Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[Soupie]

There is also the question whether (and how far) we should follow -- i.e., can productively follow -- any of the inconsistent interpretations of qm still at issue among quantum physicists in our own search for an understanding of the nature of the reality we experience.

The same holds for classical physics.

 

[Soupie]

Well it was new to me. Specifically the part about indoctrination and Orwell. This and the replies on Quora etc make me leery of lay appropriation of QM.

Most everything I've shared about QM has come from scientists and physicists.

 

[Soupie]

I agree. I've started to learn a bit about QM ... I don't know how far I'll get or how helpful it will be. I'm open to suggestions on how and where to start!

Read Thad's book. Because he is challenging the "probabilistic" tenents of QM, he is able to clearly articulate that view and explain its weaknesses as he shares his alternative, Bohmian approach.

 

[Constance]

Or more precisely...does the question [of the 'in-itself'] even make sense? "In-itself" and "for-itself" are labels that only Dasein can decode...or even use (i.e. be "meaningful")

'Decode' from what 'code'? Is the implied 'code' pre-established and determinate/determining, pre-existing being? If we understand MP and Morris, do we not have to recognize being as developing in experience, with experience grounding {ETA: the development of human reflective consciousness and mind leading to} such concepts as 'for-itself' and 'in-itself', phenomena and 'noumena'?

An experience ground would be--from our point of view--something like an 'in-itself'. If we try to to ground experience with our notions of 'for-itself' or 'in-itself;' 'phenomena and noumena; we'll end up with the tail wagging the dog I think. I think we agree on this point -- but I am having a hard time parsing your statement. The code is something that arises after pre-established 'being' -- but the conditions for the possibility of the code is not the code.

Why don't we try to sort out and clarify what each of us is saying in these three posts. Would you please start by explaining what you mean by "the code" and by "pre-established 'being'"? And also by the statement that "the conditions for the possibility of the code [are] not the code". Thanks.

 

[smcder]

Yes. He is wise to note that we really don't know, but it's evident from the rest of what he writes that he thinks taking probability seriously as a fundamental feature of nature is "stupid."

Thad equally notes that we don't know and that QST is a theory.

Their positions are the same. Stop the wiggling semantics.

https://www.quora.com/What-is-a-quantum-mechanical-wavefunction

"Stop the wiggling semantics."?

 

[Constance]

The same holds for classical physics.

I don't think most non-quantum physicists would agree. Contemporary physics still struggles to achieve a complete and coherent 'theory of everything', but there appears to be wide agreement among physicists on the reality of the component forces represented in the standard model.

 

[Soupie]

"Stop the wiggling semantics."?

Yes, you're claiming that Jayne's postion differes from Robert's position because Jayne's ultimately acknowledge's that we don't know for certain whether or not probability is a fundamental feature. Despite the fact that it's exceedingly clear which outcome he favors. Furthermore, Robert's holds the same position--acknowledges that we don't know for certain but favors closed, causal determination.

 

[Soupie]

I don't think most non-quantum physicists would agree. Contemporary physics still struggles to achieve a complete and coherent 'theory of everything', but there appears to be wide agreement among physicists on the reality of the component forces represented in the standard model.

"Reality" is the key word, there though. Although classical physics is able to make accurate predictions, the notion of "forces" and other such as being "real" is open to debate.

One way of thinking about classical physics is the probable outcomes they are working with are much easier to predict.

 

[smcder]

Yes, you're claiming that Jayne's postion differes from Robert's position because Jayne's ultimately acknowledge's that we don't know for certain whether or not probability is a fundamental feature. Despite the fact that it's exceedingly clear which outcome he favors. Furthermore, Robert's holds the same position--acknowledges that we don't know for certain but favors closed, causal determination.

No sir, I'm comparing the two quotes/statements as you presented them.

 

[Constance]

"Reality" is the key word, there though. Although classical physics is able to make accurate predictions, the notion of "forces" and other such as being "real" is open to debate.

One way of thinking about classical physics is the probably [probability] outcomes they are working with are much easier to predict.

So then classical physics does provide some basis for construing at least some aspects of the reality/the actual world we exist in?

 

[Soupie]

Who are you arguing with? I don't think anyone here is saying the world IS whirling particles. At least not in the Democritean sense.

This is very interesting. I'd like to hear more about this.

It seems to a certain degree, we are arguing semantics/labels at this point, as noted by @Michael Allen.

We all seem to agree there are subjects and objects (things external to subjects).

What we are dancing around are the labels for these things. As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop. Constance, and just recently ufology, seem to favor the notion that consciousness (subjects) emerges from physical nature. Constance seems to hold that consciousness literally emerges as something ontologically new. Whether Ufology shares this view, I can't tell. In the past, Ufology maintained that consciousness was physical and could be observed/measured like any other physical object. He seems to have backed away from that view, recently noting that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical.

As best I can tell, Smcder seems to favor a dualist approach to consciousness and matter. Either as both being fundamental or consciousness emerging from nature (but you have typically expressed concerns about emergentism).

Your comment above intrigues me; if you don't think of nature as consisting of swirling particles, what do you think it is? Do you side with the quantum physicists who say indeterminacy is fundamental or do you side with the determinists?

If you don't think matter is, well, matter, why insist that CR is so wrong? If matter isn't matter, than panpsychism as generally understood (particles being intrinsically conscious) is absurd. If there are no particles, then they can't have consciousness.

If physical nature doesn't consist of particles, well then, of what does it consist? And why be so rigid about maintaining a dualism between mind and "matter" (however you conceive it).

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us. Why such resistenc if you don't think matter is particles after all?

As I've noted and you seem to agree (?), the notion of matter is challenged by QM and, I believe, a proper understanding of perception.

It's time to reject the reification of labels such as mind and matter and recognize that both are manifestations of one noumenal substrate that we don't--and perhaps can't--fully understand.

 

[smcder]

This is very interesting. I'd like to hear more about this.

It seems to a certain degree, we are arguing semantics/labels at this point, as noted by @Michael Allen.

We all seem to agree there are subjects and objects (things external to subjects).

What we are dancing around are the labels for these things. As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop. Constance, and just recently ufology, seem to favor the notion that consciousness (subjects) emerges from physical nature. Constance seems to hold that consciousness literally emerges as something ontologically new. Whether Ufology shares this view, I can't tell. In the past, Ufology maintained that consciousness was physical and could be observed/measured like any other physical object. He seems to have backed away from that view, recently noting that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical.

As best I can tell, Smcder seems to favor a dualist approach to consciousness and matter. Either as both being fundamental or consciousness emerging from nature (but you have typically expressed concerns about emergentism).

Your comment above intrigues me; if you don't think of nature as consisting of swirling particles, what do you think it is? Do you side with the quantum physicists who say indeterminacy is fundamental or do you side with the determinists?

If you don't think matter is, well, matter, why insist that CR is so wrong? If matter isn't matter, than panpsychism as generally understood (particles being intrinsically conscious) is absurd. If there are no particles, then they can't have consciousness.

If physical nature doesn't consist of particles, well then, of what does it consist? And why be so rigid about maintaining a dualism between mind and "matter" (however you conceive it).

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us. Why such resistenc if you don't think matter is particles after all?

As I've noted and you seem to agree (?), the notion of matter is challenged by QM and, I believe, a proper understanding of perception.

It's time to reject the reification of labels such as mind and matter and recognize that both are manifestations of one noumenal substrate that we don't--and perhaps can't--fully understand.

Is it that time? Oh dear! I am so late ...

 

[Soupie]

Let's clear away terms like matter/mind and objective/subjective for a moment.

As far as I can tell, the participants in this discussion share a consensus that there are observers and observer-independent stuff. Four main questions have emerged from this shared view:

(1) Are observers and observer-independent stuff made of the same stuff (monism) or made of different stuff (dualism & emergentism)?

(2) Can the lived-experience of observers by modeled in the same way the observer-independent world is modeled?

(3) Is observer-independent stuff causally closed and fully determined?

(4) Are observers causally closed and fully determined?

 

[smcder]

This is very interesting. I'd like to hear more about this.

It seems to a certain degree, we are arguing semantics/labels at this point, as noted by @Michael Allen.

We all seem to agree there are subjects and objects (things external to subjects).

What we are dancing around are the labels for these things. As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop. Constance, and just recently ufology, seem to favor the notion that consciousness (subjects) emerges from physical nature. Constance seems to hold that consciousness literally emerges as something ontologically new. Whether Ufology shares this view, I can't tell. In the past, Ufology maintained that consciousness was physical and could be observed/measured like any other physical object. He seems to have backed away from that view, recently noting that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical.

As best I can tell, Smcder seems to favor a dualist approach to consciousness and matter. Either as both being fundamental or consciousness emerging from nature (but you have typically expressed concerns about emergentism).

Your comment above intrigues me; if you don't think of nature as consisting of swirling particles, what do you think it is? Do you side with the quantum physicists who say indeterminacy is fundamental or do you side with the determinists?

If you don't think matter is, well, matter, why insist that CR is so wrong? If matter isn't matter, than panpsychism as generally understood (particles being intrinsically conscious) is absurd. If there are no particles, then they can't have consciousness.

If physical nature doesn't consist of particles, well then, of what does it consist? And why be so rigid about maintaining a dualism between mind and "matter" (however you conceive it).

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us. Why such resistenc if you don't think matter is particles after all?

As I've noted and you seem to agree (?), the notion of matter is challenged by QM and, I believe, a proper understanding of perception.

It's time to reject the reification of labels such as mind and matter and recognize that both are manifestations of one noumenal substrate that we don't--and perhaps can't--fully understand.

I think @Usual Suspect recently said it was fundamental.

 

[Constance]

Stop the wiggling semantics.

I too wonder what you mean by this? It's clear that human languages are limited in what they enable us to think and express, especially since so many language users do not actually know/understand what it is they seek to express. One of the problems we all have is the increasing ambiguity of the terms we use, which becomes more pronounced over time in the development of our species' thinking. Still, we should be able to work through language to clarify what we mean to claim as 'knowledge', which must depend on what we can demonstrate to exist alongside us in the world we ourselves exist in.

You say you perceive 'wiggling semantics' in what others say and write. I for one can say that I also perceive 'wiggling semantics' in much of what you write. It seems to be the case that we all use core terms involved in the subjects we are discussing in differing ways. None of us is yet so trapped in what Frederic Jameson referred to as "the prison house of language" to claim, with Humpty-Dumpty, that 'words mean exactly what I think/say they mean'. So our task seems clear: to define the ways in which we are using key terms and attempt to agree on definitions we can all subscribe to, at least for the time being. This will not be easy to accomplish if, as seems to me to be the case, something deeper than our current language can yet express -- experiences, intuitions, beliefs, desires, needs, fears -- is inexpressible in the terms within which we think and express ourselves.

It's time to reject the reification of labels such as mind and matter and recognize that both are manifestations of one noumenal substrate that we don't--and perhaps can't--fully understand.

I don't think so, on the basis that we don't actually know if, and how, both mind and matter are 'manifestations of one noumenal substrate', especially since the nature of that 'noumenal substrate' remains beyond our experience or understanding.

 

[Soupie]

I don't think so, on the basis that we don't actually know if, and how, both mind and matter are 'manifestations of one noumenal substrate', especially since the nature of that 'noumenal substrate' remains beyond our experience or understanding.

But we know what "mind" and matter" are? And we know that they're distinct, ontological substrates?

 

[smcder]

I think @Usual Suspect recently said it was fundamental.

Here is Usual's post (underline is mine)

Michael Allen said: ↑

... In that case, the "Hard problem" may actually be a polymorphism of the halting problem.


Hmm. Interesting way to look at it ( the hard problem ). It certainly tends to behave that way when it's approached as a "problem", but that doesn't mean it's unfathomable. Rather, I would suggest that it is precisely because it doesn't resolve into a solution, that irreducibility is what makes it something fundamental.

And here is a link to the disambiguation page for polymorphism:

Polymorphism - Wikipedia

 

[smcder]

I too wonder what you mean by this? It's clear that human languages are limited in what they enable us to think and express, especially since so many language users do not actually know/understand what it is they seek to express. One of the problems we all have is the increasing ambiguity of the terms we use, which becomes more pronounced over time in the development of our species' thinking. Still, we should be able to work through language to clarify what we mean to claim as 'knowledge', which must depend on what we can demonstrate to exist alongside us in the world we ourselves exist in.

You say you perceive 'wiggling semantics' in what others say and write. I for one can say that I also perceive 'wiggling semantics' in much of what you write. It seems to be the case that we all use core terms involved in the subjects we are discussing in differing ways. None of us is yet so trapped in what Frederic Jameson referred to as "the prison house of language" to claim, with Humpty-Dumpty, that 'words mean exactly what I think/say they mean'. So our task seems clear: to define the ways in which we are using key terms and attempt to agree on definitions we can all subscribe to, at least for the time being. This will not be easy to accomplish if, as seems to me to be the case, something deeper than our current language can yet express -- experiences, intuitions, beliefs, desires, needs, fears -- is inexpressible in the terms within which we think and express ourselves.



I don't think so, on the basis that we don't actually know if, and how, both mind and matter are 'manifestations of one noumenal substrate', especially since the nature of that 'noumenal substrate' remains beyond our experience or understanding.

None of us is yet so trapped in what Frederic Jameson referred to as "the prison house of language" to claim, with Humpty-Dumpty, that 'words mean exactly what I think/say they mean'. So our task seems clear: to define the ways in which we are using key terms and attempt to agree on definitions we can all subscribe to, at least for the time being. This will not be easy to accomplish if, as seems to me to be the case, something deeper than our current language can yet express -- experiences, intuitions, beliefs, desires, needs, fears -- is inexpressible in the terms within which we think and express ourselves.

YES! Very non-wiggly ;-)

The image I have right now is of impertinent little boys tugging at Mother Nature's hem demanding ANSWERS!

 

[smcder]

But we know what "mind" and matter" are? And we know that they're distinct, ontological substrates?

NOW who is wiggling?? ... sometimes I think you just like to argue ;-)

 

[Soupie]

Is it that time? Oh dear! I am so late ...

You seem to reject causal closer and determinism.

You seem to favor free will.

But you reject a probabilistic interpretation of QM and favor the deterministic approach?

You want to maintain a reified dualism between mind and matter, but you don't think matter is really matter. But it's definitely not mind?

You're skeptical of emergentism, but the mind and matter can causally interact. While remaining ontologically distinct.

You think our classical models are reality have got it pretty much right, but you believe humans have free will, which classical models reject?

When were you planning to post that list of problems with dualism?