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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

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Another way to think about it is that since Copernicus, it's been one Copernican Revolution after another - with all that experience, the next step is to learn to drive the process ... choose your revolution. If that happens, then it is the machines that will have the worry of becoming "human".

My hunch is that Human 2.0 will come before AI+ ... and that consciousness is a "wet" and organic process. Was it Searle or some other comedian who remarked that a simulated kidney won't get your keyboard wet?
 
smcder said:
"--you'll find a weird kind of Cartesian chauvinism waiting at the bottom when you open your own nano robotic toolbox of embryonic development and find pure algorithmic processes waiting."

Interesting and welcome to the "purple prose" club! ;-) a sense of humor is all thats at the bottom of my toolbox ... I spray for nanobots monthly.

Can you write more clearly? What is the reference to nano robotic? Embryonic development? The use of "chauvinism" gives this a feel of emotional involvement, which I think is good.

For my part I think these are open questions. But there may actually be less at stake than we think or feel.

I recommend McGilchrist's "The Master and His Emissary".
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I think we fool ourselves when we disparage the role of "the machine" in our own existence--as if the notion itself were some kind of put-down hoisted by individuals who have forgotten that the very core of their own existence comes from a robotic molecule: DNA.

Chemists prepare an inorganic double-helix structure for the first time | September 29, 2016 Issue - Vol. 94 Issue 39 | Chemical & Engineering News

Perhaps I am preaching to a choir here (hopefully), being a carbon-based machine intelligence myself, I get a little worked up (hence my "purple prose") when I think the conversation is too cavalier or dismissive of the mechanics of self-replicating entities and the role of algorithmic processes in conveying our own experience of being. To suggest that human beings in this age are somehow losing sight of the nature of being because of recent preoccupation(s) with industry, mechanics, computers and machinery is ironic, when we find our own source of being in a nano-robotic molecule that is able (within a framework of other components, proteins, ribosomes, etc) to basically 3-D print copies of itself and its survival machine (from cell to embryo to body with all its organs) based on discrete sequences of coded information (regardless if all of it is "used" for the formation of a survival machine is irrelevant).

A sci-fi "grey goo" scenario of the world overtaken by replicating machines -- and its already happened with DNA...*shakes head.* And yet some of us (present company excluded) may still yet sit on a high horse and disparage algorithmic processes and silicon-based machine intelligence. As one of the aliens stated in the "Meat" story, "it is just too much."
 
Constance said:
That is so well said that I'd like to quote it (anonymously if you prefer, let me know] on my FB page, if that's ok with you.


I've been reading a draft chapter from a book-in-progress, this chapter available online and entitled "Nietzsche and Whitehead on the Decadent Desire for Static Being" by J. Thomas Howe, and want to quote a footnote from it for your consideration:

"Whitehead suggests that the idea that mathematical entities are devoid of process is mistaken. Plato misunderstands mathematics when he identifies it with a realm of changeless eternity. Whitehead writes 'that mathematics is concerned with certain forms of process issuing into forms which are components for further process' (MT, 92). It should be clear that Whitehead’s critique of Greek mathematics is not directed at either mathematics’ general usefulness or even the ability of mathematics to illuminate various aspects of the nature of reality. Rather, it is directed at a specific view of mathematics. What Whitehead is leery of is what Ralph Norman calls mathematicism. Mathematicism involves the presupposition that knowledge is only that which is deductively certain. Whitehead’s interest in mathematics is, as Norman writes, in its 'aesthetic philosophical use – i.e., its use as the search for infinitely rich and diverse patterns of order, in its confidence that the conception and enjoyment of such coherence is an open-ended enterprise, that in fact the mind deployed has as its destiny whatever expansion of its initial systems may be required in the large encounter of looking and finding' (Ralph V. Norman, Jr., “Whitehead and ‘Mathematicism,’” in Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L. Kline [Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963[, p. 34)."

I no longer have the url link to the chapter I'm quoting. I came across notes and extracts from it in my Word files.
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That is so well said that I'd like to quote it (anonymously if you prefer, let me know] on my FB page, if that's ok with you.

Yes ma'am, you are welcome to use it any way that you see fit.


Unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics - Wikipedia

The Reasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics
 
Michael Allen said:
I think we fool ourselves when we disparage the role of "the machine" in our own existence--as if the notion itself were some kind of put-down hoisted by individuals who have forgotten that the very core of their own existence comes from a robotic molecule: DNA.

Chemists prepare an inorganic double-helix structure for the first time | September 29, 2016 Issue - Vol. 94 Issue 39 | Chemical & Engineering News

Perhaps I am preaching to a choir here (hopefully), being a carbon-based machine intelligence myself, I get a little worked up (hence my "purple prose") when I think the conversation is too cavalier or dismissive of the mechanics of self-replicating entities and the role of algorithmic processes in conveying our own experience of being. To suggest that human beings in this age are somehow losing sight of the nature of being because of recent preoccupation(s) with industry, mechanics, computers and machinery is ironic, when we find our own source of being in a nano-robotic molecule that is able (within a framework of other components, proteins, ribosomes, etc) to basically 3-D print copies of itself and its survival machine (from cell to embryo to body with all its organs) based on discrete sequences of coded information (regardless if all of it is "used" for the formation of a survival machine is irrelevant).

A sci-fi "grey goo" scenario of the world overtaken by replicating machines -- and its already happened with DNA...*shakes head.* And yet some of us (present company excluded) may still yet sit on a high horse and disparage algorithmic processes and silicon-based machine intelligence. As one of the aliens stated in the "Meat" story, "it is just too much."
Click to expand...

Why do you get worked up? What's the threat?
 
Michael Allen said:
Conscious Robots: Facing up to the reality of being human
Conscious Robots: Facing up to the reality of being human. - Kindle edition by Paul Kwatz. Politics & Social Sciences Kindle eBooks @ Amazon.com.
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Conscious Robots shows why we’re so convinced that we’re in charge, when we’re really just carrying out our evolved pre-programmed instructions. And reveals the inevitable future, how one day humans will take control of their conscious minds, get happy and stay happy. But it will come too late for you, Dear Reader… so no point buying the book. Unless you’re extremely rich, of course. Then you can pay for the neurochemical research yourself.

“Easy to understand and persuasive” “Reminded me of Douglas Adams and Terry Pratchett”

 
Just noticed this on the sidebar of the Kwatz book - I guess this is the information available on the author:

"Hi. Unfortunately, Paul Kwatz isn't available for promotional activities or discussions.

I met Paul while I was trekking in Nepal. Paul (I don't think that's his real name) is a yak herder. Well, he's got two yaks. Not sure that's a herd, but never mind. We got talking while his yaks produced the fuel that we burned for meagre warmth and for cooking the Dal Baht. He explained his ideas - he was engaging and shy - and I didn't think much of them. But a week later after walking and thinking, I went back to see him and asked to publish his book. We did a deal involving me handing over my expensive Western puffa jacket and my party's remaining Kendal Mint Cake (which I don't like anyway, so no loss).

Paul could be living a wealthy life with a fine house, latest mobile phone and more attractive fuel than yak dung, but he'd say that life is inherently satisfactory, so what's the point?

I, however, seek to maximise the survival chances of my genes by desperately seeking approval from other conscious robots. So get in touch if you want to stroke my ego or tell me you're not a robot. Write a review and I'll comment back. Thanks so much. Ian"
 
smcder said:
I finished the Toward Elegant Pan. Very helpful. We're there two papers?

Two papers?
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I thought initially there were two papers, but it was due to you posting the same link twice in back-to-back posts. In any case, I found the paper helpful.

smcder said:
My hunch is that Human 2.0 will come before AI+ ... and that consciousness is a "wet" and organic process. Was it Searle or some other comedian who remarked that a simulated kidney won't get your keyboard wet?
Click to expand...
So you're not convinced by Putnam's position?
 
Soupie said:
I thought initially there were two papers, but it was due to you posting the same link twice in back-to-back posts. In any case, I found the paper helpful.


So you're not convinced by Putnam's position?
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I'm not sure Functional Isomorphism and Multiple Realizability mean that you can have any substrate. Putnam uses the example of a silicone computer and a computer made of cogs and wheels ... functionally isomorphic, but in the example of a kidney made of 1s and 0s and one made of "meat" - ... one can get you wet and one can't. Is that isomorphism?

Or use the tinkertoy computer - could you build a super-computer out of tinker toys? How big would it have to be? Where would you put it? Maybe in space so it wouldn't collapse under its own weight but how long would it last in outer space? How long would it take to perform a calculation? How do you power it ... etc etc

And if consciousness has certain requirements (speed of processing, etc) then it may be limited what you can make it out of ... in fact, there may be upper limits to any kind of intelligence - just as computers run into issues with heat dissipation and speed of transmission, how long a signal takes to send, timing, organization of components etc -so that if we are limited to one or a few substrates then how much intelligence we can have may have practical limits ...

And there is this ... is anyone arguing that you can make life from any substrate? Carbon is awfully handy if you want to make complex molecules, because of its chemical properties ... Sillicone much less so and I'm not sure I've seen any other candidates. if some of that is true, we could have an argument that anything intelligent and conscious would look a lot like a brain - so if that's software running on some kind of computer, then there could still be some isomorphism there so that the program is a lot like a brain ... this is what ANNs are after all ... now that is in the favor of MR/FI

So now could we put together a version of the Drake Equation with consciousness - what do we want to say? Do we want to say "well, you know - life, big deal, you can make it out of any old thing- so we're not surprised Mother Nature isn't so clever" but if so, then where is all of it (life)? Or do we want to say "wow, it's pretty much carbon and maybe sillicone and what are the odds that it all came together in the right conditions - well, pretty slim because it only happens on these planets that are just right" - Baby Bear planets ... and then if consciousness is something like kidneys ... well you can see ... so all of the above contains material to argue for or against my "hunch" ... which, you know, is why I called it a "hunch" in the first place ... and I've left a lot out and also not pursued some other junctions like "what about Quantum Computers" ... etc etc etc
 
smcder said:
I'm not sure Functional Isomorphism and Multiple Realizability mean that you can have any substrate. Putnam uses the example of a silicone computer and a computer made of cogs and wheels ... functionally isomorphic, but in the example of a kidney made of 1s and 0s and one made of "meat" - ... one can get you wet and one can't. Is that isomorphism?

Or use the tinkertoy computer - could you build a super-computer out of tinker toys? How big would it have to be? Where would you put it? Maybe in space so it wouldn't collapse under its own weight but how long would it last in outer space? How long would it take to perform a calculation? How do you power it ... etc etc

And if consciousness has certain requirements (speed of processing, etc) then it may be limited what you can make it out of ... in fact, there may be upper limits to any kind of intelligence - just as computers run into issues with heat dissipation and speed of transmission, how long a signal takes to send, timing, organization of components etc -so that if we are limited to one or a few substrates then how much intelligence we can have may have practical limits ...

And there is this ... is anyone arguing that you can make life from any substrate? Carbon is awfully handy if you want to make complex molecules, because of its chemical properties ... Sillicone much less so and I'm not sure I've seen any other candidates. if some of that is true, we could have an argument that anything intelligent and conscious would look a lot like a brain - so if that's software running on some kind of computer, then there could still be some isomorphism there so that the program is a lot like a brain ... this is what ANNs are after all ... now that is in the favor of MR/FI

So now could we put together a version of the Drake Equation with consciousness - what do we want to say? Do we want to say "well, you know - life, big deal, you can make it out of any old thing- so we're not surprised Mother Nature isn't so clever" but if so, then where is all of it (life)? Or do we want to say "wow, it's pretty much carbon and maybe sillicone and what are the odds that it all came together in the right conditions - well, pretty slim because it only happens on these planets that are just right" - Baby Bear planets ... and then if consciousness is something like kidneys ... well you can see ... so all of the above contains material to argue for or against my "hunch" ... which, you know, is why I called it a "hunch" in the first place ... and I've left a lot out and also not pursued some other junctions like "what about Quantum Computers" ... etc etc etc
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A kidney that has "wetness" as observed from our ridiculously limited point-of-view may be no more "wet" than the quarks, hadrons and leptons that make up this "wetness."
 
https://mitpress.mit.edu/sites/default/files/titles/content/9780262194969_sch_0001.pdf

"The first distinction concerns the extent of MRT: just how much multiple realizability must one accept before proclaiming MRT to be true? For purposes of answering this question, I shall adopt with slight revisions Polger’s (2002, pp. 146–147) useful taxonomy. Polger finds in the literature four conceptions of MRT:

Weak MRT: At least some creatures that are not exactly like us in their physical composition can have minds like ours.

SETI1 MRT: Some creatures that are significantly different from us in their physical composition can have minds like ours.

Standard MRT: Systems of indefinitely (perhaps infinitely) many physical compositions can have minds like ours.

Radical MRT: Any (every) suitably organized system, regardless of its physical composition, can have minds like ours.

smcder I think Chalmers' would go with Radical MRT, I'll try to look this up.

Polger notes that standard and radical MRT seem to receive most discussion and allegiance in contemporary philosophy of mind. In my view, these theses are prima facie incredible; and even if one does not agree with this sentiment, it is surely true that the burden falls on those who endorse them to say why they find them plausible. Weak and SETI MRT, on the other hand, are less easy to dismiss with a simple “prove it.” Many might be inclined to see these hypotheses as plausible on their face. But more important, some philosophers believe that there is currently at hand evidence to support them. Accordingly, much of this book is spent defending a view about how one should interpret this evidence. In the end, I hope to have diminished significantly the support for a conception of MRT that falls somewhere between weak and standard MRT."
 
throw in Gould's "tape of life" discussed in this paper to my ramblings above (Drake equation of substrate dependent consciousness)
 
"With the concept of a functional isomorphism in hand, Putnam’s empirical hypothesis is, on the current suggestion, that all systems functionally isomorphic to a mind are, in turn, minds. However, we are now in a position to see why existing evidence makes this hypothesis unlikely. Computers are devices that are remarkably successful at simulating the behavior of complex systems. Moreover, a computer simulates a complex system by virtue of establishing a functional isomorphism between its own states and the states of the system it simulates. So, for instance, it is in virtue of maintaining an isomorphism between its own states and the states of a hurricane that a meteorologist can use a computer to predict the hurricane’s path and force. Similarly, engineers rely on an isomorphism between a computer’s states and the states of an airplane to predict how the airplane will perform in turbulent winds. One can simulate any behavior at all on a computer given a machine table description of the system to be simulated. Accordingly, the question one must now ask Putnam is this: why suppose that if we build a system that is functionally isomorphic to a mind then it would be a mind, given that we have built systems that are functionally isomorphic to hurricanes and airplanes but that turn out to be neither hurricanes nor airplanes? What is it about a mind that makes it the kind of thing that can be duplicated by mere functional isomorphism when functional isomorphism typically provides us with nothing more than a simulation? In short, from what evidence we have, it seems that something that satisfies a machine-functional description of a mind is no more likely to be a mind than is something likely to be a hurricane just because it satisfies a machine-functional description of a hurricane. There is simply no more reason to believe that a system functionally isomorphic to a mind can think than there is to be believe that a system functionally The Multiple Realizability Thesis 19 isomorphic to a hurricane can bend palm trees and destroy trailer parks (see also Block 1978; Searle 1980; Sober 1992)"
 
smcder said:
What is it about a mind that makes it the kind of thing that can be duplicated by mere functional isomorphism when functional isomorphism typically provides us with nothing more than a simulation?
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Isn't the obvious answer that a mind is a subjective process while hurricanes and airplanes are objective processes?

Therefore the argument would be:

Given objective (physical) process X possessed a mind, then functionally isomorphic objective process X1 will also posses a mind.

Before anyone dismisses the above argument, they would have to explain why and how physical process X has a corresponding mind.

Since no one can do this, the above argument can't be dismissed.
 
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