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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 7

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Mark Tildens walkman was built from ... A walkman. Strictly analog.

Now ... Hobby Robotics is possible at $100 with microcontrol... But a second salvage renaissance is coming when these state of the art kits become ebay fodder for hackers.

Also:

$10 Robot Design Challenge - African Robotics Network (AFRON)

We are very good at this ... At tinkering ... Hacking
.
. and Now we are in exactly the same position with philosophy: lots of metaphysical salvage is possible.
 
1. If I make a cs decision to x ... Then consciousness is an essential part ... a by definition part of that process.

2. Not all decisions, even complex ones, have a conscious aspect.

3. What's the difference in 1 & 2? Can any decision involve OR not involve cs? If yes ... What justifies the biologically expensive (and relatively slow) involvement of "higher" cortical functions? If no ... If we can say that and even which/what kind of decisions require cs ... Then what does cs do?

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Learning calculus was 99% uncs for me ... The conscious experience was not a step by step moving from prior to current understanding but a gappy series of jumps to new understandings as a new state ... i.e. I was not then able to go back and forth to previous states of not understanding.

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But understanding couldn't occur without the conscious experiences I did have:

"Wow! That's tough... Now wait ... Hmmm ... What??? Ohhhhh
.. Now I see."

Which didn't seem immediately essential to the understanding I gained as that was ucs... Don't jump in with EF Soupie... You can't guide what you don't understand... Yet we often know when we are about to get something.



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This is the problem with formal algorithms for problem solving ... And the quality of thought of those who use them is immediately recognizable.

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That's a sample of the discussion around "free will" experiments. Statements about what's "scientifically proven" should always be very qualified ... I think such statements can almost always be replaced by descriptions of the experiments. So instead of "it's been scientifically proven that" ... We can say: here is an experiment - link to the experiment - ... And then discussion:

What do the author's conclude? Competing interpretations? Has the experiment been replicated? What's the literature review? (In the case of Libet - the lit is extensive)...

Basically, anytime you hear "it's scientifically proven that" you should get a red flag experience that it could be a rhetorical/authoritarian move.

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I'm not sure I follow this completely but it seems that you are talking about self-regulation i.e. Executive functioning.

For the most part, the organism is able to go about its business in an "automatic" fashion. However, perhaps in novel situations or highly ambiguous situations, the meta-cognitive executive self must be recruited and takes the reigns. It is when this executive self/process is engaged that the sense of will emerges.

Notably there are psychiatric disorders in which there are abnormalities with the sense of will.

It's interesting to consider this in light of consciousness. In the article above and other articles I've shared, the predictive processing approach to perception could shed some light.

The researchers point to early evidence that conscious experience correlates with the predictions of the brain rather than the raw sensory information.

When the executive system is engaged and our behaviors align with our predicted behaviors, we consciously experience agency/will.

When our behaviors do not align with our predicted behaviors, a sense of external agency emerges. There is speculation that this is what happens in schizophrenia.

This also reminds me, @scmder of a phenomenon you described here sometime ago. You said that if one stares at a pot of heated water and "wills" it to boil, that when it does boil a strong sense of agency over the boiling of the water emerges.
A "strong sense of agency" doesn't just form or occur ... Rather I said one can form a sense of willing the water to boil.

If it just "formed" then we'd feel like we caused everything that happened to us. That doesnt work! But you know what does? Feeling like everything happens to you. Not just schizophrenics but athletes in flow report this. And I can turn this feeling on and off ... at will. ;-)

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But understanding couldn't occur without the conscious experiences I did have:

"Wow! That's tough... Now wait ... Hmmm ... What??? Ohhhhh
.. Now I see."

Which didn't seem immediately essential to the understanding I gained as that was ucs... Don't jump in with EF Soupie... You can't guide what you don't understand... Yet we often know when we are about to get something.

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I'm not conflating EF and consciousness. And I'm not suggesting that consciousness is an executive function.

I don't think consciousness has a physical function. In my (current) way of thinking, consciousness is more fundamental than the physical, which is a product of our perceptual system.

So while consciousness may have a cause, it won't be a physical cause.

Ive been wanting to speculate some more in the metaphysics of consciousness.

Velmens has framed theories of consciousness into two categories: continuous and discontinuous.

Continuous theories posit that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the universe. It has no physical cause nor does it emerge from physical causes.

Discontinuous theories on the other hold that consciousness either has a physical cause and/or emerges from physical processes.

As chalmers has illustrated with his explication of the hard problem, there are major problems with discontinuous theories. We've covered those extensively in this long discussion.

I'm skeptical of discontinuous theories for two main reasons: (1) consciousness does not appear to be physical and thus cannot have a physical cause, and (2) the perceived physical features of reality are products of the human perceptual system and are thus only indirectly related to reality.

However, there are also problems with continuous theories.

Namely, despite the metaphysical problems with discontinuous theories, consciousness does appear to be discontinuous!

Phenomenologically, my memories of experience only extend back so far leading me to believe there was a time when my consciousness did not exist (namely before I was born), I've also undergone anesthesia twice during which I had absolutely zero conscious experience, and I also frequently have dreamless sleep when consciousness is not present.

How can consciousness be continuous and simultaneously discontinuous?

A la Hoffman, and emerging paradigms in the field of perception, we can recognize that reality and our perception of reality are distinct. I'll refer to reality as what-is and our conscious perception of reality as the user interface.

We can say that continuous theories of consciousness do not work in what-is nor the user interface. If consciousness were continuous, then it would never cease, not even for a moment. But it does as described above.

If one would argue that consciousness does indeed always exist but not in the form of a POV, then one would have to tackle the combination problem. How does non-POV consciousness form into POV consciousness?

Secondly, discontinuous theories of consciousness run straight into the hard problem. However, this is only a problem for physical discontinuous theories. That is, there are no physical theories approaching an explanation of how consciousness could be caused by or emerge from physical processes.

However, discontinuous theories are still available for approaches such as Hoffman's which deny that the fundamental substrate of what-is is physical/material.

Discontinuous theories are therefore still on the table.

But if what-is is not fundamentally physical/material (i.e. Little billiard balls numbing into each other) what can we say about it?

Not very much I don't think. I think we can say that it evolves and differentiates. I think we can say it unfolds according to some laws/patterns. I don't know that it follows a causal flow as we conceive causality physically. And I don't know that it's determined.

I do think it's the level at which consciousness emerges and/or dissipates. However the laws governing the emergence and/or dissipation of consciousness are not the physical laws that appear in our user interface with what-is.

So I do think consciousness is discontinuous, but as consciousness exists at a level prior to the physical (which is a manifestation of our human perceptual system), the variables leading to its emergence are currently beyond us.

One note: the fact that conscious perception seems to correlate with top-down brain processes that are broadcasting a prediction of what the organism is perceiving in what-is is very fascinating.

However it still begs the question: what function does the consciousness serve? Couldn't a zombie conceivably have the same top-down brain processes albeit sans the consciousness?

But while the answer is yes, it's still exciting that neuroscientists are homing in on the brain processes most tightly correlated with conscious experience.
 
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We've been over it and its complex.
The discussions surrounding the issue are involved, but it still boils down to those two issues. The rest are belief based, e.g. involving religious factors which ultimately break down and therefore can be discarded. I've seen nothing coherent other than the idea that free will doesn't have to depend on conscious choices, but only the ability to act as agents ( as independent systems ). One of the counterpoints I'm frequently presented with is the idea that our ability to change our decisions nullifies the idea that we're not making conscious choices. That however changes nothing, because in reality the decision to change a previous decision is also being made subconsciously.
 
The discussions surrounding the issue are involved, but it still boils down to those two issues. The rest are belief based, e.g. involving religious factors which ultimately break down and therefore can be discarded. I've seen nothing coherent other than the idea that free will doesn't have to depend on conscious choices, but only the ability to act as agents ( as independent systems ). One of the counterpoints I'm frequently presented with is the idea that our ability to change our decisions nullifies the idea that we're not making conscious choices. That however changes nothing, because in reality the decision to change a previous decision is also being made subconsciously.
Lol

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I'm not conflating EF and consciousness. And I'm not suggesting that consciousness is an executive function.

I don't think consciousness has a physical function. In my (current) way of thinking, consciousness is more fundamental than the physical, which is a product of our perceptual system.

So while consciousness may have a cause, it won't be a physical cause.

Ive been wanting to speculate some more in the metaphysics of consciousness.

Velmens has framed theories of consciousness into two categories: continuous and discontinuous.

Continuous theories posit that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the universe. It has no physical cause nor does it emerge from physical causes.

Discontinuous theories on the other hold that consciousness either has a physical cause and/or emerges from physical processes.

As chalmers has illustrated with his explication of the hard problem, there are major problems with discontinuous theories. We've covered those extensively in this long discussion.

I'm skeptical of discontinuous theories for two main reasons: (1) consciousness does not appear to be physical and thus cannot have a physical cause, and (2) the perceived physical features of reality are products of the human perceptual system and are thus only indirectly related to reality.

However, there are also problems with continuous theories.

Namely, despite the metaphysical problems with discontinuous theories, consciousness does appear to be discontinuous!

Phenomenologically, my memories of experience only extend back so far leading me to believe there was a time when my consciousness did not exist (namely before I was born), I've also undergone anesthesia twice during which I had absolutely zero conscious experience, and I also frequently have dreamless sleep when consciousness is not present.

How can consciousness be continuous and simultaneously discontinuous?

A la Hoffman, and emerging paradigms in the field of perception, we can recognize that reality and our perception of reality are distinct. I'll refer to reality as what-is and our conscious perception of reality as the user interface.

We can say that continuous theories of consciousness do not work in what-is nor the user interface. If consciousness were continuous, then it would never cease, not even for a moment. But it does as described above.

If one would argue that consciousness does indeed always exist but not in the form of a POV, then one would have to tackle the combination problem. How does non-POV consciousness form into POV consciousness?

Secondly, discontinuous theories of consciousness run straight into the hard problem. However, this is only a problem for physical discontinuous theories. That is, there are no physical theories approaching an explanation of how consciousness could be caused by or emerge from physical processes.

However, discontinuous theories are still available for approaches such as Hoffman's which deny that the fundamental substrate of what-is is physical/material.

Discontinuous theories are therefore still on the table.

But if what-is is not fundamentally physical/material (i.e. Little billiard balls numbing into each other) what can we say about it?

Not very much I don't think. I think we can say that it evolves and differentiates. I think we can say it unfolds according to some laws/patterns. I don't know that it follows a causal flow as we conceive causality physically. And I don't know that it's determined.

I do think it's the level at which consciousness emerges and/or dissipates. However the laws governing the emergence and/or dissipation of consciousness are not the physical laws that appear in our user interface with what-is.

So I do think consciousness is discontinuous, but as consciousness exists at a level prior to the physical (which is a manifestation of our human perceptual system), the variables leading to its emergence are currently beyond us.

One note: the fact that conscious perception seems to correlate with top-down brain processes that are broadcasting a prediction of what the organism is perceiving in what-is is very fascinating.

However it still begs the question: what function does the consciousness serve? Couldn't a zombie conceivably have the same top-down brain processes albeit sans the consciousness?

But while the answer is yes, it's still exciting that neuroscientists are homing in on the brain processes most tightly correlated with conscious experience.
Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness —

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The discussions surrounding the issue are involved, but it still boils down to those two issues. The rest are belief based, e.g. involving religious factors which ultimately break down and therefore can be discarded. I've seen nothing coherent other than the idea that free will doesn't have to depend on conscious choices, but only the ability to act as agents ( as independent systems ). One of the counterpoints I'm frequently presented with is the idea that our ability to change our decisions nullifies the idea that we're not making conscious choices. That however changes nothing, because in reality the decision to change a previous decision is also being made subconsciously.
Unfalsifiable hypotheses are the best!
Lol

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... So while consciousness may have a cause, it won't be a physical cause ...
That depends entirely on your definition of "physical". For a number of people, physical = material ( has weight, density, mass etc. ). However for others, especially in the context of a philosophical discussion like this one, the word "physical" might be taken as a reference to Physicalism, which, depending on the particular version one adopts, is something much more inclusive, and renders the kinds of objections raised in the rest of your post irrelevant ( as points in this particular context - nothing to do with the quality of your post ).
 
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The discussions surrounding the issue are involved, but it still boils down to those two issues. The rest are belief based, e.g. involving religious factors which ultimately break down and therefore can be discarded. I've seen nothing coherent other than the idea that free will doesn't have to depend on conscious choices, but only the ability to act as agents ( as independent systems ). One of the counterpoints I'm frequently presented with is the idea that our ability to change our decisions nullifies the idea that we're not making conscious choices. That however changes nothing, because in reality the decision to change a previous decision is also being made subconsciously.
All of which output is subject to subconscious pre-processing and therefore not subject to conscious scrutiny and therefore can't be rationally verified ... Go argue it out with Searle.

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That depends entirely on your definition of "physical". For a number of people, physical = material ( has weight, density, mass etc. ). However for others, especially in the context of a philosophical discussion like this one, the word "physical" might be taken as a reference to Physicalism, which, depending on which particular version one adopts, is something much more inclusive, and renders the kinds of objections raised in the rest of your post irrelevant.
You've trotted that one out many times! :-)

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Unfalsifiable hypotheses are the best!
In what respect do you see what I was saying as unfalsifiable? You mean this:
All of which output is subject to subconscious pre-processing and therefore not subject to conscious scrutiny and therefore can't be rationally verified ... Go argue it out with Searle.
That has no bearing. Rational verification doesn't have to be in real-time. It can be done after-the-fact, and is usually done after-the-fact, which is why it's called "verification".
 
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In what respect do you see what I was saying as unfalsifiable?
Oh that old trick! I call it R5...because its the fifth most often used one in your bag of tricks ... YOU prove it. ;-)

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In what respect do you see what I was saying as unfalsifiable? You mean this:

That has no bearing. Rational verification doesn't have to be in real-time. It can be done after-the-fact, and is usually done after-the-fact, which is why it's called "verification".
Go see Searle.

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I know that some neurophenomenologists such s Thompson have suggested that so-called dreamless sleep is not sans consciousness. (Thompson holds an emergentist approach to consciousness btw.)

However, the dissolution of consciousness during anesthesia and more so it's apparent absence and subsequent emergence as the fetus develops into a child still hold. Certain vegetative states can be noted as well.
 
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