Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[Pharoah]

This is what appears circular to me and appears to miss Nagel's point:

The individual, whose neural mechanisms then evaluate these qualitative correspondences—every microsecond—has, necessarily, a moving individuated landscape of changing qualitative impressions. That is it... it has an understanding of the qualitative relevance of its own experiences viz. it is phenomenally conscious...

This assumes what you are trying to account for in the first place.

There is nothing "necessary" about increasingly complex nervous systems becoming complex - that's Nagel's argument, the last third of his paper (98) - the point isnt whether Zombies exist, the point is they show what is and isnt conceivable for us -

If you say "well, they do" organisms do become conscious as the brain gets more complex, doesnt make it necessary ... and thats what needs to be explained - in the case of life here on earth where we can point confidently to conscious beings, there may be something else involved that makes thay happen - for example it might be something about the biology itself, I think Searle says something like that.

Ok @smcder,
Are you basically saying that you would rather plum with the conceivability of zombies, than the conceivability that an organism that is continually assimilating and evaluating the qualitative meaning of experience (as sensed in conjunction with internal drives and imperatives) is not phenomenally experiencing?
Not only is the second option conceivable (which is the key), it weakens all the conceivability arguments.
Importantly, it is not just increasing complexity as you say (that I say). That is Dennett's argument. And that, in my view, is a panpsychist leaning. Rather, the nature of the conplexity is key, which is why things like tables, cities and cups of hot tea are not going to be phenomenally conscious. The layers of environmental "knowledge" have to be in place.

I recognise that I need to put your point into the paper and to counter it

 

[Pharoah]

@smcder
Your skepticism has hit a chord; I think I know how to proceed at this point in the paper:
NB. From Nagel [edited quotes from p. 67-70 The view from nowhere]:
(")
The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realistic picture, is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must proceed under its shadow.... for we can conceive of the possibility that the world is different from how we believe it to be in ways that we cannot imagine, that our thoughts and impressions are produced in ways that we cannot conceive, and that there is no way of moving from where we are to beliefs about the world that are substantially correct. This is the most abstract form of skeptical possibility, and it remains an option on a realist view no matter what other hypotheses we may construct and embrace.

often we may try to step outside of ourselves, something will have to stay behind the lens, something in us will determine the resulting picture, and this will give grounds for doubt that we are really getting any closer to reality. The idea of objectivity thus seems to undermine itself.

skeptical problems arise not from a misunderstanding of the meaning of standard knowledge claims, but from their actual content and the attempt to transcend ourselves that is involved in the formation of beliefs about the world.

The objective self is responsible both for the expansion of our understanding and for doubts about it that cannot be finally laid to rest. The extension of power and the growth of insecurity go hand in hand once we place ourselves inside the world and try to develop a view that accommodates this recognition fully. The most familiar scene of conflict is the pursuit of objective knowledge, whose aim is naturally described in terms that, taken literally, are unintelligible: we must get outside ourselves, and view the world from nowhere within it.
(")

So... it is healthy to be critical: but skepticism? that shadow follows on the heels and cannot be banished.

 

[smcder]

@smcder
Your skepticism has hit a chord; I think I know how to proceed at this point in the paper:
NB. From Nagel [edited quotes from p. 67-70 The view from nowhere]:
(")
The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realistic picture, is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must proceed under its shadow.... for we can conceive of the possibility that the world is different from how we believe it to be in ways that we cannot imagine, that our thoughts and impressions are produced in ways that we cannot conceive, and that there is no way of moving from where we are to beliefs about the world that are substantially correct. This is the most abstract form of skeptical possibility, and it remains an option on a realist view no matter what other hypotheses we may construct and embrace.

often we may try to step outside of ourselves, something will have to stay behind the lens, something in us will determine the resulting picture, and this will give grounds for doubt that we are really getting any closer to reality. The idea of objectivity thus seems to undermine itself.

skeptical problems arise not from a misunderstanding of the meaning of standard knowledge claims, but from their actual content and the attempt to transcend ourselves that is involved in the formation of beliefs about the world.

The objective self is responsible both for the expansion of our understanding and for doubts about it that cannot be finally laid to rest. The extension of power and the growth of insecurity go hand in hand once we place ourselves inside the world and try to develop a view that accommodates this recognition fully. The most familiar scene of conflict is the pursuit of objective knowledge, whose aim is naturally described in terms that, taken literally, are unintelligible: we must get outside ourselves, and view the world from nowhere within it.
(")

So... it is healthy to be critical: but skepticism? that shadow follows on the heels and cannot be banished.

I'm not sure what point your making there ... ?

 

[smcder]

Ok @smcder,
Are you basically saying that you would rather plum with the conceivability of zombies, than the conceivability that an organism that is continually assimilating and evaluating the qualitative meaning of experience (as sensed in conjunction with internal drives and imperatives) is not phenomenally experiencing?
Not only is the second option conceivable (which is the key), it weakens all the conceivability arguments.
Importantly, it is not just increasing complexity as you say (that I say). That is Dennett's argument. And that, in my view, is a panpsychist leaning. Rather, the nature of the conplexity is key, which is why things like tables, cities and cups of hot tea are not going to be phenomenally conscious. The layers of environmental "knowledge" have to be in place.

I recognise that I need to put your point into the paper and to counter it

I recognise that I need to put your point into the paper and to counter it.

I don't know if you do or not. You say the paper is a response to Nagel 86/98 but maybe that invites to much of a direct comparison to the paper - I think of it as you saying you are responding to his paper - but you are really only taking up the idea of expansion, you're saying we only need a narrow expansion for the "view from nowhere" problem ... so maybe that needs to be rewritten in the abstract to make it clear you are only responding to that part of the paper.

On the other hand, to the extent that Nagel's arguments don't get answered, I think you can expect to be challenged on those points.

Not only is the second option conceivable (which is the key), it weakens all the conceivability arguments.

I'll have to look at that, but I really think Nagel's argument runs in a different direction, I didnt get that before. Anyway, put it on the back burner because I could be really wrong.

Importantly, it is not just increasing complexity as you say (that I say). That is Dennett's argument. And that, in my view, is a panpsychist leaning. Rather, the nature of the conplexity is key, which is why things like tables, cities and cups of hot tea are not going to be phenomenally conscious. The layers of environmental "knowledge" have to be in place.

I have a hard time separating the effect on the argument whether its increasing complexity or the nature of the complexity ... and anyway tables, cities and cups of hot tea are probably less complex than the fruit fly brain, right? How would you even measure complexity? That seems to get into the area of IIT.

It still comes down to emergence - the basic argument is make something complex enough in the right way and consciousness emerges but that doesn't address the how. It seems to me there comes to a point in your paper where you are taking the presence of consciousness for granted and start using it in your arguments.

 

[smcder]

@smcder
Your skepticism has hit a chord; I think I know how to proceed at this point in the paper:
NB. From Nagel [edited quotes from p. 67-70 The view from nowhere]:
(")
The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realistic picture, is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must proceed under its shadow.... for we can conceive of the possibility that the world is different from how we believe it to be in ways that we cannot imagine, that our thoughts and impressions are produced in ways that we cannot conceive, and that there is no way of moving from where we are to beliefs about the world that are substantially correct. This is the most abstract form of skeptical possibility, and it remains an option on a realist view no matter what other hypotheses we may construct and embrace.

often we may try to step outside of ourselves, something will have to stay behind the lens, something in us will determine the resulting picture, and this will give grounds for doubt that we are really getting any closer to reality. The idea of objectivity thus seems to undermine itself.

skeptical problems arise not from a misunderstanding of the meaning of standard knowledge claims, but from their actual content and the attempt to transcend ourselves that is involved in the formation of beliefs about the world.

The objective self is responsible both for the expansion of our understanding and for doubts about it that cannot be finally laid to rest. The extension of power and the growth of insecurity go hand in hand once we place ourselves inside the world and try to develop a view that accommodates this recognition fully. The most familiar scene of conflict is the pursuit of objective knowledge, whose aim is naturally described in terms that, taken literally, are unintelligible: we must get outside ourselves, and view the world from nowhere within it.
(")

So... it is healthy to be critical: but skepticism? that shadow follows on the heels and cannot be banished.

No I think Nagel's arguments about Zombies say something about the kind of answer he wants to see and that's integral to his call for a wide expansion ... I don't take it as a kind of skepticism. At this point in his writing he still seems to be where he was in 78 that it can be solved with a physicalist solution, I dont think he thinks the same thing in Mind and Cosmos which is why I asked if your criticism of him still applied? With Mind and Cosmos he sees consciousness as fundamental, doesn't he? And not something that emerges from physical processes as he still does in 98. What I want to trace is how he got from 98 to Mind and Cosmos -

 

[smcder]

@smcder
Your skepticism has hit a chord; I think I know how to proceed at this point in the paper:
NB. From Nagel [edited quotes from p. 67-70 The view from nowhere]:
(")
The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realistic picture, is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must proceed under its shadow.... for we can conceive of the possibility that the world is different from how we believe it to be in ways that we cannot imagine, that our thoughts and impressions are produced in ways that we cannot conceive, and that there is no way of moving from where we are to beliefs about the world that are substantially correct. This is the most abstract form of skeptical possibility, and it remains an option on a realist view no matter what other hypotheses we may construct and embrace.

often we may try to step outside of ourselves, something will have to stay behind the lens, something in us will determine the resulting picture, and this will give grounds for doubt that we are really getting any closer to reality. The idea of objectivity thus seems to undermine itself.

skeptical problems arise not from a misunderstanding of the meaning of standard knowledge claims, but from their actual content and the attempt to transcend ourselves that is involved in the formation of beliefs about the world.

The objective self is responsible both for the expansion of our understanding and for doubts about it that cannot be finally laid to rest. The extension of power and the growth of insecurity go hand in hand once we place ourselves inside the world and try to develop a view that accommodates this recognition fully. The most familiar scene of conflict is the pursuit of objective knowledge, whose aim is naturally described in terms that, taken literally, are unintelligible: we must get outside ourselves, and view the world from nowhere within it.
(")

So... it is healthy to be critical: but skepticism? that shadow follows on the heels and cannot be banished.

define the difference for you between skepticism and critical?

I'm trying to tone down my lawyer thinking and be a constructive critic, my instinct is to go for the jugular - but that's not being a skeptic as I understand - which is just saying well ultimately you can't prove anything - and Nagel acknowledges that but says we have to work under it, as you say - so I'm not just sitting back saying well you really cant prove any of this 100% thats too easy, I'm trying to find real gaps and assumptions, place the critic could attack, the skeptic can attack anywhere ... he doesnt even have to read the paper ... so thats why Im trying to get everything down to a statement by statement argument, as much as possible, and see that each statement either proceeds inevitably from the previous one or does with reasonable assumptions (and those assumptions are defended from the critical response in a reasonable way).

Does that respond to your skepticism of my criticality? ;-)

 

[smcder]

You guys can discuss it all you want, but I'm moving on in this direction:

• Thalamocortical system and human consciousness
• Consciousness and the Thalamocortical Loop

IMO, if we really want answers rather than endless looping discussions, then we need to look for information that can be used to home in on what's going on with respect to the mounting evidence that associates the brain-body system ( BBS ) with the emergence of consciousness. In a previous post I included a video in which the various parts of the brain that have a direct correlation to consciousness have been mapped. Above we have this all tied to the Thalmocortical system. And now we have evidence of how fields have a causal effect on neuronal activity. With all this put together, a 3D map of the field space in which consciousness resides should be possible, and by gathering measurable scientific data on the functioning of this system, a set of working principles should also be possible.

That still won't solve the problem of exactly how the property of consciousness is imparted onto the field, but once we have a picture that is analogous to what we get with a magnetic field, just like we can detect the presence of a magnetic field using iron filings, we should in principle be able to detect a consciousness field. At the present time the fMRI pictures are very much like the picture we get with iron filings on a solid surface inside a magnetic field. In other words we only see it where the material it's acting on is located rather than the whole structure.

The Thalamocortical System is virtually at the center in this picture, with pathways to all sensory regions. And it regulates consciousness in our sleep/wake cycles. So when it kicks in, up come the electrical fields, and those in turn orient themselves in a manner that gives rise to consciousness, or maybe a whole new field emerges that is separate, but either way, it provides feedback into the system where it is picked up by the corresponding neurons and reprocessed along with other sensory and mental input to determine the next course of action.

I think Velmans paper is anything but endless looping discussion, he pinpoints the problem of mental causation and offers a solution.

It's fine to identify mental states as physical states but you point to the exact problem here:

That still won't solve the problem of exactly how the property of consciousness is imparted onto the field

The rest of what you write to me then doesn't address that core problem.

Even if you get all of this:

filings, we should in principle be able to detect a consciousness field. At the present time the fMRI pictures are very much like the picture we get with iron filings on a solid surface inside a magnetic field. In other words we only see it where the material it's acting on is located rather than the whole structure.

you don't address the core problem - you don't know any more than we objectively know now ... thats all in Nagel's 78 paper - ... you still just assert that its a brute fact that subjective feel goes along with certain objective processes. I actually like the "brute fact" argument because it's a very honest one. You have to untangle whether its a brute fact for our kinds of minds or if other kinds of minds would see just why consciousness goes with physical processess (that's McGinn's idea that to some kind of mind out there the hard problem is first grade stuff).

But Velmans says instead, let's accept the efficacy of consciousness, that it has causal effects, we know this from the data and from our experience - and lets accept the first person account and move on with a science that accepts it. Otherwise we are stuck with a reductionist approach that doesn't acknowledge consciousness and so won't make any progress on what we can know.

The hard problem as Nagel and Chalmers construct it, is only a hard problem for physicalists. If consciousness is accepted as fundamental, there is no hard problem (however there are other problems, just as hard). But the point is such an approach allows you to move on and make progress in both the first and third person accounts and not grind away trying to reconcile the subjective into the objective.

 

[smcder]

You guys can discuss it all you want, but I'm moving on in this direction:

• Thalamocortical system and human consciousness
• Consciousness and the Thalamocortical Loop

IMO, if we really want answers rather than endless looping discussions, then we need to look for information that can be used to home in on what's going on with respect to the mounting evidence that associates the brain-body system ( BBS ) with the emergence of consciousness. In a previous post I included a video in which the various parts of the brain that have a direct correlation to consciousness have been mapped. Above we have this all tied to the Thalmocortical system. And now we have evidence of how fields have a causal effect on neuronal activity. With all this put together, a 3D map of the field space in which consciousness resides should be possible, and by gathering measurable scientific data on the functioning of this system, a set of working principles should also be possible.

That still won't solve the problem of exactly how the property of consciousness is imparted onto the field, but once we have a picture that is analogous to what we get with a magnetic field, just like we can detect the presence of a magnetic field using iron filings, we should in principle be able to detect a consciousness field. At the present time the fMRI pictures are very much like the picture we get with iron filings on a solid surface inside a magnetic field. In other words we only see it where the material it's acting on is located rather than the whole structure.

The Thalamocortical System is virtually at the center in this picture, with pathways to all sensory regions. And it regulates consciousness in our sleep/wake cycles. So when it kicks in, up come the electrical fields, and those in turn orient themselves in a manner that gives rise to consciousness, or maybe a whole new field emerges that is separate, but either way, it provides feedback into the system where it is picked up by the corresponding neurons and reprocessed along with other sensory and mental input to determine the next course of action.

And I think that is a good direction to go in - but I've presented very good reasons why I don't expect to get answers to the question I have from that approach. If you get all of that done, you will still have to say:

That still won't solve the problem of exactly how the property of consciousness is imparted onto the field,

That's the question to be answered.

And that does produce endless looping discussion, but I suggest it's not identical circles produced each time, for me anyway, its epicyclic or whatever the term is for taking a slightly different path through each time and being a little more knowledgeable each time through - more like GroundHog Day than Nietzsche's eternal recurrence (where everything is always exactly the same).

If I didn't feel like each time I came back to an idea that I learned something new (like I have just learned about the zombie argument from Nagel 98) I wouldn't stay at it. To me popping out to the neuroscience above is fine, but its not going to answer the core question.

There are already some answers to that question:

1. mysterianism (which I don't think is well understood on the thread) - which says we can't, our kinds of minds, can't understand the exact nature of mind and body - but he says there may be some kinds of minds that can, or our minds might be able to under certain conditions (

2. consciousness is fundamental, that gets rid of emergence - I don't think the real problem of emergence is well understood either, first I think it's just a label for an intuition we think we have, but we have is a comparison from things like birds flocking or ant colonies to neurons and brains - we can't really see how minds emerge from brains, but because we can say well complex things like flocks of birds are made up of simple things, we think we can easily apply that to minds (I'm really oversimplifying here). Thats what Nagel points out in his paper and say is different from any analogy to a physical system. Because subjective experience isn't like anything we have in the objective world - and he really details that in the last three pages of (98). But the big problem for me in emergence is to say that something utterly unlike anything that has existed in the world (subjective experience, phenomenal consciousness) is generated at some point of complexity/arrangement of complexity in an organism.

 

[smcder]

Let me take that last statement:

But the big problem for me in emergence is to say that something utterly unlike anything that has existed in the world (subjective experience, phenomenal consciousness) is generated at some point of complexity/arrangement of complexity in an organism.

So does that mean consciousness is inevitable?

@Pharoah and I had that discussion and it centers around teleology and I think it's still in his argument that it's inevitable in a way that Stephen Jay Gould argues it isn't - he says that evolution does not say life will move into an increasing complexity ... the next stage in man could easily be back to something like an earlier "more primitive" hominid - our popular idea of the next stage of man inevitably being smarter has no basis in evolutionary theory, he says.

See The Spread of Excellence and his idea of rewinding the tape of evolution.

But the idea of emergence to me, whether or not it does develop is irrelevant, says that consciousness is always an inherent possibility in a universe like ours. But that's unique - the problem with comparing it with fields, is that fields are part of the basic furniture of the universe - they've always been there we just didnt discover them until recently - whats different about consciousness fields is that the idea is that the brain has to come along first, has to come along and get to a point where it can generate this new kind of field - because you aren't saying its something thats out there for biology to exploit - for the brain to organize and be shaped by - but rather it is utterly new in the universe and it is generated by the brain - what else is like that in the universe?

gravity, magnetic fields, etc - were all there, very early on if not from the beginning.

So if we are in a universe where utterly new things can pop out from appropriate levels of complexity and organization and consciousness is one of them, what else might be pop up that is novel from novel kinds of complexity and organization? Well, the answer is clearly X, right? By definition we would have no idea. And thats something I struggle with is how does this novel thing come into being - how do we think about a brain generating something new without thinking in terms of teleology or intention?

I can see if there is a fundamental force and biology moves toward it, begining with primitive sense of conscious fields out there and learns to exploit it as a resource - but its coming out of nowhere, its emerging as something novel and useful, exactly when needed (@Pharoah you seem to say it pops up when needed to organize pereption and input when it gets to be particularly complex) to me that is too convenient.

Access consciousness emerging, OK. But phenomenal (or consciousness having a phenomenal aspect, if you dont think the two can be separated) just emerging - thats a hard story to sell.

 

[smcder]

@ufology says,
"However the object that is the focus of our subjective reality is not consciousness itself. Consciousness is our awareness of that subjective reality."
Your terms of reference differ to mine quite a bit. I am not sure how you allocate these terms. What term would you give to "the object that is the focus of our subjective reality"?

@TheBitterOne how about turning your head round 360 degrees.

@smcder
1. where did you get that abstract from in #841. Looks like I need to read more. Is it from, person who wrote,
"Does natural selection favor veridical perceptions, those that more accurately depict the objective environment?" Donald Hoffman?

2. "knowledge and representation etc have to be expanded, but narrowly" this is not how I am using the term narrow. The narrow is a conditional term qualifying the kind of expansionism. It is not qualifying how much knowledge and representation are to be expanded.

3. Glenn Gould hums. When I made noises during recordings, I was chastised. That's the British for you.

4. "the e coli is that the organism makes changes as it moves through the digestive tract (track?), right? and then you can fool it in the lab by making certain stimuli to think its moving along that tract (and I assume they make meds to do this in order to kill the bacteria?)"
The paper by Tagouplis is about how biochemical mechanisms evolve: biochemistries adapt such that they will preemptive environmental change (the changes that take place in the digestive track are very dramatic and varied)—gearing biochemically before changes actually happen. The author also describes these mechanisms as representational.

5. icon: the first image I saw from my desktop... I felt like hiding lol. You drew your own! I thought it might have been one of those images drawn by a bonobo lol. Actually... on second thoughts, what would Freud think of your icon? (how do you do a raised ibrow?)

@Constance. Legrand looks interesting: will read the paper

5. icon: the first image I saw from my desktop... I felt like hiding lol. You drew your own! I thought it might have been one of those images drawn by a bonobo lol. Actually... on second thoughts, what would Freud think of your icon? (how do you do a raised ibrow?)

I don't have much artistic skill and my hands shake from the meds, but I still think I have more fine motor control than a Bonobo! It's not so much about the quality of the image it's about showing I can have an individuated response. As to what Freuad would think, what did you have in mind? When people say something like that, it's usually something to do with the reproductive or excretory systems.

It's basically a doodle, I add a little more as I go along, taking breaks from the forum - and then I post up each successive image. That's all, very simple.

 

[smcder]

I can't figure out whether to slap you or wink.

I'd say he's got both coming.

By the way, it wasn't my intention to insult anyone, least of all Bruce Lee. I want that on the record.

 

[Pharoah]

@smcder
I am happy with your criticisms btw... they make sense to me.
In my last comment, I quoted parts of nagel's chapter about skepticism and its relation to any answer. Basically, it is that the skeptic will always win, or at least, prevent anyone getting a comprehensive victory. The skeptical argument is notoriously difficult to disarm: impossible.
I think the improvement I need to make is to state the skeptics reaction and present TN's discussion on the matter.
Of course, you are criticising, and identifying an important point, namely, how are we to know that what I am saying is valid? For me, I respond by saying that such a stance is of a skeptical nature, one that I cannot counter. I can merely make a plausible believable account and indicate how it might be reenforced by research.
Incidentally, I don't think of M&C as differing from TVFN. What I am wondering is if you have groked footnote 1. Perhaps I need to extend the footnote to make the point clearer.

 

[Randall]

I think Velmans paper is anything but endless looping discussion, he pinpoints the problem of mental causation and offers a solution.

The endless looping discussion I was referring to was not Velman's paper in particular, but the discussion in general. I've made my comment on Velman and I've moved on.

you don't address the core problem - you don't know any more than we objectively know now ... thats all in Nagel's 78 paper

I address the core problem by saying that my line of inquiry won't explain how consciousness is imparted onto the field. That problem is another discussion altogether. People who work with electromagnetism are more concerned with how to create and manipulate it rather than where the force comes from in the first place. If all they did was try to figure out how the electromagnetic force is imparted onto the field, we'd have never gotten around to inventing electric motors, generators, magnets and all the related technology that makes practical use of it.

- ... you still just assert that its a brute fact that subjective feel goes along with certain objective processes. I actually like the "brute fact" argument because it's a very honest one. You have to untangle whether its a brute fact for our kinds of minds or if other kinds of minds would see just why consciousness goes with physical processess (that's McGinn's idea that to some kind of mind out there the hard problem is first grade stuff).

Exactly. That's the practical applications, and to get there the identification of the components that give rise to consciousness along with the mapping of the associated sphere of influence is what should come next. At present, I wouldn't assume that any brain that doesn't have something that works like the Thalamocortical system will have consciousness.

But Velmans says instead, let's accept the efficacy of consciousness, that it has causal effects, we know this from the data and from our experience - and lets accept the first person account and move on with a science that accepts it. Otherwise we are stuck with a reductionist approach that doesn't acknowledge consciousness and so won't make any progress on what we can know.

I'd agree with that up to a point, but like I said to Constance ( not that she wants to admit it ): The reason reductionism is so attractive is because most things are reducible. One should use the tools at one's disposal and not get so hung up on one aspect of philosophy to the point where it's coming across as an ideology rather than a methodology.

If consciousness is accepted as fundamental, there is no hard problem ...

That's what I've been saying ever since the concept was brought up, but that still doesn't mean that the Hard Problem as an illustrative tool isn't valuable ( I think it is ). It's just the way that it's worded in terms of a "problem" rather than a hierarchy of phenomena, that leads to confusion.

The hard problem as Nagel and Chalmers construct it, is only a hard problem for physicalists ...

That depends on ones version of Physicalism and Dualism. I don't subscribe to any particular clique other than my own. There's nothing in my Physicalist view that prevents consciousness from being considered as fundamental as magnetism. Both are IMO physical phenomena of nature ( as opposed to something supernatural ).

(however there are other problems, just as hard). But the point is such an approach allows you to move on and make progress in both the first and third person accounts and not grind away trying to reconcile the subjective into the objective.

Recognizing that mental phenomena and material phenomena are different is perfectly fine. So are gravity and magnetism. In this sense Mind/Matter dualism within a Physicalist framework makes perfect sense. No reconciling needed, and we can get on with practical things, which is why I've moved on to the specific physical components of the system and how consciousness when active, can be measured and mapped, and because I doubt I'll be doing much of that work myself, I don't see much more room for discussion other than to watch for the latest scientific breakthroughs, or pursue less promising lines of inquiry simply for discussion's sake.

The only place we have left to go is to figure out how the fundamental forces of nature are imparted onto our universe, and then consciousness becomes incidental. It's also a question science doesn't know how to answer with any certainty. It's the mystery of existence itself, and the only sense to be had of that is that our universe is some sort of simulation and the forces that we see imparted on it are therefore arbitrary variables of the construct. If that's true, then there are even more practical applications to be had if we can figure out how to interface with the system. But in the end, even that doesn't explain what's beyond whatever realm constructed this one, and so on in an infinite recursion. There's just no answer other than to look at it all as some sort of amazing adventure for whatever species can advance far enough to explore it.

 

[Pharoah]

5. icon: the first image I saw from my desktop... I felt like hiding lol. You drew your own! I thought it might have been one of those images drawn by a bonobo lol. Actually... on second thoughts, what would Freud think of your icon? (how do you do a raised ibrow?)

I don't have much artistic skill and my hands shake from the meds, but I still think I have more fine motor control than a Bonobo! It's not so much about the quality of the image it's about showing I can have an individuated response. As to what Freuad would think, what did you have in mind? When people say something like that, it's usually something to do with the reproductive or excretory systems.

It's basically a doodle, I add a little more as I go along, taking breaks from the forum - and then I post up each successive image. That's all, very simple.

I like analysing artwork. Doodles are the best: because they lack conscious intent perhaps.
In broad outline it looks at first to me to resemble a foetus... but then a recoiled sperm. On closer examination the head seems broken in form from the tail—at what might be regarded as its back. interestingly, the connection between head and tail is supported by a clockwork-like mecahnical form—a central feature that draws the eyes: as a foetus, this feature would be the hands and arms with the fingers a prominent circle, without end and continuously in cycle. The head has a frontal cortex with plant-like features... perhaps beautiful and creative, but the bulk of the head has clockwork features, interconnected, overlaying... confused but ordered. That's it...

 

[smcder]

@smcder
I am happy with your criticisms btw... they make sense to me.
In my last comment, I quoted parts of nagel's chapter about skepticism and its relation to any answer. Basically, it is that the skeptic will always win, or at least, prevent anyone getting a comprehensive victory. The skeptical argument is notoriously difficult to disarm: impossible.
I think the improvement I need to make is to state the skeptics reaction and present TN's discussion on the matter.
Of course, you are criticising, and identifying an important point, namely, how are we to know that what I am saying is valid? For me, I respond by saying that such a stance is of a skeptical nature, one that I cannot counter. I can merely make a plausible believable account and indicate how it might be reenforced by research.
Incidentally, I don't think of M&C as differing from TVFN. What I am wondering is if you have groked footnote 1. Perhaps I need to extend the footnote to make the point clearer.

Of course, you are criticising, and identifying an important point, namely, how are we to know that what I am saying is valid? For me, I respond by saying that such a stance is of a skeptical nature, one that I cannot counter. I can merely make a plausible believable account and indicate how it might be reenforced by research.

Skepticism to me says I am saying you'll never be able to convince me ... but I'm just saying there are still gaps in the argument, you suddenly go to the presence of consciousness at a given point of complexity, organization. That's an emergent argument. Research can back that up that yes consciousness appears at this point - but the questions I bring up about emergence in the last few posts stand. Up to now, what HCT seems to say is what TENS says which is that consciousness shows up conveniently when its needed and its stays around because it confers a survival value. I want to find what HCT is saying that is different from TENS. that's what I'm not grokking - and I'm not through the paper, much less HCT so Ill put that in the back of my mind, I probably don't have enough knowledge of what TENS says (I posted some articles though on that) to sort it out. So I may not be useful there.

Anyway - I think it's best to get back to specifics. If the criticisms I raise, if you are ok with those by saying:

Of course, you are criticising, and identifying an important point, namely, how are we to know that what I am saying is valid? For me, I respond by saying that such a stance is of a skeptical nature, one that I cannot counter. I can merely make a plausible believable account and indicate how it might be reenforced by research.

And you feel like you need to address that in the paper ok, I'm fine if you don't, though - it can be implicit. You aren't writing for skeptics anyway. If you are providing something that can guide research (and here the comments by the neuroscientist you mention will back that up) then I am all for it, whether it resolves ultimate questions or not.

In M&C doesn't he accept consciousness as a fundamental aspect of the universe? In Nagel 98 he still seems to allow for a physical solution?

Footnote 1
1 In my opinion, ‘the view from nowhere’ requires expansionism in the narrow sense, whilst ‘the view from
somewhere’ (1986, cf. chapter 4) requires expansionism in the wide sense. The ‘view from nowhere’ incorporates the
idea that bridging the objective–subjective gap does not require an explanation of any specific personal perspective i.e.,
an explanatory bridge need not account for specific identities, v.g., yours as opposed to mine. In contrast, the ‘view from
somewhere’ is the altogether different problem of explaining why particular subjective identities happen to correspond
with their specific body of experience within the totality of the universe’s time and space.

This goes back to our discussion of the hard problem, I posted something a while back about a clarification - that what it is like is always what it is like for some one (some being) - so I don't see the additional "harder" problem as not being in Nagel's argument to begin with - and I'm not the only one, but it is an arguable point and enough so to build a paper on. The point above makes sense - but I'm still reading it that the reason we have consciousness show up is because its needed to provide an individual specific response to the environment. Access consciousness, yes, something like that makes sense, but phenomenal consciousness, the subjective itself - I dont think so. Thats Nagels zombie argument - that we dont see where that necessarily requires subjectivity as a sense not a recognition of self or individuation - we dont immediately see the non contingent connection from there being something it is like and being able to do what a complex organism can do - that is the bridee I think he is looking for. That some kind of complex information processing is necessary sure - and that it involves real time information that can only pertain to that one organism, sure - but why that has to be accompanied by phenomenal feel (rather than that information being just encoded) is obvous to me from your arguments.

You seem to say it must be something like that process all that real time information and apply it to yourself as an individual but its not at all obvious that it has to be that way - that may be the case only for specific organic beings - someone said you can digitize the processes of the kidney but dont expect your computer to get way ... that sort of thing - again the fact that I cant immediately see that once you have to deal with all that information, you have to be conscious and it has to feel like something to be conscious - that I think is Nagel's argument

anyway, Im repeating myself - my sticking point is that both HCT and TENS say consciousness must be necessary because we can reasonably see it in complex organisms of a certain type of complexity and one I dont see that necessity and I dont fundamentally see a difference in how the two theories say that?

So help me straighten all that out if its easy to do, if not lets go on wth the specifics - whats helpful to you and you want to address in the paper, great! What isnt, discard it. You dont have to take time to respond to all my posts - much of it is thinking out loud and getting it on paper so I can look at it later.

 

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The endless looping discussion I was referring to was not Velman's paper in particular, but the discussion in general. I've made my comment on Velman and I've moved on.

I address the core problem by saying that my line of inquiry won't explain how consciousness is imparted onto the field. That problem is another discussion altogether. People who work with electromagnetism are more concerned with how to create and manipulate it rather than where the force comes from in the first place. If all they did was try to figure out how the electromagnetic force is imparted onto the field, we'd have never gotten around to inventing electric motors, generators, magnets and all the related technology that makes practical use of it.

Exactly. That's the practical applications, and to get there the identification of the components that give rise to consciousness along with the mapping of the associated sphere of influence is what should come next. At present, I wouldn't assume that any brain that doesn't have something that works like the Thalamocortical system will have consciousness.

I'd agree with that up to a point, but like I said to Constance ( not that she wants to admit it ): The reason reductionism is so attractive is because most things are reducible. One should use the tools at one's disposal and not get so hung up on one aspect of philosophy to the point where it's coming across as an ideology rather than a methodology.

That's what I've been saying ever since the concept was brought up, but that still doesn't mean that the Hard Problem as an illustrative tool isn't valuable ( I think it is ). It's just the way that it's worded in terms of a "problem" rather than a hierarchy of phenomena, that leads to confusion.

That depends on ones version of Physicalism and Dualism. I don't subscribe to any particular clique other than my own. There's nothing in my Physicalist view that prevents consciousness from being considered as fundamental as magnetism. Both are IMO physical phenomena of nature ( as opposed to something supernatural ).

Recognizing that mental phenomena and material phenomena are different is perfectly fine. So are gravity and magnetism. In this sense Mind/Matter dualism within a Physicalist framework makes perfect sense. No reconciling needed, and we can get on with practical things, which is why I've moved on to the specific physical components of the system and how consciousness when active, can be measured and mapped, and because I doubt I'll be doing much of that work myself, I don't see much more room for discussion other than to watch for the latest scientific breakthroughs, or pursue less promising lines of inquiry simply for discussion's sake.

The only place we have left to go is to figure out how the fundamental forces of nature are imparted onto our universe, and then consciousness becomes incidental. It's also a question science doesn't know how to answer with any certainty. It's the mystery of existence itself, and the only sense to be had of that is that our universe is some sort of simulation and the forces that we see imparted on it are therefore arbitrary variables of the construct. If that's true, then there are even more practical applications to be had if we can figure out how to interface with the system. But in the end, even that doesn't explain what's beyond whatever realm constructed this one, and so on in an infinite recursion. There's just no answer other than to look at it all as some sort of amazing adventure for whatever species can advance far enough to explore it.

There is a lot to address there, but first:

I'd agree with that up to a point, but like I said to Constance ( not that she wants to admit it ): The reason reductionism is so attractive is because most things are reducible. One should use the tools at one's disposal and not get so hung up on one aspect of philosophy to the point where it's coming across as an ideology rather than a methodology.

I dont want to start a fight but thats a direct violation of your rule of quoting someone.

put an @ sign in there and then re word it to directly address her.

 

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I like analysing artwork. Doodles are the best: because they lack conscious intent perhaps.
In broad outline it looks at first to me to resemble a foetus... but then a recoiled sperm. On closer examination the head seems broken in form from the tail—at what might be regarded as its back. interestingly, the connection between head and tail is supported by a clockwork-like mecahnical form—a central feature that draws the eyes: as a foetus, this feature would be the hands and arms with the fingers a prominent circle, without end and continuously in cycle. The head has a frontal cortex with plant-like features... perhaps beautiful and creative, but the bulk of the head has clockwork features, interconnected, overlaying... confused but ordered. That's it...

lol - patient looking at ink blots:

"Why do you say I have a dirty mind, doc??? You're the one who keeps showing me all these naughty pictures!"

Onviously, it's a drawing of a brain! ;-)

 

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The endless looping discussion I was referring to was not Velman's paper in particular, but the discussion in general. I've made my comment on Velman and I've moved on.

I address the core problem by saying that my line of inquiry won't explain how consciousness is imparted onto the field. That problem is another discussion altogether. People who work with electromagnetism are more concerned with how to create and manipulate it rather than where the force comes from in the first place. If all they did was try to figure out how the electromagnetic force is imparted onto the field, we'd have never gotten around to inventing electric motors, generators, magnets and all the related technology that makes practical use of it.

Exactly. That's the practical applications, and to get there the identification of the components that give rise to consciousness along with the mapping of the associated sphere of influence is what should come next. At present, I wouldn't assume that any brain that doesn't have something that works like the Thalamocortical system will have consciousness.

I'd agree with that up to a point, but like I said to Constance ( not that she wants to admit it ): The reason reductionism is so attractive is because most things are reducible. One should use the tools at one's disposal and not get so hung up on one aspect of philosophy to the point where it's coming across as an ideology rather than a methodology.

That's what I've been saying ever since the concept was brought up, but that still doesn't mean that the Hard Problem as an illustrative tool isn't valuable ( I think it is ). It's just the way that it's worded in terms of a "problem" rather than a hierarchy of phenomena, that leads to confusion.

That depends on ones version of Physicalism and Dualism. I don't subscribe to any particular clique other than my own. There's nothing in my Physicalist view that prevents consciousness from being considered as fundamental as magnetism. Both are IMO physical phenomena of nature ( as opposed to something supernatural ).

Recognizing that mental phenomena and material phenomena are different is perfectly fine. So are gravity and magnetism. In this sense Mind/Matter dualism within a Physicalist framework makes perfect sense. No reconciling needed, and we can get on with practical things, which is why I've moved on to the specific physical components of the system and how consciousness when active, can be measured and mapped, and because I doubt I'll be doing much of that work myself, I don't see much more room for discussion other than to watch for the latest scientific breakthroughs, or pursue less promising lines of inquiry simply for discussion's sake.

The only place we have left to go is to figure out how the fundamental forces of nature are imparted onto our universe, and then consciousness becomes incidental. It's also a question science doesn't know how to answer with any certainty. It's the mystery of existence itself, and the only sense to be had of that is that our universe is some sort of simulation and the forces that we see imparted on it are therefore arbitrary variables of the construct. If that's true, then there are even more practical applications to be had if we can figure out how to interface with the system. But in the end, even that doesn't explain what's beyond whatever realm constructed this one, and so on in an infinite recursion. There's just no answer other than to look at it all as some sort of amazing adventure for whatever species can advance far enough to explore it.

I address the core problem by saying that my line of inquiry won't explain how consciousness is imparted onto the field. That problem is another discussion altogether.

Yes and that discussion is the one we are having here.

The discussion you want to have is a good one and is a subtopic here, I would suggest starting another thread, but:

I don't see much more room for discussion other than to watch for the latest scientific breakthroughs, or pursue less promising lines of inquiry simply for discussion's sake.

Indicates that such a thread would be just for posting such breakthroughs. The last half means your continuing participation here would either be to convince others of your POV (which is fine) or simply to participate for discussion's sake - which seems to me to be a waster of time.

 

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see clearly a brain ...

I need to blow it up and print it off so I have more room to fill in the blank areas
.

 

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@Pharoah

@ufology - your stance seems to me what @Pharoah calls a skeptical stance, a hard mysterianism:

The only place we have left to go is to figure out how the fundamental forces of nature are imparted onto our universe, and then consciousness becomes incidental. It's also a question science doesn't know how to answer with any certainty. It's the mystery of existence itself, and the only sense to be had of that is that our universe is some sort of simulation and the forces that we see imparted on it are therefore arbitrary variables of the construct. If that's true, then there are even more practical applications to be had if we can figure out how to interface with the system. But in the end, even that doesn't explain what's beyond whatever realm constructed this one, and so on in an infinite recursion. There's just no answer other than to look at it all as some sort of amazing adventure for whatever species can advance far enough to explore it.

@Pharaoh is that correct? I hope my approach can be differentiated from this at least on the level of being helpful to your efforts. In other words, I want to adopt a stance of helpful criticism within the scope of your paper.