis, natural variations in brain waves throughout the day in terms of wakefulness, the influence of coffee and other every day drugs - language can also alter consciousness and attention - so just when and for how long are we in a "typical" waking consciousness?

 

[Soupie]

Typical waking experience for who? I think you would if you grew up in a culture where experience is "only" phenomenal and not "real, direct reality" and there may well be or have been such cultures - the language would support this.

Interesting. I would say for an individual from any culture I'm aware ever existed. Which peoples/culture are tou refering to? Aboriginal dreamtime? Or the Buddhist maya?

It will be interesting to see if the phenomenal internalist apporach gains more ground if/when virtual reality use because mainstream.

 

[Soupie]

And as for waking experience, you have to subtract out:

daydreaming, distraction, television watching, internet time, periods of intense focus, highway hypnosis, natural variations in brain waves throughout the day in terms of wakefulness, the influence of coffee and other every day drugs - language can also alter consciousness and attention - so just when and for how long are we in a "typical" waking consciousness?

I would include all those states as normal waking experience.