Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[smcder]

Neurobiologists Find that Weak Electrical Fields in the Brain Help Neurons Fire Together

Coordinated behavior occurs whether or not neurons are actually connected via synapses. The brain—awake and sleeping—is awash in electrical activity, and not just from the individual pings of single neurons communicating with each other. In fact, the brain is enveloped in countless overlapping electric fields, generated by the neural circuits of scores of communicating neurons. The fields were once thought to be an "epiphenomenon" similar to the sound the heart makes—which is useful to the cardiologist diagnosing a faulty heart beat, but doesn't serve any purpose to the body ... See more at: Neurobiologists Find that Weak Electrical Fields in the Brain Help Neurons Fire Together | Caltech

see also:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

 

[Randall]

see also:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

OK that's cool. I deleted the redundant post, but will reinforce the point made by it that here we have an example of an emergent property of a physical nature that is not epiphenomenal, and the more I run across these tidbits, the more I'm convinced that consciousness resides in a field that is closely related to, possibly even dependent on, such fields, and is equally causal in a feedback loop context.

 

[smcder]

OK that's cool. I deleted the redundant post, but will reinforce the point made by it that here we have an example of an emergent property of a physical nature that is not epiphenomenal, and the more I run across these tidbits, the more I'm convinced that consciousness resides in a field that is closely related to, possibly even dependent on, such fields, and is equally causal in a feedback loop context.

Oh no, I wasn't saying it was redundant or wanting you to delete it - I just remembered that it had been posted before, so I linked back to that so we can see what had been discussed before.

 

[Pharoah]

6 Clarification: how we get subjectivity from objectivity

The qualitative relevancy of innate physiological adaptations is not individual-specific, but species-specific.

physiological adaptations are specific to the species, not the individual
Whilst physiologies may be sensitive to temporal and spatial constraints, an individual that possesses only innate capabilities does not relate individualistically to those constraints.

An individual that possesses only these adaptations relates to the environment as the rest of its species does
For that individual—i.e., an individual that is responsive to the qualitative relevancies of environmental characteristics as granted only by its evolved species specific physiology—there is no individuated spatio-temporal reality.
since the individual only relates to its environment according to the species' physiology - it has no individual reality so its not really an individual

The responsivity to the good and the bad of the environment and to the constraints of time and space is a relation of replicative importance and qualitative specificity between environment and species only. The individual is merely an automaton acting like an environmental-barometer on behalf of, or as a representative of the species.

summary
1. organisms that can only respond to the environment according to the adaptations (physiology) of the species - don't have an individual response to the environment, are not individuals

But, as autonomic mechanisms and sensory facility evolve in complexity—which is inevitable, because the greater the complexity the greater the potential environmental responsivity
(note this isn't inevitable, it only happens if this leads to more success in the environment - see Gould's The Spread of Excellence)

—there is the increased likelihood that the assimilation of multiple sensory inputs will evince conflicting or cyclical behaviors.

as organisms grow more complex, conflicts between sensory inputs, etc lead to conflicting behavior, to trouble sorting out whats most important to respond to in the environment and how to respond to it
Consequently, the survival precedent is to evolve mechanisms for the management of the qualitative conflicts that arise from the multiple impressions of the interoceptive and exteroceptive environments.

*what does "survival precedent" mean? - the way I read this is that as organisms grew more complex, they evolved mechanisms for the mgmt of these conflicts? Does "survival precedent" add anything to this idea?

The remit of this management is to determine the relative importance of those conflicting impressions, and henceforth, to prioritize certain qualitative evaluations over others i.e., to organize and prioritise the autonomic qualitative milieu.

These mgmt mechanisms sort out these conflicts - (this is the evolution of executive functions?)

When neural mechanisms do organize, evaluate and prioritize qualitative assimilations, the individual possesses its own individuated and evolving phenomenal world-view: it possesses an understanding of the relative merits of its environment in virtue of a continually changing internal landscape of experiential qualitative impressions. Such individuals are conscious of the changing impression of the qualitative phenomenon of their own particular experience because their world is spatially, temporally and qualitatively differentiated.

this is where consciousness could come in, but it doesn't show why or how

Accordingly, phenomenal consciousness is the process of evaluating the qualitative impressions that the environment evinces through suitably differentiating biochemical mechanisms.

again I don't see why it takes phenomenal consciousness to resolve complex conflicts? that's a function of "access" consciousness
Whilst qualitative valency has good reason to evolve in all replicating organisms, only neural mechanisms have the potential to institute real-time behavioral adaptation. These mechanisms, which increase in sophistication up the phylogenetic scale, qualify a multitude of qualitative environmental assimilations to accommodate sensory, affective and operant sensitivities. An organism possessing more than 100,000 neurons or 107 synapses is likely to be capable of mediating a constantly changing landscape of evaluated environmental impressions: these creatures experience individuated phenomenal content.

where does 10/7 neurons come in?

This view contrasts with Carruthers’ (1998, p. 216) stance that few creatures besides humans will count as having conscious states: ‘we lack any grounds for believing that animalshave phenomenally-conscious states’ and ‘it is not only animals, but also young children, who will lack phenomenal consciousness according to HOT [higher-order thought] accounts.’ (see also Gennaro 1996, on the wide view that concepts specifically are necessary for the coherent organisation of sensory states).

Biochemical mechanisms provide the foundations for real-time comparative evaluation. One can surmise, that evaluative sophistication, in turn, underpins the extent of associative learning, individuated social interaction (rather than automated social organization as observed in insect colonies, for instance), affective feeling and its communication, and the richness of an individual’s phenomenal consciousness.

@smcder to respond to your queries in italics below:

summary
1. organisms that can only respond to the environment according to the adaptations (physiology) of the species - don't have an individual response to the environment, are not individuals
No. don't have an individuated response. An ant, say, is an individual, but its responses may not be individuated but specified by the species'.

*what does "survival precedent" mean? - the way I read this is that as organisms grew more complex, they evolved mechanisms for the mgmt of these conflicts? Does "survival precedent" add anything to this idea?
Not anything new

These mgmt mechanisms sort out these conflicts - (this is the evolution of executive functions?)
Yes... that may be one way of putting it

this is where consciousness could come in, but it doesn't show why or how
Those would be neuroscientific questions. "phenomenal consciousness" to be more specific not "consciousness". i.e. conscious (mindful) of the phenomenal qualitative delineation of reality.

again I don't see why it takes phenomenal consciousness to resolve complex conflicts? that's a function of "access" consciousness
see previous question. When an organism is mindful of qualitative options, that is phen consciousness existing in that particular way for the individual. It is a qualitative evaluation that is changing every microsecond. It doesn't "take phen consciousness"; it is phen consciousness.

where does 10/7 neurons come in?
synapses. I mention synapses because it may be the number of synapse not the number of neurons that is important in terms of evaluational capability. The numbers are my estimate. It is, in reality, a greyscale at that level of organism sophistication, not an absolute cut off line

 

[Constance]

@Constance. PP = Philosophical Quarterly... of course

So not PQ? If you so say.

 

[Randall]

Oh no, I wasn't saying it was redundant or wanting you to delete it - I just remembered that it had been posted before, so I linked back to that so we can see what had been discussed before.

Yes that's cool. I figured that since the link is in your post and my reply, no need for my first one too .

 

[smcder]

@smcder to respond to your queries in italics below:

summary
1. organisms that can only respond to the environment according to the adaptations (physiology) of the species - don't have an individual response to the environment, are not individuals
No. don't have an individuated response. An ant, say, is an individual, but its responses may not be individuated but specified by the species'.

*what does "survival precedent" mean? - the way I read this is that as organisms grew more complex, they evolved mechanisms for the mgmt of these conflicts? Does "survival precedent" add anything to this idea?
Not anything new

These mgmt mechanisms sort out these conflicts - (this is the evolution of executive functions?)
Yes... that may be one way of putting it

this is where consciousness could come in, but it doesn't show why or how
Those would be neuroscientific questions. "phenomenal consciousness" to be more specific not "consciousness". i.e. conscious (mindful) of the phenomenal qualitative delineation of reality.

again I don't see why it takes phenomenal consciousness to resolve complex conflicts? that's a function of "access" consciousness
see previous question. When an organism is mindful of qualitative options, that is phen consciousness existing in that particular way for the individual. It is a qualitative evaluation that is changing every microsecond. It doesn't "take phen consciousness"; it is phen consciousness.

where does 10/7 neurons come in?
synapses. I mention synapses because it may be the number of synapse not the number of neurons that is important in terms of evaluational capability. The numbers are my estimate. It is, in reality, a greyscale at that level of organism sophistication, not an absolute cut off line

@smcder to respond to your queries in italics below:

summary
1. organisms that can only respond to the environment according to the adaptations (physiology) of the species - don't have an individual response to the environment, are not individuals
No. don't have an individuated response. An ant, say, is an individual, but its responses may not be individuated but specified by the species'.

*what does "survival precedent" mean? - the way I read this is that as organisms grew more complex, they evolved mechanisms for the mgmt of these conflicts? Does "survival precedent" add anything to this idea?
Not anything new

These mgmt mechanisms sort out these conflicts - (this is the evolution of executive functions?)
Yes... that may be one way of putting it

this is where consciousness could come in, but it doesn't show why or how
Those would be neuroscientific questions. "phenomenal consciousness" to be more specific not "consciousness". i.e. conscious (mindful) of the phenomenal qualitative delineation of reality.
but
again I don't see why it takes phenomenal consciousness to resolve complex conflicts? that's a function of "access" consciousness
see previous question. When an organism is mindful of qualitative options, that is phen consciousness existing in that particular way for the individual. It is a qualitative evaluation that is changing every microsecond. It doesn't "take phen consciousness"; it is phen consciousness.

where does 10/7 neurons come in?
synapses. I mention synapses because it may be the number of synapse not the number of neurons that is important in terms of evaluational capability. The numbers are my estimate. It is, in reality, a greyscale at that level of organism sophistication, not an absolute cut off line

Help me understand individuated responses.

1. I put a million cloned bacteria in a bucket of pine sol, some live, some die, some live not because of chemical resistance but because they more assiduosly avoided the chemicals, say by seeking a surface or whatever bacteria do ... first off they arent the same organisms even with the same genes, epigenetics ... but this would be species level responses, not indidivuated in all the above cases?

2. at ten to the magic seven synapses, there is some kind of consciousness and this informs the organism and they make individual choices

but this is all obviously a spectrum ... in one sense even humans cant make individuated choices ... our behavioral repertoire is species specific (arguing within the framework you've put out)

so how do I make this rigorous - or do you even need this in the argument, when what you are saying is that at this level of 10/7 consciousness emerges and individualized responses along with it ... right now the theory says that as things get more complex you come to a point where things have to be sorted out, I assume that was done kind of in an analong way - strengths of inputs, strongest input win but at some point you have to get organized and when that happens consciousness shows up - but your theory has to show why that consciousness is necessary - Nagel maintained throughout this not something apparent or obvious ... I mean I could easily maintain that there is no qualitative difference in an ant and an aardvaark, one is just more complex - its strictly a qualitative argument, and nothing special needs to happen at any given point, I got the Zombie argument in his paper in a way I never had before - that sweeps the objections to the argument out of the way because the point is about conceivability, not anything else ... so if we have a hard time imagining someone just like us but empty on the inside, for me, at least, I have no problem imagining a computer with the same complexity that isnt conscious at all ... there is nothing necessary there about increasing complexity that makes me want to say anything emerges ... it seems to me you dont address that part of Nagel's paper ... ?

what am I missing?

 

[smcder]

Velman's How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains

this lays out the issues of causation, physical to physical, physical to mental, mental to mental, mental to physical very clearly.

He notes mental to physical is problematic for physical reduction because of causal closure and he presents compelling evidence of mental to physical causation:

Here he talks about single neruones being brough under conscious control using biofeedback

Particularly puzzling is the evidence that under certain conditions, a range of autonomic body functions including heart rate, blood pressure, vasomotor activity, blood glucose levels, pupil dilation, electrodermal activity and immune system functioning can be influenced by conscious states.
In some cases these effects are striking. Baars and McGovern (1996) for example report that, The global influence of consciousness is dramatized by the remarkable phenomenon of biofeedback training. There is firm evidence that any single neurone or any population of neurons can come to be voluntarily controlled by giving consciousfeedback of their neural firing rates. A small needle electrode in the base of the thumb can tap into a single motor unit — a muscle fibre controlled by one motor neurone coming from the spinal cord, and a sensory fibre going back to it. When the signal from the muscle fibre is amplified and played back as a click through a loudspeaker, the subject can learn to control his or her single motor unit—one among millions—in about ten minutes. Some subjects have learned to play drumrolls on their single motor units after about thirty minutes of practice!

here the evidence seems to show that this can only occur when the subject is conscious

However, if the biofeedback signal is not conscious, learning does not occur. Subliminal feedback, distraction from the feedback signal, or feedback via a habituating stimulus — all these cases prevent control being acquired.

*Since this kind of learning only works for conscious biofeedback signals, it suggests again that consciousness creates global access to all parts of the nervous system (p. 75).

Velmans says a non-reductive science of consciousness accepts the efficacy of consciousness and moves on to build a rigorous science of both first and third person perspective.

 

[smcder]

Placebo effect

The most well accepted evidence for the effect of states of mind on medical outcome is undoubtedly the ‘placebo effect’ — well known to every medical practitioner and researcher. Simply receiving treatment, and having confidence in the therapy or therapist has itself been found to be therapeutic in many clinical situations (cf. Skrabanek and McCormick, 1989; Wall, 1996). As with other instances of apparent mind/body interaction, there are conflicting interpretations of the causal processes involved. For example, Skrabanek and McCormick (1989) claim that placebos can affect illness (how people feel) but not disease (organic disorders). That is, they accept the possibility of mental_mental causation but not of mental_physical causation.
evidence of mental --> physical causation
However, Wall (1996) cites evidence that placebo treatments may produce organic changes. Hashish et al. (1988) for example, found that use of an impressive ultrasound machine reduced not only pain, but also jaw tightness and swelling after the extraction of wisdom teeth whether or not the machine was set to produce ultrasound.

"nurse, bring in the machine that goes "PING"

Wall also reviews evidence that placebos can remove the sensation of pain accompanying well-defined organic disorders, and not just the feelings of discomfort, anxiety and so on that may accompany it.

@Soupie - the studies you brought up in which pain signatures were shown to be distinct from other emotions, reminded me of that.
As McMahon and Sheikh (1989) note, the absence of an acceptable theory of mind/body interaction within philosophy and science has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in many areas of clinical theory and practice. Conversely, the extensive evidence for mental causation within some clinical settings forms part of the database that any adequate theory of mind/ consciousness–body/brain relationships needs to explain.

 

[Pharoah]

Help me understand individuated responses.

1. I put a million cloned bacteria in a bucket of pine sol, some live, some die, some live not because of chemical resistance but because they more assiduosly avoided the chemicals, say by seeking a surface or whatever bacteria do ... first off they arent the same organisms even with the same genes, epigenetics ... but this would be species level responses, not indidivuated in all the above cases?

2. at ten to the magic seven synapses, there is some kind of consciousness and this informs the organism and they make individual choices

but this is all obviously a spectrum ... in one sense even humans cant make individuated choices ... our behavioral repertoire is species specific (arguing within the framework you've put out)

so how do I make this rigorous - or do you even need this in the argument, when what you are saying is that at this level of 10/7 consciousness emerges and individualized responses along with it ... right now the theory says that as things get more complex you come to a point where things have to be sorted out, I assume that was done kind of in an analong way - strengths of inputs, strongest input win but at some point you have to get organized and when that happens consciousness shows up - but your theory has to show why that consciousness is necessary - Nagel maintained throughout this not something apparent or obvious ... I mean I could easily maintain that there is no qualitative difference in an ant and an aardvaark, one is just more complex - its strictly a qualitative argument, and nothing special needs to happen at any given point, I got the Zombie argument in his paper in a way I never had before - that sweeps the objections to the argument out of the way because the point is about conceivability, not anything else ... so if we have a hard time imagining someone just like us but empty on the inside, for me, at least, I have no problem imagining a computer with the same complexity that isnt conscious at all ... there is nothing necessary there about increasing complexity that makes me want to say anything emerges ... it seems to me you dont address that part of Nagel's paper ... ?

what am I missing?

hmmm... What are you missing, you ask. not sure but,
the subjective world-view is one that is denlineating the objective world qualitatively. breaking this down: The qualitative correspondence is assigned by biochemical mechanisms. The individual, whose neural mechanisms then evaluate these qualitative correspondences—every microsecond—has, necessarily, a moving individuated landscape of changing qualitative impressions. That is it... it has an understanding of the qualitative relevance of its own experiences viz. it is phenomenally conscious...
but this is not the human take on reality as you will find reading further...
? does that help.

 

[smcder]

here is the link to the paper, marked for personal use only, not reproduction, so I will try to summarize from here out (sorry, Max!)
pages.pomona.edu/~rt004747/lgcs11read/Velmans02.pdf

but this is very rich on mental causation, central to what we've been talking about the last several pages, central to evolution of consciousness, consciousness of evolution, conscious evolution, etc ...

somewhere down the road we are going to run back into teleology and the ideas we began this thread with way back, the roles of consciousness itself in evolution, if it was there from the get go, that changes the story

 

[smcder]

hmmm... What are you missing, you ask. not sure but,
the subjective world-view is one that is denlineating the objective world qualitatively. breaking this down: The qualitative correspondence is assigned by biochemical mechanisms. The individual, whose neural mechanisms then evaluate these qualitative correspondences—every microsecond—has, necessarily, a moving individuated landscape of changing qualitative impressions. That is it... it has an understanding of the qualitative relevance of its own experiences viz. it is phenomenally conscious...
but this is not the human take on reality as you will find reading further...
? does that help.

qualitative correspondence is assigned by biochemical mechanisms. The individual, whose neural mechanisms then evaluate these qualitative correspondences—every microsecond—has, *necessarily*, a moving individuated landscape of changing qualitative impressions. That is it... it has an understanding of the qualitative relevance of its own experiences viz. it is phenomenally conscious...

Why "necessarily"?

 

[Randall]

here is the link to the paper, marked for personal use only, not reproduction, so I will try to summarize from here out (sorry, Max!)
www.pages.pomona.edu/~rt004747/lgcs11read/Velmans02.pdf
but this is very rich on mental causation, central to what we've been talking about the last several pages, central to evolution of consciousness, consciousness of evolution, conscious evolution, etc ... somewhere down the road we are going to run back into teleology and the ideas we began this thread with way back, the roles of consciousness itself in evolution, if it was there from the get go, that changes the story

Until we get this part straightened out, I think I'll leave the rest of the paper for another day:

"The problems posed by mentalphysical causation are particularly acute, as reductionist, materialistic science generally takes it for granted that the operation of physical systems can be entirely explained in physical terms. Yet there is a large body of evidence that states of mind can affect not only subsequent states of the mind but also states of the body."​

Two main issues there: The first is that it implies that the mind isn't a physical component of the individual, and therefore there is this problem explaining it in physical terms. So let's do away with that setup and simply accept that the mind is a physical ( but not necessarily material ) component of the individual, and secondly, let's also reject the notion that science claims to be able to explain everything in physical terms ( it doesn't ).

 

[smcder]

hmmm... What are you missing, you ask. not sure but,
the subjective world-view is one that is denlineating the objective world qualitatively. breaking this down: The qualitative correspondence is assigned by biochemical mechanisms. The individual, whose neural mechanisms then evaluate these qualitative correspondences—every microsecond—has, necessarily, a moving individuated landscape of changing qualitative impressions. That is it... it has an understanding of the qualitative relevance of its own experiences viz. it is phenomenally conscious...
but this is not the human take on reality as you will find reading further...
? does that help.

This is what appears circular to me and appears to miss Nagel's point:

The individual, whose neural mechanisms then evaluate these qualitative correspondences—every microsecond—has, necessarily, a moving individuated landscape of changing qualitative impressions. That is it... it has an understanding of the qualitative relevance of its own experiences viz. it is phenomenally conscious...

This assumes what you are trying to account for in the first place.

There is nothing "necessary" about increasingly complex nervous systems becoming complex - that's Nagel's argument, the last third of his paper (98) - the point isnt whether Zombies exist, the point is they show what is and isnt conceivable for us -

If you say "well, they do" organisms do become conscious as the brain gets more complex, doesnt make it necessary ... and thats what needs to be explained - in the case of life here on earth where we can point confidently to conscious beings, there may be something else involved that makes thay happen - for example it might be something about the biology itself, I think Searle says something like that.

 

[smcder]

Until we get this part straightened out, I think I'll leave the rest of the paper for another day:

"The problems posed by mentalphysical causation are particularly acute, as reductionist, materialistic science generally takes it for granted that the operation of physical systems can be entirely explained in physical terms. Yet there is a large body of evidence that states of mind can affect not only subsequent states of the mind but also states of the body."​

Two main issues there: The first is that it implies that the mind isn't a physical component of the individual, and therefore there is this problem explaining it in physical terms. So let's do away with that setup and simply accept that the mind is a physical ( but not necessarily material ) component of the individual, and secondly, let's also reject the notion that science claims to be able to explain everything in physical terms ( it doesn't ).

by definition "reductionist, materialistic science" does claims to explain everything in physical terms - that is what reductionist, materialistic means - everything is reduced to the material

the key problem in mental causation is causal closure over physics, that any physical effect has a physical cause - if you dont acknowledge the mental, then you dont have this issue

 

[smcder]

Until we get this part straightened out, I think I'll leave the rest of the paper for another day:

"The problems posed by mentalphysical causation are particularly acute, as reductionist, materialistic science generally takes it for granted that the operation of physical systems can be entirely explained in physical terms. Yet there is a large body of evidence that states of mind can affect not only subsequent states of the mind but also states of the body."​

Two main issues there: The first is that it implies that the mind isn't a physical component of the individual, and therefore there is this problem explaining it in physical terms. So let's do away with that setup and simply accept that the mind is a physical ( but not necessarily material ) component of the individual, and secondly, let's also reject the notion that science claims to be able to explain everything in physical terms ( it doesn't ).

The first is that it implies that the mind isn't a physical component of the individual, and therefore there is this problem explaining it in physical terms.

It is important to note however that such explanatory accounts routinely translate mind–body interactions into brain–body interactions.

*Unless one is prepared to accept that mind and consciousness are nothing more than brain processes1 this finesses the classical mind/body problems that are already posed by normal voluntary, ‘mental’ control.

So that answers your first question - it isn't implied, he acknowledges that the way out is to accept that the mind and consciousness are nothing more than ...

So, for you, the converstation on this is done! ;-)

Second question I answered above, you can't just reject the notion that science claims to be able to explain everything in physical terms, because Velmans is referring specifically to

materialistic, reductionist science

and that kind of science does claim to explain (or will come to be able to explain) everything in physical terms.

Now that that's straightened out, we can go on with the rest of the paper? ;-)

 

[smcder]

@Constance

I've posted this before, except I think this has more Q&A in it, or maybe I didnt listen to all of the Q&A before ...

At 59 minutes or so in, a person brings in the evidence from Psi, double-blind experiments, decades of data - on the physiological effects of being stared at from a distance, Velmans takes it in stride - unfortunately my player died and I'm recharging it now to listen to his response.

 

[smcder]

I long ago knew that 99% of the discussion in this thread was way above my learning/understanding of the topics explored - we have some very well read and informed participants and I am constantly impressed with the level of discourse. Consciousness and the Paranormal must be the longest running thread series ever?
I like to pop in now and then and see where it has got to in terms of what is being discussed and it's amazing the twists and turns and what get's brought into the discussion. Long may it continue and I doff my hat to the regulars!

Thanks Goggs for your work. I take the forum for granted. Thanks to @Gene Steinberg and @Christopher O'Brien

I just made a paypal donation and will try to do so more regularly.

Long live the Paracast.

-Steve

 

[smcder]

Thanks Goggs for your work. I take the forum for granted. Thanks to @Gene Steinberg and @Christopher O'Brien

I just made a paypal donation and will try to do so more regularly.

Long live the Paracast.

-Steve

er rather I will makea donation as soon as I can straighten my account out ...

 

[Randall]

Now that that's straightened out, we can go on with the rest of the paper? ;-)

You guys can discuss it all you want, but I'm moving on in this direction:

• Thalamocortical system and human consciousness
• Consciousness and the Thalamocortical Loop

IMO, if we really want answers rather than endless looping discussions, then we need to look for information that can be used to home in on what's going on with respect to the mounting evidence that associates the brain-body system ( BBS ) with the emergence of consciousness. In a previous post I included a video in which the various parts of the brain that have a direct correlation to consciousness have been mapped. Above we have this all tied to the Thalmocortical system. And now we have evidence of how fields have a causal effect on neuronal activity. With all this put together, a 3D map of the field space in which consciousness resides should be possible, and by gathering measurable scientific data on the functioning of this system, a set of working principles should also be possible.

That still won't solve the problem of exactly how the property of consciousness is imparted onto the field, but once we have a picture that is analogous to what we get with a magnetic field, just like we can detect the presence of a magnetic field using iron filings, we should in principle be able to detect a consciousness field. At the present time the fMRI pictures are very much like the picture we get with iron filings on a solid surface inside a magnetic field. In other words we only see it where the material it's acting on is located rather than the whole structure.

The Thalamocortical System is virtually at the center in this picture, with pathways to all sensory regions. And it regulates consciousness in our sleep/wake cycles. So when it kicks in, up come the electrical fields, and those in turn orient themselves in a manner that gives rise to consciousness, or maybe a whole new field emerges that is separate, but either way, it provides feedback into the system where it is picked up by the corresponding neurons and reprocessed along with other sensory and mental input to determine the next course of action.