-
NEW! LOWEST RATES EVER -- SUPPORT THE SHOW AND ENJOY THE VERY BEST PREMIUM PARACAST EXPERIENCE! Welcome to The Paracast+, eight years young! For a low subscription fee, you can download the ad-free version of The Paracast and the exclusive, member-only, After The Paracast bonus podcast, featuring color commentary, exclusive interviews, the continuation of interviews that began on the main episode of The Paracast. We also offer lifetime memberships! Flash! Take advantage of our lowest rates ever! Act now! It's easier than ever to susbcribe! You can sign up right here!
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
- Start date
Free episodes:
- Status
A poem for humans . . .
Note on Moonlight
The one moonlight, in the simple-colored night,
Like a plain poet revolving in his mind
The sameness of his various universe,
Shines on the mere objectiveness of things.
It is as if being was to be observed,
As if, among the possible purposes
Of what one sees, the purpose that comes first,
The surface, is the purpose to be seen,
The property of the moon, what it evokes.
It is to disclose the essential presence, say,
Of a mountain, expanded and elevated almost
Into a sense, an object the less; or else
To disclose in the figure waiting on the road
An object the more, an undetermined form
Between the slouchings of a gunman and a lover,
A gesture in the dark, a fear one feels
In the great vistas of night air, that takes this form,
In the arbors that are as if of Saturn-star.
So, then, this warm, wide, weatherless quietude
Is active with a power, an inherent life,
In spite of the mere objectiveness of things,
Like a cloud-cap in the corner of a looking-glass,
A change of color in the plain poet's mind,
Night and silence disturbed by an interior sound,
The one moonlight, the various universe, intended
So much just to be seen -- a purpose, empty
Perhaps, absurd perhaps, but at least a purpose,
Certain and ever more fresh. Ah! Certain, for sure . . .
Wallace Stevens, The Rock (1954).
Note on Moonlight
The one moonlight, in the simple-colored night,
Like a plain poet revolving in his mind
The sameness of his various universe,
Shines on the mere objectiveness of things.
It is as if being was to be observed,
As if, among the possible purposes
Of what one sees, the purpose that comes first,
The surface, is the purpose to be seen,
The property of the moon, what it evokes.
It is to disclose the essential presence, say,
Of a mountain, expanded and elevated almost
Into a sense, an object the less; or else
To disclose in the figure waiting on the road
An object the more, an undetermined form
Between the slouchings of a gunman and a lover,
A gesture in the dark, a fear one feels
In the great vistas of night air, that takes this form,
In the arbors that are as if of Saturn-star.
So, then, this warm, wide, weatherless quietude
Is active with a power, an inherent life,
In spite of the mere objectiveness of things,
Like a cloud-cap in the corner of a looking-glass,
A change of color in the plain poet's mind,
Night and silence disturbed by an interior sound,
The one moonlight, the various universe, intended
So much just to be seen -- a purpose, empty
Perhaps, absurd perhaps, but at least a purpose,
Certain and ever more fresh. Ah! Certain, for sure . . .
Wallace Stevens, The Rock (1954).
re: the above poem, Stevens would have loved to follow the interdisciplinary field of Consciousness Studies developing in our time, which explores questions he posed continuously in his poetry concerning consciousness/mind, the fundamental nature of perception, and the history of human ideas about the nature of mind and world as integrated parts of what-is as we experience it. He reached in the later poems deeper and more significant insights into the nature of being as expressed in and by human being in our species' grappling with what he referred to as "the eloquences of light's faculties" and "the intricacies of appearance, when perceived."
smcder
Paranormal Adept
interesting ... one third is a huge number, there must be some significance in this ability not being distributed normally.
I believe the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus has this disorder - Prosopagnosia. I wonder about these sorts of things and what further effects they have and how the person might navigate around or compensate for them and perhaps gains some benefit from their absence ... similarly what abilities might underlie extraordinary talents?
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
I'm about 2/3 of the way through it. I have a few other longform materials that I'm juggling at the moment.
I'm finding Strawsons paper to be very helpful.
Here is the latest post at Phil of Brains:
Colour and the Problem of Consciousness
I'm not convinced by his arguments but then again haven't read his argument in full of course. (I find Strawsons Real Physicalism and DR to be more agreeable.) By suggesting that colors are mind-independent but also NOT physical properties of objects, he as noted seems to be introducing a TQ, no? But then he calls this direct Realism?
Sigh.
I would like to discuss Strawson's position RR and DR and pros and cons of it when I'm done.
smcder
Paranormal Adept
May be ... a tertium quid is:
"tertium quid (e.g., a reified appearance, sense-datum, sensum, idea, quality-instance, species) mediating between the mind and external physical objects or events."
Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Strawson:
All perception involves representation, so the defining claim of indirect realism can’t be that all perception involves representation. What is it? No surprise. It’s the claim that when one perceives an object, there is some palmary sense in which one directly perceives or makes direct mental contact with the mental representation of the object, not the object itself. This, just this, is the error—a conception of a subject, a representation, and an object which has the representation somehow located between the subject and the object. It conceives the representation as a representative of the object, as in a ‘parliamentary representative’. The subject deals with the object’s representative, not with the object itself. The subject perceives the representation, not the object itself.
To this direct realism simply replies that the subject doesn’t perceive the representation. Rather, and again, the subject’s being in the visual experiential state that constitutes its visually representing the object just is its seeing the object, given that the state is caused in the right kind of way for it to count as seeing.
All perception involves representation, so the defining claim of indirect realism can’t be that all perception involves representation. What is it? No surprise. It’s the claim that when one perceives an object, there is some palmary sense in which one directly perceives or makes direct mental contact with the mental representation of the object, not the object itself. This, just this, is the error—a conception of a subject, a representation, and an object which has the representation somehow located between the subject and the object. It conceives the representation as a representative of the object, as in a ‘parliamentary representative’. The subject deals with the object’s representative, not with the object itself. The subject perceives the representation, not the object itself.
To this direct realism simply replies that the subject doesn’t perceive the representation. Rather, and again, the subject’s being in the visual experiential state that constitutes its visually representing the object just is its seeing the object, given that the state is caused in the right kind of way for it to count as seeing.
Can you quote the whole passage, or at least cite the page number? Thanks.
smcder
Paranormal Adept
Page 18 of "Real Direct Realism" ... see note 40
Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
Thanks, Steve.
Given your precious references to Rorty's philosophy I think you might find this review of a volume dedicated to his work to be of interest. I find it clarifying and interesting, not yet having read much of Rorty:
The Philosophy of Richard Rorty // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame
Given your precious references to Rorty's philosophy I think you might find this review of a volume dedicated to his work to be of interest. I find it clarifying and interesting, not yet having read much of Rorty:
The Philosophy of Richard Rorty // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame
smcder
Paranormal Adept
@Soupie
If you Google the quote:
"‘I’m an indirect realist, and I find nothing to disagree with in your account of what you call “direct realism”. So it can't really deserve the name “direct realism”.’"
You will find a link to Google books: Phenomenal Qualities.
The quote is footnoted 42 instead of 40 as in the Academia.edu draft that you quote from - but I can't read it on my phone. I think it may refer to another paper in the book?
Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
If you Google the quote:
"‘I’m an indirect realist, and I find nothing to disagree with in your account of what you call “direct realism”. So it can't really deserve the name “direct realism”.’"
You will find a link to Google books: Phenomenal Qualities.
The quote is footnoted 42 instead of 40 as in the Academia.edu draft that you quote from - but I can't read it on my phone. I think it may refer to another paper in the book?
Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk
Last edited:
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Its appears to be the same in both versions; one is just noted 40 the other 42.
Compare Paul Coates’s endorsement of indirect realism in this vol. It’s not hard to understand why there has been so much disagreement about whether Reid is a direct realist or an indirect realist, for while there’s an indisputable sense in which he has a right to be called a direct realist, he says many things of the following sort: ‘In perception, whether original or acquired, there is something which may be called the sign, and something which is signified to us, or brought to our knowledge by that sign.’
smcder
Paranormal Adept
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
@smcder
As im understanding it, if one is a Strawsonian Real Physicalist (SRP), the the difference between an IR and a DR seems to be semantical.
(Ive not finished the paper, so I dont know if Strawson addresses TQ; however, I dont think real Physicalists would appeal to TQs, right?)
So approaching this issue from the perspective of SRP:
(1) A physical subject enters state X in response to external state Y.
(2) Physical state X just is the subject perceiving external state Y.
However, if we focus on experiencing rather than perceiving, things perhaps get interesting; this is where monism and dualism become important, methinks.
For a monist, an SRP, might say:
Physical state X just is the physical subject (simultaneously) being experience X.
However, a dualist might say:
Physical state X is what the mental subject's experience Z is about.
Here it is again in symbol form:
SRP Monist
Sx (subject in state X) ---> Ey (external event Y)
We could say (1) subject is perceiving event X, and/or (2) subject just is being experience X, where being experience X has the content of—among other things—being a mental subject perceiving an event in the world.
Dualist
MSz (mental subject in state Z) ---> PSx (physical subject/organism in state X) ---> Ey (external event Y)
We could say mental subject is having experience X about physiological state Z which just is physical subject perceiving external event Y.
As im understanding it, if one is a Strawsonian Real Physicalist (SRP), the the difference between an IR and a DR seems to be semantical.
(Ive not finished the paper, so I dont know if Strawson addresses TQ; however, I dont think real Physicalists would appeal to TQs, right?)
So approaching this issue from the perspective of SRP:
(1) A physical subject enters state X in response to external state Y.
(2) Physical state X just is the subject perceiving external state Y.
However, if we focus on experiencing rather than perceiving, things perhaps get interesting; this is where monism and dualism become important, methinks.
For a monist, an SRP, might say:
Physical state X just is the physical subject (simultaneously) being experience X.
However, a dualist might say:
Physical state X is what the mental subject's experience Z is about.
Here it is again in symbol form:
SRP Monist
Sx (subject in state X) ---> Ey (external event Y)
We could say (1) subject is perceiving event X, and/or (2) subject just is being experience X, where being experience X has the content of—among other things—being a mental subject perceiving an event in the world.
Dualist
MSz (mental subject in state Z) ---> PSx (physical subject/organism in state X) ---> Ey (external event Y)
We could say mental subject is having experience X about physiological state Z which just is physical subject perceiving external event Y.
Last edited:
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
The way Strawson presents things. I like his clear, but informal, fun style.
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Im cleaning it up now. Not sure how much clearer i can make. Im trying to use the same explanatory devices that stawson used.
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Take a look again, Im afraid thats the bedt I can do.
Essentially SRP says there is a non-ontological distinction between the perceived and the perceiver, but that there is no distinction between the experiencer and the experienced.
However, dualism says there is a double distinction between the perceiver and the perceived (one ontological and one non-ontological) and there is a double distinction between the experiencer and the experienced (one ontological and one non-ontological).
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
No.
smcder
Paranormal Adept
- Status