Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[smcder]

"Contrary

Steve, I've found a paper by Heather Logue entitled "Why Naive Realism" which I suppose is the same paper delivered in the video you linked. As you know, I always prefer to read rather than listen to lectures, so I'm going to read this. Would you take a look at it and tell me if it seems to be the paper delivered in the video? Thanks.

Why Naive Realism?

I like to read and listen. I'm often surprised by how much information I get from the author's reading.

 

[smcder]

owever, apart from outright denying the existence of genuine non-conscious intentionality, there is also another option open. One might accept the existence of a non-conscious form of intentionality, but still argue that non-conscious intentionality and conscious intentionality has nothing (or very little) in common, for which reason an elucidation of the first type of intentionality throws no light upon the kind of intentionality that we find in conscious life

 

[smcder]

If @Soupie sometimes argues rather intensely, as today, I think it must be for some reason, out of a motivation, a desire, for a complete account/explanation of All-that-is. Unfortunately that goal seems to be presently unattainable by any single individual, or by any single discipline, existing/developing within the horizons of our species' spatiotemporal situation.

Even so, I think we can enjoy and learn from discussions of various theories proposed as partial explanations for what we experience, feel, and think in response to that which we encounter in the local 'world' we live in, and also from discussions of more speculative theories concerning the relation of the local 'world' we experience to the evolving nature of the universe/cosmos of which our planet is a part.

To go back to the quotation from @Soupie above:



We know that mind and matter are distinguishable from one another. This has been understood since the pre-Socratics [and likely before written philosophy], and the issue has continued to be explored throughout philosophy, both Eastern and Western.

We don't know that they originate in "distinct ontological substrates." Nor do we know that there can be only one 'ontological substrate', though we've been told over the last 200 years by materialist/objectivist scientists that the universe we exist in is closed and entirely determined by physical properties. Other physicists in our time theorize that the universe is open and changing and thus not deterministic, determined. It will be a long time before the ontological question can be answered.

It seems to me that there are other interesting questions we can pursue philosophically and scientifically concerning the nature of consciousness and mind.

1. We don't know that they originate in "distinct ontological substrates." Nor do we know that there can be only one 'ontological substrate', though we've been told over the last 200 years by materialist/objectivist scientists that the universe we exist in is closed and entirely determined by physical properties. Other physicists in our time theorize that the universe is open and changing and thus not deterministic, determined.

2. It will be a long time before the ontological question can be answered.

3. It seems to me that there are other interesting questions we can pursue philosophically and scientifically concerning the nature of consciousness and mind.

1. Yes
2. Yes
3. Yes

 

[smcder]

David Papineau argues that thought experiments and the intuitions they elicit play a central role in philosophical theorizing. They help us to identify deep-seated principles that direct our thinking.

And although such principles aren't always trustworthy, they're methodologically very important. After giving an example from the history of science, he illustrates his points with examples from recent debates in the philosophy of mind regarding the hard problem of consciousness - the supposed explanatory gap between the mental and physical. He argues that the philosophical intuition of an explanatory gap is a dualistic intuition, and materialists (physicalists) who take such a gap seriously are implicitly committed to dualism, not having fully thought through their own materialist view. This talk was part of a conference on metaphilosophy and the future of philosophy

From the (off off) Broadway musical: Papineau!

 

[smcder]

Philip Goff and David Papineau discuss consciousness and whether it's at bottom something physical or material.

Goff rejects physicalism/materialism, Papineau accepts it. In this discussion, they examine the arguments on each side. They consider the causal exclusion argument for physicalism, the much-discussed "knowledge argument" against physicalism, conceptual dualism, explore Goff's own reasons for rejecting physicalism, weigh the dualist arguments of Chalmers and Jackson, discuss Papineau's reasons to reject the transparency of phenomenal concepts, ponder what Levine calls the "explanatory gap", and confront the specter of epiphenomenalism.

 

[Michael Allen]

In what way is it accurate ... and in what way does it say too much?

As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop.

One "substrate" says too much because the notion of "substance" implies a relationship which defies it's original usage "intent"...accurate in that I consider a non-dualistic result..from method which requires temporary dualistic "approaches." But again...too much if you bring back the spectre of "substance" and it's implications.

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[smcder]

As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop.

One "substrate" says too much because the notion of "substance" implies a relationship which defies it's original usage "intent"...accurate in that I consider a non-dualistic result..from method which requires temporary dualistic "approaches." But again...too much if you bring back the spectre of "substance" and it's implications.

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1. How does

the notion of "substance" imply a relationship which defies it's original usage "intent"?

... and are you using "intent" to clarify what you mean by "usage"?

2. "accurate in that I consider a non-dualistic result" you consider what a non-dualistic result?

3. ... from method which requires temporary dualistic "approaches." - from "a" method? What are these temporary dualistic approaches and why are they required?

4. But again...too much if you bring back the spectre of "substance" and it's implications.

What is the spectre of substance and what are its implications?

 

[Michael Allen]

1. How does

the notion of "substance" imply a relationship which defies it's original usage "intent"

... and are you using "intent" to clarify what you mean by "usage"?

2. "accurate in that I consider a non-dualistic result" you consider what a non-dualistic result?

3. ... from method which requires temporary dualistic "approaches." - from "a" method? What are these temporary dualistic approaches and why are they required?

4. But again...too much if you bring back the spectre of "substance" and it's implications.

What is the spectre of substance and what are its implications?

Ok...I'm going to need to be at a keyboard to answer these questions. Standby

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[Michael Allen]

1. How does

the notion of "substance" imply a relationship which defies it's original usage "intent"?

... and are you using "intent" to clarify what you mean by "usage"?

2. "accurate in that I consider a non-dualistic result" you consider what a non-dualistic result?

3. ... from method which requires temporary dualistic "approaches." - from "a" method? What are these temporary dualistic approaches and why are they required?

4. But again...too much if you bring back the spectre of "substance" and it's implications.

What is the spectre of substance and what are its implications?

(1) Substance is a category for which between a person (or sentient) and its "object," can discern "tangibility" from it's own ability to interact with the same. The intent is to show that somehow these relations exist independent of the special interactions required to "bring it up into being." We use the word to try to excise (or what Heidegger called "de-worlding") its being from the necessary relations (for us) which we had already found without noticing. The category is artificial--which means that to ascribe a mode of being independent of our relations to it, i.e. to make it independent, requires conjuring up yet another object (with appropriate "tangibility") to measure its "presense" in a more accurate "sense." This externalized intuition of our own interactivity we pretend existed without our need to use it (i.e. to measure and weigh) and we convince ourselves that such extensions into reality stand alone without any need to conjure yet more objects (finer measuring devices, tools) for which to divide what is already fixed artificially in our "world."

(2) The method we use cut our space of experience into "ourselves," "tools" and "not-ourselves" --- this methodical dualism is just as artificial as the very categories we are trying to interrogate. The fundamental relation is that of "questioner of being" and "being that is questioned" -- which leads to something we "experience" as consciousness. This is how "things" become "thinks" (Alan Watts).

(3) The above problems are what I mean by the "spectre of substance" since it is our own (but yet they themselves "seem" to be objects). By "objects" I mean anything that causes our bodies to actively interrogate what we consider to be. We forget the the very foundation of being lies in our ability to raise these apparitions and treat them as substances.

I could delve more into this by citing isomorphic arguments for the world as idea (Berkeley) vs that of matter...but I think we can probably work it out ourselves by looking at a dictionary definition of "substance" and working out the presumptions.

 

[Randall]

(1) Substance is a category for which between a person (or sentient) and its "object," can discern "tangibility" from it's own ability to interact with the same. The intent is to show that somehow these relations exist independent of the special interactions required to "bring it up into being." We use the word to try to excise (or what Heidegger called "de-worlding") its being from the necessary relations (for us) which we had already found without noticing. The category is artificial--which means that to ascribe a mode of being independent of our relations to it, i.e. to make it independent, requires conjuring up yet another object (with appropriate "tangibility") to measure its "presense" in a more accurate "sense." This externalized intuition of our own interactivity we pretend existed without our need to use it (i.e. to measure and weigh) and we convince ourselves that such extensions into reality stand alone without any need to conjure yet more objects (finer measuring devices, tools) for which to divide what is already fixed artificially in our "world."

(2) The method we use cut our space of experience into "ourselves," "tools" and "not-ourselves" --- this methodical dualism is just as artificial as the very categories we are trying to interrogate. The fundamental relation is that of "questioner of being" and "being that is questioned" -- which leads to something we "experience" as consciousness. This is how "things" become "thinks" (Alan Watts).

(3) The above problems are what I mean by the "spectre of substance" since it is our own (but yet they themselves "seem" to be objects). By "objects" I mean anything that causes our bodies to actively interrogate what we consider to be. We forget the the very foundation of being lies in our ability to raise these apparitions and treat them as substances.

I could delve more into this by citing isomorphic arguments for the world as idea (Berkeley) vs that of matter...but I think we can probably work it out ourselves by looking at a dictionary definition of "substance" and working out the presumptions.

It seems to me that differentiating between subjective and the objective realities and their associated properties is all that's required to put everything into perspective. So to begin we could say that it's certainly possible that everything is composed of the same stuff on some fundamental level ( physical monism ) and also that some of that stuff has different properties than other stuff ( still physical monism ), and that when certain stuff with certain properties is combined in certain ways, new properties emerge, including consciousness ( still physical monism ).

Or is it still physical monism? Are properties a different kind of stuff than the stuff they're associated with? Can properties exist independently of stuff? If so then monism is out the window and if not then what exactly are properties made of? Consciousness isn't required for properties to have effects, so some properties ( like momentum ) are entirely independent of consciousness, while other properties ( like the redness of a Ferrari ) aren't. And no matter how we look at the problem, properties and the stuff they're associated with cannot be one in the same thing, that is unless there is no stuff, and properties are all there is, and the material is simply an illusion.

​

 

[Soupie]

The category is artificial--which means that to ascribe a mode of being independent of our relations to it, i.e. to make it independent, requires conjuring up yet another object (with appropriate "tangibility") to measure its "presense" in a more accurate "sense." This externalized intuition of our own interactivity we pretend existed without our need to use it (i.e. to measure and weigh) and we convince ourselves that such extensions into reality stand alone without any need to conjure yet more objects (finer measuring devices, tools) for which to divide what is already fixed artificially in our "world."

I think that's a fairly specialized/rigid definition of substance. For example, I think one could consider being to be a substance. (But that's just me, and my way of thinking is unorthodox and lay.)

But it's certainly helpful for you to clarify your understating of the term. On my view, the term is essentially synonymous with "stuff" as used in the following:

""My thesis is," [James] says, "that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known (p. 4)."[9]"

The knower and the known seems analogous to your questioner and questioned.

In any case, your approach seems to be essentially an idealist position, no?

"The category is artificial--which means that to ascribe a mode of being independent of our relations to it, i.e. to make it independent, requires conjuring up yet another object (with appropriate "tangibility") to measure its "presense" in a more accurate "sense." This externalized intuition of our own interactivity we pretend existed without our need to use it (i.e. to measure and weigh) and we convince ourselves that such extensions into reality stand alone without any need to conjure yet more objects (finer measuring devices, tools) for which to divide what is already fixed artificially in our "world.""

 

[Soupie]

And no matter how we look at the problem, properties and the stuff they're associated with cannot be one in the same thing, that is unless there is no stuff, and properties are all there is, and the material is simply an illusion.

Now you're cooking with grease.

 

[smcder]

Now you're cooking with grease.

Took a while ... ;-)

Once they get the HP ... you pretty well got 'em where you want 'em.

 

[smcder]

I think that's a fairly specialized/rigid definition of substance. For example, I think one could consider being to be a substance. (But that's just me, and my way of thinking is unorthodox and lay.)

But it's certainly helpful for you to clarify your understating of the term. On my view, the term is essentially synonymous with "stuff" as used in the following:

""My thesis is," [James] says, "that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known (p. 4)."[9]"

The knower and the known seems analogous to your questioner and questioned.

In any case, your approach seems to be essentially an idealist position, no?

"The category is artificial--which means that to ascribe a mode of being independent of our relations to it, i.e. to make it independent, requires conjuring up yet another object (with appropriate "tangibility") to measure its "presense" in a more accurate "sense." This externalized intuition of our own interactivity we pretend existed without our need to use it (i.e. to measure and weigh) and we convince ourselves that such extensions into reality stand alone without any need to conjure yet more objects (finer measuring devices, tools) for which to divide what is already fixed artificially in our "world.""

 

[Soupie]

@Constance I think it was you who recently posted a link to a paper perhaps titled "phenomenology and the Hard Problem." however now I can't seem to find the link.

Maybe it was @smcder who posted the link?

 

[smcder]

@Constance I think it was you who recently posted a link to a paper perhaps titled "phenomenology and the Hard Problem." however now I can't seem to find the link.

Maybe it was @smcder who posted the link?

It was @Constance:
http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/intentionality-experience.pdf

 

[Constance]

We forget [that] the very foundation of being lies in our ability to raise these apparitions and treat them as substances.

"The very foundation of being"? Really? Do tell us more about how you understand what you're claiming above, including what you mean by apparitions and substances.

 

[smcder]

(1) Substance is a category for which between a person (or sentient) and its "object," can discern "tangibility" from it's own ability to interact with the same. The intent is to show that somehow these relations exist independent of the special interactions required to "bring it up into being." We use the word to try to excise (or what Heidegger called "de-worlding") its being from the necessary relations (for us) which we had already found without noticing. The category is artificial--which means that to ascribe a mode of being independent of our relations to it, i.e. to make it independent, requires conjuring up yet another object (with appropriate "tangibility") to measure its "presense" in a more accurate "sense." This externalized intuition of our own interactivity we pretend existed without our need to use it (i.e. to measure and weigh) and we convince ourselves that such extensions into reality stand alone without any need to conjure yet more objects (finer measuring devices, tools) for which to divide what is already fixed artificially in our "world."

(2) The method we use cut our space of experience into "ourselves," "tools" and "not-ourselves" --- this methodical dualism is just as artificial as the very categories we are trying to interrogate. The fundamental relation is that of "questioner of being" and "being that is questioned" -- which leads to something we "experience" as consciousness. This is how "things" become "thinks" (Alan Watts).

(3) The above problems are what I mean by the "spectre of substance" since it is our own (but yet they themselves "seem" to be objects). By "objects" I mean anything that causes our bodies to actively interrogate what we consider to be. We forget the the very foundation of being lies in our ability to raise these apparitions and treat them as substances.

I could delve more into this by citing isomorphic arguments for the world as idea (Berkeley) vs that of matter...but I think we can probably work it out ourselves by looking at a dictionary definition of "substance" and working out the presumptions.

@Soupie

"I could delve more into this by citing isomorphic arguments for the world as idea (Berkeley) vs that of matter..."

I think @Michael Allen and I are saying something similar here.

 

[Soupie]

It was @Constance:
http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/intentionality-experience.pdf

@smcder I read this a few days ago. I found it helpful.

However I'm still not sure I grok the phenomenologist approach to perception.

Section 2 of the above paper was unclear to me. I'm not sure if a) I'm not understanding the approach or 2) I simply disagree with the approach.

Can we discuss section 2 in regard to perception.

My main question is: does the approach to perception outlined in section 2 contradict the approach to perception outlined by Strawson's in the paper we all read and discussed a while back.

That is, that perception by an organism entails some physiological change X1 when organism interacts with external stimulus X.

If I need to be more clear, I will try.

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie

"I could delve more into this by citing isomorphic arguments for the world as idea (Berkeley) vs that of matter..."

I think @Michael Allen and I are saying something similar here.

Can you elaborate?