Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[smcder]

Let's clear away terms like matter/mind and objective/subjective for a moment.

As far as I can tell, the participants in this discussion share a consensus that there are observers and observer-independent stuff. Four main questions have emerged from this shared view:

(1) Are observers and observer-independent stuff made of the same stuff (monism) or made of different stuff (dualism & emergentism)?

(2) Can the lived-experience of observers by modeled in the same way the observer-independent world is modeled?

(3) Is observer-independent stuff causally closed and fully determined?

(4) Are observers causally closed and fully determined?

(2) I don't think so
(3) with Millican ... I don't think we know
(4) it doesn't feel like it!

I share @Constance's intuition:

This will not be easy to accomplish if, as seems to me to be the case, something deeper than our current language can yet express -- experiences, intuitions, beliefs, desires, needs, fears -- is inexpressible in the terms within which we think and express ourselves.

So I am not sure you are going to get the conversation you want from us on the terms you have dictated.

 

[Soupie]

NOW who is wiggling?? ... sometimes I think you just like to argue ;-)

I'm pointing out the you and constance are just as guilty of being unclear, contradictory, and impenetrable as anyone else who has participated in this discussion.

 

[smcder]

You seem to reject causal closer and determinism.

You seem to favor free will.

But you reject a probabilistic interpretation of QM and favor the deterministic approach?

You want to maintain a reified dualism between mind and matter, but you don't think matter is really matter. But it's definitely not mind?

You're skeptical of emergentism, but the mind and matter can causally interact. While remaining ontologically distinct.

You think our classical models are reality have got it pretty much right, but you believe humans have free will, which classical models reject?

When were you planning to post that list of problems with dualism?

I never seem to recognize myself in your characterizations! I think I've posted links to problems with dualism. I know I have read lots about it ... and since it gets bashed around here ahem by some people ... ;-) I do post things in defense of dualism.

seven things you cant say on tv - - Yahoo Video Search Results

Just before he died George Carlin put "Dualism" as #8

 

[smcder]

I'm pointing out the you and constance are just as guilty of being unclear, contradictory, and impenetrable as anyone else who has participated in this discussion.

I know I am!

 

[Soupie]

So I am not sure you are going to get the conversation you want from us on the terms you have dictated.

I see.

 

[smcder]

I see.

If you got everyone pinned down to a clearly worded creedal statement with their identity cards neatly checked - all of ze papers in ordnung ... what would you have?

 

[smcder]

I know I am!

That's the cleaned up version you see on the forum ... in my head, it's a real mess.

I don't walk around day to day thinking my head is one kind of stuff and my body another ... all sorts of thoughts and notions float around ... contradictory ... nonsensical ...

 

[smcder]

You seem to reject causal closer and determinism.

You seem to favor free will.

But you reject a probabilistic interpretation of QM and favor the deterministic approach?

You want to maintain a reified dualism between mind and matter, but you don't think matter is really matter. But it's definitely not mind?

You're skeptical of emergentism, but the mind and matter can causally interact. While remaining ontologically distinct.

You think our classical models are reality have got it pretty much right, but you believe humans have free will, which classical models reject?

When were you planning to post that list of problems with dualism?

Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

See #5 "Problems for Dualism"

 

[smcder]

This is very interesting. I'd like to hear more about this.

It seems to a certain degree, we are arguing semantics/labels at this point, as noted by @Michael Allen.

We all seem to agree there are subjects and objects (things external to subjects).

What we are dancing around are the labels for these things. As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop. Constance, and just recently ufology, seem to favor the notion that consciousness (subjects) emerges from physical nature. Constance seems to hold that consciousness literally emerges as something ontologically new. Whether Ufology shares this view, I can't tell. In the past, Ufology maintained that consciousness was physical and could be observed/measured like any other physical object. He seems to have backed away from that view, recently noting that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical.

As best I can tell, Smcder seems to favor a dualist approach to consciousness and matter. Either as both being fundamental or consciousness emerging from nature (but you have typically expressed concerns about emergentism).

Your comment above intrigues me; if you don't think of nature as consisting of swirling particles, what do you think it is? Do you side with the quantum physicists who say indeterminacy is fundamental or do you side with the determinists?

If you don't think matter is, well, matter, why insist that CR is so wrong? If matter isn't matter, than panpsychism as generally understood (particles being intrinsically conscious) is absurd. If there are no particles, then they can't have consciousness.

If physical nature doesn't consist of particles, well then, of what does it consist? And why be so rigid about maintaining a dualism between mind and "matter" (however you conceive it).

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us. Why such resistenc if you don't think matter is particles after all?

As I've noted and you seem to agree (?), the notion of matter is challenged by QM and, I believe, a proper understanding of perception.

It's time to reject the reification of labels such as mind and matter and recognize that both are manifestations of one noumenal substrate that we don't--and perhaps can't--fully understand.

If you don't think matter is, well, matter, why insist that CR is so wrong? If matter isn't matter, than panpsychism as generally understood (particles being intrinsically conscious) is absurd. If there are no particles, then they can't have consciousness.

I don't know a lot about CR. I have posted links to some concerns about CR by people who know a lot more than I do ... but I also found it hard to find much about CR other than what Hoffman has posted. What you posted on CA helped ... but it kind of feels like it came out of nowhere and if it solves the HP of consciousness it creates a HP of material ... others say it's just another form of Idealism and that there are problems with his model, assumptions he made when running evolutionary simulations ... if he gets done what he has set out for himself to do ... to derive physics from his model, then I think he will get some notice.

If physical nature doesn't consist of particles, well then, of what does it consist? And why be so rigid about maintaining a dualism between mind and "matter" (however you conceive it).

I don't feel like I am rigid about it ... like I said, it's not a popular notion around here, so I introduce supporting arguments from time to time ... no position, that I know of, has really ever been abandoned in philosophy - that's an important point to consider.

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us. Why such resistenc if you don't think matter is particles after all?

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us.

I don't think of it as strong resistance. It's obvious that how we see things depends on "us". But I don't think we can use that to necessarily support a particular theory. If what reality is is CAs ... then how do we prove that? Many people are saying CR is not falsifiable! Sad! ;-) QM I think has mathematics and experiments ... if CA can provide the same thing, if he can derive QM from CR ... then how do we choose between the two theories or do we live with the fact that we can now describe reality in different ways? Maybe we use the one theory for one kind of problem and the other for another. We make that decision as we have made that decision all along ... according to the merits of the theories ... maybe in 50 years we will be talking about CRQM ... but I don't have high expectations of seeing reality "as it is" as I don't think that makes much sense.

 

[smcder]

This is very interesting. I'd like to hear more about this.

It seems to a certain degree, we are arguing semantics/labels at this point, as noted by @Michael Allen.

We all seem to agree there are subjects and objects (things external to subjects).

What we are dancing around are the labels for these things. As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop. Constance, and just recently ufology, seem to favor the notion that consciousness (subjects) emerges from physical nature. Constance seems to hold that consciousness literally emerges as something ontologically new. Whether Ufology shares this view, I can't tell. In the past, Ufology maintained that consciousness was physical and could be observed/measured like any other physical object. He seems to have backed away from that view, recently noting that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical.

As best I can tell, Smcder seems to favor a dualist approach to consciousness and matter. Either as both being fundamental or consciousness emerging from nature (but you have typically expressed concerns about emergentism).

Your comment above intrigues me; if you don't think of nature as consisting of swirling particles, what do you think it is? Do you side with the quantum physicists who say indeterminacy is fundamental or do you side with the determinists?

If you don't think matter is, well, matter, why insist that CR is so wrong? If matter isn't matter, than panpsychism as generally understood (particles being intrinsically conscious) is absurd. If there are no particles, then they can't have consciousness.

If physical nature doesn't consist of particles, well then, of what does it consist? And why be so rigid about maintaining a dualism between mind and "matter" (however you conceive it).

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us. Why such resistenc if you don't think matter is particles after all?

As I've noted and you seem to agree (?), the notion of matter is challenged by QM and, I believe, a proper understanding of perception.

It's time to reject the reification of labels such as mind and matter and recognize that both are manifestations of one noumenal substrate that we don't--and perhaps can't--fully understand.

Consciousness emerging as something new ... is problematic ... I'm not sure if that is what @Constance is saying? I know she has talked about it going back to interactions between particles in QM and in the molecular basis of life or at least in very simple organisms ... we saw that in something recently posted about simple organisms going up the food gradient ... but Phenomenal Consciousness in particular ... could you say at least that it is potentially there from the get go? Before or after the Big Bang? Maybe it depends on the physical constants in this particular world ... there you get into Zombie Universes, etc ... I don't know ... but I think it makes sense to say consciousness is fundamental without insisting that it's a different stuff ... but it could be Millican argued from Humean induction that mental causation on pains of Dualism isn't necessarily problematic ... on the other hand, we seem to only consider one or two ... not many ... why is pluralism a neglected option? Because our brains are too small?

I wonder if the last statement above comes about because there is a particular image in your head? Without that image ... I don't see any necessary objections to there being two, three or many fundamental things ... the urge to go back to one may even be cultural/linguistic ... or come from a concrete picture of the Big Bang ... on the other hand, I don't suppose there is any necessary reason why things couldn't emerge, even novel things ... strong emergence ...

 

[smcder]

This is very interesting. I'd like to hear more about this.

It seems to a certain degree, we are arguing semantics/labels at this point, as noted by @Michael Allen.

We all seem to agree there are subjects and objects (things external to subjects).

What we are dancing around are the labels for these things. As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop. Constance, and just recently ufology, seem to favor the notion that consciousness (subjects) emerges from physical nature. Constance seems to hold that consciousness literally emerges as something ontologically new. Whether Ufology shares this view, I can't tell. In the past, Ufology maintained that consciousness was physical and could be observed/measured like any other physical object. He seems to have backed away from that view, recently noting that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical.

As best I can tell, Smcder seems to favor a dualist approach to consciousness and matter. Either as both being fundamental or consciousness emerging from nature (but you have typically expressed concerns about emergentism).

Your comment above intrigues me; if you don't think of nature as consisting of swirling particles, what do you think it is? Do you side with the quantum physicists who say indeterminacy is fundamental or do you side with the determinists?

If you don't think matter is, well, matter, why insist that CR is so wrong? If matter isn't matter, than panpsychism as generally understood (particles being intrinsically conscious) is absurd. If there are no particles, then they can't have consciousness.

If physical nature doesn't consist of particles, well then, of what does it consist? And why be so rigid about maintaining a dualism between mind and "matter" (however you conceive it).

You also express very strong resistance to the notion that how reality appears to us is to a very large degree dependent on... us. Why such resistenc if you don't think matter is particles after all?

As I've noted and you seem to agree (?), the notion of matter is challenged by QM and, I believe, a proper understanding of perception.

It's time to reject the reification of labels such as mind and matter and recognize that both are manifestations of one noumenal substrate that we don't--and perhaps can't--fully understand.

@Michael Allen

@Soupie says

As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop.

Is that right?

 

[Constance]

But we know what "mind" and matter" are? And we know that they're distinct, ontological substrates?

NOW who is wiggling?? ... sometimes I think you just like to argue ;-)

If @Soupie sometimes argues rather intensely, as today, I think it must be for some reason, out of a motivation, a desire, for a complete account/explanation of All-that-is. Unfortunately that goal seems to be presently unattainable by any single individual, or by any single discipline, existing/developing within the horizons of our species' spatiotemporal situation.

Even so, I think we can enjoy and learn from discussions of various theories proposed as partial explanations for what we experience, feel, and think in response to that which we encounter in the local 'world' we live in, and also from discussions of more speculative theories concerning the relation of the local 'world' we experience to the evolving nature of the universe/cosmos of which our planet is a part.

To go back to the quotation from @Soupie above:

But we know what "mind" and matter" are? And we know that they're distinct, ontological substrates?

We know that mind and matter are distinguishable from one another. This has been understood since the pre-Socratics [and likely before written philosophy], and the issue has continued to be explored throughout philosophy, both Eastern and Western.

We don't know that they originate in "distinct ontological substrates." Nor do we know that there can be only one 'ontological substrate', though we've been told over the last 200 years by materialist/objectivist scientists that the universe we exist in is closed and entirely determined by physical properties. Other physicists in our time theorize that the universe is open and changing and thus not deterministic, determined. It will be a long time before the ontological question can be answered.

It seems to me that there are other interesting questions we can pursue philosophically and scientifically concerning the nature of consciousness and mind.

 

[Constance]

Steve, I've found a paper by Heather Logue entitled "Why Naive Realism" which I suppose is the same paper delivered in the video you linked. As you know, I always prefer to read rather than listen to lectures, so I'm going to read this. Would you take a look at it and tell me if it seems to be the paper delivered in the video? Thanks.

Why Naive Realism?

 

[Michael Allen]

@Michael Allen

@Soupie says

As far as I can tell, Michael and I favor a monist approach: there is one substrate from which all objects and subjects develop.

Is that right?

Yes, that sounds accurate...but may also say too much.

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

 

[smcder]

Yes, that sounds accurate...but may also say too much.

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

Always with the caveats! I dub thee Caveat Emperor!

 

[Soupie]

If you got everyone pinned down to a clearly worded creedal statement with their identity cards neatly checked - all of ze papers in ordnung ... what would you have?

Neutral Monism best captures my approach to the relationship between "mind" and "matter."

Neutral Monism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the ‘pure’ experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that. (James 1904b: 23)

Mind and matter, knower and known, thought and thing, representation and represented are then interpreted as resulting from different functional groupings of pure experience (see James 1905: 64).

Neutral monism - Wikipedia

"My thesis is," [James] says, "that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known (p. 4)."[9]

(Note that this doesn't mean I agree with the rest of James' thinking regarding consciousness.)

 

[Constance]

@Soupie, when/if you have an opportunity to write about it, I would like to hear what aspects of James's thinking re consciousness you disagree with.


I've been reading today about different viewpoints on the relationship of phenomenality and intentionality and came across this book chapter by Zahavi, which I'm linking for anyone interested in reading it:

Intentionality and phenomenality:
A phenomenological take on the hard problem

http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/intentionality-experience.pdf

 

[smcder]

Steve, I've found a paper by Heather Logue entitled "Why Naive Realism" which I suppose is the same paper delivered in the video you linked. As you know, I always prefer to read rather than listen to lectures, so I'm going to read this. Would you take a look at it and tell me if it seems to be the paper delivered in the video? Thanks.

Why Naive Realism?

I believe it is!

 

[smcder]

Yes, that sounds accurate...but may also say too much.

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

In what way is it accurate ... and in what way does it say too much?

 

[smcder]

@Constance

"I've been reading today about different viewpoints on the relationship of phenomenality and intentionality and came across this book chapter by Zahavi, which I'm linking for anyone interested in reading it:
Intentionality and phenomenality:
A phenomenological take on the hard problem

http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/intentionality-experience.pdf[/QUOTE]

This is a very good paper.

"According to such a traditional (empiricist) concept, phenomenal consciousness has in and of itself no relation to the world. It is like a closed container filled with experiences that have no immediate bearing on the world outside. Typically, this internalist position has then been given a representationalist slant:

On its own, our mind cannot reach all the way to the objects themselves.

It is therefore necessary to introduce some kind of representational interface between the mind and the world if we are to understand and explain intentionality, i.e., the claim has been that our cognitive access to the world is mediated by mental representations."