Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[Constance]

It's a book with a more modest aim.

Is the pdf one of the chapters from Harman's The Quadruple Object or an essay by him in his edited volume Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures?

 

[Soupie]

Can you lay out the steps that led you to this conclusion?

To the conclusion regarding UT as being fundamental?

I feel that I already have in past discussions to the best of my ability. Moreover, it's not really pertinent to our main concern in this discussion, the MBP.

As regards the MBP and CR, maybe the follow approach will make more sense. (I also think it's closer to the idea @Michael Allen has been trying to articulate.)

In considering the relationship between matter, consciousness, and mind, let's for a moment put the terms matter and consciousness to the side. Let's instead consider being and mind only.

Lets start with being and define being as that which exists. Let's assume that being has certain qualities.

Within this being form structures; one type of structure in which we are most interested is minds.

One ability of minds of particular interest to us is the ability to perceive—in small part—being, that which exists.

Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself.

And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being.

 

[Constance]

Is the pdf one of the chapters from Harman's The Quadruple Object or an essay by him in his edited volume Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures?

ETA, I linked back to your Quora source and was able to link through from there to the Harman source specified, which turns out to be an additional book by Harman entitled Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing, sampled here at amazon:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0812696174/?tag=rockoids-20

 

[smcder]

ETA, I linked back to your Quora source and was able to link through from there to the Harman source specified, which turns out to be an additional book by Harman entitled Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing, sampled here at amazon:

Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing (Ideas Explained): Graham Harman: 9780812696172: Amazon.com: Books

The entire book is available online as a PDF

Maybe this link will work

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sou...ggaMAA&usg=AFQjCNEzqIBrnMmJlNChuQ6M0ODUnNSVQg

 

[smcder]

To the conclusion regarding UT as being fundamental?

I feel that I already have in past discussions to the best of my ability. Moreover, it's not really pertinent to our main concern in this discussion, the MBP.

As regards the MBP and CR, maybe the follow approach will make more sense. (I also think it's closer to the idea @Michael Allen has been trying to articulate.)

In considering the relationship between matter, consciousness, and mind, let's for a moment put the terms matter and consciousness to the side. Let's instead consider being and mind only.

Lets start with being and define being as that which exists. Let's assume that being has certain qualities.

Within this being form structures; one type of structure in which we are most interested are minds.

One ability of minds of particular interest to us is the ability to perceive—in small part—being, that which exists.

Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself.

And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being.

@Michael Allen is this closer to what you are trying to express?

@Constance thoughts?

 

[Michael Allen]

@Michael Allen is this closer to what you are trying to express?

@Constance thoughts?

Seems legit...will have to dig in for a closer look later. Current prepping for vacation in Germany

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

 

[smcder]

Seems legit...will have to dig in for a closer look later. Current prepping for vacation in Germany

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

Viele spass! Ich wurde ein Jahr in Deutschland als Austauschschuler.

 

[smcder]

To the conclusion regarding UT as being fundamental?

I feel that I already have in past discussions to the best of my ability. Moreover, it's not really pertinent to our main concern in this discussion, the MBP.

As regards the MBP and CR, maybe the follow approach will make more sense. (I also think it's closer to the idea @Michael Allen has been trying to articulate.)

In considering the relationship between matter, consciousness, and mind, let's for a moment put the terms matter and consciousness to the side. Let's instead consider being and mind only.

Lets start with being and define being as that which exists. Let's assume that being has certain qualities.

Within this being form structures; one type of structure in which we are most interested are minds.

One ability of minds of particular interest to us is the ability to perceive—in small part—being, that which exists.

Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself.

And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being.

For starters ... I'm not sure you have set aside the terms"consciousness" and "matter" ... I'm not sure you have - conducted the discussion above about "mind" "body" "perceptual faculties" "structure" in the absence of the implicit cognitive/linguistic/conceptual framework(s) that go with them or whether you've simply declared that you've done so.

 

[Soupie]

For starters ... I'm not sure you have set aside the terms"consciousness" and "matter" ... I'm not sure you have - conducted the discussion above about "mind" "body" "perceptual faculties" "structure" in the absence of the implicit cognitive/linguistic/conceptual framework(s) that go with them or whether you've simply declared that you've done so.

I havent attempted to set aside the "implicit cog/ling/con frameworks that go with them." I only wanted to set a side the terms. Because i think our preconceptions about those terms cause us to struggle with the idea im presenting. I could be wrong.

 

[smcder]

To the conclusion regarding UT as being fundamental?

I feel that I already have in past discussions to the best of my ability. Moreover, it's not really pertinent to our main concern in this discussion, the MBP.

As regards the MBP and CR, maybe the follow approach will make more sense. (I also think it's closer to the idea @Michael Allen has been trying to articulate.)

In considering the relationship between matter, consciousness, and mind, let's for a moment put the terms matter and consciousness to the side. Let's instead consider being and mind only.

Lets start with being and define being as that which exists. Let's assume that being has certain qualities.

Within this being form structures; one type of structure in which we are most interested are minds.

One ability of minds of particular interest to us is the ability to perceive—in small part—being, that which exists.

Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself.

And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being.

I'm also not sure you can reduce the, as you may have noticed, not uncontroversial subjects of "being" and "mind" to a syllogistic type of logical sequence ... at the least, your declarative premises are subject to challenge on all fronts, not the least of which is definitional ... if we could simply assume our philosophical troubles would either be at an end or an unimaginable beginning!

And all of that in service to a somewhat vague and broad conclusion:

"Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself.

And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being."

That said this does remind me a bit of aspects of Phenomenology ... e.g. bracketing ... so it may be that you would pursue something down that path as you work on this.

Btw, both Urology's "consciousness motor" and the neuroscience paper you just posted reminded me of morphic resonance and termites ... (more to come!)... although it seems that the parts of the brain weren't truly physically isolated.

 

[smcder]

I havent attempted to set aside the "implicit cog/ling/con frameworks that go with them." I only wanted to set a side the terms. Because i think our preconceptions about those terms cause us to struggle with the idea im presenting. I could be wrong.

Like saying "don't think of an elephant!" or "strike that from the record" I'm not sure you can or did in the actual discussion... meaning that I think you'd have to set aside more than two terms to avoid those preconceptions ... you could however explicitly spell those preconceptions out and very carefully try to proceed without them ... As they say about H. - he is impossible to translate ... even into German.

 

[smcder]

To the conclusion regarding UT as being fundamental?

I feel that I already have in past discussions to the best of my ability. Moreover, it's not really pertinent to our main concern in this discussion, the MBP.

As regards the MBP and CR, maybe the follow approach will make more sense. (I also think it's closer to the idea @Michael Allen has been trying to articulate.)

In considering the relationship between matter, consciousness, and mind, let's for a moment put the terms matter and consciousness to the side. Let's instead consider being and mind only.

Lets start with being and define being as that which exists. Let's assume that being has certain qualities.

Within this being form structures; one type of structure in which we are most interested is minds.

One ability of minds of particular interest to us is the ability to perceive—in small part—being, that which exists.

Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself.

And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being.

"Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself."

This seems reflexively true ... a tautology. What question does it answer?

"And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being."

What would be a structure that does not form within being?

 

[smcder]

"Whereas Heidegger’s earlier lecture courses said that the history of philosophy is a worthless topic unless we are philosophizing ourselves, he now stresses the other side of the issue: we cannot directly tackle philosophical problems outside of history, since these problems are already passed down to us with all sorts of historical encrustations. When we ask philosophical questions that seem original and highly personal, we do not realize that we are silently dominated by the Greek way of looking at the world. For this reason, a good deal of historical work is needed to clear up the subjects that are handed to us." G.H.

 

[Constance]

. . . I'm also not sure you can reduce the, as you may have noticed, not uncontroversial subjects of "being" and "mind" to a syllogistic type of logical sequence ... at the least, your declarative premises are subject to challenge on all fronts, not the least of which is definitional ... if we could simply assume our philosophical troubles would either be at an end or an unimaginable beginning!

And all of that in service to a somewhat vague and broad conclusion:

"Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself.

And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being."

That said this does remind me a bit of aspects of Phenomenology ... e.g. bracketing ... so it may be that you would pursue something down that path as you work on this.

"And the relation of mind to being is thus: the mind is a structure that forms within being."

That said this does remind me a bit of aspects of Phenomenology ... e.g. bracketing ... so it may be that you would pursue something down that path as you work on this.

Husserl's bracketing is a method by which one can come closer to comprehending the nature of phenomena -- the phenomenal appearances of things, which we encounter -- by excluding our prior interpretations of things as received from the culture in which we are embedded, have learned to 'think'. I don't think that phenomenological philosophy or Husserl's methodological foundations for it can be understood as similar in any way to the ideas @Soupie is presenting.

@Michael Allen is this closer to what you are trying to express?

@Constance thoughts?

I seem to be unable to engage the metaphysical abstractions that @Soupie employs in his effort to substantiate the concept of "unbound telesis."

 

[Constance]

"Therefore, the relation of the body to the mind is thus: the body is what the mind perceives when it turns its perceptual faculties upon itself."

This seems reflexively true ... a tautology. What question does it answer?

I'm wondering how the 'body' suddenly turns up in S's metaphysical 'mind-being' mileau. And how that which this mind first perceives is taken to be the body in which the mind exists, but not also the visible, audible, sensible environing world in which the embodied mind as we know it finds itself existing.

 

[Constance]

[quoting Harman] "Whereas Heidegger’s earlier lecture courses said that the history of philosophy is a worthless topic unless we are philosophizing ourselves, he now stresses the other side of the issue: we cannot directly tackle philosophical problems outside of history

Harman seems to be conflating two different issues/matters Heidegger commented on at different points in his work. Does Harman cite the sources for the two statements he juxtaposes?

I have to confess that I'm reluctant to spend time reading Harman's Explaining Heidegger after reading his The Quadruple Object and other sources dealing in 'object-oriented-ontology', which for the most part misunderstood and misrepresented phenomenological philosophy.

 

[Constance]

But then I spent some time browsing about in the book and ended up reading the last 50 pages or so. I think Harman writes too impressionistically, and certainly too superficially, about Heidegger's major themes rather than engaging and exploring them deeply and critically. Some of the responses to the Quora question about how to prepare for reading Heidegger referred to and recommended another introductory text (Heidegger: An Introduction by Richard Polt) that, judging by the reviews, seems like a better bet.

 

[smcder]

But then I spent some time browsing about in the book and ended up reading the last 50 pages or so. I think Harman writes too impressionistically, and certainly too superficially, about Heidegger's major themes rather than engaging and exploring them deeply and critically. Some of the responses to the Quora question about how to prepare for reading Heidegger referred to and recommended another introductory text (Heidegger: An Introduction by Richard Polt) that, judging by the reviews, seems like a better bet.

Excellent! I'll have a look today. I'm skimming through Harman's book as I'm thinking about re-reading Being and Time and getting into the commentaries a little deeper this time ...

 

[Soupie]

I'm wondering how the 'body' suddenly turns up in S's metaphysical 'mind-being' mileau. And how that which this mind first perceives is taken to be the body in which the mind exists, but not also the visible, audible, sensible environing world in which the embodied mind as we know it finds itself existing.

On this approach, the body doesn't suddenly turn up.

On this approach, bodies (organisms) theoretically evolved in the same manner as that theorized by evolution via natural selection.

This approach does not deny the existence of an "environing world" in which the mind finds itself existing.

However, on this approach, the duality between the mind and the body is a perspectival duality rather than an ontological duality.

That is, what at first take may seem like two, ontologically distinct phenomena (a mind and a body) are really one phenomena: a mind perceiving itself.

This idea is perhaps unpalatable for a number of reasons. One of them being that the mind—as lived phenomenologically—seems so different from the body as perceived. To entertain the idea that they are ontologically the same structure is asking too much for some perhaps.

But that is indeed what I am suggesting.

Just how the mind—as lived from the "inside"—can differ so much from the mind as perceived from the "outside" is an excellent question.

I think the answer hinges on the extent to which our minds are immensely complex structures that evolved over billions of years to—among other things—perceive a reality that is many degrees more complex than the minds which evolved within it.

That is to say, the human mind and the perceptions therein are but small parts of a vastly wider and more complex reality.

 

[smcder]

On this approach, the body doesn't suddenly turn up.

On this approach, bodies (organisms) theoretically evolved in the same manner as that theorized by evolution via natural selection.

This approach does not deny the existence of an "environing world" in which the mind finds itself existing.

However, on this approach, the duality between the mind and the body is a perspectival duality rather than an ontological duality.

That is, what at first take may seem like two, ontologically distinct phenomena (a mind and a body) are really one phenomena: a mind perceiving itself.

This idea is perhaps unpalatable for a number of reasons. One of them being that the mind—as lived phenomenologically—seems so different from the body as perceived. To entertain the idea that they are ontologically the same structure is asking too much for some perhaps.

But that is indeed what I am suggesting.

Just how the mind—as lived from the "inside"—can differ so much from the mind as perceived from the "outside" is an excellent question.

I think the answer hinges on the extent to which our minds are immensely complex structures that evolved over billions of years to—among other things—perceive a reality that is many degrees more complex than the minds which evolved within it.

That is to say, the human mind and the perceptions therein are but small parts of a vastly wider and more complex reality.

"One of them being that the mind—as lived phenomenologically—seems so different from the body as perceived. To entertain the idea that they are ontologically the same structure is asking too much for some perhaps."

Not so different! This won't seem so radical if you move past Cartesianism. The body as perceived is the mind lived phenomenologically - see Merleau-Ponty.

"On this approach, bodies (organisms) theoretically evolved in the same manner as that theorized by evolution via natural selection."

What is the mechanism of selection for the mind perceiving itself that results in the way we now see the world i.e. as mind vs. matter? What is the "natural history" so to speak? The equivalent to the Big Bang is consciousness arising from UT ... Are CAs fundamental in an analogous sense to fundamental particles? What happened after that arising? We have an account that takes us from Big Bang to particles atoms molecules organic molecules life .... What is the story according to CR?