Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[Constance]

So many comments about Chalmers' HP paper... but I sometimes wonder how many people have actually read it.
And understood what he wanted to achieve by writing it.

Someone (I think it was Steve) pointed out above that Chalmers has written eleven papers on the hard problem. In any case, would you clarify with some supporting extracts from the first one what your understanding is of "what he wanted to achieve by writing it"? Varela, in the paper I linked for you, read him as intending to express the 'irreducibility' of consciousness.

 

[Constance]

Is the conclusion regarding Nagel’s opinion really that he is a negative optimist?

You asked Steve this question, but he's preparing for an out of town trip over the weekend and might not have time to respond. I haven't read as much of Nagel as Steve has, but regarding Nagel's being "a negative optimist" I'd like to say that his speculation about the time required to radically change our conception of reality seems reasonable to me given the rigidity of presently dominant reductive presuppositions about consciousness and mind. I also think his position, if it can be called 'negative', is far more rational than, and preferable to, the 'positive (and positivist) optimism' expressed by physicalists, AI theorists/fantasists, and neuroscientists who assure us that they'll have understood and mechanized consciousness in the near future.

 

[Constance]

Yes. "What it is like" would be relatively easy to explain. Still trying to grasp this concept here..

Example: the stay at home dad

What is it like to be a mother??
Long days, constantly caring for the child, the birthing process, and so on.

A man would be able to understand what is like and perform the role of a mother based on the explanation of the role he needs to adopt. The hard problem in this scenario would be that even though he plays the role he will never experience motherhood.

He might not physically experience the process of pregnancy and giving birth, but once the newborn infant is in his arms and so long as he participates in day to day care of the infant, I think he is open to the same bonding process that the mother is. Often fathers are better, more empathetic, more loving parents than mothers are. The parent-child relationship is eminently transpersonal because of its intimacy and because of the child's need for nurturing. I think that few experiences can change a human being more profoundly than parenting.[/quote]

I'd if it would make a difference or not but what if you add the element of free will into the equation of the hard problem. See that free will is basically the foundation of out consciousness and decision making abilities. Would it have some 0lace in some of the biggest problems with understanding consciousness as a whole??

Yes. I think we recognize {know} the degrees and types of our personal freedom and that this knowledge plays a critical role in how we behave in the world, what we think about ourselves and others, and how we think about the local world we live in, especially in terms of the sociocultural world we live in.

 

[Michael Allen]

My understanding is that the "Hard problem" isn't a real problem...one might imagine many 'problems' invented by an embedded PSM machine that models itself in the world within its material self... The problem we are trying to solve is akin to trying to use the digits of a particular very large (4096) RSA modulus to determine the transform function of another modulus (again an RSA 4096)...the problem is we see the same mechanism or functional outcome in two completely different realms (key and transform space) of meaning...while the mathematical underpinnings of a particular key pair A are precisely the same as B, nevertheless there is no way to derive any inside information on the actual specifics of the information transform by using the data from A to infer B or vice versa (in general this is absolutely true, or else our strongest crypto algorithms would be useless).

RSA (cryptosystem) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Much apologies for the esoteric analogy, but it is the closest I can get to this concept (surprisingly close). Feel free to ask for clarification if you want more depth (as such that would make your eyes bleed if necessary )

Likewise it would be very difficult to recreate the physical and relational situations that would merge your PSM virtual simulation of "mineness" with another independent VM...the point is that once both VMs merged their PSMs into one, they would reinterpret the entire history of the separate VM "minenesses" as a degenerate version of their current merger...

In simple terms (proof coming!) if two minds are able to directly copy the immediate experience totality of the other, they would cease to consider the separate forms as comprehensible...together they would re-write the entire history of their own existence and would--in effect--nullify each independent thread into another PSM (which is what we do with our own DNA replicators and former ancestry...near and distant).

A thing is a think.

Edit: Tip..Question, interrogate and remember the phenomenon of the "problem" we cannot let our own questions pass unexamined...a question pre-loads its metaphysics before we even understand what is the basis. "But already when we ask, 'what is _____?' we stand in an understanding of the 'is' without being able to define conceptually what the 'is' means. We do not even know the horizon upon which we are supposed to grasp and pin down the meaning. This average and vague understanding of being is a fact." -- Heidegger, Being and Time (Stambaugh trans.)

This is extremely subtle, as our own feelings (our only true method of validation) of the merger of two PSMs is the retro-active irrelevancies that are uncovered by the merged PSM...which were (and this is very important) once relevant to each separate PSM...once they have achieved the comprehension of the mystery, they have re-worked the separate histories into a unified interpretation rubric...that rubric, which was individually meaningful to the separate PSMs now becomes an objective account of the formation of the current PSM (merged)...we can sense this because we don't recognize the former mergers of the PSMs of our ancestry (so we are stuck again with the same question).

 

[smcder]

@smcder
epiphenomenalism: I am curious about this.
Image an ant that seeks to move a big leaf from A to B, but the leaf is too heavy.
After some assistance from its colony, 10 ants begin to move the leaf.
The leaf sways from side to side, and gradually motions from A to B in a zig zag path.

Now... if we are to say that the swaying is the equivalent to phenomenal experience, would this be epiphenomenal?
What I am trying to get at is that individual ants are pushing this way and that causing the swaying... at any moment in time, on observing the swaying, one might say the ants don't know where they are going. The swaying looks arbitrary and purposeless and the ants are heaving with all their might in a haphazard fashion. And of course, each sway is purposeless.
But curiously the swaying feeds back to the ants and they adjust their motivations accordingly.
The leaf zig zags rather clumsily. To what purpose? In its isolation, it might look inept or random.
But sure enough the leaf gets from A to B.

I am not sure whether this analogy is missing the point of epiphenomenalism...

That's an example of emergentism.

There might be a few simple rules that govern each individual's reaction to the feedback, then taken together it looks as if the ants intelligently coordinated their actions ... flocks of birds are another example, an early computer program called "boids" used three rules to replicate flocking behavior. (of course there probably is intelligence going on in both ants and birds - but the point is a good simulation can be made by a few simple rules ... cf. two dudes moving a couch)

Epiphenomenalism is a phenomena that runs parallel to a primary one ... epiphenomenal theories of mind say that physiological processes underlie both the behavior of the organism and the phenomenal feel of being that organism but that the phenomenal feel, the what it is like to be that organism doesn't feed back into the system - it's merely an effect of physical processes.

The way I presented it here on the thread was as a counterargument to non-reductive physicalist accounts of mind. See Jaegwon Kim's argument for the assumptions/premises ... causal closure and causal exclusion both of which Kim felt were reasonably acceptable to physicalists.

I think the thing @ufology didn't understand about causal exclusion (and may have since cleared up - I'm not caught up on the thread yet) is it doesn't mean one cause per effect, it means once you have sufficient cause (in total) then additional cause is a case of over-determination ... so a physicalist says all the causes are physical, one of the effects is the mental, the phenomenal feel ... what it is like ... etc but the mental is not itself a cause because we can explain all the behaviors with physical effects.

An example of over-determination on these terms would be if someone put the 8 ball in the cornet pocket and said "did you see that? how the ball curved over like that into the pocket? I used my mind to move it in that direction" - you would say no, the sum of the forces imparted by the cue put the ball in the pocket, in exactly the same way the epiphenomenalist would say it's not your experience of willing your hand to move, that was all physical processes - neuronal, chemical, muscular, etc etc - @ufology's example of not being consciously aware until after a decision is made comes into play in such an argument.

Another way that I understand the hard problem ... and I think this is Nagel's point in WILTBAB ... if I provide a recipe for the universe - all of the objective, physical information needed to create a world and run it through a computer fabricator - a computerized reality generator, then presumably there will be consciousness but the "what it is like to be" is not included in that recipe, isn't contained in the objective description ... that was Nagel's modest critique of physicalism which at the time claimed to completely describe the universe - he said no, because you leave out "what it is like".

Chalmers took it from there and labelled it the "hard problem" and love it or hate it - the rest is history.

 

[Randall]

... I think the thing @ufology didn't understand about causal exclusion (and may have since cleared up - I'm not caught up on the thread yet) is it doesn't mean one cause per effect, it means once you have sufficient cause (in total) then additional cause is a case of over-determination ... so a physicalist says all the causes are physical, one of the effects is the mental, the phenomenal feel ... what it is like ... etc but the mental is not itself a cause because we can explain all the behaviors with physical effects ...

What I'm not clear on is if there is more than one cause for people thinking I don't understand the concepts discussed and referencing me in the third person ... LOL. Let's see here: I didn't say that causal closure means one cause per effect, I said:

"I looked at not only the paper you referenced but as always, did a little cross referencing by searching the phrase "causal closure", and I don't think that it's as flexible as Occham's Razor. The Wikipedia description is as good as any and it says: CCP states that "Physical effects have only physical causes." If by physical they mean both material and non-material, but still in the realm of the physical universe, then it's circular logic and trivial, if not, then it falls apart. Either way, even as a heuristic it has little value."​

If you have something to say about me, please try addressing me directly rather than putting words in my mouth and assuming I don't comprehend something.

 

[smcder]

What I'm not clear on is if there is more than one cause for people thinking I don't understand the concepts discussed and referencing me in the third person ... LOL. Let's see here: I didn't say that causal closure means one cause per effect, I said:

"I looked at not only the paper you referenced but as always, did a little cross referencing by searching the phrase "causal closure", and I don't think that it's as flexible as Occham's Razor. The Wikipedia description is as good as any and it says: CCP states that "Physical effects have only physical causes.".If by physical they mean both material and non-material, but still in the realm of the physical universe, then it's circular logic and trivial, if not, then it falls apart. Either way, even as a heuristic it has little value."​

If you have something to say about me, please try addressing me directly rather than putting words in my mouth and assuming I don't comprehend something.

I put "@ufology" - which notifies you.

I provided an explanation of causal closure in the context of Kim's argument in my post above.

 

[Randall]

My understanding is that the "Hard problem" isn't a real problem...one might imagine many 'problems' invented by an embedded PSM machine that models itself in the world within its material self... The problem we are trying to solve is akin to trying to use the digits of a particular very large (4096) RSA modulus to determine the transform function of another modulus (again an RSA 4096)...the problem is we see the same mechanism or functional outcome in two completely different realms (key and transform space) of meaning...while the mathematical underpinnings of a particular key pair A are precisely the same as B, nevertheless there is no way to derive any inside information on the actual specifics of the information transform by using the data from A to infer B or vice versa (in general this is absolutely true, or else our strongest crypto algorithms would be useless).

RSA (cryptosystem) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Much apologies for the esoteric analogy, but it is the closest I can get to this concept (surprisingly close). Feel free to ask for clarification if you want more depth (as such that would make your eyes bleed if necessary )

Likewise it would be very difficult to recreate the physical and relational situations that would merge your PSM virtual simulation of "mineness" with another independent VM...the point is that once both VMs merged their PSMs into one, they would reinterpret the entire history of the separate VM "minenesses" as a degenerate version of their current merger...

In simple terms (proof coming!) if two minds are able to directly copy the immediate experience totality of the other, they would cease to consider the separate forms as comprehensible...together they would re-write the entire history of their own existence and would--in effect--nullify each independent thread into another PSM (which is what we do with our own DNA replicators and former ancestry...near and distant).

A thing is a think.

Edit: Tip..Question, interrogate and remember the phenomenon of the "problem" we cannot let our own questions pass unexamined...a question pre-loads its metaphysics before we even understand what is the basis. "But already when we ask, 'what is _____?' we stand in an understanding of the 'is' without being able to define conceptually what the 'is' means. We do not even know the horizon upon which we are supposed to grasp and pin down the meaning. This average and vague understanding of being is a fact." -- Heidegger, Being and Time (Stambaugh trans.)

This is extremely subtle, as our own feelings (our only true method of validation) of the merger of two PSMs is the retro-active irrelevancies that are uncovered by the merged PSM...which were (and this is very important) once relevant to each separate PSM...once they have achieved the comprehension of the mystery, they have re-worked the separate histories into a unified interpretation rubric...that rubric, which was individually meaningful to the separate PSMs now becomes an objective account of the formation of the current PSM (merged)...we can sense this because we don't recognize the former mergers of the PSMs of our ancestry (so we are stuck again with the same question).

You might be interested in the following: Researchers Break RSA 4096 Encryption With Just A Microphone And A Couple Of Emails

 

[Michael Allen]

You might be interested in the following: Researchers Break RSA 4096 Encryption With Just A Microphone And A Couple Of Emails

RSA acoustical side-channel attack Technically not a real break of RSA though

Sent from my SM-G900V using Tapatalk

 

[Randall]

I put "@ufology" - which notifies you.

Thanks for that much.

I provided an explanation of causal closure in the context of Kim's argument in my post above.

Maybe the situation is that each participant looks at the concepts a little differently based on the illustrative examples their mind constructs to give them meaning, and that contained within those scenarios are words that can have more than one meaning or impart a connotation that is interpreted by other participants differently than the writer intended. Consequently all participants might understand the concept at the core of the discussion, but be missing some point or another that another participant was trying to make, leading them to believe ( incorrectly ) that another participant doesn't understand the core concept.

So as indicated earlier, if you think I've missed some point of another, please don't just let it go. Let's work it out. The resolution to these points of contention is as important to me as the discussion itself, and indeed IMO reflects on the concepts discussed because it's all about getting out to others what's going on inside our heads. BTW I hope you got to the other posts where I cleared up the issue where Constance ( who I replied to in person as well ) seemed to have misinterpreted the issue of using the phrase, "You're smarter than you think you are." as an accusation rather than as a point of discussion, and I hope you didn't make the same assumption there.

To sum up: It might be entirely possible that I'm missing some key points ( as in misinterpreting something you say ) while at the same time still grasping the underlying concept of the discussion itself. Or maybe I really don't get some concept or another ( which is fairly rare ), but either way, I think it's important to hash these situations out and not let it get personal.

 

[smcder]

What do you think of this:

In ‘The View from Nowhere’ (1986), Nagel expresses his opinion that bridging the objective-subjective divide will require a radical theory of reality, a theory that is probably centuries away (p.51). It is a curious kind of optimism, namely, that he should both conceive of the possibility of a bridge and yet think of its realisation as requiring hundreds of years. What should we expect to be happening in the intervening centuries? Surely, all that is required is the requisite keystone concepts. Why should such a visionary idea require time any more than an individual? Perhaps the key ideas are presently brewing in the mind of an individual working at a post office, a retired primary school teacher, a lab technician, or in the head of the quiet taxi driver that dropped you off at the airport the other day. Stranger things have happened. Perhaps all that might be required is a way of thinking or a certain thought inspired by the movement of milk being stirred into tea or by the passage of landscapes viewed through a train window. Like the journalist that anticipates tragic events about which to write, but then writes about them when they occur as regrettable and most unfortunate, so too the philosopher’s craft is perpetually in danger of anticipating no immediate solutions because of a perverse yearning motivation to vigorously debate the conceivability of answers; a craft in both denying yet relinquishing defeat. Is the conclusion regarding Nagel’s opinion really that he is a negative optimist?

Have you read Nagel's most recent book? Mind and Cosmos - he comes to the conclusion that consciousness is fundamental and draws out conclusions from that.

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-core-of-mind-and-cosmos/?_r=0

 

[Randall]

RSA acoustical side-channel attack Technically not a real break of RSA though

Sent from my SM-G900V using Tapatalk

True, but still very cool. It represents exactly the way I look at solving those kinds of problems. I suck at math, but I'm pretty good at analyzing situations to come up with out of the box solutions. So although I'd never get hired by the NSA to decrypt cyphers based on my performance in a math test, I might have ( no I can say with confidence would have ) come up with a similar type of hack. Which is probably why I think it's such a cool article .

 

[Randall]

Have you read Nagel's most recent book? Mind and Cosmos - he comes to the conclusion that consciousness is fundamental and draws out conclusions from that.

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-core-of-mind-and-cosmos/?_r=0

Chiming in, I'll have to say nope; haven't read it, but it sounds promising, that is if I understand the word "fundamental" the way that I've seen Chalmers use it, which seems synonymous, ( or at least nearly synonymous ) with the way that I've been using the word "property", as in, "an emergent property of a normally functioning BBS ( brain-body system ) in its waking state." I'll have to check it out.

 

[smcder]

Chiming in, I'll have to say nope; haven't read it, but it sounds promising, that is if I understand the word "fundamental" the way that I've seen Chalmers use it, which seems synonymous, ( or at least nearly synonymous ) with the way that I've been using the word "property", as in, "an emergent property of a normally functioning BBS ( brain-body system ) in its waking state." I'll have to check it out.

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-core-of-mind-and-cosmos/?_r=0

 

[smcder]

My understanding is that the "Hard problem" isn't a real problem...one might imagine many 'problems' invented by an embedded PSM machine that models itself in the world within its material self... The problem we are trying to solve is akin to trying to use the digits of a particular very large (4096) RSA modulus to determine the transform function of another modulus (again an RSA 4096)...the problem is we see the same mechanism or functional outcome in two completely different realms (key and transform space) of meaning...while the mathematical underpinnings of a particular key pair A are precisely the same as B, nevertheless there is no way to derive any inside information on the actual specifics of the information transform by using the data from A to infer B or vice versa (in general this is absolutely true, or else our strongest crypto algorithms would be useless).

RSA (cryptosystem) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Much apologies for the esoteric analogy, but it is the closest I can get to this concept (surprisingly close). Feel free to ask for clarification if you want more depth (as such that would make your eyes bleed if necessary )

Likewise it would be very difficult to recreate the physical and relational situations that would merge your PSM virtual simulation of "mineness" with another independent VM...the point is that once both VMs merged their PSMs into one, they would reinterpret the entire history of the separate VM "minenesses" as a degenerate version of their current merger...

In simple terms (proof coming!) if two minds are able to directly copy the immediate experience totality of the other, they would cease to consider the separate forms as comprehensible...together they would re-write the entire history of their own existence and would--in effect--nullify each independent thread into another PSM (which is what we do with our own DNA replicators and former ancestry...near and distant).

A thing is a think.

Edit: Tip..Question, interrogate and remember the phenomenon of the "problem" we cannot let our own questions pass unexamined...a question pre-loads its metaphysics before we even understand what is the basis. "But already when we ask, 'what is _____?' we stand in an understanding of the 'is' without being able to define conceptually what the 'is' means. We do not even know the horizon upon which we are supposed to grasp and pin down the meaning. This average and vague understanding of being is a fact." -- Heidegger, Being and Time (Stambaugh trans.)

This is extremely subtle, as our own feelings (our only true method of validation) of the merger of two PSMs is the retro-active irrelevancies that are uncovered by the merged PSM...which were (and this is very important) once relevant to each separate PSM...once they have achieved the comprehension of the mystery, they have re-worked the separate histories into a unified interpretation rubric...that rubric, which was individually meaningful to the separate PSMs now becomes an objective account of the formation of the current PSM (merged)...we can sense this because we don't recognize the former mergers of the PSMs of our ancestry (so we are stuck again with the same question).

If anyone hasn't read these two papers - and/or for handy reference

http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

 

[Soupie]

I'm assuming that your example is to illustrate how a third party unaware of the phenomena of pain might view the behavior of a person touching a hot surface and then pulling back as the result of biomechanics alone, and indeed we could build a robot that performs these exact same actions. A third party observer might even conclude that the whole event was purely accidental. The thing is, we know from our own experience that consciousness in humans includes the phenomenon of pain, and that it plays a causal role in behavior.

You are on the cusp of groking the hard problem! If it was a snake, it would bite you!

You essentially capture the hard problem right here: "a third party unaware of the phenomena of pain might view the behavior of a person touching a hot surface and then pulling back as the result of biomechanics alone."

That's it! That's the hard problem. Science relies on "the view from nowhere" to describe the universe. The Hard Problem postulates that there is no way to objectively describe conscious experience. You seem to grok this, ufology, because in the same paragraph you say:

"we know from our own experience that consciousness in humans includes the phenomenon of pain"​

Of course we do. But subjective experience is invisible to science (objective observation).

Do you see? The Hard Problem is to objectively describe subjective experience.

Now, the only way to reject the Hard Problem as false is if one were to believe that, indeed, someday we will be able to objectively observe subjective, conscious experience. I'm not sure where you stand on that.

Do you believe, Ufology, that someday we will be able to observe thoughts, emotions, and sensations in the same way that we observe chemical reactions, microorganisms, and volcanic eruptions? Do you suppose that we will be able to see or touch a person's joy, see or touch a person's longing for home, or see and touch a person's experience of light blue?

If you think someday we will be able to objectively observe the conscious experiences of others, then yes, you reject the Hard Problem.

I want to circle back around to this idea that you've shared several times:

"The thing is, we know from our own experience that consciousness in humans includes the phenomenon of pain, and that it plays a causal role in behavior."​

Again, this is the HP. You've got it right at the tip of your brain. We--individually--know from our own experience. But that is not science. Additionally, you say: "[consciousness] plays a causal role in behavior."

Prove it. If you prove it, you will win a Nobel.

You can't. At least not with the metaphysical, philosophical tools currently at our disposal. That. is. the. hard. problem.

 

[smcder]

Thanks for that much.

Maybe the situation is that each participant looks at the concepts a little differently based on the illustrative examples their mind constructs to give them meaning, and that contained within those scenarios are words that can have more than one meaning or impart a connotation that is interpreted by other participants differently than the writer intended. Consequently all participants might understand the concept at the core of the discussion, but be missing some point or another that another participant was trying to make, leading them to believe ( incorrectly ) that another participant doesn't understand the core concept.

So as indicated earlier, if you think I've missed some point of another, please don't just let it go. Let's work it out. The resolution to these points of contention is as important to me as the discussion itself, and indeed IMO reflects on the concepts discussed because it's all about getting out to others what's going on inside our heads. BTW I hope you got to the other posts where I cleared up the issue where Constance ( who I replied to in person as well ) seemed to have misinterpreted the issue of using the phrase, "You're smarter than you think you are." as an accusation rather than as a point of discussion, and I hope you didn't make the same assumption there.

To sum up: It might be entirely possible that I'm missing some key points ( as in misinterpreting something you say ) while at the same time still grasping the underlying concept of the discussion itself. Or maybe I really don't get some concept or another ( which is fairly rare ), but either way, I think it's important to hash these situations out and not let it get personal.

I'm not aware of anything personal.

At this point I've lost the thread of what may be contentious - if you can lay it out, I will take a look, otherwise I am fine with where we are.

 

[Constance]

Edit: Tip..Question, interrogate and remember the phenomenon of the "problem" we cannot let our own questions pass unexamined...a question pre-loads its metaphysics before we even understand what is the basis. "But already when we ask, 'what is _____?' we stand in an understanding of the 'is' without being able to define conceptually what the 'is' means. We do not even know the horizon upon which we are supposed to grasp and pin down the meaning.This average and vague understanding of being is a fact." -- Heidegger, Being and Time (Stambaugh trans.)

How much work do you want that quotation from Heidegger to do? Do you take it to represent his deepest insight into the structure of being? I see it as a statement of Dasein's initial confusion on the way to contemplating its own situatedness within the being of its physical environment – i.e., the situation of the be-ing/the existence of its own consciousness that is primordially sensed before it is thought.

The question 'what-is?' already arises from the sense of what-is, at least locally. The posing of the question "what is?," as the primordial articulation of this situation (adumbrated in Dasein's pre-reflective experience in the world) does not presuppose a metaphysics but rather opens the way to thinking in terms of both physics and metaphysics. In Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, it is the recognition of the traversable 'depth' of the physical environment and its changing horizons as the individual moves about in it (encountering physical things and other beings similar to itself) that opens the path to thinking. Eventually, in Heidegger, thinking leads to the conception of the four-fold structure of Being as it can be thought from the position of situated, existential, consciousness in its (and the physical world's) be-ing together within cognizable horizons.

Your position seems to be that our thinking this existential situatedness as real is an illusion produced by computational mechanisms, structures, evolved in the brain by the time of our species' current level of evolution. It's an interesting hypothesis, but I'm not seeing evidence to support it in what you've written so far. If you want to make your hypothesis clear, I think you will have to express it -- and what you see as the grounds for it -- more directly, in plain language. I, for one, would need such clarification, and perhaps others here also will. I would like to understand what you are saying.

The question that needs answering seems to be "what is the source of the question 'what is?'" How and why does that question arise? My own point of view is that it evolves over the course of the evolution of species of life. I agree with Nagel's argument expressed in the NYT article Steve linked today:

". . . the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory.

This means that the scientific outlook, if it aspires to a more complete understanding of nature, must expand to include theories capable of explaining the appearance in the universe of mental phenomena and the subjective points of view in which they occur – theories of a different type from any we have seen so far."

 

[Constance]

Excellent post, Soupie. I'd like to add two considerations.

Again, this is the HP. You've got it right at the tip of your brain. We--individually--know from our own experience. But that is not science.

I want to add that the hard problem has be to taken up by 'science' if science is to enable us to understand more fully and concretely what we are and what we know. Varela's last paper on neurophenomenology, linked a few days ago, explains why and how 'brain science' must be expanded.

Additionally, you say: "[consciousness] plays a causal role in behavior."

Prove it. If you prove it, you will win a Nobel.

You can't. At least not with the metaphysical, philosophical tools currently at our disposal. That. is. the. hard. problem.

I think we know that consciousness plays a causal role in behavior. But understanding the ways in which it does so cannot be approached with the current presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience and computational theories of consciousness. I do think that the currently expanding toolbox of philosophy and metaphysical thinking is not preventing the development of a science of consciousness but instead encouraging it. But the changes needed represent changes of the dominant scientific paradigm in our time.

 

[Randall]

I'm not aware of anything personal.

Great. BTW It was just mentioned as a general qualifier, not as an accusation or statement of fact.

At this point I've lost the thread of what may be contentious - if you can lay it out, I will take a look, otherwise I am fine with where we are.

Where we were ( if you don't mind being reminded ) was on the concepts of causality and how it relates to the experience of consciousness and there were statements being made that I don't understand a couple of philosophical principles, namely causal closure and the Hard Problem of consciousness. It seemed to me that my comments on both were interpreted in a manner that led to the assumption I didn't understand them, and I don't know from which specific comments I had made, that that situation arose. If you're satisfied now that I do understand the concepts, then we can move on to the points you say I missed in your post here: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5 which links back to a previous one and seems to be grounded way back here in my post: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

If you don't want to review all that then I'll attempt to summarize:

My belief is that the experience of consciousness ( the Hard Part ) when active, serves as a vital link in a chain of causal events that can be observed in human behavior ( e.g. pain causes behavior that relieves pain ), and that if causal closure ( as a materialist principle ) fails to take this into account, then they are arbitrarily discarding evidence, but if one materialist philosopher or another says it can be taken into account because in their view of materialism includes not only the "material", but all physical phenomena as well, then their logic becomes circular and therefore trivial, so either way we're no further ahead. We still have the issue of the Hard Part performing a causal role without an adequate explanation for how it comes to exist.

This leads to thinkers like Chalmers, Nagel, and I who theorize that the experience of consciousness is a property analogous to an electromagnetic field, which science attributes to a 'fundamental' force. Just like electricity passing through wire coiled around a ferrite core results in the emergence of a magnetic field, the physical structure of the BBS in its waking state causes the emergence of conscious experience, and therefore IMO, consciousness can be considered to be a physical phenomenon ( part of the set of all phenomena of nature as opposed to something supernatural ). To be fair, I'm not 100% sure Chalmers and Nagel would agree with my reasoning that it's the BBS that is causal. That is just my way of illustrating the idea.

If there's something in there ( above ) that needs clearing up please let me know. There are a couple of potential spots for the trickster to sneak in and tie our shoelaces together. For example I came up with my take on 'fundamental' independently of both of Chalmers and Nagel, and I'm not sure if Chalmers and Nagel each came up with it independently as well, but it just happens that we all seem to be thinking along the same lines as opposed to "Chalmers, Nagel, and I" as a group. I realize this is rather obvious to you because you are familiar with me here on a somewhat personal level. But hypothetically someone new to the thread could read it differently.

Additionally, Chalmers ( or someone he's based the idea on - not sure which ) has divided the idea of emergence up into two parts similar to the way he does with consciousness, only he ( Chalmers ) refers to it as "Weak Emergence" and "Strong Emergence" and he submits that consciousness is a form of Strong Emergence. I've also tried to get the point across that just like the Easy and Hard parts of consciousness, if we're assuming a physical approach as opposed to a supernatural approach, the distinctions are actually illusory because waves on the water are as much a part of the natural physical universe as electromagnetic fields.

I think that the preceding point has been construed in the past as me not getting the ideas behind the Easy Part and the Hard Part and the Weak Part and the Strong Part, when in fact I do, and as I attempted to get across before, while I think they are useful tools to illustrate the issues, they also have this divisive facet that somewhat ironically is dangerously close reductionist ( reducing the natural world down into simpler elements like weak and strong or easy and hard ) when IMO they're all part of the same thing.