Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[smcder]

Abstract

We present a formal framework that generalizes and subsumes the standard
Bayesian framework for vision. While incorporating the fundamental role of
probabilistic inference, our Computational Evolutionary Perception (CEP) framework
also incorporates fitness in a fundamental way, and it allows us to consider
different possible relationships between the objective world and perceptual representations
(e.g., in evolving visual systems).

In our framework, shape is not assumed
to be a reconstruction of an objective world property. It is simply a representational
format that has been tuned by natural selection to guide adaptive behavior. In brief,
shape is an effective code for fitness. Because fitness depends crucially on the actions
of an organism, shape representations are closely tied to actions. We model
this connection formally using the Perception-Decision-Action (PDA) loop. Among
other things, the PDA loop clarifies how, even though one cannot know the effects
of ones actions in the objective world itself, one can nevertheless know the results
of those effects back in our perceptions. This, in turn, explains how organisms can
interact effectively with a fundamentally unknown objective world.

 

[smcder]

What you say is true... that genome alone might not be enough... that herein lies a flaw in the argument.
It is not really though.
The point still applies that whatever the plant has through its physiology and its workings with environment: that stands in as enough for it to survive and perpetuate its species. That EDNA (+ whatever) is the knowledge that corresponds with environment. And that knowledge is instituted by physiologies pertaining only to this species. There may well be environmental triggers to gene expression but this does not disarm the argument about knowledge and its (non-conceptual/non-belief) construction.

thinking out loud

ok we haven't even talked about Nagel ... conceiving the impossible (98)

Abstract: This paper is a response to Nagel’s (1986) call for an ‘integrated theory of reality’ which, he argues, is

necessary to provide an objective–subjective bridge. Such a theory, he suggests (1998), requires an expansionist

rather than a reductionist or eliminativist approach.

ok so this is where my expectations come in ...

knowledge and representation etc have to be expanded, but narrowly, this is your response to Nagel's paper ... you say you answer the "view from nowhere" ... this is part of where my expectations about the HP come in, going back to look at Nagel's paper ... it's also fair to look at what TENS says on

knowledge
representation - perception (posted above)
etc

VII What will be the point of view, so to speak, of such a theory?
Nagel, sonorous or sotto voce - deus machina:

If we could arrive at it, it would render transparent the relation between mental and physical, not directly, but through the transparency of their common relation to something that is not merely either of them. Neither the mental nor the physical point of view will do for this purpose. The mental will not do because it simply leaves out the physiology, and has no room for it.
The physical will not do because while it includes the behavioral and functional manifestations of the mental, this doesn’t, in view of the falsity of conceptual reductionism, enable it to reach to the mental concepts themselves.

clever, clever, light dawning ... my view is naive here ...

 

[smcder]

@Pharoah

I'm going to begin reading your paper tonight. Here are the questions I'm expecting it to address and answer.

(1) What is phenomenal consciousness?

(2) How and why do humans possess it?

And as a bonus, (3) how and why are we only phenomenally conscious of some of the physical stimuli interacting with and influencing our bodies (and behavior) at any given moment?

Are those fair questions?

You have to read Nagel 98 conceiving the impossible, first I'd say ...

 

[Randall]

@ufology:
"Answer: It's facilitating the translation of objective reality into conscious awareness of that reality ( subjective reality ). However that's still not the same as consciousness itself."
"conscious awareness" is a fuzzy term. In my understanding of it, conscious awareness is what humans have, but not animals. You may be using the term differently.

Yes I'm using it differently. In the example there is the objective reality we typically think of as the world beyond our brain body system ( BBS ) that is translated ( or to use your term "facilitated" ) via our sensory mechanisms into an internal subjective analog I refer to as subjective reality. However the object that is the focus of our subjective reality is not consciousness itself. Consciousness is our awareness of that subjective reality.

On my account, creatures with as few as 100,000 neurons may be conscious of the phenomenal qualitative nature of experience: they have a subjective reality. But that subjectivity is not the same as the human introspective experience. Humans are aware of being conscious of the phenomenal qualitative nature of experience: they recognise (unlike other animals) an objective/subjective distinction, and in that recognition, recognise their 'self' as part of an objective world from the view-point of a subjective world-view.

That sounds reasonable and in keeping with experiments, such as those that test an organism's ability to recognize itself in a mirror.

Another fuzzy bit... are you talking about conscious awareness as being the distinction between awake vs not awake?...
So... I am not sure where you are coming from...

I'll attempt to clarify: When I'm talking about conscious awareness, I'm not talking about the distinction between awake vs. not awake; I'm talking about the conscious awareness of something ( or the lack thereof ), be it detected by the senses, or by the mind. So in the example, that "something" was objective reality; that world beyond our BBS that is detected by our senses and translated into perceptions of something. It's not synonymous with consciousness itself.

The distinction between "awake and not awake" is the same as the distinction between being completely unconscious ( as in a dreamless sleep ) vs. having conscious awareness of something. When we have conscious awareness of something our consciousness is engaged. When we have no conscious awareness of anything ( as in a dreamless sleep ), our consciousness is not engaged ( has not emerged, is not switched on, is not there, doesn't exist ).

 

[TheBitterOne]

"She blinded me with science..."

I can't figure out whether to slap you or wink.

 

[Pharoah]

@ufology says,
"However the object that is the focus of our subjective reality is not consciousness itself. Consciousness is our awareness of that subjective reality."
Your terms of reference differ to mine quite a bit. I am not sure how you allocate these terms. What term would you give to "the object that is the focus of our subjective reality"?

@TheBitterOne how about turning your head round 360 degrees.

@smcder
1. where did you get that abstract from in #841. Looks like I need to read more. Is it from, person who wrote,
"Does natural selection favor veridical perceptions, those that more accurately depict the objective environment?" Donald Hoffman?

2. "knowledge and representation etc have to be expanded, but narrowly" this is not how I am using the term narrow. The narrow is a conditional term qualifying the kind of expansionism. It is not qualifying how much knowledge and representation are to be expanded.

3. Glenn Gould hums. When I made noises during recordings, I was chastised. That's the British for you.

4. "the e coli is that the organism makes changes as it moves through the digestive tract (track?), right? and then you can fool it in the lab by making certain stimuli to think its moving along that tract (and I assume they make meds to do this in order to kill the bacteria?)"
The paper by Tagouplis is about how biochemical mechanisms evolve: biochemistries adapt such that they will preemptive environmental change (the changes that take place in the digestive track are very dramatic and varied)—gearing biochemically before changes actually happen. The author also describes these mechanisms as representational.

5. icon: the first image I saw from my desktop... I felt like hiding lol. You drew your own! I thought it might have been one of those images drawn by a bonobo lol. Actually... on second thoughts, what would Freud think of your icon? (how do you do a raised ibrow?)

@Constance. Legrand looks interesting: will read the paper

 

[Soupie]

Does natural selection favor veridical perceptions, those that more accurately depict the objective environment? Students of perception often claim that it does. But this claim, though influential, has not been adequately tested. Here we formalize the claim and a few alternatives. To test them, we introduce ‘‘interface games,’’ a class of evolutionary games in which perceptual strategies compete. We explore, in closed-form solutions and Monte Carlo simulations, some simpler games that assume frequency- dependent selection and complete mixing in infinite populations. We find that veridical perceptions can be driven to extinction by non-veridical strategies that are tuned to utility rather than objective reality. This suggests that natural selection need not favor veridical perceptions, and that the effects of selection on sensory perception deserve further study.

The PLM? Phenomenal landscape model?

 

[Pharoah]

Dear Dr Pharoah [I like that bit ]
Thanks for giving Biology and Philosophy a chance to consider your "Bridging the objective-subjective divide through an expansionist framework", but having had a look at your paper last night, I do not think we are quite the right journal for it. I think it needs to go to a straight epistemology and metaphysics journal, especially one with a significant metaphysics emphasis (Nous or Philosophical Quarterly perhaps). It is true that the line of thought you develop depends on some biological ideas, but the core issue you attack is one that has had its main audience in the general epistemology and metaphysics journals; that is where Nagel's home has been.
Yours

 

[Soupie]

Would you flesh out the relevance of that quote in terms of the thread today, or to something you or someone else has posted in it? The connection or context is not clear to me at the moment. Thanks.

I'm playing with the notion of how the interaction of three systems might relate to the manifestation of experience.

The phenomenal self model, the phenomenal world model, and the conceptual world model.

Remember, Helen Keller says she was not conscious until she had language (conceptual world/self model). And the natives didn't experience phenomenal blue until they had a concept for it.

On the other hand, we seem to have phenomenal experiences that we lack conceptual models for. Or do we?

 

[Constance]

@Constance
My essay on Rovelli Information unravelling with Rovelli | Philosophy of Consciousness
I have not read it recently. Can't even remember what I say and don't recognise the opening text that I wrote; I have no idea if it is any good.
I have a limited understanding of Rovelli's work btw.

I'm reading your dialogue with Rovelli's 2013 paper ‘Relative Information at the foundation of physics’ today and find it to be clarifying. I think it will be productive for discussion here concerning the applicability of information theory to consciousness. Here's the link for others who want to pursue this issue:

Information unravelling with Rovelli | Philosophy of Consciousness

 

[smcder]

6 Clarification: how we get subjectivity from objectivity

The qualitative relevancy of innate physiological adaptations is not individual-specific, but species-specific.

physiological adaptations are specific to the species, not the individual
Whilst physiologies may be sensitive to temporal and spatial constraints, an individual that possesses only innate capabilities does not relate individualistically to those constraints.

An individual that possesses only these adaptations relates to the environment as the rest of its species does
For that individual—i.e., an individual that is responsive to the qualitative relevancies of environmental characteristics as granted only by its evolved species specific physiology—there is no individuated spatio-temporal reality.
since the individual only relates to its environment according to the species' physiology - it has no individual reality so its not really an individual

The responsivity to the good and the bad of the environment and to the constraints of time and space is a relation of replicative importance and qualitative specificity between environment and species only. The individual is merely an automaton acting like an environmental-barometer on behalf of, or as a representative of the species.

summary
1. organisms that can only respond to the environment according to the adaptations (physiology) of the species - don't have an individual response to the environment, are not individuals

But, as autonomic mechanisms and sensory facility evolve in complexity—which is inevitable, because the greater the complexity the greater the potential environmental responsivity
(note this isn't inevitable, it only happens if this leads to more success in the environment - see Gould's The Spread of Excellence)

—there is the increased likelihood that the assimilation of multiple sensory inputs will evince conflicting or cyclical behaviors.

as organisms grow more complex, conflicts between sensory inputs, etc lead to conflicting behavior, to trouble sorting out whats most important to respond to in the environment and how to respond to it
Consequently, the survival precedent is to evolve mechanisms for the management of the qualitative conflicts that arise from the multiple impressions of the interoceptive and exteroceptive environments.

*what does "survival precedent" mean? - the way I read this is that as organisms grew more complex, they evolved mechanisms for the mgmt of these conflicts? Does "survival precedent" add anything to this idea?

The remit of this management is to determine the relative importance of those conflicting impressions, and henceforth, to prioritize certain qualitative evaluations over others i.e., to organize and prioritise the autonomic qualitative milieu.

These mgmt mechanisms sort out these conflicts - (this is the evolution of executive functions?)

When neural mechanisms do organize, evaluate and prioritize qualitative assimilations, the individual possesses its own individuated and evolving phenomenal world-view: it possesses an understanding of the relative merits of its environment in virtue of a continually changing internal landscape of experiential qualitative impressions. Such individuals are conscious of the changing impression of the qualitative phenomenon of their own particular experience because their world is spatially, temporally and qualitatively differentiated.

this is where consciousness could come in, but it doesn't show why or how

Accordingly, phenomenal consciousness is the process of evaluating the qualitative impressions that the environment evinces through suitably differentiating biochemical mechanisms.

again I don't see why it takes phenomenal consciousness to resolve complex conflicts? that's a function of "access" consciousness
Whilst qualitative valency has good reason to evolve in all replicating organisms, only neural mechanisms have the potential to institute real-time behavioral adaptation. These mechanisms, which increase in sophistication up the phylogenetic scale, qualify a multitude of qualitative environmental assimilations to accommodate sensory, affective and operant sensitivities. An organism possessing more than 100,000 neurons or 107 synapses is likely to be capable of mediating a constantly changing landscape of evaluated environmental impressions: these creatures experience individuated phenomenal content.

where does 10/7 neurons come in?

This view contrasts with Carruthers’ (1998, p. 216) stance that few creatures besides humans will count as having conscious states: ‘we lack any grounds for believing that animalshave phenomenally-conscious states’ and ‘it is not only animals, but also young children, who will lack phenomenal consciousness according to HOT [higher-order thought] accounts.’ (see also Gennaro 1996, on the wide view that concepts specifically are necessary for the coherent organisation of sensory states).

Biochemical mechanisms provide the foundations for real-time comparative evaluation. One can surmise, that evaluative sophistication, in turn, underpins the extent of associative learning, individuated social interaction (rather than automated social organization as observed in insect colonies, for instance), affective feeling and its communication, and the richness of an individual’s phenomenal consciousness.

 

[smcder]

Dear Dr Pharoah [I like that bit ]
Thanks for giving Biology and Philosophy a chance to consider your "Bridging the objective-subjective divide through an expansionist framework", but having had a look at your paper last night, I do not think we are quite the right journal for it. I think it needs to go to a straight epistemology and metaphysics journal, especially one with a significant metaphysics emphasis (Nous or Philosophical Quarterly perhaps). It is true that the line of thought you develop depends on some biological ideas, but the core issue you attack is one that has had its main audience in the general epistemology and metaphysics journals; that is where Nagel's home has been.
Yours

I am sorry to hear the paper wasn't accepted, Pharoah. Did you receive any more specific feedback?

What do you make of the response?

 

[Pharoah]

I am sorry to hear the paper wasn't accepted, Pharoah. Did you receive any more specific feedback?

What do you make of the response?

I like the response. The wrong kind of material for the journal is fair. And the recommendation is helpful... though I am intimidated by the prospect of trying to get PP to publish it—and they take 3 months which is a long time to wait for a rejection.
A neuroscientist has offered to add 1000 words of scientific reference and comment to the paper which might make it more relevant to B&P. I thought I might try Biosemiotics journal next.
Your comments will help me improve it I am sure.

 

[Constance]

I'm playing with the notion of how the interaction of three systems might relate to the manifestation of experience.

The phenomenal self model, the phenomenal world model, and the conceptual world model.

I'll follow what you write in support of this idea. My initial reaction is that I doubt that the fluid, embodied, and integrative character of consciousness can be understood in terms of/as the result of separately functioning modular conceptual systems in the brain, even if you argue that consciousness 'arises' from the "interaction of [these three systems]. The clear implication of what you write above is that these three 'systems' somehow develop separately from one another before there are crossings between and among them enabling consciousness to 'emerge', whereas it appears to me that consciousness develops from protoconsciousness and prereflective experience.

Remember, Helen Keller says she was not conscious until she had language (conceptual world/self model).

I remember our first exchange about your interpretation of Keller's statement to that effect. As I argued then, I think her expression of what had changed was inexact -- i.e., that she was indeed conscious before Annie Sullivan introduced her to language as a system of signs, a semiotic system she could work through in construing her relationship to things and others (and her self) in the world, so that she finally understood what her consciousness was. As a result she could cope more meaningfully with the world in which she existed despite her lack of vision and hearing. I wonder whether Annie Sullivan had studied Peirce's semiotics or whether she understood the same thing all on her own. I'm going to look for an autobiography or biography of Sullivan to find out.

And the natives didn't experience phenomenal blue until they had a concept for it.

I'm still not sure your interpretration of that report is accurate. It seems to me that blue and green mingle in many colors we see in the natural world and in works of art, and as a result it is often difficult to distinguish 'blue' from 'green' in what we see. It seems to me that what the 'native' people involved in the study you cited learned was how to see 'blue' and 'green' as distinguishable from one another by attending to color swatches at either end of the spectrum of color we experience within which things are either bluish green or greenish blue.

On the other hand, we seem to have phenomenal experiences that we lack conceptual models for. Or do we?

Yes we do, in spades, in prereflective consciousness, which not only precedes the development of reflective consciousness in individuals and species but continues to feed into reflective consciousness throughout our lives..

 

[Constance]

I like the response. The wrong kind of material for the journal is fair. And the recommendation is helpful... though I am intimidated by the prospect of trying to get PP to publish it—and they take 3 months which is a long time to wait for a rejection.

Good reaction, Pharoah. Finding the right journal is the key. Have you considered sending it to Consciousness and Cognition? Btw, what is 'PP'?

A neuroscientist has offered to add 1000 words of scientific reference and comment to the paper which might make it more relevant to B&P. I thought I might try Biosemiotics journal next.
Your comments will help me improve it I am sure.

The Biosemiotics journal might also be a likely publisher. It's excellent that a neuroscientist has made that offer. Please share what he writes with us when you receive it.

 

[smcder]

Can evolutionary theory explain the existence of consciousness? A Review of Humphrey, N. (2010) Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. London: Quercus, ISBN 9781849162371

A review by Velman's - I just read it - it made some things click for me, especially the last couple of paragraphs - the first few paragraphs were a very clear overview too ... I may do a summary ... its a free download, you just need an academia.edu account - can probably find it other places on the web

 

[Constance]

It seems to me that prereflective consciousness is generally not understood, either here or among most of the consciousness studies investigators we read. It's worth working through the paper I linked last night as a beginning step toward recognizing what prereflective consciousness is -- the very nexus, the chiasmic relation, between subjective experience and what we inexactly refer to as 'objective reality'.

 

[smcder]

It seems to me that prereflective consciousness is generally not understood, either here or among most of the consciousness studies investigators we read. It's worth working through the paper I linked last night as a beginning step toward recognizing what prereflective consciousness is -- the very nexus, the chiasmic relation, between subjective experience and what we inexactly refer to as 'objective reality'.

this one?

http://www.janushead.org/9-2/Legrand.pdf

 

[Pharoah]

@Constance. PP = Philosophical Quarterly... of course

 

[smcder]

@Pharoah

still working on EDNA and what the geneticists can know ... how much can you get rid of here, or is it just the worng example to clearly defne what you mean by this expansion of "knowledge"?

what if an alien bacteria had been found?

how about an alien primate?

the geneticists vs all the other scientists doesnt seem to hold up either ... I think what you are saying is that E-DNA is a kind of knowledge and you prove that by showing how the geneticists interpet their conceptual knowledge from it ... but I'm not sure thats an adequate response to the argument against information, the essence, the genes or whatever is more clearly information, the way EDNA puts it in play in the environment is more arguably knowledge ... if I understand? what goes on between EDNA and the environment is way more than contained in the genes, an example is getting a robot to walk upright over uneven ground, part of that "knowledge" for an animal is physics, the tendons and the very structure of the bones have been shaped to fit all manner of terrain - squirrels dont have in their DNA all the knowledge of how to run on pavement, grass, hills and climb trees ... and I'm not sure all of that ability is knowledge ...