• NEW! LOWEST RATES EVER -- SUPPORT THE SHOW AND ENJOY THE VERY BEST PREMIUM PARACAST EXPERIENCE! Welcome to The Paracast+, eight years young! For a low subscription fee, you can download the ad-free version of The Paracast and the exclusive, member-only, After The Paracast bonus podcast, featuring color commentary, exclusive interviews, the continuation of interviews that began on the main episode of The Paracast. We also offer lifetime memberships! Flash! Take advantage of our lowest rates ever! Act now! It's easier than ever to susbcribe! You can sign up right here!

    Subscribe to The Paracast Newsletter!

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

Free episodes:

Status
Not open for further replies.
Putnam on the difference in being a naive realist and a color realist:

"Briefly, a naive realist thinks that in the case of veridical perception not only do we perceive objective colors (which can mean many things, depending on the particular account of "perception" the philosopher gives), but that the qualia we enjoy in a case of veridical perception are the objective colors, or at least that each objective color has just one color quale that represents it "as it is". At times John McDowell, in Mind and World, seems to me very close to that, except that he wouldn't use the word "qualia" (he does allow "impressions" however, which was Hume's term for sensations). To change the example, a naive realist about shape would have to believe that in the case of a veridical perception of a rectangular table, I would have to have rectangular qualia. I believe there are rectangular tables, but the physical property of rectangularity is quite different from any property of qualia (especially if you take the variably curved spacetime of relativity into account when you talk about physical objects!). Nevertheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which we often perceive the rectangular shape of something (although "the senses" can be fooled about that). I believe that there are green objects (green artifacts, green leaves, green scum) and that they they have a complex, disjunctive, anthropocentric, property in common. And I agree with Tyler Burge that the perceptual system represents that property (although the representations are not qualia, but can be triggered by qualia). And disjunctive anthropocentric properties can correspond to real causal structures. Being an apple is not a natural kind in physics, but it is in biology, recall. Being complex and of no interest to fundamental physics isn't a failure to be "real". I think green is as real as applehood."
 
"(This is where I expect @Constance will probably ask me to write a huge paper/monograph explaining this.)"


Actually not. You've written quite enough there that I'll need to read it several times before possibly understanding it.

I started re-writing @Michael's response one line at a time - of course @Michael would have to agree that this keeps the meaning of his words! This method has been helpful to me in the past.


When we conjure the category "physical monism," we have to remind ourselves that we are using our fingers to "point at the moon."

In using the category “physical monism” we are pointing at the moon.

We will find "illusion" either way -- i.e. when we put everything into the category of "mind" or "matter."


Whether we put everything into the category of “mind” or into the category of “matter”, we will find illusion.

It is THIS very division that is illusory, but we may try to prove the division is such by examining "form" (mind) in terms of "matter" or vice versa.


The division: “mind” or “matter” is illusory. We may try to prove that it is illusory by examining “mind” (or “form”) in terms of “matter” or “matter” in terms of “mind” but either way leads to a dead end.

Either way we wind up in a cul-de-sac...a dead end.

The problem is that we are using our own simulation artifacts as a basis for proof.

(“simulation artifacts” needs explanation/definition)

In this way we end up noticing that placing the entire world in terms of "mind" or "idea" is isomorphic to the same regarding "matter" or "thing."

If we use our own simulation artifacts as a basis for proof – we see that it doesn't matter if we categorize the world in terms of “mind”/”idea” or in terms of “matter”/”thing”.

The answer is of course neither...the things (for which we interact with) in our world our as much a part of ourselves as we are to ourselves.

We cannot say the world is all “mind” or all “matter” because the things we interact with are as much a part of ourselves as we are a part of ourselves.

In fact, a basic review of our nature will show that our "awareness" or "consciousness" of "ourselves" and other things (or to be more precise, "ourselves through the mediation of that which is not of what we denote as 'ourselves'") is something that cannot be put into either categories.

A review of our nature will show that our awareness or consciousness of ourselves and other things through that which is not what we say is of ourselves is something that can't be categorized.

Both categories of "us" vs "that" or vs "them" require a world that supercedes such notions. We don't have to grasp the superceding framework as a "thing" because such "grasping" would have to be analogous to the categories we have already assumed prior to the attempt (at the grasping of "reality).

The categories “us” / “that” or “us” / “them” require a world that supercedes (“takes the place of”? not sure this is the right word) ideas of “us”/”that”/”them”.

So all of the questions regarding the "stuff" and its "properties" and whether one is "dependent" on "another" is dependent on a pre-existing reality that remains unexamined.

So all of the questions regarding “stuff” and its properties and whether one is dependent on another - these questions are dependent on an un-examined reality.

The "reality" which we are "looking for" is something that stands in the background of all that enables our powers to make such categories and distinctions.

The reality we are looking for is something that stands in the background of what enables us to make such categories and distinctions. (need to be clear what “such categories and distinctions refers to)

This is very frustrating, because we are used to our own sensory impressions making up the fullness of reality which is relevant to our continued survival.

This is very frustrating (need to be clear why this is frustating) because the fullness of our reality is made up of sensory impressions relevant to our survival.
 
Here's my attempt to translate:

Our attempts to categorize the world are bound to fail. All our categories are illusions. This is because the processes that allow us to make categories precede our ability to make categories and thus are not included in our categories, making our categories useless for categorizing the processes that allow us to categorize.

We evolved to survive, not to accurately categorize the world.
 
@smcder

I finished the Toward Elegant Pan. Very helpful. We're there two papers?

Is Putnams approach accurately categorized at Strong Emergentism?

I still hold that the combination problem is analogically a problem for physicalists as well.

In fact, as a I believe @blowfish pointed out long ago, I think a central hard problem for consciousness studies is why/how do we feel (in the true sense of feel) separate from the world while by all constitutive accounts we are not.
 
... Existence lies fundamentally unexplained, only because such a fundamental is required for our ability to "experience." We want to find a "root" in being that ends all "questioning"--but to find such a "root" is to put ourselves into a state of "non-being." Once we have found the answers to all questions regarding the nature of our own existence and ability to experience...we will cease to "exist."
I think we've been down this road before. The only alternative to the situation that things exist independently of our experience is subjective idealism, which is nonsense, if for no other reason that it presupposes that the rest of the universe never existed before we humans came along to experience it. So let's forget that idea.

When I use the word "physical" I don't equate it to "material" as in "materials" ( solids, liquids, gasses, plasmas ) but simply to the state of a thing's existence ( if it exists it's physical ). So the distinction between mental and material is categorical ( in both contexts of the word ). In this sense, mental objects are as physical a phenomenon as material objects, yet they are two different types of physical phenomena and in the context of our experience mean the difference between Dasein ( Jaspers' version ) and existenz ( or loosely what we might consider pure subjectivity ).
 
Last edited:
I started re-writing @Michael's response one line at a time - of course @Michael would have to agree that this keeps the meaning of his words! This method has been helpful to me in the past.

Thank you, Steve. Your translation of Michael's text is very helpful, including especially your recognition of several critical points where Michael's meaning remains ambiguous. If Michael goes ahead and clarifies his meaning in those places -- [perhaps in bracketed restatements of what he claims/means] -- and if he otherwise affirms that you have correctly interpreted and restated his claims, we can go on to discuss his claims.

I think that the major claim in M's text that needs clarification is the one you highlighted here:

The problem is that we are using our own simulation artifacts as a basis for proof.
(“simulation artifacts” needs explanation/definition)
 
Thank you, Steve. Your translation of Michael's text is very helpful, including especially your recognition of several critical points where Michael's meaning remains ambiguous. If Michael goes ahead and clarifies his meaning in those places -- [perhaps in bracketed restatements of what he claims/means] -- and if he otherwise affirms that you have correctly interpreted and restated his claims, we can go on to discuss his claims.

I think that the major claim in M's text that needs clarification is the one you highlighted here:

Steve's summary is better than the original (mine). I reverently bow to his abilities and will gladly step down from the podium and let him continue where I left off...

Regarding my "simulation" comment...it is in fact deploying an analogy of something we ourselves use in our own world to "grasp" reality of another (i.e. hardware device) through the mechanics of something else which "goes through the motions" in another medium. So in a way I am using our ability to create functional analogies in computer science (software emulators of hardware state machines) as an analogy to point to our ability to create and make sense of the same. When I said "simulation artifacts" I am pointing to the patterns of electro-chemical mechanism which we uncover in our analyses of our own body tissues and the underlying correlates between such patterns and the "things" which we "grasp internally" in our own "representational space." Such correlates (neural correlates they are often called) are coupled directly into the world of "things" ...but the point we must always remember is that the boundary and the internal "simulation" artifacts (neural correlates, impressions, etc) are just as much a part of the overall "physical" reality we are trying to comprehend as the same "externals" which we looking at.
 
Steve's summary is better than the original (mine). I reverently bow to his abilities and will gladly step down from the podium and let him continue where I left off...

Regarding my "simulation" comment...it is in fact deploying an analogy of something we ourselves use in our own world to "grasp" reality of another (i.e. hardware device) through the mechanics of something else which "goes through the motions" in another medium. So in a way I am using our ability to create functional analogies in computer science (software emulators of hardware state machines) as an analogy to point to our ability to create and make sense of the same. When I said "simulation artifacts" I am pointing to the patterns of electro-chemical mechanism which we uncover in our analyses of our own body tissues and the underlying correlates between such patterns and the "things" which we "grasp internally" in our own "representational space." Such correlates (neural correlates they are often called) are coupled directly into the world of "things" ...but the point we must always remember is that the boundary and the internal "simulation" artifacts (neural correlates, impressions, etc) are just as much a part of the overall "physical" reality we are trying to comprehend as the same "externals" which we looking at.
Makes sense to me. So the paranormal must be physical too then. Can anything even be "non-physical" in the sense we're talking about?
 
Last edited:
Steve's summary is better than the original (mine). I reverently bow to his abilities and will gladly step down from the podium and let him continue where I left off...

Regarding my "simulation" comment...it is in fact deploying an analogy of something we ourselves use in our own world to "grasp" reality of another (i.e. hardware device) through the mechanics of something else which "goes through the motions" in another medium. So in a way I am using our ability to create functional analogies in computer science (software emulators of hardware state machines) as an analogy to point to our ability to create and make sense of the same. When I said "simulation artifacts" I am pointing to the patterns of electro-chemical mechanism which we uncover in our analyses of our own body tissues and the underlying correlates between such patterns and the "things" which we "grasp internally" in our own "representational space." Such correlates (neural correlates they are often called) are coupled directly into the world of "things" ...but the point we must always remember is that the boundary and the internal "simulation" artifacts (neural correlates, impressions, etc) are just as much a part of the overall "physical" reality we are trying to comprehend as the same "externals" which we looking at.
So you are arguing for monism. You don't like the term substance, so would it be Being Monism.

moreover the terms physical and mental are meaningless. You reject a true duality between physical things and mental things.

Ufology wants to continue to use the term physical but this is a problem.

you reject a true duality between the physical and mental, but there is still the duality between so-called objectivity and subjectivity. Even if true objectivity can't be obtained in practice, it may exist in principal, no?

So you may reject a duality between the physical and mental, but we're still left with the challenge of explaining the subjective in objective terms.

That's why I think it's problematic to continue to refer to everything as physical. Despite ufology's re-defining the term, the physical has typically meant things that can be explained/described in objective terms.

So long as the "mental" resists description in objective terms, I think it's problematic to refer to the mental as physical.

I agree that the mental and the physical are not a true duality, but rather than elevate one of these substance to a primary position, I think we are forced to elevate a neutral "substance" to primacy.

The "substance" may be pure being and/or experience, or perhaps something we can't currently conceive.
 
So you are arguing for monism. You don't like the term substance, so would it be Being Monism.

moreover the terms physical and mental are meaningless. You reject a true duality between physical things and mental things.

Ufology wants to continue to use the term physical but this is a problem.

you reject a true duality between the physical and mental, but there is still the duality between so-called objectivity and subjectivity. Even if true objectivity can't be obtained in practice, it may exist in principal, no?

So you may reject a duality between the physical and mental, but we're still left with the challenge of explaining the subjective in objective terms.

That's why I think it's problematic to continue to refer to everything as physical. Despite ufology's re-defining the term, the physical has typically meant things that can be explained/described in objective terms.

So long as the "mental" resists description in objective terms, I think it's problematic to refer to the mental as physical.

I agree that the mental and the physical are not a true duality, but rather than elevate one of these substance to a primary position, I think we are forced to elevate a neutral "substance" to primacy.

The "substance" may be pure being and/or experience, or perhaps something we can't currently conceive.

I reject fundamentalist duality, what you call "true duality." Whatever we (and the world we live in) are they cannot be ascertained entirely by the "simulation artifacts" that we use in our everyday experience.

I think the fundamental block on our understanding (or the reason we continue to feel something about our existence is "mysterious") is in the full stop we instinctively search for in the contents of our "terms" (irregardless of the categories we assert as a backend to those terms). Terms are artificially "terminal" and they necessarily place limitations on our full understanding regarding the background from which they emerge. In computer programming "terms" we find the end of an algorithm process which accomplishes our limited goal(s) through complicated conditions and filters on a greater background of reality. Without these limitations we have no meaning--in order to bring complete our understanding we have to destroy the pattern along with the background from which it emerged. In this respect, we might consider our artificial "mental" and "physical" categories as a kind of figure/ground from which all experience and understanding emerges.

Regarding "substance" we are simply looking for some consistency or endurance in the patterns of reality within which we "dwell" and "interact." In olden times "substance" was thought of as the fundamental "backend" or "basis" from which all perceptual or experience flowed--a "something-I-know-not-what" which is the bedrock of our reality (experience). It is a "terminal" or "termination" of all things into a gigantic question mark (and to others considered as a "genus"). So "terms," while very useful for communication/inter-subjective activities, aren't very useful when we turn them against themselves (algorithmically). This is very much akin to the "halting problem" in mathematics and computer science, whereby we see the folly in trying to create a program A which takes as input arguments another arbitrary program B (to be run on the same state machine) and those program's arguments (B1, B2, ... Bn) and outputs (Ob1, Ob2, Ob3....) and then through execution finds a property (e.g. will it finish) which can only be discovered by running the input program B on the state machine and waiting for that property to emerge.

So even though we may not be able to conceive "pure being" or experience, nevertheless we can understand something about why such a conception might lead ultimately to meaninglessness or contradiction.
 
So even though we may not be able to conceive "pure being" or experience, nevertheless we can understand something about why such a conception might lead ultimately to meaninglessness or contradiction.

Or we can abandon such conceptions and figure out the nature of our existence in what we can refer to with Cannonball Adderley as 'this here'.



Handily reduced to language by Jon Hendricks and vocalized by Lambert, Hendricks, and Ross here:

 
Michael Allen said:
I guess everything is both ...or neither :)
Hmm. OK. But more seriously, I'm thinking that everything, including paranormal phenomena, must be something physical, at least within the context of what "physical" means to me, which is synonymous with extant, but implies a hierarchy of order that in theory can be used to differentiate one thing from another, e.g. the mental from the material.
Michael Allen said:
... So even though we may not be able to conceive "pure being" or experience, nevertheless we can understand something about why such a conception might lead ultimately to meaninglessness or contradiction.
I can see how contradictions can happen, but not meaninglessness, other than when what is meant in specific terms is taken out of context, which is more like irrelevance. Nothing extant and perceived by consciousness is devoid of meaning.

This was an interesting aside: The birth and death of fundamentalism in nonduality and Advaita teachings. | Jeff Foster
 
Last edited:
Hmm. OK. But more seriously, I'm thinking that everything, including paranormal phenomena, must be something physical, at least within the context of what "physical" means to me, which is synonymous with extant, but implies a hierarchy of order that in theory can be used to differentiate one thing from another, e.g. the mental from the material.
I can see how contradictions can happen, but not meaninglessness, other than when what is meant in specific terms is taken out of context, which is more like irrelevance. Nothing extant and perceived by consciousness is devoid of meaning.


This was an interesting aside: The birth and death of fundamentalism in nonduality and Advaita teachings. | Jeff Foster

Very good. I also greatly enjoyed the essay you linked.

It's relevant that in his later works Merleau-Ponty said that in understanding the being of perception we come to the point of moving from "I see" to "one sees."
 
In computer programming "terms" we find the end of an algorithm process which accomplishes our limited goal(s) through complicated conditions and filters on a greater background of reality. Without these limitations we have no meaning--in order to bring complete our understanding we have to destroy the pattern along with the background from which it emerged.

The algorithmic limitations you refer to seem to be built into what computer scientists refer to as the computer's 'ontology', a term I think is wholly misapplied in computer technology. In that field it seems to mean what is propositionally and processually laid into the computer by its programmer. The computer can only process information within the limitations of an informational 'world' given to the computer as the context of meaning within which it can operate/function. If that's not correct, please correct what I've said. If I'm on the right track about this, you seem to be indicating that you as a programmer would have to destroy the computer to open it to some access to the world outside of it: "to bring complete our {?} understanding we have to destroy the pattern along with the background from which it emerged." Surely you don't mean 'your' understanding, and I don't think you intend to destroy a computer you've programmed in order to open it to a 'background' as extensive as the one we discover, exist in, experience, and increasingly comprehend. So what do you mean?

You go on to extend your analogy:


In this respect, we might consider our artificial "mental" and "physical" categories as a kind of figure/ground from which all experience and understanding emerges.

What is the basis for the notion that our species' evolved and developing embodied intelligence and conscious capacity for social, cultural, philosophical, scientific, explorative, and creative activity is 'artificial' in the same way in which the computer you program is artificial? For example, again and again individual members of our species and our species as a whole in its historical development have "broken the patterns" of our thinking, behavior, activity, goals, and intentions in life as, over time, we have come to understand the inadequacy of our former ideas about and insights into the 'background' from which we emerge. And will undoubtedly continue doing so as long we exist.
 
Last edited:
David Paulides work and does it correlate with feelings prior to a encounter and the smell of danger, Unknown the wind noise is it the sound produced when breaking into our dimension ? by eyewitness who have left mobile phones behind "Swirling Noise" as a method of travel , weapon (already here) and plausible a different type of natural camouflage of higher intelligence. Can the swirling noise be some natural cloaked tornadoes from nature? Constance ,
enjoyed that tune.
 
The algorithmic limitations you refer to seem to be built into what computer scientists refer to as the computer's 'ontology', a term I think is wholly misapplied in computer technology. In that field it seems to mean what is propositionally and processually laid into the computer by its programmer. The computer can only process information within the limitations of an informational 'world' given to the computer as the context of meaning within which it can operate/function. If that's not correct, please correct what I've said. If I'm on the right track about this, you seem to be indicating that you as a programmer would have to destroy the computer to open it to some access to the world outside of it: "to bring complete our {?} understanding we have to destroy the pattern along with the background from which it emerged." Surely you don't mean 'your' understanding, and I don't think you intend to destroy a computer you've programmed in order to open it to a 'background' as extensive as the one we discover, exist in, experience, and increasingly comprehend. So what do you mean?

You go on to extend your analogy:




What is the basis for the notion that our species' evolved and developing embodied intelligence and conscious capacity for social, cultural, philosophical, scientific, explorative, and creative activity is 'artificial' in the same way in which the computer you program is artificial? For example, again and again individual members of our species and our species as a whole in its historical development have "broken the patterns" of our thinking, behavior, activity, goals, and intentions in life as, over time, we have come to understand the inadequacy of our former ideas about and insights into the 'background' from which we emerge. And will undoubtedly continue doing so as long we exist.



Actually the algorithmic limitations lie purely within mathematics -- the machines which process the tiny rules into patterns of meaning for us mimic the same patterns of "on-off" and "yes/no" firings of neurons in our brains -- of course the machines we create are static, regardless of the flexibility allowed by the software (collections of machine op codes that allow the machine to perform tasks that are meaningful for us). In many ways we are like computers that can only process information within the limitations of our evolved "coupling" with our environment. Limitations are the bread and butter of sentience--such limitations happen in the negative space of possibilities which are irrelevant to our own survival (and yet remain as if they could one day become relevant). Simply put, patterns of existence in our conscious domain must emerge from a pattern of being/non-being

Binary Hex
1111 1111 1111 1111 FFFF
000 000 000 000 0000

Binary Pattern (hexadecimal encoding for brevity):

54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 6D 65 61 6E 69 6E 67 66 75 6C 20 73 74 61 74 65 6D 65 6E 74 20 61 74 20 6C 65 61 73 74 20 66 6F 72 20 74 68 69 73 20 63 75 72 72 65 6E 74 20 73 74 61 74 65 20 6D 61 63 68 69 6E 65 20 70 72 6F 63 65 73 73 69 6E 67 20 74 68 65 20 6F 6E 65 73 20 61 6E 64 20 7A 65 72 6F 20 70 61 74 74 65 72 6E 73 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 63 6F 72 72 65 73 70 6F 6E 64 20 74 6F 20 74 68 65 20 62 69 6E 61 72 79 20 61 73 63 69 69 20 65 6E 63 6F 64 69 6E 67 20 66 6F 72 20 74 68 69 73 20 70 61 72 74 69 63 75 6C 61 72 20 73 65 6E 74 65 6E 63 65 2E

Translation:

["]This is a meaningful statement at least for this current state machine processing the ones and zero patterns which correspond to the binary ascii encoding for this particular sentence.["]


While the human created "physical" state machines are often static (for which much of this is made up with the possibilities of software) -- there are other hardware devices (i.e. FPGAs) which are like "hardware" that can be reconfigured. The boundary between "meaningful algorithmic processes" in hardware state machines and the same regarding software (the input data that can be "executed" or "decoded") is getting blurry.

So the same can be said for the billions of networked fibers in your brain making up the trillions of interconnected "yes/no" configurations which provide a figure/ground basis (condition for the possibility) of our understanding of being.

What is the basis for the notion that our species' evolved and developing embodied intelligence and conscious capacity for social, cultural, philosophical, scientific, explorative, and creative activity is 'artificial' in the same way in which the computer you program is artificial?

I say "artificial" because--using formal indication here-- any "being" which thrives and uses part of itself to organize its own destiny in the world through itself (i.e. the "other") is "artificial" in the sense that the elements on your monitor right now are artificially providing you access to meaning that is largely irrelevant to the orderly existence of array of pixels in themselves.

 
Last edited:
Actually the algorithmic limitations lie purely within mathematics -- the machines which process the tiny rules into patterns of meaning for us mimic the same patterns of "on-off" and "yes/no" firings of neurons in our brains -- of course the machines we create are static, regardless of the flexibility allowed by the software (collections of machine op codes that allow the machine to perform tasks that are meaningful for us). In many ways we are like computers that can only process information within the limitations of our evolved "coupling" with our environment. Limitations are the bread and butter of sentience--such limitations happen in the negative space of possibilities which are irrelevant to our own survival (and yet remain as if they could one day become relevant). Simply put, patterns of existence in our conscious domain must emerge from a pattern of being/non-being

Binary Hex
1111 1111 1111 1111 FFFF
000 000 000 000 0000

Binary Pattern (hexadecimal encoding for brevity):

54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 61 20 6D 65 61 6E 69 6E 67 66 75 6C 20 73 74 61 74 65 6D 65 6E 74 20 61 74 20 6C 65 61 73 74 20 66 6F 72 20 74 68 69 73 20 63 75 72 72 65 6E 74 20 73 74 61 74 65 20 6D 61 63 68 69 6E 65 20 70 72 6F 63 65 73 73 69 6E 67 20 74 68 65 20 6F 6E 65 73 20 61 6E 64 20 7A 65 72 6F 20 70 61 74 74 65 72 6E 73 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 63 6F 72 72 65 73 70 6F 6E 64 20 74 6F 20 74 68 65 20 62 69 6E 61 72 79 20 61 73 63 69 69 20 65 6E 63 6F 64 69 6E 67 20 66 6F 72 20 74 68 69 73 20 70 61 72 74 69 63 75 6C 61 72 20 73 65 6E 74 65 6E 63 65 2E

Translation:

["]This is a meaningful statement at least for this current state machine processing the ones and zero patterns which correspond to the binary ascii encoding for this particular sentence.["]


While the human created "physical" state machines are often static (for which much of this is made up with the possibilities of software) -- there are other hardware devices (i.e. FPGAs) which are like "hardware" that can be reconfigured. The boundary between "meaningful algorithmic processes" in hardware state machines and the same regarding software (the input data that can be "executed" or "decoded") is getting blurry.

So the same can be said for the billions of networked fibers in your brain making up the trillions of interconnected "yes/no" configurations which provide a figure/ground basis (condition for the possibility) of our understanding of being.



I say "artificial" because--using formal indication here-- any "being" which thrives and uses part of itself to organize its own destiny in the world through itself (i.e. the "other") is "artificial" in the sense that the elements on your monitor right now are artificially providing you access to meaning that is largely irrelevant to the orderly existence of array of pixels in themselves.

"In many ways we are like computers that can only process information within the limitations of our evolved "coupling" with our environment."

Are you gonna get in so much trouble ... ;-)

"the machines which process the tiny rules into patterns of meaning for us mimic the same patterns of "on-off" and "yes/no" firings of neurons in our brains"

neurons fire based on combined input (analog) modeled by ANNs __ yes/no?

see Braitenberg's Vehicles

Amazon.com: Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology (0000262521121): Valentino Braitenberg: Books

it's a brilliant little book and the basis for some fascinating work in robotics
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top