Yes, I'll read Strawson's paper but after a bit of poking around Wikipedia it seems that whether one is a materialist, idealist, or dualist matters greatly in their meaning of Direct Realism.
For example, it seems that some believe that perception based on physiological changes in response to environmental events is a form of representationalism and thus a form of Indirect Realism (which has always been my understating).
In the paper Steve linked last night Strawson clarifies what Direct Realism is in contrasting it with the conceptions of the relationship of consciousness/mind and world that have been proposed by earlier Western philosophers, which have presented different and developing ideas about the directness or indirectness of the relationship of conscious beings with the worlds in which they find themselves existing. I think reading this paper, in conjunction with re-reading the papers by Pierre Le Morvan and Kafatos, will enable our reaching a mutual understanding of the grounds for their shared theory of Direct Realism as distinguished from various forms of Indirect Realism and 'Naive Realism'. The insights of phenomenological philosophy have inspired and guided all three of these authors. Among the things we need to understand at the outset is the difference between ' phenomenalism' and 'phenomenology', which Strawson develops in this new paper Steve linked last night.
Two further things we need to understand are, first, the extent to which what you refer to as 'physiological changes' occurring in contact with natural things {and other consciousnesses} in the individual's environment are not merely objectively described mechanical processes but also involve incrementally accumulating knowledge. As Strawson writes concerning the nature of directly felt experience in/of the environing world, 'having it is knowing', and this begins in prereflective consciousness. And second, we need to get clear about the differences between 'representation' and 'presentation' in the experiential contact that both preconscious and conscious living beings have with things and gestalts presented to them through the natural affordances of their senses and their embodied conditions of being as consciousnesses.
Whereas the author we'be been reading says no, but only in the case of TQ is IR invoked.
However, the author of the current paper seems to be a physicalist.
So it seems perhaps that whether one characterized perception as direct or indirect is contingent on whether they are a monist or a dualist?
The more we approach the developing understanding of embodied consciousness the less able we are to accept dualism. Kafatos overcomes dualistic thinking in his scientifically informed analysis of interaction and integration recognizable in quantum mechanics and field theory. The paper I'll link below develops a similar approach in terms of 'chirality' in nature as recognized and explained in the later works of Merleau-Ponty. We might add this paper to our core reading as we continue to work out the nature of consciousness (and thus of mind) as based in direct contact with 'what-is' as presented originarily in the awareness and affectivity of primordial forms of life early in the evolution of life on this planet.
The Chirality of Being: Exploring a Merleau-Ponteian Ontology of Sense
David Morris, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University, davimorr@alcor.concordia.caconcordia.academia.edu/DavidMorris
Published in Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought 12 (2011): 165-182.
Opening paragraph:
“Being is. But being is also something, it is determinate. The problem of ontology is not only or so much saying how it is that being is, but how it is that being is determinate: how being has orientations, senses, meanings, differences that make a difference, rather than being an indifferent blank void of all sensible determinations. This paper explores the thought that being’s sense stems from an ‘ontological chirality,’ a kind of ontological difference with characteristics kin to differences between left and right hands. The concept of reversibility in Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology led me to this thought, so I begin by briefly showing how chirality lurks within reversibility—especially in a relation between activity and passivity that is crucial to reversibility. I then discuss results in chemistry, biology and geometry to illuminate the importance of chiral differences and to develop a definition of ontological chirality that connects with an ontology of sense. Reversibility, a concept central to Merleau-Ponty’s later works “Eye and Mind” (OE) and The Visible and the Invisible (VI), indicates both a relational structure and its ontology. For Merleau-Ponty the perceiver and the perceived in general are reversible. He often illustrates this with touch. . . . .”
https://www.academia.edu/452362/The_Chirality_of_Being_Exploring_a_Merleau-Ponteian_Ontology_of_Sense
Here is another paper I've come across (but have not yet read) that might add to our understanding of the project of 'naturalizing phenomenology', from which our current discussion has evolved:
Sami Pihlström
Journal of Philosophical Research 35:323-352 (2010)
Abstract
This paper examines the metaphysical status of the fact-value entanglement. According to Hilary Putnam, among others, this is a major theme in both classical and recent pragmatism, but its relevance obviously extends beyond pragmatism scholarship. The pragmatic naturalist must make sense of the entanglement thesis within a broadly non-reductively naturalist account of reality. Two rival options for such metaphysics are discussed: values may be claimed to emerge from facts (or normativity from factuality), or fact and value may be considered continuous. Thus, pragmatic naturalism about fact and value may be based on either emergentism or Peircean synechism. This is a crucial tension not only in pragmatist philosophy of value but in pragmatically naturalist metaphysics generally.
http://www.nordprag.org/papers/Pihlstrom - Pragmatic Metaphysics of the Fact-Value Entanglement.pdf
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