From the long version:
"1 Biochemical Knowledge
If on a clear day I were to ask you, “where is the sun’s location?”, you would point and reply, “over there”, explaining that your brain perceives by way of some complex of reliable neurological and biochemical mechanisms. Notwithstanding illusions or hallucination, you are justified to state categorically that you know it to be a fact—because of these various mechanisms—that the sun is located where you are pointing.
There are many species of plant whose leaves and/or flowers follow the sun as it traverses the sky. Of course, it is not luck nor chance that plants should do this. But if not chance, what could a plant possibly be if not informed about its environment in some manner? Otherwise one might well ask, why is there this correspondence between sun and plant? Might it be possible that the plant’s physiology—with its complex biochemical mechanisms—amounts to an innately determined information-construct that enables the following of the sun’s movement? What should we call this correspondence with fact? Maybe it is too far fetched to suggest that plants possess ‘biochemically constructed knowledge’: a knowledge that is devoid of conceptual representations about reality, that institutes no processes of thoughtful consideration, requires no belief, but rather, is a knowledge that is qualitatively relevant having proved highly valuable in terms of its survival potency. It is a fact that the sun traverses the sky and undoubtedly that fact is represented in the plant’s physiological mechanism; capturing the sun’s light is what the plant’s movements are about."
...
"4 Berrybug and the qualitative relevance of colour
From a physical standpoint, an object might reflect light within the frequency range 526–606 THz whilst a second object 400-484 THz.3 Let us assume that on earth, surfaces that reflect frequencies within 526-606 THz are ubiquitous, for complex reasons that we shall not explore here for the sake of brevity, and that these surfaces are of no material evolutionary benefit to a particular insect species by the name of Berrybug. Conversely, some rare objects that reflect frequencies within 400-484 THz are important to Berrybug’s survival because of their nutritional content.4 It would be qualitatively pertinent—i.e., it would have an impact on survival pressures—for that species to evolve mechanisms (innate biochemical and neurological mechanisms) that are alert to 400-484 THz reflecting colouration. By ‘alert’, what I mean is that it would be qualitatively pertinent for mechanisms to prioritise 400-484 THz colourations over other frequencies during the assimilation of sensory stimulation. These prioritising biochemical and neurological mechanisms would intensify focus in favour of this range of colours; augment feedback through perceptual re-enforcement; and more accurately direct further sensory exploration and assimilation. These accentuating mechanisms would facilitate operational economy for more responsive and ultimately rewarding motor activities. Conversely, it would be pertinent for innate mechanisms to be indifferent to the ubiquitous 526-606 THz reflecting objects by attenuating their focal impact neurologically. Additionally, if those desirable 400-484 THz objects had the added characteristic of possessing spherical contours (rather than jagged, for instance), any individuals of the species possessing autonomic shape-distinguishing neurological capabilities would possess an additional qualifying survival advantage. In themselves, these coloured and shaped objects have no intrinsic phenomenal identity, but the species will tend to evolve increasingly subtle and sophisticated biochemical and neurological mechanisms that are qualitatively delineated due to their impact on survival potentials. These capabilities might remain innately acquired, and therefore appear non-representational from an orthodox philosophical perspective (such as expressed in Block, 1995; McGinn, 1986; and Searle, 1983), but the physiologies do represent something; they represent the qualitative relevancy of environments in terms of the particular survival requirements of that species. So on this account, there is necessarily a qualitative representational correspondence between physiologies and the world. It is the relationship between evolved physiologies and their relevance to the environment and to survival that allows us to conclude that these light frequencies (526-606 and 400-484 THz), whose colours humans experience as green and red respectively, and each shape, which humans refer to as spherical and jagged (or dare I say, ‘acute-triangle shaped in appearance’ see Dennett, 2007, p. 215), are potentially both qualitatively differentiated and observer-dependent for any given species6 (observer-dependent rather than observer-independent; which is a significant departure from Tye’s stance; 1995, p. 100).
If an organism species feeds off red berries because of its nutritional benefits, it makes sense—sense with regard survival—for the species to evolve innate physiological mechanisms that energise and provoke its individuals to respond attentively to the visual perception of red colouration and to spherical objects more generally. In contrast, it makes sense for enthusiasm to be dampened to green colouration and to the asymmetries of jagged contours neurologically because of their insignificant survival relevancy. From this we have the foundational idea of the attractive and aversive characterisation of environmental properties in the construction of complex innate biochemical and neurological mechanisms. Of course, this implies that a creature that gains nutritional benefits from blue bananas whilst being indifferent to the nutritional content of red berries will possess inverted phenomenal affectations to that of Berrybug (because its survival would depend on it) giving us a plausible account that undermines the view that it is not possible for organisms that are sensitive to the same range of wavelengths as ourselves to have inverted or contrasting phenomenal impressions to ourselves.7"
Pharoah, over all I'm finding the writing to be easy to follow. Ive only finished with section four, but I like how the paper is unfolding.
I want to ask again about your use of the phrase "qualitatively relevant." You first use the phrase in section one, but don't go to lengths to define it.
I think of the term qualitative in two ways; one is the sense in which something has the quality of being, essentially, good or bad from a particular pov, and another sense in which it refers to the characteristics of something (in the context of consciousness, a synonym might be "phenomenal.")
In what Ive read of HCT—including the above—you seem to explain your use of the phrase in the former sense, but you then also seem to assume (?) that you've explained the latter sense as well. (I've tried to highlight this with my underlines above.)
That is, explaining that certain environmental stimuli are good or bad for an organism and that this is why an evolved organism might possess physiological mechanics that guide them toward or away from such qualitatively relevant stimuli does not explain how/why qualitative/phenomenal properties and/or experience exists.
For instance, your entire explanation of the dynamic relationship between environments and the organisms which evolve within them need not involve the phenomenal properties of red, green, and shapes.
That is, the frequencies of 526-606 and 400-484 THz could exist in the environment and be represented in an organism with chemical reaction X or vibration Z of neural cluster X and that would be the end of it. There is no need to appeal to subjective, phenomenal qualities such as green and red.
Furthermore, for every variety of photon wave frequency, there could easily be a corresponding chemical reaction, neural cluster, or vibration frequency to represent said frequency. Again, there is no need to bring phenomenal characteristics (red, green, etc) into the explanation. Of course, these physiological representations would still be geared toward stimuli that were qualitatively relevant, but that, in itself, does not give rise to phenomenal characteristics, no?
Finally, I didnt follow the last bit about blue bananas. The final sentence included a double negative which made it hard to follow.
I would ask, why couldn't the frequencies 526-606 and 400-484 (which you say for humans possess—or are given—the phenomenal qualities of green and red) have the reverse phenomenal qualities of red and green? That is to say, why for humans is 526-606 THz experienced as green and 400-484 THz experienced as red?
This would mean that in your analogy the same objects (spheres reflecting 400-484 THz) would be qualitatively good for the organism, but the organism would experience them as green berries instead of red. From whence comes the specific phenomenal property of an environmental stimulus?
