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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

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I definitely have misunderstandings and probably have committed some phenomenological heresies here and there--usually when I forget to add quotes to old style genera like "consciousness," "subject," "object," "causality," etc

(I've actually gasped a few times reading my past comments--but I can usually salvage the central idea from the butchery :) )

Hopefully there are some good ideas to work with -- I've always wondered what precisely was the conflict between a deterministic universe (a concept we create in our PSMs) and our experience of "freewill." It seemed to me that without a deterministic universe with rules, choices and relations would cease to have meaning. Even the definition sets itself erroneously against its own elements

  1. the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

Of course the real issue I wonder even now as I write this--seeing the problem is one of externalizing, de-worlding and disassociating the elements in the Dasein-world totality? The only way Dasein can realize itself in a world of things and equipment is to have a universe that follows principles and rules, and since Dasein is a emergence from the same basis as its relations to equipment and its environment and the very act of deciding has as its basis the pre-existing relation in the world to itself before a virtual machine encapsulated these relations itself into a model of the world into itself. Dasein and the world are coeval in the respect that the condition for the possibility of reflection lies on a deterministic framework that had no world (ontological).

Now to catch up on reading and other tasks :)

I wonder if you would explain more clearly what you're saying in the highlighted passage, especially the parts I've lowlighted in olive green type? I'm also confused by what you mean in the last sentence. Thanks.
 
Thanks for reposting to berkley.edu - its a good source ... several lecture series by Dreyfus there.
What do you make of the material?

I posted it because I happened to run across it while trying to find out how MP, Husserl, and Heidegger, define the word "soul", and remembered you were collecting links to papers. So I haven't dissected it, but I think the last couple of sentences sum it up nicely:

"For Merleau-Ponty, then, strictly speaking, we do not have bodies, rather “we are our body,” which is to say, 'we are in the world through our body, and insofar as we perceive the world with our body.” In effect, “the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception'"
BTW I still haven't found anything definitive on how either of the three philosophers mentioned define the soul. If you should happen to run across something, please tag me.
 
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Btw, I love this new line in your signature:

"Quantum mechanics ... ? So simple a primate could do it." - Kestrel Q. Fossillbottom The Al Dente Chronicles

I hope you'll write that whole book since, having looked it up at amazon, I see it's not there yet. And I really want to read it. ;)

... from The Case of Binsford's Law - #112 in The Al Dente Chronicles

“You know what your problem is?” the Veg asked me.

“I gotta lotta problems.” I reply “… what’s this one’s name? Sheila, Betty … ”

Your problem” the Veg said, waving tendrils at me “is you’re a substratist. Ever since you learned they were made of meat, it’s all with the monkey jokes, never mind your own sketchy credentials are rendered in silicone, for Fern’s* sake.”

“Get your frond’s outta my face or I’m gonna have salad for dinner!” I roar. The Veg retracts a bit then drops all but the lead tendrils and kind of lick’s its whatchamacallit.

“It’s called a Szmonhfu!**” the Veg snapped “And one of these nights I’m gonna root into that silicone and find out how you violate Binford’s law, that ain’t natural.”

“Go air out your succulents.” I wave the Veg off and lean into the incoming transmission. The Veg goes tendrils up … we gotta case!

...
*sometimes the anthropomorphizer comes out with some real doozies
**this isn't exactly what the anthropomorphizer comes out with, but it's an inside joke for the Veg and me, referring to an obscure late 20th century writer
 
I posted it because I happened to run across it while trying to find out how MP, Husserl, and Heidegger, define the word "soul", and remembered you were collecting links to papers. So I haven't dissected it, but I think the last couple of sentences sum it up nicely:

"For Merleau-Ponty, then, strictly speaking, we do not have bodies, rather “we are our body,” which is to say, 'we are in the world through our body, and insofar as we perceive the world with our body.” In effect, “the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception'"
BTW I still haven't found anything definitive on how either of the three philosophers mentioned define the soul. If you should happen to run across something, please tag me.

The link, at least up to:

Socrates.berkeley.edu

... may actually reach Hall of Fame status, with 14 instances that I can find on the C&P.

@ufology writes:

BTW I still haven't found anything definitive on how either of the three philosophers mentioned define the soul. If you should happen to run across something, please tag me.

That may depend on how you define definitive.

@Constance's quote above (post #157) has 4 of the 5 mentions of the word "soul" in the SEoP article on MM-P (the fifth is in the bibliography of course) - so that's a pretty good starting point for him.
 
... from The Case of Binsford's Law - #112 in The Al Dente Chronicles

“You know what your problem is?” the Veg asked me.

“I gotta lotta problems.” I reply “… what’s this one’s name? Sheila, Betty … ”

Your problem” the Veg said, waving tendrils at me “is you’re a substratist. Ever since you learned they were made of meat, it’s all with the monkey jokes, never mind your own sketchy credentials are rendered in silicone, for Fern’s* sake.”

“Get your frond’s outta my face or I’m gonna have salad for dinner!” I roar. The Veg retracts a bit then drops all but the lead tendrils and kind of lick’s its whatchamacallit.

“It’s called a Szmonhfu!**” the Veg snapped “And one of these nights I’m gonna root into that silicone and find out how you violate Binford’s law, that ain’t natural.”

“Go air out your succulents.” I wave the Veg off and lean into the incoming transmission. The Veg goes tendrils up … we gotta case!

...
*sometimes the anthropomorphizer comes out with some real doozies
**this isn't exactly what the anthropomorphizer comes out with, but it's an inside joke for the Veg and me, referring to an obscure late 20th century writer

I cannot wait to read the whole of this when you complete it, and any parts of it you post here in the meantime. :)
 
The following extracts are from the Taylor Carmen paper linked by ufology.

"...taking the problem of embodiment seriously, as Merleau-Ponty does, entails a radical reassessment of the very conceptual distinctions on which Husserl’s enterprise rests. More generally, the problem of embodiment raises questions concerning the very notion of the mental as a distinct phenomenal region mediating our intentional orientation in the world. Merleau-Ponty never doubts or denies the existence of mental phenomena, of course, but he insists, for example, that thought and sensation as such occur only against a background of perceptual activity that we always already understand in bodily terms, by engaging in it. Moreover, the body undercuts the supposed dichotomy between the transparency of consciousness and the opacity of objective reality: “the distinction between subject and object is blurred in my body (and no doubt the distinction between noesis and noema as well?).”3 Mentalistic theories of intentionality like Husserl’s therefore inevitably take for granted the very worldly structures of perceptual experience that they pretend to bracket or set aside as irrelevant to the project of transcendental reflection and pure description.

. . . Merleau-Ponty appreciates the essentially incorporated structure of perception in a way that Husserl does not. For Merleau-Ponty, that is, the body plays a constitutive role in experience precisely by grounding, making possible, and yet remaining peripheral in the horizons of our perceptual awareness: “my body is constantly perceived,” Merleau-Ponty writes, yet “it remains marginal to all my perceptions” (PP, 90). Again, the body is neither an internal subject nor a fully external object of experience. Moreover, as embodied perceivers, we do not typically understand ourselves as pure egos standing in a merely external relation to our bodies, for example by “having” or “owning” them, instead the body is itself already the concrete agent of all our perceptual acts (PP, 90–94). In perception, that is, we understand ourselves not as having but as being bodies."


. . . except in OBEs and NDEs. In the former, one's vision and consciousness are relocated outside, usually above, the body. This was undoubtedly the case in the spontaneous OBE I've described having when I was 21. But notably, it was not my 'egoic self' that seemed to take the outside perspective on my body, which remained facing toward the wall across the room. Undoubtedly all my prior experience in the world had been securely located from within my physically embodied immersion in the world. around me. During the OBE I was surprised but not concerned about my 'embodied and egoic existence' (rather, aloof from it), like the other consciousness I encountered later during the OBE when I overheard the thoughts it/she {I sensed it was a 'she'} was thinking.

An OBE state is very frequently reported as the first state experienced during an NDE. The descriptions of those OBEs parallel the nature of my OBE years ago. The individual is surprised to find herself/himself hovering above his or her body from near the ceiling (often in a far corner as also in my OBE), overhears conversations going on in the room or nearby, observes the attempts of medics to revive the body, and wishes, even attempts, to intervene and stop those efforts. Within a short time the out-of-body individual moves out of the scene, toward a light, through a tunnel/tube, encounters others, etc.

MP never wrote about OBEs or NDEs, the latter only becoming widely recognized after his own death. I write about these experiences only to point out that phenomenology as developed by MP missed the opportunity they presented for further exploration of the nature of consciousness when unembodied. But there is no more significant thinker to read concerning the nature of embodied consciousness. From reading him on this subject one gains a very comforting sense of the palpable roots of one's existence in the physical world, one's being almost seamlessly integrated with this world in innumerable ways. In his later philosophy MP conceives of this integration in terms of the 'flesh' of the world, of which we are a continuous part. The sense of a separation between the mental and physical worlds we occupy (the whole subject-object distinction) are almost overcome in his concept of the Chiasm in being produced by consciousness in the natural world..
 
The link, at least up to:@Constance's quote above (post #157) has 4 of the 5 mentions of the word "soul" in the SEoP article on MM-P (the fifth is in the bibliography of course) - so that's a pretty good starting point for him.
It's easy to bandy the word "soul" around in order to sound metaphysical, but with respect to the aforementioned philosophers, I would imagine that they are referring to something much more specific. Yet without a citation to exactly what that is, there's no way to be sure of, and hence make sense of, what they are talking about when they use the word "soul", and I've already spent more time than I wanted digging around trying to find specific quotes. In the meantime I find that the idea that "we are our bodies" as found in the PDF on embodiment, and the idea that we are our "souls" as I've heard expressed in casual discussion many times, are difficult to reconcile.

Add to that confusion, the seeming disparity between these two positions:

1. "“my body is constantly perceived,” Merleau-Ponty writes, yet “it remains marginal to all my perceptions”
2: "... “the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception."​

I fail to see how one's "natural self", a critical component of who we are ( "we are our bodies" ) can at the same time be viewed as merely "marginal"; not to mention that the body isn't merely the "subject of perception"; it's' the very thing that generates the signals we interpret as perception of the external world. It's these kinds of issues that have led me to the conclusion on several occasions, that the level of consistency in metaphysical beliefs seems directly proportionate to the need to make reality fit the belief rather than the other way around, and it's all cleverly wrapped up in complex specialized jargon that, as mentioned before, seems largely coherent, but nearly every time I bother to take the time to unravel it all, it's done nothing but lead me around in a great big circle back to where I am now.

Perhaps unlike the others who embroil themselves in philosophical discussion, my aim isn't to become versed on all the minutiae. "Husserl said this and Descartes said that, but Nietzsche says this and on and on and on. I don't care. Essentially I have two aims that motivate me to explore the issues. One is to see if it holds any clues to the nature of existence in this universe, and the other is as a casual interest in the concept of AI and whether or not that can be made to include consciousness similar in principle to the way we experience it. I just want to get to the core of how whatever is under discussion applies to those issues and advance from there. I made a tiny little bit of progress way back at the start where, contrary to my position at the time, I decided that consciousness may not be simply a matter of combining sufficient raw processing power and programming with external sensory detection.
 
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It's easy to bandy the word "soul" around in order to sound metaphysical, but with respect to the aforementioned philosophers, I would imagine that they are referring to something much more specific. Yet without a citation to exactly what that is, there's no way to be sure of, and hence make sense of, what they are talking about when they use the word "soul", and I've already spent more time than I wanted digging around trying to find specific quotes. In the meantime I find that the idea that "we are our bodies" as found in the PDF on embodiment, and the idea that we are our "souls" as I've heard expressed in casual discussion many times, are difficult to reconcile.

Add to that confusion, the seeming disparity between these two positions:

1. "“my body is constantly perceived,” Merleau-Ponty writes, yet “it remains marginal to all my perceptions”
2: "... “the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception."

I fail to see how one's "natural self", a critical component of who we are ( "we are our bodies" ) can at the same time be viewed as merely "marginal"; not to mention that the body isn't merely the "subject of perception"; it's' the very thing that generates the signals we interpret as perception of the external world. It's these kinds of issues that have led me to the conclusion on several occasions, that the level of consistency in many metaphysical models seems directly proportionate to their need to make reality fit their model rather than the other way around, and it's all cleverly wrapped up in complex specialized jargon that, as mentioned before, seems largely coherent, but nearly every time I bother to take the time to unravel it all, it's done nothing but lead me around in a great big circle back to where I am now.

Perhaps unlike the others who embroil themselves in philosophical discussion, my aim isn't to become versed on all the minutiae. "Husserl said this and Descartes said that, but Nietzsche says this and on and on and on. I don't care. Essentially I have two aims that motivate me to explore the issues. One is to see if it holds any clues to the nature of existence in this universe, and the other is as a casual interest in the concept of AI and whether or not that can be made to include consciousness similar in principle to the way we experience it. I just want to get to the core of how whatever is under discussion applies to those issues and advance from there. I made a tiny little bit of progress made way back at the start where, contrary to my position at the time, I decided that consciousness may not be simply a matter of combining sufficient raw processing power and programming with external sensory detection.

Let us know if you do make any more progress on these two goals.
 
I can thank you and @Constance, and @Michael Allen for what progress I have made so far. There's been a lot of interesting discussion here and you've all contributed some really deep and interesting content. So I'll continue to observe and comment when I see content that shows promise, or I alternately, if I think it's leading others to believe in nonsense, but I wouldn't hold my breath that anything new is going to emerge any time soon. If it does, you'll be among the first to know :) .
 
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It's easy to bandy the word "soul" around in order to sound metaphysical, but with respect to the aforementioned philosophers, I would imagine that they are referring to something much more specific. Yet without a citation to exactly what that is, there's no way to be sure of, and hence make sense of, what they are talking about when they use the word "soul", and I've already spent more time than I wanted digging around trying to find specific quotes. In the meantime I find that the idea that "we are our bodies" as found in the PDF on embodiment, and the idea that we are our "souls" as I've heard expressed in casual discussion many times, are difficult to reconcile.

Add to that confusion, the seeming disparity between these two positions:

1. "“my body is constantly perceived,” Merleau-Ponty writes, yet “it remains marginal to all my perceptions”
2: "... “the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception."​

I fail to see how one's "natural self", a critical component of who we are ( "we are our bodies" ) can at the same time be viewed as merely "marginal"; not to mention that the body isn't merely the "subject of perception"; it's' the very thing that generates the signals we interpret as perception of the external world. It's these kinds of issues that have led me to the conclusion on several occasions, that the level of consistency in metaphysical beliefs seems directly proportionate to the need to make reality fit the belief rather than the other way around, and it's all cleverly wrapped up in complex specialized jargon that, as mentioned before, seems largely coherent, but nearly every time I bother to take the time to unravel it all, it's done nothing but lead me around in a great big circle back to where I am now.

Perhaps unlike the others who embroil themselves in philosophical discussion, my aim isn't to become versed on all the minutiae. "Husserl said this and Descartes said that, but Nietzsche says this and on and on and on. I don't care. Essentially I have two aims that motivate me to explore the issues. One is to see if it holds any clues to the nature of existence in this universe, and the other is as a casual interest in the concept of AI and whether or not that can be made to include consciousness similar in principle to the way we experience it. I just want to get to the core of how whatever is under discussion applies to those issues and advance from there. I made a tiny little bit of progress way back at the start where, contrary to my position at the time, I decided that consciousness may not be simply a matter of combining sufficient raw processing power and programming with external sensory detection.
My thinking is that the word 'soul' is an outdated term for the entire nexus of relations and conditions of Dasein.

Sent from my SM-G900V using Tapatalk
 
Reading further in the Carman Taylor paper:

"Nor does Husserl’s notion of the “psychophysical unity” of persons prevent him from referring elsewhere to “the connection (Verknüpfung) of consciousness and body,” in which consciousness “in this psychophysical relation to the corporeal, forfeits nothing of its own essence and can take up into itself nothing foreign to its essence, indeed that would be an absurdity” (Id I, 103). In short, describing persons as “unities” of mind and body is precisely the opposite of acknowledging what Strawson calls “the primitiveness of the concept of a person,”15 according to which “The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness.”16 Husserl’s distinction between the lived body and material bodies is not enough, then, to overcome the conceptual dualism underwriting his project."

This is interesting. First, the underscored quote from Husserl suggests an extremely subtle relationship of consciousness to the body -- as if an embodied consciousness is somehow insulated from materiality despite dwelling in and engaging the physical world through a material body. I don't see how else to read that sentence, but am open to, and hope to hear, other possible readings. The claim does not ring true for me.

The Strawson quote is close to the thought of another early phenomenologist, Max Scheler. This SEP article on Scheler is a good introduction to his thought:

Max Scheler (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Extracts

". . . With Kant, Scheler rejects both utilitarianism and eudiamonism, and holds that ethics rests upon an a priori, an obligation non-relative to future consequences or happiness. For Kant, the a priori is expressed in the form of a categorical imperative, an imperative that is universalizable. For Scheler, such a formulation of the a priori is abstract and as a consequence, fails to account for both the unique obligation one has to another person and the unique call to responsibility given in the ethical imperative (GW II, 34). The ethical imperative, Scheler insists, is given as what one ought to necessarily do, but it is also experienced as what ‘I,’ and not merely anyone, ought to do (GW II, 94).

Scheler argues that a material or a non-formal a priori arises in experience, specifically in the experience of value. All experience is already value latent (GW II, 35). An object of perception such as an oak tree is not only green or large, but also pleasurable, beautiful and magnificent. Objects of experience are bearers of values. Historical artifacts bear cultural values, religious icons bear the value of the “holy.” To suggest that an object bears a value is not to imply that a value inheres in an object. Just as the color red does not inhere in the tricycle, but is only given in the act of perception, the beauty of the painting is only given in the act of valuing. The value an object bears is given intuitively through a type of value-ception. We “see” the beauty of a painting just as we “see” its colors. The grasping of value is our most original and primordial relation to the world. An object has value for us before it is perceived or known (GW II, 40). For Scheler, it is the world that entices us to perceive it and to know it. Things of positive value come to the foreground of our attention, while things of negative value recede into the background. The world is always already given in relief, a world to which we are emotionally attached."



"Scheler's commitment to the distinctive nature of the human being and to the two irreducible movements of the Weltgrund, spirit and life-urge, leaves his final thought in a kind of dualism
. He is readily aware of this and argues that his is a new type of dualism. It does not suffer from the problems introduced by the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. Yet, due in part to the unfinished nature of both his philosophical anthropology and metaphysics, we are left with more questions than answers about the relation between life and spirit. For instance, how do spirit and life interact when life is value blind and spirit is powerless? How is the human being a unity when it participates in two essentially different movements? What is clear is that these two movements constituting the unique place of the human being interpenetrate one another through a discourse of loving, the eros of life and the agape of spirit. Through his or her existence, the human being is the unification of both forms of loving and is afforded the unique insights that arise through eros and agape. Scheler's attempt at a metaphysics is a more speculative approach to an examination of human existence, but this speculative move is motivated by a fuller understanding of the original and loving openness the human being bears to the world."

The short essay at this next link helps to clarify a common core in the thinking of Scheler, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty concerning the meaning of 'essences' of human experience as understood in phenomenology:

Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, and “Essences”
 
Still farther along in the Taylor Carman paper, in his clarification of the differences between Husserl's thinking in his early and middle periods [and Sartre's thinking in general] and their critique by MP, we come to this paragraph which I think might be useful to Michael (whose primary reading in existential phenomenology seems to have been in Sartre):

'For his part, undercutting the distinction between real and ideal, Merleau-Ponty insists that “the material and form of knowledge are artifacts of analysis. I posit a material of knowledge when, breaking away from the original faith of perception, I adopt a critical attitude toward it and ask myself, ‘What am I really seeing?’” Indeed, in ordinary experience, “Neither object nor subject is posited” (PP, 241). My awareness does not present itself to me as an immanent sphere over against transcendent objects, rather “the perception of our own body and the perception of external things provide an example of nonpositing consciousness” (PP, 49). The logic of everyday perceptual experience, far from constituting “ideal essences” in the domain of transcendental subjectivity, is “a logic lived through that cannot account for itself,” its meaning “an immanent meaning that is not clear to itself and that becomes fully aware of itself only through the experience of certain natural signs” (ibid.).'

Merleau-Ponty is speaking here about what he referred to as the "perceptual faith" disclosed in experience examined and understood phenomenologically -- the knowledge dawning even at the level of prereflective consciousness that we live in a real world within whose actual depth and dimensionality we move and act toward and in relation to things and others. This perceptual faith occurs out of the actual grounding of consciousness, the chiasm which cannot be understood from analytical and objectifying viewpoints developed later in abstract thought. It is the point of direct contact between consciousness and the palpable world in which consciousness arises, the ground to which -- no matter how far we distance ourselves from consciously lived experience in abstract objectifying ideas about what-is -- we always return at the end of the day, from the lab, the library, the corporation, the bureaucratically managed world, the technologized and dehumanized world, etc. {. . . but increasingly in our time return, in Heidegger's words, "forgetful of being").
 
My thinking is that the word 'soul' is an outdated term for the entire nexus of relations and conditions of Dasein.

Sent from my SM-G900V using Tapatalk
That sounds good with respect to one context, but I'd like to see it expanded a little to include some specific "relations and conditions". In my exploration of the subject matter there are several different contexts and more than one interpretation within each, so it can get pretty mucky. The two main contexts are of course the ideas that the soul are:

1. A non-corporeal person, complete with consciousness and faculties of perception and intellect, that can go drifting off during astral journeys, OOBEs, NDEs, and after physical death, and allegedly even inhabit other bodies. It is according to some religious beliefs subject to the rules that govern the realms of the afterlife, and can find itself in a variety of pleasant or unpleasant situations depending on what particular realm it winds up in ( See example here ).

2. One's various psychological traits including character, intelligence, emotions and so on.

Number 1. above, while entertaining, is in IMO sheer myth and nonsense. That's not to say I don't believe people have genuine experiences that lead them to believe the myth and nonsense. Number 2. above basically turns the notion of the soul into a convenience term for our our psychological status. So rather than saying, "Sally is a happy soul", we can simply say, "Sally is happy." Or instead of saying, "Jim is a creative soul." We can simply say, "Jim is creative." We can drop the word "soul" altogether and use unambiguous phrases that don't imply mysticism or religion.
 
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I can thank you and @Constance, and @Michael Allen for what progress I have made so far. There's been a lot of interesting discussion here and you've all contributed some really deep and interesting content. So I'll continue to observe and comment when I see content that shows promise, or I alternately, if I think it's leading others to believe in nonsense, but I wouldn't hold my breath that anything new is going to emerge any time soon. If it does, you'll be among the first to know :) .

Progress, as used above, is defined in terms of your two goals:

Essentially I have two aims that motivate me to explore the issues.

1. to see if it holds any clues to the nature of existence in this universe (here "it" seems to refer broadly to the issues discussed in this thread, correct?)
2. a casual interest in the concept of AI and whether or not that can be made to include consciousness similar in principle to the way we experience it

This is then re-iterated as:

I just want to get to the core of how whatever is under discussion applies to those issues and advance from there. I made a tiny little bit of progress way back at the start where, contrary to my position at the time, I decided that consciousness may not be simply a matter of combining sufficient raw processing power and programming with external sensory detection.

If that is correct so far, the last sentence pertains to progress on the second goal of determing whether or not AI can be made to include consciousness similar in principle to the way we experience it (what is it like to be a robot?). If that is correct, it seems reasonable to search for this answer in the field of neurophenomenology. The Gallagher book I cited above includes a chapter "A Short Robotic Interlude" chapter 8, as well as references to AI throughout the text that may be of some help - unfortunately, that PDF does not include a bibilography, but you can get author names and publication dates from that - and at least key names and concepts to research.

As to the first goal, is it possible to clarify "any clues to the nature of existence in this universe"?
  • given that there there is sufficient evidence to cause in you a belief that "conscious experience derives from a material basis"
All proof is, is sufficient evidence to justify belief in a claim, and there's plenty enough evidence to provide sufficient cause for some people ( myself included ) to believe that "conscious experience derives from a material basis".

A belief follows that the nature of existence in this universe is material. If that is correct, it seems reasonable to search for clues to the nature of existence in this universe in terms of physics.

Regarding these statements:

All proof is, is sufficient evidence to justify belief in a claim, and there's plenty enough evidence to provide sufficient cause for some people ( myself included ) to believe that "conscious experience derives from a material basis".

Therefore, for some people, the view has been proven, while for others, it has not.

summarizing:

1. proof is sufficient evidence to justify belief in a claim
2. there is sufficient evidence to provide sufficient cause for some people to believe conscious experience derives from a material basis

therefore

a. for some people the view has been proven
b. for others, it has not

What is the difference between the people in a and b?

If both groups have equal intelligence and education and have all the available evidence and they understand it - then the question is, why are they not all caused to believe the same thing?
 
If that is correct so far, the last sentence pertains to progress on the second goal of determing whether or not AI can be made to include consciousness similar in principle to the way we experience it (what is it like to be a robot?). If that is correct, it seems reasonable to search for this answer in the field of neurophenomenology. The Gallagher book I cited above includes a chapter "A Short Robotic Interlude" chapter 8, as well as references to AI throughout the text that may be of some help - unfortunately, that PDF does not include a bibilography, but you can get author names and publication dates from that - and at least key names and concepts to research.
Yes. I've across some content on neurophenomenology during my exploration and if we imagine a Venn diagram illustrating the intersection between neuroscience and phenomenology, it seems, from my limited exposure to it, to be a very sound and academic approach to take in addition to neuroscience on the whole.
summarizing:

1. proof is sufficient evidence to justify belief in a claim
2. there is sufficient evidence to provide sufficient cause for some people to believe conscious experience derives from a material basis

therefore

a. for some people the view has been proven
b. for others, it has not

What is the difference between the people in a and b?

If both groups have equal intelligence and education and have all the available evidence and they understand it - then the question is, why are they not all caused to believe the same thing?
Excellent question, and I would suggest that if the parameters you mention were the only contributing factors, then all those in that group probably would believe the same thing. The differences IMO arise primarily from religious indoctrination and personal experience. There are other factors as well, but religious indoctrination is responsible for the largest portion of belief in myth and nonsense among the general population because many millions of people have some affiliation with one religion or another.

Those doing the indoctrination probably equate what they're doing with education, but I don't see that as a fair comparison. Indoctrination isn't merely like taking a religious studies course at a secular school. Many well educated people have been indoctrinated at an early age prior to their academic years, effectively immunizing their belief in religious myth and nonsense by compartmentalizing it as separate from the processes of critical thinking that would otherwise expose all its flaws and weaknesses. I'm sure I don't need to explain all that to you any further.

The other primary factor is personal experience. Many reasonably well educated people, I don't know the exact number, but I would safely say it would be in the millions, have had some personal experience like an NDE, OOBE, ghost encounter, or something we would consider paranormal, and the powerful personal impact that those experiences lead them to believe in the explanations traditionally supplied by myth and religion, mostly because they are already either indoctrinated or have some knowledge about it, and secular schooling hasn't offered much of an alternative explanation until recent times. Add to that, that people don't always take the time to really examine their experiences from a critically minded and detached viewpoint. Sometimes they want their interpretation to be true because it makes them feel better. This is what has allowed holy rollers, spirit channelers and other con-artists ( IMO ) to exploit good people who have yet to find closure on the loss of loved ones or other other tragedies.
 
Yes. I've across some content on neurophenomenology during my exploration and if we imagine a Venn diagram illustrating the intersection between neuroscience and phenomenology, it seems, from my limited exposure to it, to be a very sound and academic approach to take in addition to neuroscience on the whole.

Excellent question, and I would suggest that if the parameters you mention were the only contributing factors, then all those in that group probably would believe the same thing. The differences IMO arise primarily from religious indoctrination and personal experience. There are other factors as well, but religious indoctrination is responsible for the largest portion of belief in myth and nonsense among the general population because many millions of people have some affiliation with one religion or another.

Those doing the indoctrination probably equate what they're doing with education, but I don't see that as a fair comparison. Indoctrination isn't merely like taking a religious studies course at a secular school. Many well educated people have been indoctrinated at an early age prior to their academic years, effectively immunizing their belief in religious myth and nonsense by compartmentalizing it as separate from the processes of critical thinking that would otherwise expose all its flaws and weaknesses. I'm sure I don't need to explain all that to you any further.

The other primary factor is personal experience. Many reasonably well educated people, I don't know the exact number, but I would safely say it would be in the millions, have had some personal experience like an NDE, OOBE, ghost encounter, or something we would consider paranormal, and the powerful personal impact that those experiences lead them to believe in the explanations traditionally supplied by myth and religion, mostly because they are already either indoctrinated or have some knowledge about it, and secular schooling hasn't offered much of an alternative explanation until recent times. Add to that, that people don't always take the time to really examine their experiences from a critically minded and detached viewpoint. Sometimes they want their interpretation to be true because it makes them feel better. This is what has allowed holy rollers, spirit channelers and other con-artists ( IMO ) to exploit good people who have yet to find closure on the loss of loved ones or other other tragedies.

Given this:

"Excellent question, and I would suggest that if the parameters you mention were the only contributing factors, then all those in that group probably would believe the same thing."

We can then state your position as:

Persons of sufficient intelligence and education, who have all the available evidence and understand it and who do not have religious indoctrination or personal experience to the contrary will be caused to believe that "consciousness arises from material processesses".

This belief is caused as a result of processes of belief formation that are deterministic* and subconscious.

Consciousness is epiphenomenal; causally impotent.

Is that correct so far?
 
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Will do ... I believe there is a summary paper by the authors and this may also be helpful in the mean time:

http://anti-matters.org/articles/12/public/12-12-1-PB.pdf

This is indeed an excellent presentation of the essential contributions of each chapter of Irreducible Mind. Here are extracts from the reviewer's summary of chapter 5 as an example:

"The topics of the fifth chapter (by Adam Crabtree) are psychological automatisms and secondary centers of consciousness. Myers categorized psychological automatisms under two heads: passive and active, or sensory and motor. Motor automatisms included automatic writing,5 automatic speaking, automatic drawing, and use of the Chevreul pendulum. Sensory automatisms included apparitions, hallucinations, dreams, anesthesias, automatically manifested creative productions (such as literary or musical compositions), most hypnotic phenomena, as well as “idiot savant” performances. What all psychological automatisms had in common was that they arose from some unknown inner conscious intelligence. Hence their close association with the subject of multiple personalities."

"After discussing Myers’s views on automatisms and related views of some major contemporaries (Pierre Janet, William James, Morton Prince, T. W. Mitchell, William McDougall, Sigmund Freud, and Carl Jung), Crabtree turns to more recent work on automatisms and multiple personalities by Ernest Hilgard and by Stephen Braude. Particularly noteworthy is Braude’s analysis of the reasons for accepting the notion of a unifying self beyond multiplicity, which for Crabtree provides one of the most persuasive arguments to date for the reality of Myers’s Subliminal Self.6

[6 Myers (1887, p. 260) considered it erroneous to think that the analysis of personality into many components means that there is no ultimate unity behind it. He insisted on the clear distinction between “Individuality” or “Self ” — “the underlying psychical unity” which he postulated “as existing beneath all our phenomenal manifestations” — and “personality’’ or “self,” by which he meant the “more external and transitory” chains of memory, including the ordinary supraliminal self, as well as the potentially infinite number of selves that may be formed from “the elements of our being” (Myers, 1892, p. 305; 1888, p. 387).]


Although Braude’s supporting data are drawn principally from the experiences of individuals with multiple personality disorder (now more generally called dissociative identity disorder), “the same conclusions could be reached from a similar examination of the production of hypnotic personalities and other secondary personalities of automatism” (IM, p. 340).

Crabtree holds that cognitive psychology, having embraced a one-consciousness view of mental functioning, is essentially unable to deal with the data of psychological automatism. “Many cognitive theorists have an almost superstitious fear of the notion of ordinary consciousness itself, and if they are so spooked by this ‘ghost in the machine’. . . they respond to the possibility of secondary centers of consciousness as to a veritable band of demons” (IM, p. 346). Which is why [w]e have hardly begun to look at how multiple conscious centers manifest concretely in ongoing human life, an undertaking that was already well underway at the beginning of the 20th century. We have yet to carry out the serious and thorough examination of the whole spectrum of human experience that Myers and James said was so sorely needed, paying attention to phenomena that today, as at that time, remain unpopular to establishment science. (IM, p. 348)

Between the formation of the SPR in 1882 and his death in 1901, Myers and his colleagues published in their Proceedings and Journal something over 10,000 pages of reports on supernormal phenomena, including not only extended field observations with mediums and heavily documented studies of spontaneous cases, but early attempts to study telepathy and kindred phenomena experimentally and quantitatively. “The industry, thoroughness, and care manifest in these publications is unsurpassed in any scientific literature known to me,” writes Gauld, echoing James (1910, pp. 304-305): “were I asked to point to a scientific journal where hard-headedness and never-sleeping suspicion of sources of error might be seen in their full bloom, I think I should have to fall back on the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.” Further hundreds of articles, monographs, and books written with similarly high standards were published during the same time period in continental Europe and the United States. One of the great contributions of [Myers's] Human Personality is that it distills this enormous mass of material into an orderly, coherent, and accessible scheme of presentation.

The book itself is thickly documented with case reports and summaries of observations, and it repeatedly refers the reader to other reports, additional documentation, and more detailed reports on the same or related subjects. This vast literature, to which Human Personality itself is only an introduction, remains an unrivaled archive of information with which anyone who intends to render judgment on the phenomena must become familiar. Collectively it provides impressive — and in my view, compelling — evidence for the reality of supernormal phenomena. Any serious examination will dismiss this literature at its peril. (IM, p. 353)

In the remainder of the chapter Crabtree discusses the connections between automatisms and supernormal performances and abilities. The physiologists who originally developed the notion of automatism were struggling to explain, among other things, the subjective descriptions of the creative process given by some of the greatest literary and musical masters, who spoke of their productions as sometimes coming to them fully formed, as though they had been fashioned in some hidden workshop by artists unknown. These historical geniuses described feelings of not being part of the process that produced their greatest works, acting more like scribes than anything else. (IM, p. 354) Myers suggested that genius should be regarded as a power of utilizing a wider than normal range of faculties that in some degree are innate in all — “a power of appropriating the results of subliminal mentation to subserve the supraliminal stream of thought” (HP, vol. 1, p. 71). He described the “inspiration of genius” (Meyers’s own quotes) as

"a subliminal uprush, an emergence into the current of ideas which the man is consciously manipulating of other ideas which he has not consciously originated, but which have shaped themselves beyond his will, in profounder regions of his being. I shall urge that there is here no real departure from normality. . . but rather a fulfilment of the true norm of man, with suggestions, it may be, of something supernormal; — of something which transcends existing normality as an advanced stage of evolutionary progress transcends an earlier stage. (HP, vol. 1, p. 71)

The subject of genius is further developed in Chapter 7."

http://anti-matters.org/articles/12/public/12-12-1-PB.pdf
 
Given this:

"Excellent question, and I would suggest that if the parameters you mention were the only contributing factors, then all those in that group probably would believe the same thing."

We can then state your position as:

Persons of sufficient intelligence and education, who have all the available evidence and understand it and who do not have religious indoctrination or personal experience to the contrary will be caused to believe that "consciousness arises from material processesses".

This belief is caused as a result of processes of belief formation that are deterministic* and subconscious.

Consciousness is epiphenomenal; causally impotent.

Is that correct so far?
Not exactly. It's incomplete. There are other factors besides religion and personal experience of paranormal phenomena. There is also the issue of how different people define what is and isn't "material". There are theories based on a combination of religion, mythology, and other "movements" be they cultural like the New Age Movement or philosophy that are sometimes blended with scientific ideas. These ideas are held by individuals distributed throughout the general population, and given all the permutations it isn't possible to delineate each and every one of these theories, suffice it to say that I've discussed this topic informally with many people over the years, and it seems everyone who isn't affixed to a specific mainstream doctrine has some ideas of their own. Most people don't dwell on it as much as we see here in this thread, but for those who do, it can be likened to a personal journey of discovery.

So it doesn't boil down to a single recipe for understanding. More simply, none of us have been exposed to nor fully understand "all the available evidence" and therefore we cannot say with certainty what that would cause such a person to believe. All I can say with confidence is that anyone with a reasonably objective perspective on the issues, who applies critical thinking to the same breadth and depth of experiences and information as I have, should, at least in theory arrive at the same conclusions, and contrary to the opinion of at least one participant here, my explorations are not as shallow as have been assumed.

I'm now 57 years old and I've been exploring these topics for the majority of that time, hanging onto what is applicable, discarding that which isn't, and from all that, built what appears to be the most reasonable model I have yet to encounter so far, and again, to be clear, that's not to say I've been looking for evidence to suit my own theories. I change my views and beliefs to suit the evidence and ideas that makes the most sense from a detached logical perspective. Not the other way around. I may very well find in the future that new evidence will cause me to change it again, but that doesn't look too likely at this point in time.

All this taken together means that generally speaking, it's a significant underestimation for anyone to assume that because I don't hold the same views as they do, or agree with everything they do, that I don't understand the issues. It's usually more likely that they are simply so invested in their present viewpoint that they are resistant to change, and that makes it's easier to dismiss the contributions of others who hold different views. This becomes readily apparent when I ask someone to explain how a particular facet of their position nullifies a contradictory viewpoint based on other evidence or logic, and instead of providing an explanation, they hand wave, become personally critical, or refer me to volumes of peripherally relevant information rather than speaking to the specific issue at hand. I've run into that sort of thing time and time again, especially with skeptics while discussing UFOs. They are culturally invested in believing that alien visitation is woo and have assumed incorrectly on numerous occasions that the only reason I believe it is because I'm either uniformed or unintelligent.

To conclude this post, I have a couple of questions for you that I'll ask in a sort of round-about way. Your role here has been largely to facilitate and provide avenues for further exploration regardless of what path any individual might be on at any given time. This has made it easy for you to establish a very positive rapport with most everyone who has a genuine interest in the subject matter. You also seem at least as smart as I am, and that probably means you're even smarter, but I still don't have a clear idea where you stand on these issues yourself. Can you please put together a paragraph for me that sums up your present view, how close it comes to a belief for you, and if it's not sufficient for you to believe your view is actually be the case, what's still missing for you and which direction do you think the answer lies?
 
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