Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[Constance]

From Morris, Bringing Phenomenology Down to Earth, in the section concerning determinate and indeterminate being . . . .

"...we need a standard of determinacy that is something more than what is given here and now, that could not therefore be directly visible in the here and now — but must nonetheless show up in that which appears. In
VI Merleau-Ponty grasps this paradoxical standard by conceptualizing something invisible right there in the visible and nowhere else, an invisible that is of the visible."

 

[Constance]

Or more precisely...does the question even make sense? "In-itself" and "for-itself" are labels that only Dasein can decode...or even use (i.e. be "meaningful")

'Decode' from what 'code'? Is the implied 'code' pre-established and determinate/determining, pre-existing being? If we understand MP and Morris, do we not have to recognize being as developing in experience, with experience grounding such concepts as 'for-itself' and 'in-itself', phenomena and 'noumena'?

 

[Soupie]

This may be the source of some confusion:

"Having said that, both maps and territories are constituted of atoms (let's suppose) and in an analogous way, we can say that the thing-in-itself and perceptions are constituted of noumena."

Yes, I can how that could be confusing taken out of context of the point Ive been articulating for weeks. That the physical/material world—which includes atoms—is a product of our perceptual system.

 

[Soupie]

Wikipedia

"Naïve realism, also known as direct realism or common sense realism, is a philosophy of mind rooted in a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast, some forms of idealism assert that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas and some forms of skepticism say we cannot trust our senses.

The realist view is that we perceive objects as they really are. They are composed of matter, occupy space and have properties, such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually perceived correctly. Objects obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone to observe them.[1]

Naïve realism is known as direct as against indirect or representative realism when its arguments are developed to counter the latter position, also known as epistemological dualism;[2] that our conscious experience is not of the real world but of an internal representation of the world."

etc.

Strawson is helpful on that last bit as is this from the IEP:

"The naïve realist claims that, in the good cases, external objects and their properties “partly constitute one’s conscious experience” (Martin 1997: 83) and thereby “shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience” (Martin 2004: 64)." vs. the world for us being merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by neural processes in our brain (although we could maybe know that it is merely an ... etc etc ;-).

In other words, representationalist's brains have to do a lot more work and so they are too tired to do good philosophy.

"Party constitute." Sure. (And even that is debatable.) Do they mean it in the sense of my maps, territory, atoms analogy?

Or do they mean that our conscious perceptions extend out ffromnour bodies into the external environment?

Either way, I don't see that the above is a challenge to the following g point:

Therefore, regardless of the fact that we perceive the world to be physical material it does not follow that the world just is physical material.

 

[smcder]

Perception (from the Latin perceptio, percipio) is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information in order to represent and understand the environment.[1] (Wiki)


You obviously haven't understood my position argued for over the last several threads, and even my last 2-3 posts. It's not for lack of clarity on my part, I can assure you, it's because you're projecting your own meaning into my posts.

I've made it exceedingly clear that I believe the HP contains an erroneous presupposition and therefore consciousness/experience does not emerge from a physical/material reality.

What I've argued for instead is the position that consciousness itself or some other absolute substrate is primary. And therefore matter/physical is secondary to our perceptual systems, since our perceptual systems generate our perceptions.

While our perceptual systems allow us to perceive the external noumenal/absolute, we should avoid naively conflating our perceptions of the noumenal as veridical in regards to the noumenal.

Therefore, regardless of the fact that we perceive the world to be physical material it does not follow that the world just is physical material.

"It's not for lack of clarity on my part, ... " that's for the readership, not the

Yes, I can how that could be confusing taken out of context of the point Ive been articulating for weeks. That the physical/material world—which includes atoms—is a product of our perceptual system.

Lol ... I know and I know it's frustrating ... But you have to be very consistent. It is all on you, the writer - is the salesman's boss going to be upset with the buyer ... Or the salesman if the product doesnt move?

 

[Soupie]

"It's not for lack of clarity on my part, ... " that's for the readership, not the


Lol ... I know and I know it's frustrating ... But you have to be very consistent. It is all on you, the writer - is the salesman's boss going to be upset with the buyer ... Or the salesman if the product doesnt move?

You understand and to be honest that all I care about. Note understanding is not agreeing.

 

[smcder]

"Party constitute." Sure. (And even that is debatable.) Do they mean it in the sense of my maps, territory, atoms analogy?

Or do they mean that our conscious perceptions extend out ffromnour bodies into the external environment?

Either way, I don't see that the above is a challenge to the following g point:

Therefore, regardless of the fact that we perceive the world to be physical material it does not follow that the world just is physical material.

Regardless of whether you perceive it to be a challenge to the point, it does not follow that it isnt. ;-)

 

[Soupie]

Regardless of whether you perceive it to be a challenge to the point, it does not follow that it isnt. ;-)

Can you explain how it is?

 

[smcder]

"Party constitute." Sure. (And even that is debatable.) Do they mean it in the sense of my maps, territory, atoms analogy?

Or do they mean that our conscious perceptions extend out ffromnour bodies into the external environment?

Either way, I don't see that the above is a challenge to the following g point:

Therefore, regardless of the fact that we perceive the world to be physical material it does not follow that the world just is physical material.

I'm not sure it directly addresses what its made of ... Its about whether your experience is wholly contained in your nervous system? I think not. Not very efficient. My point is to make clear what NR is.

 

[smcder]

Can you explain how it is?

Mostly that was me playing with your words. As a skeptical statement, taken on its own, it can't really be ultimately challenged, but, as the article explains, disjunctivism takes away one of the skeptics arguments.

The argument isnt about what the outside world is made of but about the directness of its perception. Im trying to clear up what NR claims.

 

[Soupie]

I'm not sure it directly addresses what its made of ... Its about whether your experience is wholly contained in your nervous system? I think not. Not very efficient. My point is to make clear what NR is.

Then I'll create my own term:

Strong Direct Realism

This is the view that the so-called primary qualities are ontologically primary and everything else in existence is derivative of them.

"Primary qualities are thought to be properties of objects that are independent of any observer, such as solidity, extension, motion, number and figure. These characteristics convey facts. They exist in the thing itself, can be determined with certainty, and do not rely on subjective judgments. For example, if an object is spherical, no one can reasonably argue that it is triangular. (wiki)"

The HP and main stream, materiastic science is grounded in "Strong Direct Realism."

I think this is an error based on the arguments laid out above.

 

[Soupie]

Then I'll create my own term:

Strong Direct Realism

This is the view that the so-called primary qualities are ontologically primary and everything else in existence is derivative of them.

"Primary qualities are thought to be properties of objects that are independent of any observer, such as solidity, extension, motion, number and figure. These characteristics convey facts. They exist in the thing itself, can be determined with certainty, and do not rely on subjective judgments. For example, if an object is spherical, no one can reasonably argue that it is triangular. (wiki)"

The HP and main stream, materiastic science is grounded in "Strong Direct Realism."

I think this is an error based on the arguments laid out above.

I think "Strong Direct Realism," the HP, and mainstream, materialist science are challenged in two simple ways, which I've articulated in various ways over the past several weeks:

(1) Regardless of the fact that we perceive the world to be physical material it does not follow that the world just is physical material.

(2) QM challenges all of the so-called primary qualities (as well as the classical notion of causality).

 

[smcder]

I think "Strong Direct Realism," the HP, and mainstream, materialist science are challenged in two simple ways, which I've articulated in various ways over the past several weeks:

(1) Regardless of the fact that we perceive the world to be physical material it does not follow that the world just is physical material.

(2) QM challenges all of the so-called primary qualities (as well as the classical notion of causality).

Primary qualities arent challenged at the macrocosmoc level.

 

[smcder]

I think "Strong Direct Realism," the HP, and mainstream, materialist science are challenged in two simple ways, which I've articulated in various ways over the past several weeks:

(1) Regardless of the fact that we perceive the world to be physical material it does not follow that the world just is physical material.

(2) QM challenges all of the so-called primary qualities (as well as the classical notion of causality).

1. is inconclusive ... It does not follow but it's not disproven. CR multiplies entities and may be falsifiable ... To me its close to a skeptical position.

 

[smcder]

1. is inconclusive ... It does not follow but it's not disproven. CR multiplies entities and may not be falsifiable ... To me its close to a skeptical position.

It "solves" the HP by simply inverting it. You now have the HP of mayterialism:

Why ... in a world of CAs do we perceive things to be material?


"Why youre nothing but a Conscious Eliminativist!" Alice said to the Red Queen.

 

[Constance]

You obviously haven't understood my position argued for over the last several threads, and even my last 2-3 posts.

That's correct. I am unable to follow your reasoning.

I've made it exceedingly clear that I believe the HP contains an erroneous presupposition and <therefore> consciousness/experience does not emerge from a physical/material reality.

Yes, what you believe (take to be real) is clearly expressed. The questions that remain to be explored are, first, whether your belief that the HP is founded on an "erroneous presupposition" is valid, and second, whether what you conclude from your belief is valid. I think in both respects your work remains to be done if you are to persuade others to take up your belief.

 

[Soupie]

@smcder Why bring CR into it? Points (1) and (2) are arguments against SDR and the HP, not arguments for CR.

 

[Soupie]

Conscious Realism is just one of many possibilities once physical monism is abandoned.

 

[Soupie]

Primary qualities arent challenged at the macrocosmoc level.

The macroscopic level is derived from the microscopic level, no?

1. is inconclusive ... It does not follow but it's not disproven. CR multiplies entities and may be falsifiable ... To me its close to a skeptical position.

And that's all (1) claims.

But there's reason to believe that it's disproven; namely the failure to answer the HP via classic models.

 

[Michael Allen]

And yet the notion that reality is constituted entirely of matter holds on this logic?

"Matter" as a label results from a mode of being -- a category we create in our struggle within ourselves in a world from which we grew out of. It is an artificial category because its usage must always be accompanied by "form" in the older jargon.